I mean beghairati ki bhi koi limit hoti hai.
Islamic Republic of Pakistan : News, Discussions & Updates
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- Start date
A day without Humiliation is a day wasted. PAKHANISTAN is the only country to have 2 cricket trophies without winning it....
Pakistan is facing a widening energy crunch as disruptions around key Gulf shipping routes drive up global oil prices and put pressure on the Shehbaz Sharif government to contain fuel costs and petroleum consumption. Sharif is facing mounting pressure as ministers warn about the impact of disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.
Pakistan raised petrol prices by PKR 4.10 per litre and high-speed diesel prices by PKR 6.41 per litre on Tuesday night. Following the increase, petrol is priced at PKR 384.34 per litre, while high-speed diesel costs PKR 415.83 per litre.
Pakistan has introduced lockdown-style restrictions to conserve fuel as disruptions in West Asia threaten its oil supplies. Markets must close by 9 pm, marriage halls by 10 pm and restaurants by 11 pm. Official travel has been restricted, while government vehicle fuel allocations have been halved. The military is exempt. Energy Minister Ali Pervaiz Malik says supplies are secured for September and October, but November remains uncertain. Islamabad is seeking alternative crude sources and considering large oil tankers. However, inadequate port infrastructure and a shortage of smaller vessels could complicate deliveries, raising questions about Pakistan's ability to maintain fuel supplies.
Pakistan has launched airstrikes on 10 sites in Afghanistan, saying they were used to launch and stockpile drones. The strikes come amid accusations that the Afghan Taliban is allowing the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan to operate from Afghan territory, a claim Kabul denies. With recent civilian casualties, deadly attacks in Pakistan and a major March airstrike on Kabul, tensions between the neighbours are rising again.
This is not shamelessness. They know they can carry on and get away with it precisely because their shithole is a ticking timebomb nobody wants to bear. Them breeding like rabbits and getting closer to failure only prompts IMF/World Bank to give them more debt despite knowing it is a country sized Ponzi scheme and prevents India from annihilating and dismantling the entire pakee military apparatus.
Pakistan’s borrowing needs have reached around 20% of its GDP, highlighting the scale of financing the country requires to manage its fiscal pressures and debt obligations. The figure comes as Pakistan continues to navigate high debt, financing requirements and economic challenges. Watch this report for a closer look at Pakistan’s borrowing needs, its debt burden and what the latest numbers mean for the country’s economy.
What's behind the Pakistani strikes on Afghanistan?
Kabul (AFP) – Airstrikes that hit Afghanistan's border area and the key city of Kandahar are a clear warning from Pakistan to the country's supreme leader, analysts told AFP.
Issued on: 24/09/2026 - 18:36
With vital security issues still unresolved between the neighbouring countries, renewed violence raises the spectre of a return to full-scale war seen earlier this year.
The latest strikes followed militant attacks in Pakistan and hit 10 targets, Islamabad said Thursday, while the Afghan government reported four civilians killed.
In Kandahar, home to the Taliban government's supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, a fireball lit up the night sky.
Antonio Giustozzi, a senior research fellow at the UK-based RUSI think tank, said "the Pakistanis are signalling their willingness to escalate".
"The Taliban are not very worried about these strikes along the border," he told AFP.
"This strike on Kandahar is another way of reminding the Taliban that they can come after you," added Giustozzi, in reference to the Afghan leadership.
Although there has been a series of recent strikes near the frontier, this is the first confirmed Pakistani bombardment of Kandahar since March.
It follows a militant attack on a police headquarters in northern Pakistan last week that killed at least 31 people, as well as Islamabad reporting drones launched across the border.
Pakistan said the latest strikes were limited to "identified military objectives" linked to attempted attacks.
For Giustozzi, "the Pakistani military has to show to the Pakistani public that they are responding", regardless of the value of such operations.
Farzana Shaikh, an associate fellow at the Chatham House think tank, said Islamabad clearly feels that Afghanistan is not doing enough to tackle militant groups such as the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) that frequently commit attacks.
However, she said, "the issue is actually far more complex than simply this trading of accusations".
The Afghan government is concerned that if it curbs the Pakistani Taliban, "many of these TTP fighters would gravitate towards (the) Islamic State" group, Shaikh said.
The group's regional branch, IS-K, had carried out multiple deadly attacks in Afghanistan since the Taliban authorities returned to power in 2021.
The Afghan government denies Pakistan's accusation that it shelters groups such as the TTP.
But with Islamabad confronting a rise in militant violence, Shaikh said the Kandahar strike "probably sends out a very powerful message that Pakistan will respond not only forcefully, but also target the top leadership".
Bring Afghanistan 'to heel'
Georges Lefeuvre, a research associate at the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), suggested Pakistan's operation was calculated as part of the "tit for tat" between the two countries.
"There does not seem to have been, on Pakistan's part, any intention to cause mass casualties," he said.
"This is not an escalation of the conflict; it is the continuation of a conflict that is not finding any resolution," encompassing both militancy and long-festering frontier disputes, Lefeuvre said.
There has been a considerable diplomatic effort to resolve the conflict this year, with China hosting talks and countries including Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey also engaging.
But global interest has been focused since February on the United States' war against Iran, in which Pakistan has sought to act as a peacemaker.
Giustozzi said multiple countries have been putting pressure on the Afghan government, which has been making an effort to "restrain" the TTP.
Mediating countries "are trying to at least resolve these issues so that Pakistan can pay greater attention to the developments in the Gulf and the Middle East", he said.
Shaikh, meanwhile, suggested that with the world distracted by the Iran war, Pakistan may think it should "seize the opportunity while it can to bring the government in Kabul to heel".
"Pakistan has made a big play of its commitment to diplomacy and dialogue, but seems quite incapable of reaching out to those Talibs to bring about any shift in the current deadly situation," she said.
Kabul (AFP) – Airstrikes that hit Afghanistan's border area and the key city of Kandahar are a clear warning from Pakistan to the country's supreme leader, analysts told AFP.
Issued on: 24/09/2026 - 18:36
With vital security issues still unresolved between the neighbouring countries, renewed violence raises the spectre of a return to full-scale war seen earlier this year.
The latest strikes followed militant attacks in Pakistan and hit 10 targets, Islamabad said Thursday, while the Afghan government reported four civilians killed.
In Kandahar, home to the Taliban government's supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, a fireball lit up the night sky.
Antonio Giustozzi, a senior research fellow at the UK-based RUSI think tank, said "the Pakistanis are signalling their willingness to escalate".
"The Taliban are not very worried about these strikes along the border," he told AFP.
"This strike on Kandahar is another way of reminding the Taliban that they can come after you," added Giustozzi, in reference to the Afghan leadership.
Although there has been a series of recent strikes near the frontier, this is the first confirmed Pakistani bombardment of Kandahar since March.
It follows a militant attack on a police headquarters in northern Pakistan last week that killed at least 31 people, as well as Islamabad reporting drones launched across the border.
Pakistan said the latest strikes were limited to "identified military objectives" linked to attempted attacks.
For Giustozzi, "the Pakistani military has to show to the Pakistani public that they are responding", regardless of the value of such operations.
Farzana Shaikh, an associate fellow at the Chatham House think tank, said Islamabad clearly feels that Afghanistan is not doing enough to tackle militant groups such as the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) that frequently commit attacks.
However, she said, "the issue is actually far more complex than simply this trading of accusations".
The Afghan government is concerned that if it curbs the Pakistani Taliban, "many of these TTP fighters would gravitate towards (the) Islamic State" group, Shaikh said.
The group's regional branch, IS-K, had carried out multiple deadly attacks in Afghanistan since the Taliban authorities returned to power in 2021.
The Afghan government denies Pakistan's accusation that it shelters groups such as the TTP.
But with Islamabad confronting a rise in militant violence, Shaikh said the Kandahar strike "probably sends out a very powerful message that Pakistan will respond not only forcefully, but also target the top leadership".
Bring Afghanistan 'to heel'
Georges Lefeuvre, a research associate at the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), suggested Pakistan's operation was calculated as part of the "tit for tat" between the two countries.
"There does not seem to have been, on Pakistan's part, any intention to cause mass casualties," he said.
"This is not an escalation of the conflict; it is the continuation of a conflict that is not finding any resolution," encompassing both militancy and long-festering frontier disputes, Lefeuvre said.
There has been a considerable diplomatic effort to resolve the conflict this year, with China hosting talks and countries including Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey also engaging.
But global interest has been focused since February on the United States' war against Iran, in which Pakistan has sought to act as a peacemaker.
Giustozzi said multiple countries have been putting pressure on the Afghan government, which has been making an effort to "restrain" the TTP.
Mediating countries "are trying to at least resolve these issues so that Pakistan can pay greater attention to the developments in the Gulf and the Middle East", he said.
Shaikh, meanwhile, suggested that with the world distracted by the Iran war, Pakistan may think it should "seize the opportunity while it can to bring the government in Kabul to heel".
"Pakistan has made a big play of its commitment to diplomacy and dialogue, but seems quite incapable of reaching out to those Talibs to bring about any shift in the current deadly situation," she said.
I seldom see the Indian govt marketing itself like Pakistan. Check the article from the infiltrated think tank Hudson below. They're making the argument - IMEC is bad, MECCA pact is great (especially since Pakistan is in it, and Pakistan will prevent the MECCA block from drifting into Chinese sphere of influence!) and US should let Pakistan wh0re itself to US and China equally!
Ken Moriyasu & Hamza Azhar Salam
Sep 2, 2026 | Washington Examiner
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif sign a trilateral agreement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on August 7, 2026.
From Gwadar on the Arabian Sea to the Golden Horn in Istanbul, a new geopolitical arc is forming as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey sign the “Mecca Pact.”
Meanwhile, from Mumbai on the Arabian Sea to Piraeus in the Aegean, a parallel arc is stretching, with India, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece forming a new grouping. This bloc is increasingly connected by trade, energy, defense cooperation, and the promise of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
Both sit a few thousand miles east of Winston Churchill’s “iron curtain,” which he said in 1946 descended “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic.”
Washington’s instinct may be to gravitate toward the alignment containing Israel. But America does not need to choose between the two Middle Easts. It needs both.
Last month, President Donald Trump endorsed the Mecca Pact, writing on Truth Social that he was “Very happy” to see the three countries coming together to defend themselves in a more meaningful way. He is right to do so.
In terms of grand strategy, Washington must avoid two outcomes. The first is allowing the Israel-Turkey rift, which is at the heart of these groupings, to escalate even further. The second is abandoning the Mecca grouping to China, which would significantly strengthen Beijing’s position across the Eurasian landmass.
The two arcs are the culmination of several overlapping rivalries: Israel and Turkey over regional leadership after the current Iran conflict ends; Saudi Arabia and the UAE over leadership in the Arab and Muslim worlds; India and Pakistan over South Asian primacy; and Turkey and India over the routes connecting Asia to Europe. The last is less visible but increasingly apparent in the South Caucasus, where India has emerged as a major arms supplier to Armenia, counterbalancing the “one nation, two states” partnership between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
The Middle East has not yet hardened into rival blocs. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is also part of IMEC. But it is making clear through the Mecca Pact that its enthusiasm for the Abraham Accords with Israel has soured, for now.
Today’s divisions are unlikely to be permanent. From 2017 to 2021, Saudi Arabia and the UAE blockaded Qatar over its ties with Iran and alleged support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Today, Saudi Arabia is an ally of Turkey, Qatar’s closest regional partner. Middle East partnerships can quickly change.
Some have argued that American inconsistency has pushed Saudi Arabia toward the Turkey-Pakistan camp, and that a decisive American victory over Iran could put IMEC back on track and draw Riyadh firmly into a U.S.-aligned regional order.
But framing the choice as between IMEC and Mecca grouping overlooks a fundamental goal of American grand strategy: preventing any one power from dominating Eurasia.
Treating the Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan grouping as an opposing bloc — such as by labeling it an “Islamic NATO” — risks pushing it into China’s arms. In doing so, Washington could win IMEC and lose Eurasia.
This is particularly dangerous because Turkey and Pakistan are what might be called “amphibious swing states”: continental powers with strategic access to the seas, sitting where China’s overland corridors meet the maritime world.
China is vulnerable at sea. Closures of maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz could quickly strangle China’s economy. The more resilient it becomes on land — through pipelines, railways, roads, and energy relationships — the greater its ability to withstand disruption at sea.
