BATTLE OF ASAL UTTAR 1965 – TURN OF THE TIDE
BACKGROUND :
The 1960s began a difficult decade for India.The euphoria of independence was fading,the economy was shaky,there was a food crisis,the morale of the Indian army had taken a beating after the humiliation of 1962 against China.Nehru had breathed his last in 1964 and his successor -the diminutive Lal Bahadur Shastri was viewed as a compromise candidate ,perhaps even a weak one.Indian legislations to integrate Kashmir constitutionally put political pressure on the Ayub Khan military government.To Pakistani strategic planners the time must have seemed ripe for a military solution to enforce their geopolitical ambitions.
Pakistan had since 1958 been an US ally in CENTO and recieved over 1.2 billion dollars worth of military aid in equipment and money.This had bolstered the strength of the Pakistani armed forces to very impressive levels ,bristling as it was by 1965 with hundreds of the latest Patton tanks,Sabre jets and 155 mm artillery guns.The Indian army expansion and reorganization begun after 1962 was still in transition,and while the modernization process was incomplete pakistan held a decided advantage .Pakistan had to strike before the Indians could catch up while it still had the chance to impose a decisive victory on her rival.Zulfiqar Bhutto,advisor to Ayub Khan and later PM summed up the situation as the – ”Last chance to take Kashmir by force”.
(Pakistan’s Grand Strategy)
Failure of Operation Gibraltar –
Pakistan tested Indian resolve and its new weapons by probing constantly in the disputed Rann of Kutch area in repeated skirmishes during April 1965 ,this dispute was eventually settled by British mediation. Emboldened by its performance in the Rann of Kutch,from early August Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar – thousands of pakistani soldiers and Commandoes infiltrated into Kashmir with the object of inciting a general uprising amongst the kashmiri population.It was believed the Indian Army would not cross the ceasefire line and merely defend itself.In the event it failed miserably,as locals informed the Indian army of the intruders which acted swiftly to contain them.In a daring attack the Indians crossed the ceasefire line took Haji Pir Pass -the main entry point of the infiltrators.Faced with a huge loss of face , Ayub unleashed his main conventional strategic scheme -Operation Grand Slam with the confident prediction – ”Hindu morale will not stand a couple of hard blows at the right time and place”.
(Pakistan’s assault – Chamb Sector)
Operation Grand Slam –
Pakistan launched a massive combined armour-infantry assault in Chamb sector aimed at capturing the bridge at Akhnoor – the only all-weather lifeline of India’s main Infantry division in J & K (with 20 battalions) and then used as a staging point for the capture of Jammu,the main communications and logistics hub connecting India with Kashmir.The meagre indian force holding Chamb consisted of 4 infantry battalions and 1 light tank squadron of amx-13s.These faced a a pakistani assault of 8.5 infantry battalions as well as 2 armoured regiments( equipped with pattons which couldn’t be penetrated by the AMX tanks )with a pakistani local superiority of 2:1 in infantry,6:1 in armour and 6:1 in artillery.
(I Corps counterattack in Sialkot sector)
Sorely pressed and on the verge of collapse at Akhnoor,India responded by crossing the International Border and launching its own offensive spearheaded by I corps in the Sialkot sector aimed at relieving the pressure on Akhnoor, carrying the war into the Pakistani heartland of Punjab and threatening Sialkot and Lahore, which would force Pakistan to divert its forces.In this it was succesful,as pressure soon slackened on Akhnoor which was held succesfully.As can be seen on the above map Pakistan’s great advantage in 1965 was that it possesed 2 large scale offensive maneuvre assets in 6th and 1st Armoured division.the 6th was facing the Indian offensive in Sialkot which contained India’s sole I Armoured division.Despite possesing a large overall numerical superiority in Infantry,in the actual battlespace this was reduced to near parity because as many as 38 battalions were tied up in Kashmir and several forces were on the China border.
(Indian XI corps Limited Offensive)
Even before I corps launched its offensive in Sialkot sector,Indian XI corps launched a limited attack on 6th September on the Lahore-Amritsar axis.This formation composed of the 15th ,7th and 4th Infantry divisions launched a three-pronged attack aimed at establishing a forward defensive line on what was ironically considered Pakistan’s great defensive asset in Punjab –the Ichogil Canal.This would capture useful territory which could be used as a bargaining tool later,as well as secure a strong defensive line for the Indian infantry against pakistani armoured attack on the canal line.It would also set up a staging area for a possible later offensive towards Lahore by 15 division in conjunction with the Northern offensive by I corps. XI corps expected to be faced by two pakistani infantry divisions – 10th and the newly raised 11th . Unknown to them, the crack pakistani 1st armoured division was waiting for them (its exact location being not known to Indian intelligence)
The axis of attacks were –
15th Infantry Division along the GT road on Amritsar-Lahore axis.
7th Infantry Division along Khalra-Barki-Bhikkiwind Axis
4th Mountain Division along Khemkaran -Kasur Axis.
