La défense antimissile balistique : bouclier militaire ou défi stratégique ?
2. Aster Block II - the middle-high endo-atmospheric
For now the Aster Block II is a simple concept of the European missile MBDA. The Aster Block II proposes to deal with ballistic missiles short and medium range of theater, that is to say a range of up to 3,000 kilometers away. More specifically, the Aster Block IItargets the new generation of maneuvering missiles. This threat is not taken into account by American programs, be it Patriot , THAAD or SM-3.
The Russians have developed the SS-26 Iskander , the Chinese the M9, the Syrians the M600 and the Iranians the Fateh 110. None of these missiles use new technologies. We had already used these technologies for the Hades pre-strategic missile . These missiles have a peculiarity. They fly in the atmosphere, below 60 to 70 kilometers, and when they enter the dense layers of the atmosphere, 25 or 30 kilometers, they acquire a maneuvering capacity that makes them almost impossible to intercept. The interception of these missiles must therefore be between 25/30 and 60/70 kilometers.
According to MBDA's analysis, the THAAD does not descend below 50 kilometers, while the Patriot does not rise above 20 to 25 kilometers. As for the SM-3, it evolves in the exoatmospheric space.
Assuming that the Aster Block II program is engaged, it should be associated with a standby radar and a fire control radar.
Thales has a GS 1500 radar project that could do both, provided there are two radar units for a launcher - one for acquisition and the other for fire control. Such a radar could contribute to the ALTBMD's high-level capability and enable maneuvering missiles to be handled in the terminal phase up to 3,000 km range.
The industry estimates a PEA of about € 40 million per year over five years that could lead to the specifications of an Aster Block II program , excluding the GS 1500 radar .
In order to assess the desirability of such a program, it seems important to point out that this is undoubtedly one of the areas where European cooperation could be facilitated by the program's more or less smooth programmed outage. American-German-Italian MEADS. Our German and Italian allies are thus faced with the problem of reinvesting at their best the large sums invested by them in this program, which mainly concern radar technology.
In the absence of European cooperation, India, which is also planning to develop high-endo-atmospheric interception capabilities for theater ballistic missiles, could be, in the framework of the French-Indian strategic partnership, associated with Aster Block'stechnological work. II .
It is important to note that the ballistic missile capability of SAMP / T is limited to missiles of the Scud family . Without evolution of the current system, there will be no export market, as countries wishing to acquire a ballistic missile capability wish to be able to have a sufficient defense against the future proliferating ballistic threat of the short and medium range.
The cost of a program of this type is very difficult to evaluate given the lack of specifications and definition of the final target. Nevertheless, the order of magnitude is two billion euros, with a target size similar to the SAMP / T program.
The MBDA strategy on the DAMB was built on the basis of four fundamentals:
§ In-depth analysis of the ballistic threat, which is the most proliferating because it will inevitably be the one whose probability of occurrence will be the highest. This analysis makes it possible to define the most appropriate defense systems.
§ The American approach, because it is the United States that has irrigated the strategic thinking on the DAMB. We can not ignore what the United States does; we must therefore approach the DAMB as follows: how France, the US can contribute to the DAMB in addition to what the US do.
§ Capitalizing on what has already been done in this area at capacity and industrial levels, using an incremental approach to minimize costs.
§ The identification of what France could do financially and technically with other European powers.
Given the growth potential of the current ASTER systems (SAMP / T for land application and PAAMS for naval application), MBDA, together with its partners Safran Group and Thales, studied the evolution of its systems by introducing a new interceptor High-endoatmospheric - ASTER Block II - to cover all short and medium range (SRBM and MRBM) ballistic threats.
The concept of the ASTER Block 2 system has been defined to cover the spectrum of SRBM and MRBM ballistic threats, with or without enhanced penetration capabilities, ie current and next generation SRBM and MRBM. It has been optimized to intercept in the altitude range 20 to 70km to ensure, among other things, the destruction of ballistic missiles with maneuvers such as SS 26, M9 and Fateh 110 and the missiles of this class drawn in tight trajectories, which defy the exoatmosphere systems (because the ballistic missile trajectories do not come out enough from the atmosphere) and / or the low endoatmospheric systems (because of the maneuvers).
This ASTER BII system, while retaining the capabilities of the ASTER Block 1 system (SAMP / T for the terrestrial or future PAAMS Block 1 version for the naval version), can handle the most likely ballistic threats "without leaving a hole in the racket "of the SRBM and MRBM domains.
By their proliferation, this type of ballistic threat is therefore on theaters of external operations, or possibly on the southeast flank of Europe, and that is why the concept of the ASTER Bl2 system has been defined as ballistic missile defense system, but may also be used as part of a territorial defense, to protect population centers and / or sensitive sites .
Its positioning allows to answer to:
§ An autonomous defense capability at the national / European level to protect the command and forces deployed in a theater of operations, as well as the populations of the host country;
§ An in-kind contribution to the NATO ALTBMD layer for deployed force protection, interoperable with US high-layer systems (SM-3 / Aegis, THAAD), reinforcing the principle of command and control deployable operations of NATO (BMC3 / ACCS).
§ A possible complement to the Aegis / SM-3 mobile systems proposed by the United States for the defense of the Alliance's territory which would also advocate a more NATO command system, an extension of that of NATO ALTBMD, which can be connected to the PAA command system. Indeed, the chain of command and commitment can only be justified at a NATO level if it can handle interceptions with systems from multiple allies; if only the United States brings interception systems, then the principle of a chain under NATO operational responsibility will be weakened , for the benefit of a purely American command.
Complementarity of ASTER B II with SM-3 and THAAD
In the case of the ALTBMD and the Missile Defense , contributing with the ASTER Block 2 system provides additional capacity:
§ Positioning itself as a complement to the SM-3,
§ The SM-3 is a naval system that intercepts purely exoatmospheric (outside atmosphere). ASTER Block 2 deals with, among other things, a range of ballistic missiles not covered by the SM-3, ie SRBMs and MRBMs with out-of-atmosphere phases insufficient to provide exo interception (eg taut trajectories for missiles with a range of less than 1500km and minimum energy trajectories for missiles with a range of less than 800km)
§ With European naval platforms equipped with ASTER Bl2 interoperable with Aegis SM-3 US naval platforms, providing wider geographic coverage, but also improved threat sealing, in the case of saturated attack several types of missiles for example; the ASTER Block 2 offering optimal naval capability in addition to the SM-3 / Aegis system.
§ By offering both an alternative and a complement to THAAD,
§ The THAAD is a terrestrial system that intercepts in very high endoatmospheric (from 40 / 50km altitude) and low exoatmosphérique. ASTER Block 2 is complementary for a range of targets whose interception can only be done between 20 and 40km altitude. What is the case of the new generation SRBM type SS26, Chinese M9 ...
§ ASTER Block 2 is also considered complementary to THAAD because, unlike the latter, its definition is also optimized for a naval component.
§ It can be an alternative for a terrestrial component, since the ASTER Block 2 and THAAD have a common interception domain, and therefore in this context, ASTER Block 2 batteries can replace (or increase quantitatively) THAAD batteries if these were proposed in insufficient quantity by the USA to ensure a significant coverage.
This complement ASTER B2 system capability in its naval and land applications thus offers qualitative and quantitative complementarities to the THAAD terrestrial systems and to the naval and terrestrial SM-3 systems, which are intended to increase their capacities to deal with IRBM and ICBM threats, thus allowing a wider protection coverage.
ASTER Block 2 can therefore be considered as an element of cooperation with the US as it is interoperable with American systems and can be integrated into a NATO command system, thus promoting cooperative commitments for DAMB missions.
DAMB high layer systems are considered by the United States as enabling them to establish their political and technological supremacy, as they need to pull up technological know-how; it is for this reason that it seems unthinkable for the Americans to offer Europeans forms of cooperation on high-value industrial and technological activities.
The niche of ballistic missile defense is fundamental to positioning itself as a major player in the DAMB both within NATO, in operational cooperation with the United States, and towards the exporting countries.
Before launching the ASTER Block 2 program, it is necessary to carry out an upstream program of about 40 million euros per year for extending the ballistic missile capabilities of the ASTER family.
The proposed work focuses on reducing the risks of critical functions associated with technologies to ensure interception with direct impact in a high dynamic range and at high altitude, that is to say in a rarefied atmosphere.
The aim of this PEA would be to bring the following areas of technology to maturity:
· The attachment and the pursuit of the high-Mach target (around Mach 7), by an infrared homing device, in an environment of strong aerothermal constraints after the IRdome's dechilting, which impose high detection and tracking performance ,
· The pyrotechnic piloting using the DACS solid technology (Divert & Attitude Control System) which allows a reactive piloting in a rarefied atmosphere,
· But also, the two-level thrust cruising propulsion which participates in the piloting in the upper layers of the atmosphere and which must be able to be stopped to order so as to allow the separation of the last stage,
· The definition of the interceptor and the Kill Vehicle, in particular the following aspects:
· Thermomechanical behavior in harsh environments, particularly for the Kill Vehicle, and the cruise stage,
· Volume constraints on the Kill Vehicle architecture in which the subassemblies will have to be integrated in a compact way,
The work of PEA, conducted by MBDA with its partners SPS, Sagem and ONERA:
· Enable the assessment of critical functions and equipment on the ground and in flight,
· Are presented in a coherent way to bring the necessary mature technologies around the ASTER Block 2 high altitude interceptor structural project against ballistic threats,
· May, for some of them, be used for other applications in the field of interception.
The results of the set will allow to obtain the definition and the feasibility of the interceptor, and the associated reachable performances necessary for a possible development.
This PEA demonstrator would have a duration of 5 years.
In parallel, system work will also be carried out to identify the critical functions of the weapon system (discrimination, harmonization, communications, ground / missile link, etc.) and to build for each of them a program to lift risks.
This work, over 5 years, will be proposed in two phases realized jointly by Thales and MBDA:
· A first phase of two years of study and predefinition of the system architectures, with choice of a reference solution at the end of this phase;
· A second phase of risk reduction including conducting tests on critical chains and the constitution of a definition file with performance evaluation.
2. Aster Block II - the middle-high endo-atmospheric
For now the Aster Block II is a simple concept of the European missile MBDA. The Aster Block II proposes to deal with ballistic missiles short and medium range of theater, that is to say a range of up to 3,000 kilometers away. More specifically, the Aster Block IItargets the new generation of maneuvering missiles. This threat is not taken into account by American programs, be it Patriot , THAAD or SM-3.
The Russians have developed the SS-26 Iskander , the Chinese the M9, the Syrians the M600 and the Iranians the Fateh 110. None of these missiles use new technologies. We had already used these technologies for the Hades pre-strategic missile . These missiles have a peculiarity. They fly in the atmosphere, below 60 to 70 kilometers, and when they enter the dense layers of the atmosphere, 25 or 30 kilometers, they acquire a maneuvering capacity that makes them almost impossible to intercept. The interception of these missiles must therefore be between 25/30 and 60/70 kilometers.
According to MBDA's analysis, the THAAD does not descend below 50 kilometers, while the Patriot does not rise above 20 to 25 kilometers. As for the SM-3, it evolves in the exoatmospheric space.
Assuming that the Aster Block II program is engaged, it should be associated with a standby radar and a fire control radar.
Thales has a GS 1500 radar project that could do both, provided there are two radar units for a launcher - one for acquisition and the other for fire control. Such a radar could contribute to the ALTBMD's high-level capability and enable maneuvering missiles to be handled in the terminal phase up to 3,000 km range.
The industry estimates a PEA of about € 40 million per year over five years that could lead to the specifications of an Aster Block II program , excluding the GS 1500 radar .
In order to assess the desirability of such a program, it seems important to point out that this is undoubtedly one of the areas where European cooperation could be facilitated by the program's more or less smooth programmed outage. American-German-Italian MEADS. Our German and Italian allies are thus faced with the problem of reinvesting at their best the large sums invested by them in this program, which mainly concern radar technology.
In the absence of European cooperation, India, which is also planning to develop high-endo-atmospheric interception capabilities for theater ballistic missiles, could be, in the framework of the French-Indian strategic partnership, associated with Aster Block'stechnological work. II .
It is important to note that the ballistic missile capability of SAMP / T is limited to missiles of the Scud family . Without evolution of the current system, there will be no export market, as countries wishing to acquire a ballistic missile capability wish to be able to have a sufficient defense against the future proliferating ballistic threat of the short and medium range.
The cost of a program of this type is very difficult to evaluate given the lack of specifications and definition of the final target. Nevertheless, the order of magnitude is two billion euros, with a target size similar to the SAMP / T program.
ASTER BLOCK II
MBDA's industrial proposal
(Source MBDA)
MBDA's industrial proposal
(Source MBDA)
The MBDA strategy on the DAMB was built on the basis of four fundamentals:
§ In-depth analysis of the ballistic threat, which is the most proliferating because it will inevitably be the one whose probability of occurrence will be the highest. This analysis makes it possible to define the most appropriate defense systems.
§ The American approach, because it is the United States that has irrigated the strategic thinking on the DAMB. We can not ignore what the United States does; we must therefore approach the DAMB as follows: how France, the US can contribute to the DAMB in addition to what the US do.
§ Capitalizing on what has already been done in this area at capacity and industrial levels, using an incremental approach to minimize costs.
§ The identification of what France could do financially and technically with other European powers.
Given the growth potential of the current ASTER systems (SAMP / T for land application and PAAMS for naval application), MBDA, together with its partners Safran Group and Thales, studied the evolution of its systems by introducing a new interceptor High-endoatmospheric - ASTER Block II - to cover all short and medium range (SRBM and MRBM) ballistic threats.
The concept of the ASTER Block 2 system has been defined to cover the spectrum of SRBM and MRBM ballistic threats, with or without enhanced penetration capabilities, ie current and next generation SRBM and MRBM. It has been optimized to intercept in the altitude range 20 to 70km to ensure, among other things, the destruction of ballistic missiles with maneuvers such as SS 26, M9 and Fateh 110 and the missiles of this class drawn in tight trajectories, which defy the exoatmosphere systems (because the ballistic missile trajectories do not come out enough from the atmosphere) and / or the low endoatmospheric systems (because of the maneuvers).
This ASTER BII system, while retaining the capabilities of the ASTER Block 1 system (SAMP / T for the terrestrial or future PAAMS Block 1 version for the naval version), can handle the most likely ballistic threats "without leaving a hole in the racket "of the SRBM and MRBM domains.
By their proliferation, this type of ballistic threat is therefore on theaters of external operations, or possibly on the southeast flank of Europe, and that is why the concept of the ASTER Bl2 system has been defined as ballistic missile defense system, but may also be used as part of a territorial defense, to protect population centers and / or sensitive sites .
Its positioning allows to answer to:
§ An autonomous defense capability at the national / European level to protect the command and forces deployed in a theater of operations, as well as the populations of the host country;
§ An in-kind contribution to the NATO ALTBMD layer for deployed force protection, interoperable with US high-layer systems (SM-3 / Aegis, THAAD), reinforcing the principle of command and control deployable operations of NATO (BMC3 / ACCS).
§ A possible complement to the Aegis / SM-3 mobile systems proposed by the United States for the defense of the Alliance's territory which would also advocate a more NATO command system, an extension of that of NATO ALTBMD, which can be connected to the PAA command system. Indeed, the chain of command and commitment can only be justified at a NATO level if it can handle interceptions with systems from multiple allies; if only the United States brings interception systems, then the principle of a chain under NATO operational responsibility will be weakened , for the benefit of a purely American command.
Complementarity of ASTER B II with SM-3 and THAAD
In the case of the ALTBMD and the Missile Defense , contributing with the ASTER Block 2 system provides additional capacity:
§ Positioning itself as a complement to the SM-3,
§ The SM-3 is a naval system that intercepts purely exoatmospheric (outside atmosphere). ASTER Block 2 deals with, among other things, a range of ballistic missiles not covered by the SM-3, ie SRBMs and MRBMs with out-of-atmosphere phases insufficient to provide exo interception (eg taut trajectories for missiles with a range of less than 1500km and minimum energy trajectories for missiles with a range of less than 800km)
§ With European naval platforms equipped with ASTER Bl2 interoperable with Aegis SM-3 US naval platforms, providing wider geographic coverage, but also improved threat sealing, in the case of saturated attack several types of missiles for example; the ASTER Block 2 offering optimal naval capability in addition to the SM-3 / Aegis system.
§ By offering both an alternative and a complement to THAAD,
§ The THAAD is a terrestrial system that intercepts in very high endoatmospheric (from 40 / 50km altitude) and low exoatmosphérique. ASTER Block 2 is complementary for a range of targets whose interception can only be done between 20 and 40km altitude. What is the case of the new generation SRBM type SS26, Chinese M9 ...
§ ASTER Block 2 is also considered complementary to THAAD because, unlike the latter, its definition is also optimized for a naval component.
§ It can be an alternative for a terrestrial component, since the ASTER Block 2 and THAAD have a common interception domain, and therefore in this context, ASTER Block 2 batteries can replace (or increase quantitatively) THAAD batteries if these were proposed in insufficient quantity by the USA to ensure a significant coverage.
This complement ASTER B2 system capability in its naval and land applications thus offers qualitative and quantitative complementarities to the THAAD terrestrial systems and to the naval and terrestrial SM-3 systems, which are intended to increase their capacities to deal with IRBM and ICBM threats, thus allowing a wider protection coverage.
ASTER Block 2 can therefore be considered as an element of cooperation with the US as it is interoperable with American systems and can be integrated into a NATO command system, thus promoting cooperative commitments for DAMB missions.
DAMB high layer systems are considered by the United States as enabling them to establish their political and technological supremacy, as they need to pull up technological know-how; it is for this reason that it seems unthinkable for the Americans to offer Europeans forms of cooperation on high-value industrial and technological activities.
The niche of ballistic missile defense is fundamental to positioning itself as a major player in the DAMB both within NATO, in operational cooperation with the United States, and towards the exporting countries.
Before launching the ASTER Block 2 program, it is necessary to carry out an upstream program of about 40 million euros per year for extending the ballistic missile capabilities of the ASTER family.
The proposed work focuses on reducing the risks of critical functions associated with technologies to ensure interception with direct impact in a high dynamic range and at high altitude, that is to say in a rarefied atmosphere.
The aim of this PEA would be to bring the following areas of technology to maturity:
· The attachment and the pursuit of the high-Mach target (around Mach 7), by an infrared homing device, in an environment of strong aerothermal constraints after the IRdome's dechilting, which impose high detection and tracking performance ,
· The pyrotechnic piloting using the DACS solid technology (Divert & Attitude Control System) which allows a reactive piloting in a rarefied atmosphere,
· But also, the two-level thrust cruising propulsion which participates in the piloting in the upper layers of the atmosphere and which must be able to be stopped to order so as to allow the separation of the last stage,
· The definition of the interceptor and the Kill Vehicle, in particular the following aspects:
· Thermomechanical behavior in harsh environments, particularly for the Kill Vehicle, and the cruise stage,
· Volume constraints on the Kill Vehicle architecture in which the subassemblies will have to be integrated in a compact way,
The work of PEA, conducted by MBDA with its partners SPS, Sagem and ONERA:
· Enable the assessment of critical functions and equipment on the ground and in flight,
· Are presented in a coherent way to bring the necessary mature technologies around the ASTER Block 2 high altitude interceptor structural project against ballistic threats,
· May, for some of them, be used for other applications in the field of interception.
The results of the set will allow to obtain the definition and the feasibility of the interceptor, and the associated reachable performances necessary for a possible development.
This PEA demonstrator would have a duration of 5 years.
In parallel, system work will also be carried out to identify the critical functions of the weapon system (discrimination, harmonization, communications, ground / missile link, etc.) and to build for each of them a program to lift risks.
This work, over 5 years, will be proposed in two phases realized jointly by Thales and MBDA:
· A first phase of two years of study and predefinition of the system architectures, with choice of a reference solution at the end of this phase;
· A second phase of risk reduction including conducting tests on critical chains and the constitution of a definition file with performance evaluation.