That matters for Taiwan.
A China confident that its continental flank is secure would have greater freedom to take risks in the western Pacific. Turkey and Pakistan, perhaps along with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, are arguably the most important countries through which China’s continental corridors pass.
Of the countries involved in the two arcs, Pakistan has by far the deepest relationship with China.
Islamabad sits at the junction of nearly every strategic geography involved in this story. Through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative, Pakistan offers western China overland access to Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. It is historically intertwined with Saudi security, increasingly close to Turkey, adjacent to India, and offers the landlocked nations of Central Asia a path to warm waters.
Pakistan could become the hinge connecting the Mecca group to China. For the United States, that should make engagement with Islamabad a diplomatic priority.
Pakistan playing an integral role in America’s strategy towards China is well-rooted in history.
Disguised in a fedora and sunglasses, Henry Kissinger surreptitiously disappeared from public view during a visit to Pakistan in the summer of 1971. While the press was told that Kissinger was recovering from a stomach ailment in the Pakistani mountains, he had actually boarded a secret flight to Beijing.
Islamabad was allied with America, but it was also China’s closest partner in the region. It was the middleman between two great powers because it was trusted by both. Some in Washington are wary of Pakistan’s hedge between America and China, but it was precisely this characteristic that ended decades of diplomatic isolation between Washington and Beijing.
America, once again, capitalized on Pakistan’s hedging strategy 55 years later, when Vice President JD Vance flew to Islamabad to negotiate directly with the Iranian leadership. This was the highest level of face-to-face engagement between the Americans and Iranians in the last 50 years, but could it have been possible if Islamabad had been locked into an anti-American “Islamic NATO?”
To understand Islamabad’s calculus, Washington must consider how Islamabad is not in the race to lead the Muslim world. That competition is between Riyadh, Ankara, and Tehran.
But Pakistan has an extremely powerful military, it has nuclear weapons, and it is increasingly positioning itself as a security lender of the last resort. Islamabad does not want to lead the Muslim world — it wants to decide who does.
The Mecca Pact cements Pakistan’s role as a security provider to the Muslim world. What began as the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Mutual Defense Pact has now expanded to the Mecca Pact, which echoes NATO’s Article 5. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan are building a mutual security architecture that is both a deterrent for Iran and a signal to America and Israel.
The religious symbolism of the pact is not incidental and makes it quite difficult for critics from Mashhad to Marrakesh to attack it.
So while Pakistan may have chosen Saudi Arabia over Iran, it has not yet made a firm choice between America and China.
Washington could resent Islamabad’s tendency to hedge between great powers. But it could also capitalize on it.
For instance, America could invest in the construction of a deep-water port in Pasni, which is merely 140 kilometers (87 miles) away from Gwadar. This has already been proposed by Pakistan. America should not ask Pakistan to choose between Gwadar and Pasni. It could offer Gwadar and Pasni.
Washington’s answer to the developing dynamics should be simple: Keep the map messy. Overlapping relationships are a strategic asset. They give middle powers room to maneuver and make it much harder for any outside great power to dominate the region.
For Washington, the greatest danger is not the regional rivalry itself. It is what that rivalry could mean for the balance of power with China. To prevent Beijing from dominating Eurasia, Washington must remain engaged with both the northern, continental arc running through Turkey and the southern, maritime arc running through India and Israel.
In April, when Taiwanese opposition leader Cheng Li-wun sat down for lunch with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, the first dish served was a Fujian clam stewed in chicken broth. Xi pointed to the menu and told Cheng that this was the same dish China had served Richard Nixon in 1972.
More than half a century later, Xi was serving the chairwoman of Taiwan’s Kuomintang a culinary reminder of the diplomatic opening that transformed U.S.-China relations — and of the unfinished business that followed it.
Nixon’s opening to China began a year earlier, when Kissinger secretly flew to Beijing through Pakistan.
Fifty-five years later, Pakistan may again prove pivotal to America’s China strategy — this time by helping ensure that Washington does not hand Eurasia to Beijing.
The So-Called Islamic NATO Is America’s Secret Leverage Against China
Ken Moriyasu & Hamza Azhar Salam
Sep 2, 2026 | Washington Examiner
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif sign a trilateral agreement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on August 7, 2026.
From Gwadar on the Arabian Sea to the Golden Horn in Istanbul, a new geopolitical arc is forming as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey sign the “Mecca Pact.”
Meanwhile, from Mumbai on the Arabian Sea to Piraeus in the Aegean, a parallel arc is stretching, with India, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece forming a new grouping. This bloc is increasingly connected by trade, energy, defense cooperation, and the promise of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
Both sit a few thousand miles east of Winston Churchill’s “iron curtain,” which he said in 1946 descended “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic.”
Washington’s instinct may be to gravitate toward the alignment containing Israel. But America does not need to choose between the two Middle Easts. It needs both.
Last month, President Donald Trump endorsed the Mecca Pact, writing on Truth Social that he was “Very happy” to see the three countries coming together to defend themselves in a more meaningful way. He is right to do so.
In terms of grand strategy, Washington must avoid two outcomes. The first is allowing the Israel-Turkey rift, which is at the heart of these groupings, to escalate even further. The second is abandoning the Mecca grouping to China, which would significantly strengthen Beijing’s position across the Eurasian landmass.
The two arcs are the culmination of several overlapping rivalries: Israel and Turkey over regional leadership after the current Iran conflict ends; Saudi Arabia and the UAE over leadership in the Arab and Muslim worlds; India and Pakistan over South Asian primacy; and Turkey and India over the routes connecting Asia to Europe. The last is less visible but increasingly apparent in the South Caucasus, where India has emerged as a major arms supplier to Armenia, counterbalancing the “one nation, two states” partnership between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
The Middle East has not yet hardened into rival blocs. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is also part of IMEC. But it is making clear through the Mecca Pact that its enthusiasm for the Abraham Accords with Israel has soured, for now.
Today’s divisions are unlikely to be permanent. From 2017 to 2021, Saudi Arabia and the UAE blockaded Qatar over its ties with Iran and alleged support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Today, Saudi Arabia is an ally of Turkey, Qatar’s closest regional partner. Middle East partnerships can quickly change.
Some have argued that American inconsistency has pushed Saudi Arabia toward the Turkey-Pakistan camp, and that a decisive American victory over Iran could put IMEC back on track and draw Riyadh firmly into a U.S.-aligned regional order.
But framing the choice as between IMEC and Mecca grouping overlooks a fundamental goal of American grand strategy: preventing any one power from dominating Eurasia.
Treating the Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan grouping as an opposing bloc — such as by labeling it an “Islamic NATO” — risks pushing it into China’s arms. In doing so, Washington could win IMEC and lose Eurasia.
This is particularly dangerous because Turkey and Pakistan are what might be called “amphibious swing states”: continental powers with strategic access to the seas, sitting where China’s overland corridors meet the maritime world.
China is vulnerable at sea. Closures of maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz could quickly strangle China’s economy. The more resilient it becomes on land — through pipelines, railways, roads, and energy relationships — the greater its ability to withstand disruption at sea.
That matters for Taiwan.
A China confident that its continental flank is secure would have greater freedom to take risks in the western Pacific. Turkey and Pakistan, perhaps along with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, are arguably the most important countries through which China’s continental corridors pass.
Of the countries involved in the two arcs, Pakistan has by far the deepest relationship with China.
Islamabad sits at the junction of nearly every strategic geography involved in this story. Through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative, Pakistan offers western China overland access to Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. It is historically intertwined with Saudi security, increasingly close to Turkey, adjacent to India, and offers the landlocked nations of Central Asia a path to warm waters.
Pakistan could become the hinge connecting the Mecca group to China. For the United States, that should make engagement with Islamabad a diplomatic priority.
Pakistan playing an integral role in America’s strategy towards China is well-rooted in history.
Disguised in a fedora and sunglasses, Henry Kissinger surreptitiously disappeared from public view during a visit to Pakistan in the summer of 1971. While the press was told that Kissinger was recovering from a stomach ailment in the Pakistani mountains, he had actually boarded a secret flight to Beijing.
Islamabad was allied with America, but it was also China’s closest partner in the region. It was the middleman between two great powers because it was trusted by both. Some in Washington are wary of Pakistan’s hedge between America and China, but it was precisely this characteristic that ended decades of diplomatic isolation between Washington and Beijing.
America, once again, capitalized on Pakistan’s hedging strategy 55 years later, when Vice President JD Vance flew to Islamabad to negotiate directly with the Iranian leadership. This was the highest level of face-to-face engagement between the Americans and Iranians in the last 50 years, but could it have been possible if Islamabad had been locked into an anti-American “Islamic NATO?”
To understand Islamabad’s calculus, Washington must consider how Islamabad is not in the race to lead the Muslim world. That competition is between Riyadh, Ankara, and Tehran.
But Pakistan has an extremely powerful military, it has nuclear weapons, and it is increasingly positioning itself as a security lender of the last resort. Islamabad does not want to lead the Muslim world — it wants to decide who does.
The Mecca Pact cements Pakistan’s role as a security provider to the Muslim world. What began as the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Mutual Defense Pact has now expanded to the Mecca Pact, which echoes NATO’s Article 5. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan are building a mutual security architecture that is both a deterrent for Iran and a signal to America and Israel.
The religious symbolism of the pact is not incidental and makes it quite difficult for critics from Mashhad to Marrakesh to attack it.
So while Pakistan may have chosen Saudi Arabia over Iran, it has not yet made a firm choice between America and China.
Washington could resent Islamabad’s tendency to hedge between great powers. But it could also capitalize on it.
For instance, America could invest in the construction of a deep-water port in Pasni, which is merely 140 kilometers (87 miles) away from Gwadar. This has already been proposed by Pakistan. America should not ask Pakistan to choose between Gwadar and Pasni. It could offer Gwadar and Pasni.
Washington’s answer to the developing dynamics should be simple: Keep the map messy. Overlapping relationships are a strategic asset. They give middle powers room to maneuver and make it much harder for any outside great power to dominate the region.
For Washington, the greatest danger is not the regional rivalry itself. It is what that rivalry could mean for the balance of power with China. To prevent Beijing from dominating Eurasia, Washington must remain engaged with both the northern, continental arc running through Turkey and the southern, maritime arc running through India and Israel.
In April, when Taiwanese opposition leader Cheng Li-wun sat down for lunch with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, the first dish served was a Fujian clam stewed in chicken broth. Xi pointed to the menu and told Cheng that this was the same dish China had served Richard Nixon in 1972.
More than half a century later, Xi was serving the chairwoman of Taiwan’s Kuomintang a culinary reminder of the diplomatic opening that transformed U.S.-China relations — and of the unfinished business that followed it.
Nixon’s opening to China began a year earlier, when Kissinger secretly flew to Beijing through Pakistan.
Fifty-five years later, Pakistan may again prove pivotal to America’s China strategy — this time by helping ensure that Washington does not hand Eurasia to Beijing.
Pakistan conducted a successful test launch of the indigenously developed extended version of the Fatah-IV ground-launched cruise missile, the military’s media wing said in a statement on Tuesday.
In a statement, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) said, “Equipped with advanced avionics and state-of-the-art navigational aids, the weapon system is capable of engaging targets at extended ranges with high precision and lethality.”
“The test also validated additional technical parameters of various sub-systems incorporated for improved accuracy and enhanced survivability,” it added.
According to the statement, the launch was witnessed by senior officers from the Pakistan Army along with scientists and engineers of the developing agency.
It added that President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir and all service chiefs commended the successful test and “appreciated the technical prowess, dedication and commitment of all those who contributed towards achieving this milestone”.
Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi congratulated the nation on the successful test, said a statement issued by his ministry.
“The successful test of the extended version of Fatah-IV cruise missile is an important advancement in the defence sector,” Naqvi was quoted as saying. He also congratulated the scientists and engineers who worked on it and appreciated their efforts.
In May, the Army Rocket Force Command conducted the successful test fire of the Fatah-IV ground-launched cruise missile.
A month earlier, the Army Rocket Force Command had also conducted the successful training launch of the Fateh-II missile system. The same month, the Pakistan Navy successfully fired a locally developed anti-ship ballistic missile to engage targets at an extended range.
In September 2025, the Pakistan Army had also successfully conducted the training launch of the Fatah-IV cruise missile at a range of 750 kilometres.