How did North Korea get its nuclear weapons?

Aashish

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How did North Korea get its nuclear weapons?
As tensions between America and North Korea simmer, politicians around the world have stepped into condemn Kim Jong-un’s threats of nuclear war.

“The North Korean regime is the cause of this problem and they must fix it,” the UK foreign secretary, Boris Johnson has said.

“The international community is shoulder to shoulder in ensuring North Korea stops its aggressive acts.”

But how did such an isolated and poverty-stricken country manage to get nuclear weapons in the first place?

Somehow, North Korea has obtained the money, knowledge and materials necessary to build missiles which it claims can reach American soil.

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Cold War collaborations

To understand how North Korea got its nuclear weapons, we need to go back to the Second World War.

The whole Korean Peninsula had been under Japanese colonial rule since 1910. But when the US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Japan surrendered and Korea was ‘liberated’.

The peninsula was divided in two: the US controlled the south, while the Soviet Union controlled the north, with former Soviet soldier Kim Il-sung as its administrative leader.

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Both north and south claimed power over the whole area, which ultimately led to the Korean War in 1950. As fighting broke out, US President Truman warned that the use of an atomic bomb was under “active consideration”.

In the end, this threat was not carried out, but both North and South Korea were left in ruins by the war.

In North Korea, more than a million people were killed or unaccounted for, while many more were injured.

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When the war ended, the two sides signed an armistice and Kim Il-sung began consolidating his power in North Korea. He started a dynasty – succeeded by his son, and then his grandson, Kim Jong-un, who is the current leader.

But the tensions with South Korea and America remained.

During the Cold War, North Korea began working with Soviets over its nuclear capabilities. They signed a joint research agreement in 1956 and, for years, Korean scientists were invited abroad for training.

Meanwhile, the US were well ahead of the game. By the early 1960s, it had around 600 nuclear weapons positioned below the border in South Korea.

North Korea, on the other hand, had only progressed to conducting basic experiments. If it was to get nuclear weapons, help from other countries would be essential.

Not long after the Soviet help began, China also got in on the act. For instance, they helped with a geological survey to find uranium in North Korea, revealing huge deposits across the country.

The Pakistan allegations
By the 1990s, North Korea pulled out of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and started using more covert methods to develop its technology.

Documents published by the Washington Post in 2011 appeared to suggest that North Korea managed to bribe top officials in Pakistan’s military to share their country’s nuclear secrets.

One insider, Abdul Qadeer Khan, claimed that he had personally transferred more than $3 million to corrupt officers.

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Huge amounts of cash and jewels were apparently transferred inside cardboard boxes of fruit, in return for sensitive information.

The Pakistani officials have denied the claims, but US intelligence officials believe the evidence is authentic.

Khan says that he was involved in selling components to Iran and Libya, as well as North Korea. But he claims he was acting on behalf of other senior leaders in Pakistan.

The British connection
In order to transfer money, information and components for nuclear weapons, North Korea uses a complicated web of secretive front companies across the world, according to a UN report.

And that includes links to Britain. One such company that was alleged to be involved was finally closed down in 2016, after operating for 11 years.

The Korea National Insurance Corporation was registered in a detached house in the leafy suburbs of south London.

But reports claimed it was secretly channeling up to £33 million a year to Kim Jong-un.

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Authorities linked the firm to a secretive arm of the North Korean government which generates “revenues for the leadership” by managing slush funds.

North Korean officials denied the allegations. An anonymous spokesperson for the embassy in London told the Mail on Sunday: “The EU is making baseless assumptions about KNIC. The company and its workers have been made scapegoats. KNIC has not funded the nuclear programme.”

However, the British connection doesn’t end there.

When North Korea launched its Unha-3 rocket in 2012, South Korea managed to recover some of the debris and allowed UN investigators to examine it.

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They found parts that had been manufactured across the world, including Switzerland, the US and the UK.

Most of these parts were not specifically listed as “prohibited items” for trading – and the manufacturers were probably unaware that they would be used to help develop North Korea’s nuclear programme.

But the UN said the discovery showed that the regime was able to assemble complex missile systems using “globally sourced components”.

So who exactly were these British manufacturers?

FactCheck has obtained letters sent between British government and the UN, showing that authorities managed to identify three different businesses.

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The companies have never been named because government investigators agreed to grant them anonymity.

Their names have been redacted throughout the documents, which were released to FactCheck under the Freedom of Information Act.

The letters suggest that components were sold through a complex chain of companies, before finally ending up in North Korea. Many of them, it seems, were transported via firms in China.

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This was not a one-off, either. Parts made by at least one of these British companies were found yet again, following another North Korean missile test in 2016.

This time, however, they had come via a different chain of companies.