The only reserve possesed by XI corps was the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade near Amritsar.This formation was composed of 2 armoured regiments -3rd Cavalry and 8 Cavalry(equipped with AMX-13) . The former was the only Indian armoured formation in the sector equipped with Centurion tanks -the one Indian tank capable of going toe to toe with Pattons.India in 1965 had only 4 regiments of Centurions,and 3 of those were in 1st Armoured division(initially all 4) in Sialkot sector.Indian HQ recognizing AMX equipped brigade wouldn’t be combat effective against pattons had reinforced 2nd Armoured Brigade on the eve of the war by transfering one of the four centurion regiments from 1st armoured division in the form of 3rd Cavalry.This proved to be a far-sighted decision.
(Initial advance of 4th Mountain Division)
4th Mountain Division in Khem Karan Sector –
4th Mtn Div was tasked to capture the Ichogil canal line from Bedian to Lohgarh with one armoured regiment of 9 Deccan Horse( 2 squadrons) equipped with shermans for infantry support.They were tasked also to blow the bridge from Kasur to Khemakaran over the Ichogil canal.
4th Mtn Div consisted of –
> 7 Mountain Brigade consisting of 3 battalions( 4 grenadiers,7 grenadiers,1/9 Gurkha was half strength)
> 62 Mountain Brigade consisting of 3 battalions (9 JAK,13 Dogra,18 Rajputana Rifles)
> Integral Artillery Brigade with one Field Regiment (25 pounders), two Mountain Regiments (3.7 inch howitzers), one Medium Regiment (5.5 inch Guns) and one Light Regiment (120mm mortars).
4th Mountain Division began its attack o the 6th making modest progress owing to strong pakistani defences and its superior long range artillery.However oblivious to the Indians,Pakistan had prepared to deal its primary thrust in this sector.Instead of facing a single infantry brigade ,4 Mtn found itself faced by 11th infantry division with 2 infantry brigades plus the elite pakistani 1st armoured division.Sharp pakistani counterattacks made by 11th division whose commander acted with alacrity(using helicopters to assess the situation rapidly) and its tenous defensive position led to a disorderly withdrawal of 4th Mountain Division to Asal Uttar,just North of Khem Karan where it prepared to make its stand against the incoming onslaught.
(Pakistan’s Plan)
Pakistani Plan –
The Pakistani operational plan was bold and ambitious,and reflected its need for a quick and decisive decision as it lacked the resources for a drawn out attritional struggle. The Pakistani offensive was to be launched in two phases.
Phase 1 entailed 11 Infantry Division to establish a bridgehead across the obstacle system in the area of Khem Karan. In Phase 2, 1 Armoured Division was to break out from the bridgehead in three axes.
The first was by 4 Armoured Brigade with two armoured regiments and a mechanized infantry battalion along Valtoha- Fatehabad and then astride the Sobraon branch canal, to capture the bridges of the Beas.This would cut off West Punjab from rest of India and sever XI corps main Line of Communications and supply.
The second axis was 3 Armoured Brigade with two armoured regiments and a mechanized infantry battalion along Khem Karan-Bhikkiwind-Taran Taran astride Kasur branch canal, to capture Jandiala Guru as also cut off the Grand Trunk road connecting Amritsar with Jallandhar.
. The third axis entailed providing flank protection by 5 Armoured Brigade with one armoured regiment and an infantry battalion advancing west of axis Kasur – Khem Karan- Bhikkiwind.
It was planned to take Harike Bridge by 8th September and reach Beas Bridge by the evening of 9th.
If successful this would cut off Punjab West of the Beas,and allow for the encirclement and destruction of XI Corps by attacks from both flanks and rear,followed by the capture of Amritsar.The road to Delhi –a mere 24 hour drive would be open with no substantial reserves standing in the way. It had the potential to be what has been called India’s ‘Fourth Battle of Panipat’ in the plains of Punjab.
Asal Uttar here assumed a position of prime strategic importance,it commanded the approaches to the 2 main Pakistani thrust lines.Importantly,once past the Asal Uttar area the Pakistani armour would have free reign as terrain was flat and the natural river obstacles would only serve to secure the flanks of their armoured thrust.However before asal uttar this was a liability,the Pakistani bridgehead was very constricted hemmed in between the Rohi nallah and Sobraon branch.The frontage of a Pakistani attack around this area was a small 7kms,with not much space for broad outflanking movements.However once past Asal Uttar this would expand very quickly into a 15km frontage around Patti and a large 45 kms on the Tarn Taran area.Once the numerically and qualitatively superior Pakistani armour penetrated into these areas it would be extremely difficult for any Indian defensive to contain them as the space would allow them to use multiple armoured thrusts from different directions which the Indians lacking sufficient armour would not be able to counter adequately.From the Indian point of view thus it was critical that the Pakistanis be stopped cold at Asal Uttar in a forward defensive before the Pattons could break out into the plains.Indian defensive preparations were conducted accordingly.
CONTD: