Future Combat Vehicle Programs (FRCV and FICV)

[randomradio]

You should join PKS and write stories. Or else back up with sources.

One post ago you mentioned "Make" Which is used in FICV program which follows the Designing -> developing -> producing with a foreign partner. Did you skip that to mix it up with SP?

Should I post 'Strategic Partner' chapter of DPP? or Maybe you should to prove your fictional new process.

FICV is not under Make, it is under Buy and Make. Make is an entirely different process from DPP-2016. It didn't exist during FICV.

What Z-10 have to do with anything Indian?

Dude, you are not getting anything I said. Did you actually read up about Z-10?

FGFA is under SP?

You didn't get this one either.

You are not getting anything about the procedure.

FRCV will have three contracts, not one. Do you realize that?

One contract is for design. This will be signed with a foreign company and a private company. The Chinese did the same with Z-10. They asked the Russian company Kamov to design the Z-10. So we are going to do the same with FRCV. We will do it though SP. Your RFI only talks about this contract.

Second contract is for R&D. Indian company will do this along with DRDO. This will have a separate RFI and RFP.

Third contract is for production. Indian company. This will have a separate RFI and RFP.

So all three contracts are separate.

 

[Ashwin]

FICV is not under Make, it is under Buy and Make. Make is an entirely different process from DPP-2016. It didn't exist during FICV.

I get that. I was referring to your new 'process'

Dude, you are not getting anything I said. Did you actually read up about Z-10?

Again, What this has to do with Indian Defence Procurement Procedure?

Did you read up on SP?

FRCV will have three contracts, not one. Do you realize that?

One contract is for design. This will be signed with a foreign company and a private company. The Chinese did the same with Z-10. They asked the Russian company Kamov to design the Z-10. So we are going to do the same with FRCV. We will do it though SP. Your RFI only talks about this contract.

Second contract is for R&D. Indian company will do this along with DRDO. This will have a separate RFI and RFP.

Third contract is for production. Indian company. This will have a separate RFI and RFP.

According to whom there will be three contracts? I'm asking for sources not stories

 

[randomradio]

I get that. I was referring to your new 'process'


Again, What this has to do with Indian Defence Procurement Procedure?

Did you read up on SP?


According to whom there will be three contracts? I'm asking for sources not stories

Read this article.
Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV)
The process of advancing the project will be in three stages. The first stage will be the Design Stage. The second stage will be the Prototype Development Stage and the third stage will be the Production Stage leading to the final stage – the Induction Stage.

So this should explain the three contract process.

This project, from start to finish, is a "Make" project. What's more special is that the Army will be in the process from the ground up. They will setup a design bureau and work with the other participants right from the beginning. Their main objective is to remove DRDO from a position of power and make them a subcontractor, like how the navy operates.

Fact: This is known to anybody and everybody who has followed the program. So why are you so clueless about it? And when you are so clueless about it, why do you attack me at every turn? Why is your ignorance my problem?

 

[Ashwin]

Read this article.
Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV)
The process of advancing the project will be in three stages. The first stage will be the Design Stage. The second stage will be the Prototype Development Stage and the third stage will be the Production Stage leading to the final stage – the Induction Stage.

What a credible source from July 14, 2016!, When there was no SP or RFI. A lot of water has flowed under the bridge since this. SP chapter was notified in May 2017 and this tender came out two months ago. Army has moved away from it and yet you are frozen in time.

Fact: This is known to anybody and everybody who has followed the program. So why are you so clueless about it? And when you are so clueless about it, why do you attack me at every turn? Why is your ignorance my problem?

But, Somehow you missed the actual tender document and continue building over assumption. Is questioning considered attacking now? My problem is with your overconfidence. You dismiss other arguments even after producing substantial evidence.

 

[randomradio]

What a credible source from July 14, 2016!, When there was no SP or RFI. A lot of water has flowed under the bridge since this. SP chapter was notified in May 2017 and this tender came out two months ago. Army has moved away from it and yet you are frozen in time.


But, Somehow you missed the actual tender document and continue building over assumption. Is questioning considered attacking now? My problem is with your overconfidence. You dismiss other arguments even after producing substantial evidence.

It's all the same thing. There have been no changes. If there were changes, then the RFI wouldn't have gone out in 2017.

The article clearly explains that there are 3 different contracts. The tender document is only for the first contract.

The source is first class. You don't like it, nobody cares.

 

[bonobashi]

Lol - the know-it-all is back.

Unfortunately you do not seem to know squat. As you seem to have so skillfully deduced the agency responsible for laying down the specs of the Arjun, may you also be skillful enough to figure which was the agency responsible for laying down this new '50 ton' requirement? Was it ISRO?

Then maybe you would also be skilled enough to figure out why the requirement for a ~65T tank was laid down in the first place? Was it to beat Pakistani-operated Chinese T-55/T-62 copies? Please dedicate some brain cells of your's (if you still have any) to figure that one out.

It's truly unfortunate that you appear to disbelieve in the existence of such a thing as changing requirements and threat-assessment.

Was my post not clear enough? Did it need to be bi-syllabic to make sense to you? Wasn't the point precisely that the same agency was doing a pirouette on the specifications? Or was that too bizarre a manoeuvre for you to comprehend?

As for the specifications reaching a certain weight, it is a matter that every foreign vendor or system integrator knows well - why the Indian military, Army, Navy or Air Force, defines its requirements in a certain way is a mystery, even to the specifying authority itself. They build detailed specifications, while at the same time having no clue as to how the design will be integrated with their doctrine and practices. Nobody has to waste time thinking through changing threat perceptions - the biggest threat to the Indian military is the Indian military. And before you think with the benefit of your decades of dealing with these entities that you are now reading a clever quip and nothing more, think instead about the inconsistency of a specification writing authority that ignores its own ground realities, the severe differences in numbers between what it has and what it needs, or between what it has and what it faces, and writes Star Wars equipment into the scenario. Can such organisations be trusted any more?

Looking back in the thread it's laughable that the most sophisticated explanation you could come up with was 'Russian Dalals!' Note that I'm not saying it is untrue - just that it is nowhere as sophisticated an explanation as was expected of you.

....thus illustrating my fears that there are no bounds to your stupidity. You just said 'it's laughable that the most sophisticated explanation you could come up with was the correct one. Nothing wrong with it being correct, just that coming from you it should have been complex as well as correct'!

My poor aching sides.

That's great. BTW, I find you condescending. And hilarious.

That's a rare combination.

Condescending is a relative position; it was not selected a priori, it emerged. Hilarious too was possible only with your inimitable contributions. However, the stupidity is admittedly entirely your own, a hallmark, as it were.

 

[Parthu]

Was my post not clear enough? Did it need to be bi-syllabic to make sense to you? Wasn't the point precisely that the same agency was doing a pirouette on the specifications? Or was that too bizarre a manoeuvre for you to comprehend?

As for the specifications reaching a certain weight, it is a matter that every foreign vendor or system integrator knows well - why the Indian military, Army, Navy or Air Force, defines its requirements in a certain way is a mystery, even to the specifying authority itself. They build detailed specifications, while at the same time having no clue as to how the design will be integrated with their doctrine and practices. Nobody has to waste time thinking through changing threat perceptions - the biggest threat to the Indian military is the Indian military. And before you think with the benefit of your decades of dealing with these entities that you are now reading a clever quip and nothing more, think instead about the inconsistency of a specification writing authority that ignores its own ground realities, the severe differences in numbers between what it has and what it needs, or between what it has and what it faces, and writes Star Wars equipment into the scenario. Can such organisations be trusted any more?

Agreed that the requirements often specified by IA are bizarre. But that is a two-lane street: if the current '50 ton' requirement is bizarre - then so was Arjun. It was IA that specified a 60-ton MBT be built (which in it's Mk-2 form is almost touching 70T) when they knew very well that they had made no effort (and have not in a large scale, even as of today) to upgrade their infrastructure suitably.

The Arjun was dead before it was born. And no attempts were made it resuscitate it. And with the new FRCV requirement on table, it is now clear without a doubt: it's too late for Arjun.

But as far as IA's existing tank-support infra goes, FRCV is within realistic limits, as it seeks to emulate the weight specs set by IA's existing T-series MBTs. Which was my original point.

However, just like many other procurement programs I won't be surprised if this one too ends up amounting to absolutely nothing. Which, again, I had stated in my original post. The problem however is that we can't be found wanting for Arjun to be ordered in 1000s simply because it has 'Made in India' printed on it - when we can clearly see that's not going to happen anymore.

Will there be a turnaround? Will IA see the light and realize that internationally, MBTs are only getting heavier and heavier? Will they realize that the sooner they upgrade their nation-wide infra to support 70T/Above MBTs, the better? It remains a possibility - and the only way the Arjun (or some future variant developed from it) can actually be adopted in large numbers.

It appears you failed to understand what my original post even meant to imply. Not surprising though.

thus illustrating my fears that there are no bounds to your stupidity. You just said 'it's laughable that the most sophisticated explanation you could come up with was the correct one. Nothing wrong with it being correct, just that coming from you it should have been complex as well as correct'!

My poor aching sides.

Glad the humor wasn't lost on you. But again you fail to show your sophistication (which I'm sure you spent decades polishing). Unfortunately, it still sucks.

Condescending is a relative position; it was not selected a priori, it emerged. Hilarious too was possible only with your inimitable contributions. However, the stupidity is admittedly entirely your own, a hallmark, as it were.

No, hilarious is all you. And not because you try - but because you simply are. The joke is not how you're saying - it's what you're saying.

 

[bonobashi]

Agreed that the requirements often specified by IA are bizarre. But that is a two-lane street: if the current '50 ton' requirement is bizarre - then so was Arjun. It was IA that specified a 60-ton MBT be built (which in it's Mk-2 form is almost touching 70T) when they knew very well that they had made no effort (and have not in a large scale, even as of today) to upgrade their infrastructure suitably.

The Arjun was dead before it was born. And no attempts were made it resuscitate it. And with the new FRCV requirement on table, it is now clear without a doubt: it's too late for Arjun.

But as far as IA's existing tank-support infra goes, FRCV is within realistic limits, as it seeks to emulate the weight specs set by IA's existing T-series MBTs. Which was my original point.

However, just like many other procurement programs I won't be surprised if this one too ends up amounting to absolutely nothing. Which, again, I had stated in my original post. The problem however is that we can't be found wanting for Arjun to be ordered in 1000s simply because it has 'Made in India' printed on it - when we can clearly see that's not going to happen anymore.

Will there be a turnaround? Will IA see the light and realize that internationally, MBTs are only getting heavier and heavier? Will they realize that the sooner they upgrade their nation-wide infra to support 70T/Above MBTs, the better? It remains a possibility - and the only way the Arjun (or some future variant developed from it) can actually be adopted in large numbers.

It appears you failed to understand what my original post even meant to imply. Not surprising though.

Paraphrase: "You didn't understand what I was saying. It was the same as you."

Glad the humor wasn't lost on you. But again you fail to show your sophistication (which I'm sure you spent decades polishing). Unfortunately, it still sucks.

Paraphrase: "For me, if I'm right, I win. For you, if you're right, you lose; you have to be polished as well."

No, hilarious is all you. And not because you try - but because you simply are. The joke is not how you're saying - it's what you're saying.

Paraphrase: "Whatever you're saying, twice!"

 

[Parthu]

Paraphrase: "You didn't understand what I was saying. It was the same as you."

Yes - except I was the first one to say it. But you are excused as your overwhelming need to sound sophisticated often clouds your focus on the matter at hand.

Please re-read my first post. I can't have you doing a tomahto-tomayto and confuse the rest of the readers just because you may have had a bone to pick with me (from our last conversation back in the SWAT thread).

Paraphrase: "For me, if I'm right, I win. For you, if you're right, you lose; you have to be polished as well."

A predicament you put yourself in. Thanks to your tendency to resort to eloquent sentences as a stand-in for actual points to raise.

Paraphrase: "Whatever you're saying, twice!"

...that, after it's clear you're the one who came barging in trying to offer a new perspective (that of bashing IA top brass), when in fact it was me who was the first to point out IA's infrastructure shortcomings (which directly lead to favoring & support of T-series/lighter tanks as opposed to Arjun/heavier tanks).

For reference:
Indian Army Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV)

Our current argument is a result of your attempt to portray IA's 50-ton requirement as a bizarre, out of place attempt to kill Arjun - without realizing their order for a measly 124 Arjuns (without even having any plans whatsoever to make it standard and build nationwide infra to support that weight class) was equally, if not even more, bizarre.

The current 50T requirement is actually far more sane: simply because it falls within the infrastructural limitations IA has.

 

[bonobashi]

Yes - except I was the first one to say it. But you are excused as your overwhelming need to sound sophisticated often clouds your focus on the matter at hand.

Please re-read my first post. I can't have you doing a tomahto-tomayto and confuse the rest of the readers just because you may have had a bone to pick with me (from our last conversation back in the SWAT thread).

My, looks like we are carrying a lot of baggage! The only lessons from that earlier thread that I carried away was that I would have to be wary of a kid with a zeal for collecting tin soldiers all painted in their authentic livery. This was an independent insight into a childish approach, devoid of any personal understanding or acquaintance with the forces and their thinking. Useful, in a way; insights gained into the nature of fanboys, or fan-kiddies, actually, as the degree of juvenile failure to develop colours views and perceptions more and more.

A predicament you put yourself in. Thanks to your tendency to resort to eloquent sentences as a stand-in for actual points to raise.

Ah, yes; familiar, this. "If you only could be understood...."

...that, after it's clear you're the one who came barging in trying to offer a new perspective (that of bashing IA top brass), when in fact it was me who was the first to point out IA's infrastructure shortcomings (which directly lead to favoring & support of T-series/lighter tanks as opposed to Arjun/heavier tanks).

For reference:
Indian Army Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV)

Our current argument is a result of your attempt to portray IA's 50-ton requirement as a bizarre, out of place attempt to kill Arjun - without realizing their order for a measly 124 Arjuns (without even having any plans whatsoever to make it standard and build nationwide infra to support that weight class) was equally, if not even more, bizarre.

The current 50T requirement is actually far more sane: simply because it falls within the infrastructural limitations IA has.

How did you come to these lightning flashes of understanding? I am not even going to follow your attempts to make comprehensible your lectures that have gone sadly astray; it is enough to leave them standing in their naked glory.

My point remains what it always was: that the IA put up a fanciful, Star Wars specification for the Arjun; that it was aghast when those specs were met; that it went into survival mode and pulled out really silly arguments about infrastructure (which fanboys like you readily believed); and that in an attempt to avoid obvious public obloquy, some derisory orders were placed. Finally, faced with the need to indent large numbers of effective modern tanks, the Army went back and carefully tiptoed its way through a specification that denied access to the Arjun while making it easier for the obvious attempts at building up the commissions payable for imports.

Everyone knows that the 124 unit order was bizarre, because it neither shuts the door on the Arjun nor accepts it whole-heartedly.

Perhaps, dear scholar, it will help you to understand the really stupid part of the debate: the part in which the Army hoodwinks all desktop experts sitting far from the possible scene of action.

The Army has repeatedly cited their difficulties with infrastructure, in this case, the carrying capacity of bridges and of the railways. Idiots have always listened to this and fallen in line, unable and unwilling to think this through on their own and come to any judgement on the rights and wrongs of that case. If you were to do a little, very simple desk research, you would soon enough find out why, other than fanboys with limited knowledge of the India-Pakistan theatre and the topography involved, nobody can be taken in for more than the minute that it takes to look at a map.

Concentrate on reality rather than polishing your book knowledge and you might make sense.

 

[Parthu]

My, looks like we are carrying a lot of baggage! The only lessons from that earlier thread that I carried away was that I would have to be wary of a kid with a zeal for collecting tin soldiers all painted in their authentic livery. This was an independent insight into a childish approach, devoid of any personal understanding or acquaintance with the forces and their thinking. Useful, in a way; insights gained into the nature of fanboys, or fan-kiddies, actually, as the degree of juvenile failure to develop colours views and perceptions more and more.

Contrary to what you may think - attempting to belittle the person you are arguing with does NOT, in fact, pass off as an alternative for actually putting forward an informative argument.

When one is not capable of offering an explanation for why things are the way they are, but are personally inclined to put up a facade of being someone who has a limitless bank of knowledge in military matters - this is very much the discourse a discussion would take.

My point remains what it always was: that the IA put up a fanciful, Star Wars specification for the Arjun; that it was aghast when those specs were met; that it went into survival mode and pulled out really silly arguments about infrastructure (which fanboys like you readily believed); and that in an attempt to avoid obvious public obloquy, some derisory orders were placed.

I personally never heard anything about infrastructural limitations being a problem for additional Arjuns from the IA's side. IA brass was actually attacking the tank itself - not their own infra. As per the narrative put forth by IA - the reason why more Arjuns are not coming is due to technical issues of the tank itself and it's inability to meet the requirements set by IA. This narrative is obviously designed to put the blame on the companies making Arjun, taking the pressure off IA.

The truth however, is that the fault lies not with the tank - but with the infrastructure supporting it (or lack thereof).

Finally, faced with the need to indent large numbers of effective modern tanks, the Army went back and carefully tiptoed its way through a specification that denied access to the Arjun

Actually....IA did not tiptoe around Arjun specs, because the Arjun is nowhere near what IA's infra supports. What IA did is merely create a realistic technical requirement. Unfortunately, some people don't seem to like it when IA is actually coming back to Earth for once.

while making it easier for the obvious attempts at building up the commissions payable for imports.

Erm...the way this FRCV requirement seems to be structured (outright favoring the Russian Armata), it is simply set up to fail. As there is a high chance any international competition emerging from this could end up in a single-vendor situation and coming back to square one (cancelled/called off) because of it - as I had already stated in my original post.

So if IA is simply doing this to get commissions, then they're doing a shoddy job of it.

Unless ofcourse, we decide to go Govt-to-Govt on the whole thing. Again, a possibility I had already mentioned in my original post.

Perhaps, dear scholar, it will help you to understand the really stupid part of the debate: the part in which the Army hoodwinks all desktop experts sitting far from the possible scene of action.

On that note, it's truly unfortunate that one who appears to want to claim to be sitting right in the heart of the action, is found offering zilch in terms of information, and truckloads in terms of BS.

The Army has repeatedly cited their difficulties with infrastructure, in this case, the carrying capacity of bridges and of the railways. Idiots have always listened to this and fallen in line, unable and unwilling to think this through on their own and come to any judgement on the rights and wrongs of that case. If you were to do a little, very simple desk research, you would soon enough find out why, other than fanboys with limited knowledge of the India-Pakistan theatre and the topography involved, nobody can be taken in for more than the minute that it takes to look at a map.

Ah - so you have indeed carried a lot with you since our last conversation. Especially the part where your need to be seen as offering a unique perspective leads you to claim such things as the sun rising in the West.

Some reading that might do you (and others viewing this thread) some good:

" India’s MBT fleets during peacetime are stored in the hinterland far away from their wartime staging areas close to the border. This means to get to the border areas the almost all MBTs have to be transported by railways, this being known as exterior lines of communication. Once these MBTs arrive by rail in their respective theatres of operation, they then have to disembark & be re-loaded on road-mobile motorised trailers in order to reach their respective staging areas, typically 40km/70km away from the border, and this type of road connectivity is known as interior lines of communication. It is this transfer of lines of communication (from exterior to interior) that is time-consuming, as witnessed during OP Parakram. Within the interior lines of communication, most of the roads & bridges are not MLC-70-class, meaning while they can cater for loads of up to 50 tonnes (which augurs well for MBTs like the 46-tonne T-90S & 38-tonne T-72M1s), they cannot cater for loads for heavier MBTs like the Arjun. There are two logical options for overcoming the above-two limitations. One calls for pre-positioning a substantial number of MBTs closer to the border so that they do away with the need for using exterior lines of communication & make use of only interior lines of communication. Secondly, within the interior lines of communication, all bridges & roadways ought to be upgraded to MLC-70 standard. Now, in both cases, this calls for acquiring real estate (land) from state governments for establishing several new Army cantonments containing warehouses & workshops for mechanised & motorised vehicles & their spares inventories, plus housing quarters, along with the commencement of a massive road transportation upgrade programme. It is THIS that is the main hurdle that is extremely difficult to overcome, since land is a state subject & therefore the states & the Centre tend to spend years haggling with each other before the land can be acquired by the MoD. For upgrading the interior lines of communication too, it is the state’s responsibility & if the state is unwilling to spend money, then there’s very little that the MoD can do. Therefore, it makes no sense for the IA to acquire any state-of-the-art heavy MBT if such MBTs are not able to be deployed at short notice whenever & wherever they’re needed. This is what the problem is all about, & it has nothing to do with any performance parameter (like battlefield mobility) of the Arjun MBT. "

" In case of a future round of hostilities between India & Pakistan with a nuclear backdrop, the traditional areas for the clashing armoured forces will be the Thar/Cholistan deserts & the Chhamb area within the Shakargarh Bulge (Chicken’s Neck area), both being areas devoid of any man-made obstacles like ditch-cum-bundhs (DCB) & irrigation canals. The Arjun MBT has therefore been optimised for operating precisely in these areas & the IA has no complaints about it at all. But at the same time, the Army finds both its hands tied behind its back when it comes to the improvement of interior lines of communication in states like Rajasthan, Punjab & J & K, simply because it is totally helpless & can’t do anything at all to make things better. Only the Centre, its MoD & the concerned state govts can offer solutions, which they’re not willing to at the moment. Therefore, if anyone is to be directly blamed for sabotaging the Arjun MBT programme, it is not IA HQ, but the MoD & state govts. It is these two entities that are seen to be conspiring to condemn the IA to live with & operate lighter underperforming tanks like the T-72CIA & T-90S, instead of going for the best that the country’s military-industrial entities have painstakingly developed for both operations in the plains (Arjun Mk1/Mk1A) & in the mountains (TANK EX). "

-- Prasun K. Sengupta

Concentrate on reality rather than polishing your book knowledge and you might make sense.

If I'm still not clear in what I'm trying to say, let me make it very simple : Either provide information, or don't provide BS. Either option you take is fine by me.

 

[bonobashi]

Contrary to what you may think - attempting to belittle the person you are arguing with does NOT, in fact, pass off as an alternative for actually putting forward an informative argument.

When one is not capable of offering an explanation for why things are the way they are, but are personally inclined to put up a facade of being someone who has a limitless bank of knowledge in military matters - this is very much the discourse a discussion would take.



I personally never heard anything about infrastructural limitations being a problem for additional Arjuns from the IA's side. IA brass was actually attacking the tank itself - not their own infra. As per the narrative put forth by IA - the reason why more Arjuns are not coming is due to technical issues of the tank itself and it's inability to meet the requirements set by IA. This narrative is obviously designed to put the blame on the companies making Arjun, taking the pressure off IA.

The truth however, is that the fault lies not with the tank - but with the infrastructure supporting it (or lack thereof).



Actually....IA did not tiptoe around Arjun specs, because the Arjun is nowhere near what IA's infra supports. What IA did is merely create a realistic technical requirement. Unfortunately, some people don't seem to like it when IA is actually coming back to Earth for once.



Erm...the way this FRCV requirement seems to be structured (outright favoring the Russian Armata), it is simply set up to fail. As there is a high chance any international competition emerging from this could end up in a single-vendor situation and coming back to square one (cancelled/called off) because of it - as I had already stated in my original post.

So if IA is simply doing this to get commissions, then they're doing a shoddy job of it.

Unless ofcourse, we decide to go Govt-to-Govt on the whole thing. Again, a possibility I had already mentioned in my original post.



On that note, it's truly unfortunate that one who appears to want to claim to be sitting right in the heart of the action, is found offering zilch in terms of information, and truckloads in terms of BS.



Ah - so you have indeed carried a lot with you since our last conversation. Especially the part where your need to be seen as offering a unique perspective leads you to claim such things as the sun rising in the West.

Some reading that might do you (and others viewing this thread) some good:

" India’s MBT fleets during peacetime are stored in the hinterland far away from their wartime staging areas close to the border. This means to get to the border areas the almost all MBTs have to be transported by railways, this being known as exterior lines of communication. Once these MBTs arrive by rail in their respective theatres of operation, they then have to disembark & be re-loaded on road-mobile motorised trailers in order to reach their respective staging areas, typically 40km/70km away from the border, and this type of road connectivity is known as interior lines of communication. It is this transfer of lines of communication (from exterior to interior) that is time-consuming, as witnessed during OP Parakram. Within the interior lines of communication, most of the roads & bridges are not MLC-70-class, meaning while they can cater for loads of up to 50 tonnes (which augurs well for MBTs like the 46-tonne T-90S & 38-tonne T-72M1s), they cannot cater for loads for heavier MBTs like the Arjun. There are two logical options for overcoming the above-two limitations. One calls for pre-positioning a substantial number of MBTs closer to the border so that they do away with the need for using exterior lines of communication & make use of only interior lines of communication. Secondly, within the interior lines of communication, all bridges & roadways ought to be upgraded to MLC-70 standard. Now, in both cases, this calls for acquiring real estate (land) from state governments for establishing several new Army cantonments containing warehouses & workshops for mechanised & motorised vehicles & their spares inventories, plus housing quarters, along with the commencement of a massive road transportation upgrade programme. It is THIS that is the main hurdle that is extremely difficult to overcome, since land is a state subject & therefore the states & the Centre tend to spend years haggling with each other before the land can be acquired by the MoD. For upgrading the interior lines of communication too, it is the state’s responsibility & if the state is unwilling to spend money, then there’s very little that the MoD can do. Therefore, it makes no sense for the IA to acquire any state-of-the-art heavy MBT if such MBTs are not able to be deployed at short notice whenever & wherever they’re needed. This is what the problem is all about, & it has nothing to do with any performance parameter (like battlefield mobility) of the Arjun MBT. "

" In case of a future round of hostilities between India & Pakistan with a nuclear backdrop, the traditional areas for the clashing armoured forces will be the Thar/Cholistan deserts & the Chhamb area within the Shakargarh Bulge (Chicken’s Neck area), both being areas devoid of any man-made obstacles like ditch-cum-bundhs (DCB) & irrigation canals. The Arjun MBT has therefore been optimised for operating precisely in these areas & the IA has no complaints about it at all. But at the same time, the Army finds both its hands tied behind its back when it comes to the improvement of interior lines of communication in states like Rajasthan, Punjab & J & K, simply because it is totally helpless & can’t do anything at all to make things better. Only the Centre, its MoD & the concerned state govts can offer solutions, which they’re not willing to at the moment. Therefore, if anyone is to be directly blamed for sabotaging the Arjun MBT programme, it is not IA HQ, but the MoD & state govts. It is these two entities that are seen to be conspiring to condemn the IA to live with & operate lighter underperforming tanks like the T-72CIA & T-90S, instead of going for the best that the country’s military-industrial entities have painstakingly developed for both operations in the plains (Arjun Mk1/Mk1A) & in the mountains (TANK EX). "

-- Prasun K. Sengupta



If I'm still not clear in what I'm trying to say, let me make it very simple : Either provide information, or don't provide BS. Either option you take is fine by me.

Once you have started quoting Prasun K. Sengupta, it becomes clear that there is little to be gained trying to recover you from the general debris. What you have quoted above is the opinion of a self-declared expert, like yourself, who does not have the elementary sense of looking immediately beyond the country's borders.

When you get a little 'grounding' in 'ground' realities, let me know.

 

[Parthu]

Once you have started quoting Prasun K. Sengupta, it becomes clear that there is little to be gained trying to recover you from the general debris. What you have quoted above is the opinion of a self-declared expert, like yourself, who does not have the elementary sense of looking immediately beyond the country's borders.

When you get a little 'grounding' in 'ground' realities, let me know.

Spoken like one who actually seems to be claiming that he's something more than a self-declared expert.

As expected, you would rather slander others than offer anything in way of information.

Let me know before I cross that one step you said I was away from before finding my way to your ignore list.

 

[bonobashi]

Spoken like one who actually seems to be claiming that he's something more than a self-declared expert.

As expected, you would rather slander others than offer anything in way of information.

Let me know before I cross that one step you said I was away from before finding my way to your ignore list.

LOL.

You are well beyond it. Relax. Nothing more is needed to be done from your side.

 

[_Anonymous_]

KSingh (@KSingh84856557) Tweeted:
FICV induction by 2026-7 when it should have been in early 2020s, modern force with BMPs? Absurd.

And let’s be clear, FRCV is another way for Army to continue to import, totally unjustified but see how they use it to commit India to another 30 years of reliance on foreigners Indian Defence on Twitter (

https://twitter.com/x/status/1220215520126857217

)
KSingh (@KSingh84856557) Tweeted:
FICV induction by 2026-7 when it should have been in early 2020s, modern force with BMPs? Absurd.

And let’s be clear, FRCV is another way for Army to continue to import, totally unjustified but see how they use it to commit India to another 30 years of reliance on foreigners Indian Defence on Twitter (

https://twitter.com/x/status/1220215520126857217

)
KSingh (@KSingh84856557) Tweeted:
FICV induction by 2026-7 when it should have been in early 2020s, modern force with BMPs? Absurd.

And let’s be clear, FRCV is another way for Army to continue to import, totally unjustified but see how they use it to commit India to another 30 years of reliance on foreigners Indian Defence on Twitter (

https://twitter.com/x/status/1220215520126857217

)

 

[Ashwin]

Interview: India plans future infantry combat vehicle induction in 2027, says Gen. Naravane

New Delhi: Indian Army is readying for the modernisation of its armoured and mechanised forces, with the induction of Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV), Future Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) and Arjun MkII Main Battle Tank slated for the coming decade.

Especially, the FICV’s induction is scheduled for the 2027 fiscal, India’s Chief of Army Staff General Manoj Mukund Naravane said in an exclusive interview with Defence.Capital earlier this month.


The General said for inductin of the FICV, the army will soon issue a Request for Information (RFI), which stand prepared already, to the industry to develop and manufacture the vehicle for the Mechanised Forces.

With regard to the FICV, there have been interactions with the stakeholders on progressing the procurement case expeditiously, Gen. Naravane said. “We have considered various models for this process, such as issuing a fresh Request for Information for the project.

“Keeping with the pace of the phasing out of the existing platforms, the Indian Army is making efforts to achieve the FICV induction by 2026-27,” he said.

Regarding the FRCV, the Army chief said the Request for Information was uploaded on the Ministry of Defence website on Nov. 8, 2017 with the date of response submission as Jun. 30, 2018.

“The process for ratification of the Services Qualitative Requirements for the FRCV is currently under progress. The FRCV project is progressing as per laid down guideline of the Strategic Partnership model.”

Giving a thumbs up to the Arjun MBT project, the General said it had met the operational requirements as laid out by the Indian Army. “The DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) has further upgraded the tank and the new Arjun Mk1A tanks being inducted into the Indian Army will come with these upgrades incorporated.”

Some of the upgrades include the Commander’s Panoramic Sight, Mine Ploughs for mobility, ERA panels and a Laser Warning and Counter Measure system.

An interesting development is that the user trials for the Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot MkII have been successfully concluded in Nov. 2019, enabling induction of this ammunition for the Arjun tanks soon.

Asked if he though tank battles are now part of folklore, the General disagreed. “The world over, tanks and infantry combat vehicles are being employed innovatively in conflict zones to achieve decisive victory,” he said.

“Notwithstanding our thrust on development of niche technologies, our emphasis on capability development with reference to the Mechanised Forces remains a focus.”

Gen. Naravane said undoubtedly, futuristic warfare is evolving with advancement in technology. “Cyber, Space and Information are emerging as new domains of modern warfare.

“In our context, we have disputed borders on both the western and northern front. To maintain punitive deterrence, especially against our western adversary, the Indian Army’s capability including Mechanised Forces must maintain an edge over them.”

 

[Gautam]

Some information about L&T-DRDO light tank :

 

[randomradio]

Some information about L&T-DRDO light tank :

View attachment 16934

A K9 based light tank may end up being incapable of airdrop and will likely have a weaker gun, hopefully the shell will compensate. At least we know the army is flexible and do not really want amphibious capability or weak armour.

The infrared version of Hammer is good news. Goodbye Chinese tanks.

 

[zapper]

IA should ask the private sector to develop something on these lines

 

[randomradio]

IA should ask the private sector to develop something on these lines

I watched the exact same video just yesterday. Check out Rheinmetall Lynx as well.

Both weigh 40T and can't be part of FICV. But FRCV is a family of vehicles, and a 40T heavy IFV is part of it.

L&T's FICV design should meet your tastes.