The pressure transmitter on the left was found in North Korea’s missile test in 2012; the one on the right came was used in 2016. But both were originally manufactured in the UK.

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According to the letters we’ve seen, the British companies were cleared of any wrongdoing.

But it has proved difficult for investigators to find out exactly where in the transaction chain the problem lies.

Ukrainian links?
Classified assessments and analysis have recently suggested that North Korea bought the engines for their rockets off a black market, which may link back to a factory in the Ukraine.

Reports claim the factory used to have ties with Russia’s missile programme.

Michael Elleman, a missile expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said: “The big question is how many they have and whether the Ukrainians are helping them now.”

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But the evidence here is not clear. Yuzhmash, the state-owned Ukrainian aerospace company concerned, has disputed the claim – as have the Ukrainian government as well as a US intelligence official.

Elleman explained his analysis saying that the type of liquid-propellant engines used by North Korea recently were based on designs developed under the Soviet Union, and likely came from the Ukrainian factory.

“We’ve seen it there,” he said. “So that’s the most likely source.”

However, an unnamed US intelligence official told CNN: “We have intelligence to suggest that North Korea is not reliant on imports of engines – instead, we judge they have the ability to produce the engines themselves.”

But the Ukrainian link doesn’t end there. CCTV footage released by the country’s security services in August reportedly showed two North Korean spies photographing what they thought were designs for nuclear missiles. It was actually an elaborate sting operation to catch the secret agents.

Ukrainian officials used this footage to argue that they would have successfully intercepted any attempt by North Korea to obtain missile technology from them.

Whoever is right about Ukraine’s links with North Korea’s nuclear missile programme, there is no doubt that a range of countries around the world have been essential for acquiring the the necessary materials and cash.

Despite efforts from the international community, it seems the flow of resources has continued.

Evading sanctions
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According to the UN, North Korea has increasingly tried to circumnavigate rules and sanctions by using secretive organisations and criminal groups.

The UK government already has sanctions in place against 55 organisations and 100 individuals. But it seems there are many more who have slipped under the authorities’ radar.

Particularly useful to the North Korean regime are many of the world’s secretive tax havens, which have allowed financial paper trails to be buried.

For instance, a firm called DCB Finance Ltd was registered in the British Virgin Islands by a former British banker, Nigel Cowie.

But leaked documents seen by the Guardian suggest it was actually front company for Daedong Credit Bank, which has allegedly been used to help finance and expand North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.

Nigel Cowie’s lawyer told the Guardian that DCB Finance Ltd was used for “legitimate business”, adding that Cowie was “unaware of any transactions being made with any sanctioned organisation or for any sanctioned purpose, during his tenure”.

However, the US issued sanctions against his company in 2013, claiming it was used by Daedong Credit Bank “as a means to avoid scrutiny”.

Elaborate secrecy is not uncommon. In February, the UN said North Korea’s evasion techniques were “increasing in scale, scope and sophistication”.

It said: “Diplomats, missions and trade representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea systematically play key roles in prohibited sales, procurement, finance and logistics.”

According to one account, the UN suspects North Korea of shipping materials from countries including China, Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, the Cayman Islands, the Philippines, Mauritania, Singapore.

The sheer number of countries, companies and individuals tied up in it all makes preventing the flow of resources a near impossible task.

But one thing seems certain: North Korea wouldn’t be able to make its nuclear weapons without help from the outside world.

Source - How did North Korea get its nuclear weapons?


@nair @Hellfire @Avi @vstol Jockey @randomradio @Picdelamirand-oil @Abingdonboy @BMD @Ashwin @Tarun @anant_s @GuardianRED @Ankit Kumar @Nick @Falcon @Levina @bonobashi @Arvind @Shashank @Ashutosh @Himanshu @Himanshu Pandey @SpArK @Manmohan_MMY @Arpit @Soumya @tunguska @Harry @halloweene @Parthu @dray @all
 
North Korea

After approval from the Prime Minister and the COAS, a contract was signed with the North Koreans for a Km 1500 surface-to-surface guided missile. A delegation led by me and including Gen. Mian Mushtaq, DGCD, Admiral Sohail Ahmed Khan, Col. Qazi, Dr. Mirza, Nasim Khan and others visited North Korea for about 5 days. Later their team came here and the deal was finalized with the participation of the then DGCD, Gen. Ziauddin, Dr. Samar Mubarakmand and Chairman Suparco, Mr. Sikander. The Korean team was officially allowed to stay at Kahuta once the products started coming. This was some time in 1993-4. They had to work in the shops and instruct our engineers and technicians in the making of the components. Most of their work was in the two machine shops that were also producing and assembling centrifuges and centrifuge sub-assemblies. They became interested in the technology and some engineers spent a lot of time with Khokhar in his shop where rotor tubes, bellows, etc. were being made and there was a test-bed of P-2. Khokhar was making the liquid fuel rocket engine and needed the Koreans the whole day on a daily basis. During the course of their stay it is quite possible that he explained some details of centrifuge machines to them.

Some time in 1996, when the missile project was in full swing, some payments from the GHQ to the Koreans were pending. Somebody from GHQ advised Gen Kang, the Korean representative, to pay some money to Gen. Ziauddin to get the money released. Gen. Kang gave him a suitcase containing $ 0.5 million. Gen. Ziauddin informed Gen. Waheed, COAS, and they returned the money to Kang. Gen. J. Karamat, CGS, came to know of this and phoned me after a few days saying that I should arrange with Gen. Kang to pay this money to him for some secret army funds. He would then sanction the payment of their outstanding charges. He phoned me a few times to expedite the matter. I talked to Gen. Kang and he gave me the $ 0.5 million in cash, which I personally delivered to Gen. J. Karamat. In the meantime Gen. Karamat became COAS and said to me that he needed more money for the same secret funds and that I should talk to Gen. Kang. Gen. Kang came back to me after a few days and said that his boss was willing to give a further $ 2.5 million, provided we helped them with the enrichment technology. They already had a production reactor and were producing plutonium. They had also manufactured a few weapons as, according to Gen. Kang’s boss, they had received Kg 200 plutonium and weapon designs from the Russians in the mid-fifties after the Korean War. They had shown Dr. Mirza and me the perfect nuclear weapon, technologically more advanced than ours. They wanted this technology only for fuel for the power reactors as it cost only 1/10 of that of the diffusion process and required only low capital investment. They were not interested in weapon-grade production of material and did not ask any questions or for drawings for specially designed cascades for weapon-grade material. I informed Gen. J. Karamat; he agreed and gave me a go-ahead. I asked my people to prepare 20 outdated P-1 machines and gave them. Since they were working in the plant and were familiar with the P-2 machines, they asked for 4 of these too. I discussed the matter with the COAS and obtained his approval. After that I personally gave the remaining $ 2.5 million to Gen. Karamat in cash at the Army House to make up the whole amount. The senior engineers at Kahuta were responsible for the Korean’s movements and work. People at the plant were mixing with them every day and taking them around or discussing things with them. I was hardly there. I used to go to Kahuta for 3 or 4 hours to do administrative work and mostly spent the time in my office or with Brig. Behram who was making a launcher, which was our priority at the time. The Koreans took the machines in their own plane with which they were bringing missile parts for us. Security Staff was always present to check incoming and outgoing cargo. Even Dr. Mirza and Nasim Khan made some control panels and software packages and gave them. The Koreans had brought some UF6 gas for analysis, which we tested and found that it was not pure enough. They requested a few Kg of depleted gas for comparison purposes, which we gave them. Technically and monetarily it had no value. One could buy such a sample from abroad. One flowmeter was given to them as a sample. A flowmeter is an ordinary instrument in a UF6 plant. It is banned for Pakistan but available in the open market in Europe. They, in return, taught us how to make Krytrons (fast switches), which were banned items and are needed in nuclear weapons detonation. This was very valuable to us.

After having been here for years, the COAS (Gen. Pervez Musharraf) desired that we should send the Koreans back immediately. They left within 3 days. After that we had no more contact with them.

I left KRL on 31.3.2001 and that was that.

As far as the destroying of any papers or gate passes is concerned, I only advised people not to keep any papers or records that could implicate Pakistan with transfer of technology or equipment to North Korea at any later stage. At that time there were various lobbies against Pakistan and I feared that these papers could, if falling into wrong hands, be used to implicate Pakistan. It was only meant as a precautionary measure.

I have done nothing against the interests of Pakistan and whatever I did could not have resulted in proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was primarily meant to keep up our friendship with those countries that had been helping Pakistan from time to time.

I would like to reiterate that I never - repeat never - ever put foot on Iranian or Libyan soil.

A.Q. Khan's Thirteen-Page Confession
 
Let's not get carried away here. A power resistor and pressure transmitter are not state-of-the-art or even high technology. You could buy them from Maplin or RS Components, or even ebay/amazon.
 
Exclusive: North Korea 'secretly helped by Iran to gain nuclear weapons', British officials fear

Iran signs nuclear deal, NK suddenly get H-Bomb and ICBM shortly after.

Exclusive: North Korea 'secretly helped by Iran to gain nuclear weapons', British officials fear
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Kim Jong-Un looking at a metal casing at an undisclosed location CREDIT: STR/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

9 SEPTEMBER 2017 • 9:30PM
North Korea’s sudden advancement in developing nuclear weapons may be due to secret support from Iran, British officials fear.

The Foreign Office is investigating whether “current and former nuclear states” helped Kim Jong-Un in his drive to mount nuclear warheads on missiles.

Senior Whitehall sources told The Sunday Telegraph it is not credible that North Korean scientists alone brought about the technological advances.

Iran is top of the list of countries suspected of giving some form of assistance, while Russia is also in the spotlight.

The fear is that outside influences have provided North Korea with equipment or expertise that has moved them closer to becoming a nuclear nation.

“North Korean scientists are people of some ability, but clearly they’re not doing it entirely in a vacuum,” said one Government minister.
 
Let's not get carried away here. A power resistor and pressure transmitter are not state-of-the-art or even high technology. You could buy them from Maplin or RS Components, or even ebay/amazon.

Will you provide details of those MilSpec transistors and transmitter which used by Pak and North Korea in 80s and 90s?

Further, the link of website which sold these in 80s and 90s.
Thank You
 
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How did North Korea get a liquid-propellant engine for its Hwasong Missiles?


Quoting from - The secret to North Korea’s ICBM success

North Korea’s missile programme has made astounding strides over the past two years. An arsenal that had been based on short- and medium-range missiles along with an intermediate-range Musudan that repeatedly failed flight tests, has suddenly been supplemented by two new missiles: the intermediate-range Hwasong-12 and the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Hwasong-14. No other country has transitioned from a medium-range capability to an ICBM in such a short time. What explains this rapid progression? The answer is simple. North Korea has acquired a high-performance liquid-propellant engine (LPE) from a foreign source.

Available evidence clearly indicates that the LPE is based on the Soviet RD-250 family of engines, and has been modified to operate as the boosting force for the Hwasong-12 and -14. An unknown number of these engines were probably acquired though illicit channels operating in Russia and/or Ukraine. North Korea’s need for an alternative to the failing Musudan and the recent appearance of the RD-250 engine along with other evidence, suggests the transfers occurred within the past two years.

Identifying the new LPE and its origins

The origins of the new engine (see Figures 1 and 2) are difficult to determine with certainty. However, a process of elimination sharply narrows the possibilities.

There is no evidence to suggest that North Korea successfully designed and developed the LPE indigenously. Even if, after importing Scud and Nodong engines, North Korea had mastered the production of clones, which remains debateable, this does not mean that it could design, develop and manufacture a large LPE from scratch, especially one that uses higher-performance propellants and generates 40 tonnes’ thrust.

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Figure 1: The liquid-propellant engines ground tested in September 2016 and March 2017 appear to be the same, though only the second ground test and the Hwasong-12 flight test operate with four auxiliary or vernier engines, which steer the missile.

Claims that the LPE is a North Korean product would be more believable if the country’s experts had in the recent past developed and tested a series of smaller, less powerful engines, but there are no reports of such activities. Indeed, prior to the Hwasong-12 and -14 flights, every liquid-fuelled missile launched by North Korea – all of the Scuds and Nodongs, even the Musudan – was powered by an engine developed and originally produced by the Russian enterprise named for A.M. Isayev; the Scud, Nodong and R-27 (from which the Musudan is derived) missiles were designed and originally produced by the Russian concern named after V.P. Makeyev. It is, therefore, far more likely that the Hwasong-12 and -14 are powered by an LPE imported from an established missile power.

If this engine was imported, most potential sources can be eliminated because the external features, propellant combination and performance profile of the LPE in question are unique. The engine tested by North Korea does not physically resemble any LPE manufactured by the US, France, China, Japan, India or Iran. Nor do any of these countries produce an engine that uses storable propellants and generates the thrust delivered by the Hwasong-12 and -14 LPE. This leaves the former Soviet Union as the most likely source.

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Figure 2: The three missiles tested by North Korea are powered by the same engine complex, with one main engine and four steering engines

Given North Korea’s reliance to date on technologies originating with the Isayev and Makeyev enterprises, one might suspect one or both as the probable supplier. However, neither enterprise has been associated with an engine that matches the performance of LPE used by Hwasong-12 and -14.

An exhaustive search of engines produced by other manufacturers in the former Soviet Union yields a couple of possibilities, all of which are associated with the Russian enterprise named after V.P. Glushko, now known as Energomash. The RD-217, RD-225 and RD-250 engine families use high-energy, storable-liquid propellants similar to those employed by engines tested by North Korea. Neither the RD-217 nor RD-225 have external features matching those of North Korea’s new engine. The RD-250 is the only match.

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Figure 3: The RD-250 engine consists of a pair of combustion chambers fed by a single turbopump. Each chamber produces about 394k Newtons of thrust, or about 40 tonnes’ force, when relying on UDMH as the fuel, and N2O4 as the oxidiser. The RD-250’s nozzle also features a cooling tube and a compliance ring that resemble those found on the engines tested by North Korea. The small engine with its nozzle pointed upward and displayed in the foreground is not associated with the RD-250 engine.

The RD-250 engine is normally configured as a pair of combustion chambers, which receive propellant from a single turbopump, as shown in Figure 3. When operated in tandem, the two chambers generate roughly 78–80 tonnes’ thrust. This level of thrust is similar to the claims North Korea made when the first ground test was conducted and publicised in September 2016.

It gradually became clear, however, that the Hwasong-12 and -14 used single-chamber engines. Note, for example, that Pyongyang claimed that a new pump design was used for the September ground test. This makes sense, because operating the RD-250 as a single chamber LPE would necessitate a new or modified turbopump. Having no demonstrated experience modifying or developing large LPE turbopumps, Pyongyang’s engineers would have been hard pressed to make the modifications themselves. Rather, the technical skills needed to modify the existing RD-250 turbopump, or fashioning a new one capable of feeding propellant to a single chamber would reside with experts with a rich history of working with the RD-250. Such expertise is available at Russia’s Energomash concern and Ukraine’s KB Yuzhnoye. One has to conclude that the modified engines were made in those factories.

The alternative hypothesis, that Russian/Ukraine engineers were employed in North Korea is less likely, given the absence of any known production facility in North Korea for such engines. In addition, Western experts who visited KB Yuzhnoye Ukraine within the past year told the author that a single-chamber version was on display at a nearby university and that a local engineer boasted about producing it.

Why single-chamber engines were transferred rather than the more powerful double-chamber original versions is unclear. One possible hypothesis is that the exporters, for whatever reason, exercised restraint in what they were willing to transfer to North Korea. Combined with a second stage, however, the single-chamber RD-250 engine is powerful enough to send an ICBM to cities on the American West Coast at least.

The RD-250 was originally designed by the Glushko enterprise of Russia, and produced and incorporated into the first stage of the R-36 (SS-9) ICBM and the Tsiklon-2 satellite launcher by KB Yuzhnoye of Ukraine. The Tsiklon-2 carrier rocket lofted its first satellite into orbit in 1969, with the last of 106 launches occurring in 2006. While Yuzhnoye was responsible for producing the Tsiklon-2 rocket, Russian entities launched the satellite. The relationship survived the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 primarily because of long-standing institutional linkages, and the commercial interests of both enterprises and countries. However, despite the Tsiklon-2’s unsurpassed reliability record, Russia stopped purchasing the Yuzhnoye rocket in 2006 in favour of an indigenous system. Yuzhnoye’s repeated attempts to market the rocket and related technologies to other potential customers, including Boeing and Brazil, yielded little. The once vaunted KB Yuzhnoye has been near financial collapse since roughly 2015.

The total number of RD-250 engines fabricated in Russia and Ukraine is not known. However, there are almost certainly hundreds, if not more, of spares stored at KB Yuzhnoye’s facilities and at warehouses in Russia where the Tsiklon-2 was used. Spares may also exist at one or more of Energomash’s many facilities spread across Russia. Because the RD-250 is no longer employed by operational missiles or launchers, facilities warehousing the obsolete LPEs are probably loosely guarded. A small team of disgruntled employees or underpaid guards at any one of the storage sites, and with access to the LPEs, could be enticed to steal a few dozen engines by one of the many illicit arms dealers, criminal networks, or transnational smugglers operating in the former Soviet Union. The engines (less than two metres tall and one metre wide) can be flown or, more likely, transported by train through Russia to North Korea.

Pyongyang has many connections in Russia, including with the illicit network that funnelled Scud, Nodong and R-27 (Musudan) hardware to North Korea in the 1980s and 1990s. United Nations sanctions imposed on Pyongyang have likely strengthened the Kim regime’s ties to these criminal networks. North Korean agents seeking missile technology are also known to operate in Ukraine. In 2012, for example, two North Korean nationals were arrested and convicted by Ukrainian authorities for attempting to procure missile hardware from Yuzhnoye. Today, Yuzhnoye’s facilities lie close to the front lines of the Russian-controlled secessionist territory. Clearly, there is no shortage of potential routes through which North Korea might have acquired the few dozen RD-250 engines that would be needed for an ICBM programme.

How did North Korea acquire the RD-250 engine?

When and from where RD-250 engines may have been shipped to North Korea is difficult to determine. It is possible the transfers occurred in the 1990s, when North Korea was actively procuring Scud- and Nodong-related hardware, as well as R-27 technology and its Isayev 4D10 engine. But this seems unlikely for three reasons.

Firstly, the network North Korea relied on in the 1990s focused on products originating from Russia’s Makeyev and Isayev enterprises. Energomash and Yuzhnoye had limited connections to Makeyev or Isayev; indeed, they were rival enterprises competing for contracts as the Soviet Union crumbled. It is, therefore, a stretch to assume the illicit channels Pyongyang was using in the 1990s had access to products manufactured or used at either Yuzhnoye or Energomash two decades ago.

Secondly, until recently, North Korea appeared to focus on exploiting R-27 hardware for its long-range missile ambitions. Pyongyang’s first intermediate-range missile, the Musudan, which was first displayed in a 2010 parade, is derived from the R-27 technology acquired in the 1990s. Moreover, until the Hwasong-12 launch in March 2017, Pyongyang’s design concepts for a prospective ICBM featured a first stage powered by a cluster of two Isayev 4D10 LPEs. Photographs taken while Kim Jong-un toured a missile plant in March 2016 captured the back end of an ICBM prototype that appeared to house a pair of 4D10 engines, not a single RD-250 LPE. A month later, Kim attended the ground test featuring a cluster of two 4D10 engines operating in tandem, a clear indication that North Korea’s future ICBM would rely on this configuration. There is no evidence during this period to suggest that North Korea was developing a missile based on the RD-250 engine.

Thirdly, the Isayev 4D10 engine, which relies on staged combustion, is a complicated closed-cycle system that is integrated within the missile’s fuel tank. If the open-cycle, externally mounted RD-250 engine had been available in 2015, engineers would have likely preferred to use it to power a new long-range missile, as it shares many features with the engines North Korea has worked with for decades.

However, when North Korean specialists began flight testing the Musudan in 2016, the missile repeatedly failed soon after ignition. Only one flight test is believed to have been successful. The cause of the string of failures cannot be determined from media reports. That many failed very early in flight suggests that problems with either the engine itself, or the unique ‘submerged’ configuration of the engine, were responsible. If this was the case, North Korea’s engineers may have recognised that they could not easily overcome the challenges. This might explain why the Musudan has not been tested since 2016.

The maiden appearance of the modified RD-250 in September 2016 roughly coincides with North Korea’s decision to halt Musudan testing. It is reasonable to speculate that Kim’s engineers knew the Musudan presented grim or insurmountable technical challenges, which prompted a search for an alternative. If North Korea began its quest to identify and procure a new LPE in 2016, the start of the search would have occurred in the same year Yuzhnoye was experiencing the full impact of its financial shortfalls. This is not to suggest that the Ukrainian government was involved, and not necessarily Yuzhnoye executives. Workers at Yuzhnoye facilities in Dnipropetrovsk and Pavlograd were likely the first ones to suffer the consequences of the economic misfortunes, leaving them susceptible to exploitation by unscrupulous traders, arms dealers and transnational criminals operating in Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere.

North Korea’s ICBM still a work in progress

Acquisition of the modified RD-250 engine enabled North Korea to bypass the failing Musudan development effort and begin work on creating an ICBM sooner than previously expected. The Hwasong-14, however, is not yet an operationally viable system. Additional flight tests are needed to assess the missile’s navigation and guidance capabilities, overall performance under operational conditions and its reliability. Empirical data derived from tests to validate the efficacy of warhead re-entry technologies is also needed. Pyongyang could elect to deploy the Hwasong-14 as early as 2018, after only a handful of additional test launches, but at the risk of fielding a missile with marginal reliability. The risks could be reduced over time by continuing flight trials after the missile is assigned to combat units.

Further, the Hwasong-14 employs an underpowered second stage, which could limit Kim Jong-un to threatening only those American cities situated along the Pacific Coast. Arguably, Pyongyang will want a more powerful ICBM, one that can target the entire US mainland. The modified RD-250 engine can be clustered to provide a basis for an improved ICBM, but development of a new missile will require time.

It is not too late for the US and its allies, along with China and perhaps Russia, to negotiate an agreement that bans future missile testing, and effectively prevents North Korea from perfecting its capacity to terrorise America with nuclear weapons. But the window of opportunity will soon close, so diplomatic action must be taken immediately.
 
How was the RD 250 proto-type engines transported from Ukraine, when stringent international sanctions were in place? The answer lies with smuggling networks in China and Pakistan, which have with impunity violated non-proliferation rules and
regimes. A total of 5233 Chinese companies have traded (including in dual-use technology) with North Korea between 2013 and 2016. One example of an actual smuggling initiative is the case of the Chinese company Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Co. Ltd., which exported US $28.5 million worth of material to North Korea during 2013-2016, including a shipment of $790,000 worth of ‘radio navigational aid apparatus’ in June 2016.

According to experts at the James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, the goods probably included guidance devices for ballistic missiles. The Hong Kong business registry states that the firm's owner is Sun Sidong, a Chinese national. A ship that was owned by Sun Sidong — Jie Shun — was seized last year by Egyptian authorities. It was carrying 30,000 North Korean-made rocket
propelled grenades concealed under a cargo of iron ore. It was found that the ownership of the vessel had recently changed and the present registered owner was one Sun Sihong, who listed her residential address as an apartment in the same
complex as Sun Sidong!

China has also supplied six transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) trucks, which are designed to move and fire ballistic missiles. Such a mobile system makes satellite surveillance difficult. The trucks were made by China’s Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Company, which is a subsidiary of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp, a state-owned company that makes the Shenzhou rocket as well as missiles. When questioned about the sale, China mendaciously gave a written submission to the UN with a copy of the end-user certificate provided by North Korea that the vehicles had been imported for the purpose of transporting
timber! This year, North Korea has used another Chinese truck model, made by Sinotruk, to tow a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
 
North Korea-Pakistan Nexus

A cause for serious disquiet is that the bi-conic warhead design of the Hwasong missiles appears similar to the warhead on Pakistan’s Ababeel missile, which has MIRV compatibility. The warhead has reportedly been made with Chinese help, and designs or the warhead itself has been supplied to Pyongyang from Pakistan.

Photographic analysis of North Korea’s new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) reveals the nose cone of the nuclear-capable rocket appears similar to a suspected Chinese-supplied warhead for a Pakistani nuclear-capable missile.

Missile analyst Rick Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, tells Inside the Ring the warhead stage of the new ICBM, dubbed Hwasong-14 and flight-tested with great fanfare July 4, appears very similar to the last stage of a missile tested in January by Pakistan.

The Pakistani medium-range Ababeel missile was flight-tested Jan. 24 and is assessed to be capable of carrying either a conventional or nuclear warhead.

The warhead stage similarities suggest “there is a real possibility that North Korea and Pakistan are continuing their historic cooperation in the development of long-range ballistic missiles,” Mr. Fisher said.

Mr. Fisher said Asian intelligence sources told him that the third warhead stage of the Ababeel is liquid-fueled and was launched atop two solid-fuel stages developed from Pakistan’s Shaheen II or Shaheen III medium-range missiles.

The new Hwasong-14 appears to use three liquid-fuel stages, and the nose cone shown in state-run North Korean video reveals it is nearly identical to the new Pakistan missile nose cone.

“What is important to note is that, according to Indian sources, Ababeel demonstrated either a multiple-warhead capability or the ability to deploy decoys along with a single warhead,” Mr. Fisher said.

The multiple-warhead capability for the Ababeel is likely sourced to China, which has provided Pakistan with nuclear weapons and other missile technology for several decades, he added.

“It is also possible that China could have given this technology to North Korea originally, using a Pakistan test as a means to further conceal the technology origin,” Mr. Fisher said, noting it is “very unlikely” such multiple-warhead technology could have been developed indigenously by either Pakistan or North Korea.

China’s goal has been to create ever greater deniability regarding its proliferation of missile and nuclear technologies by enabling North Korea, Pakistan and Iran to become nuclear missile states via their discreet sharing of technologies, much of which comes from China,” he said.

Another clear sign of Chinese collusion with the North Korean and Pakistani missile programs is the fact that both mobile launchers used to fire the Hwasong-14 and Pakistan’s Shaheen III appear to be made by the Sanjiang Special Vehicle Corp. of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp., China’s main missile maker.

Despite the disclosures of covert Chinese exports of mobile launchers since 2012, the U.S. government had taken no action against Beijing.

“What matters for American security planners is that North Korea’s Hwasong-14 ICBM may begin its career with a multiple warhead capability — technology that will likely be improved as North Korea develops its solid fuel and mobile medium-range and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles,” Mr. Fisher said.

A mobile ICBM capability for North Korea greatly increases the danger of a surprise nuclear attack.

The North Korean regime of Kim Jong-un for years has threatened to conduct nuclear attacks on the United States and has produced videos simulating nuclear strikes on American cities.

Inside the Ring: North Korea’s ICBM warhead


Cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea is long standing, and there is evidence that Benazir Bhutto, former prime minister of Pakistan, visited Pyongyang in 1993 and procured several computer disks containing blueprints for the No-Dong missile, which she delivered to A.Q. Khan.

With Pakistan in turmoil and the Bush administration rapidly losing patience with Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the time seems ripe for Benazir Bhuttos return to power. But how would the former prime minister handle the most critical international issue confronting Pakistan today? We are not talking about dealing with Islamic extremists within its borders, though that is perilous enough. Even more critical to the international community is the matter of securing Pakistans nuclear arsenal and eradicating the final vestiges of A.Q. Khans nuclear Wal-Mart. Bhutto may say all the right things on this issue, but history raises troubling questions about her performance when it comes to nuclear weapons.

In the fall of 1989, less than a year into her first term as prime minister, Bhutto attended a conference for Islamic heads of government in Tehran. On the sidelines, then President of Iran Hashemi Rafsanjani pulled Bhutto aside to talk about a critical matter:

Our countries have reached an agreement on special defense matters, Rafsanjani said, according to a Bhutto aide who was there. This agreement was reached on a military-to-military basis, but I want us to reaffirm it as leaders of our governments.

Bhutto maintained that she knew nothing of any defense pact with Iran. What exactly are you talking about, Mr. President? she asked, gesturing for the aide to move closer to overhear.

Nuclear technology, Madam Prime Minister, nuclear technology, said the Iranian leader.

Two years earlier, A.Q. Khan, a leading Pakistani nuclear scientist, had sold Iran components and plans for centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for weapons or to fuel civilian reactors. The equipment and knowledge gave Iran a jump-start in its secret program to enrich uranium, which the United States and other countries now claim is part of a plan to produce a nuclear weapon.

Bhutto has confirmed the story and consistently said that she was furious to find out from Rafsanjani that Pakistan was providing its nuclear technology to Iran. She said she responded by ordering that no nuclear scientist be permitted to travel outside Pakistan without her approval. Although Bhutto publicly declared her opposition to nuclear weapons for Pakistan, she often took a different line in private discussions and talked about extending the nuclear legacy of her late father, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who began the effort in 1972 to build an Islamic Bomb.

The military ousted Benazir Bhutto as prime minister in 1990, in part because her ties to the United States had raised fears that she would sacrifice the countrys nuclear program. Pakistans nuclear weapons capability simply cannot be safe under the leadership of a Westernized woman, said Maulana Sami ul-Haq, the head of one of the Islamic parties aligned with the intelligence service at the time.

After engineering a political comeback and winning reelection in October 1993, Bhutto reemerged wiser and wilier, determined to avoid confrontation with senior military and intelligence officials. So when Khan requested an appointment with her in December 1993, Bhutto saw an opportunity to recruit an ally. By that time, Khan was recognized as the public face of Pakistans nuclear weapons program, an open secret in the country and the world. He was wealthy and influential, supported by the generals and intelligence masters Bhutto feared most.

Arriving at Bhuttos office, Khan explained that he knew the prime minister was scheduled to pay a state visit to China later that month. He asked if she would make a detour on his behalf. If you are going to North Korea, it would be very nice if you could talk to Kim Il Sung about helping us with this nuclear thing, said Khan, according to Bhuttos own recollection.

A Tale of Two Bhuttos

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This missile, which was smuggled to Iran, re-appeared as Shabab-3 and in Pakistan as Hatf-V. North Korean design features are also visible in the Hatf-IX missiles, which are being used by Pakistan as tactical weapons to be deployed along the Indian border (especially in Gujranwala).

Missile-related developments in Pakistan are especially worrying but not as worrying as the illicit nuclear network between Pyongyang and Islamabad, with Beijing serving as the pivot. Galaxy Corporation Pvt Ltd, a Pakistani front company affiliated with
the Pakistan Energy Commission (PAEC), has supplied to North Korea two specialised nickel-alloy metals — Inconel and Monel – which are corrosion-resistant and have applications in uranium enrichment and chemical weapons production.

Another questionable export is that of vacuum induction melting (VIM) furnaces used in forging uranium or plutonium metal into hemispheres for the fissile pit and is hence controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) due to their utility for nuclear weapons manufacturing.

These had been procured from Suntech Technologies, a Beijing-based company, which is a primary producer of these items. A complaint lodged by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was officially received (June 2016) by the China Atomic
Energy Authority (CAEA) on this matter. Galaxy Corporation’s imports from other Chinese companies include thyratrons (used as triggering devices in nuclear weapons) and radiation monitors with the end-user certificate being shown as PAEC. These items are an integral part of the hydrogen bomb test conducted by Pyongyang on September 3, 2017.

Pakistan continuing to sell nuclear materials to North Korea, reveal US sources
PAEC have been continuing to supply restricted items such as 'Monel' and 'Inconel' material to North Korea in violation of UN sanctions
Pakistan is continuing to sell nuclear materials to North Korea, while at the same time urging the international community to accept its membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), according to highly placed US sources who are involved with the tracking of nuclear commerce.

In making this dramatic revelation, the sources said that entities of the Pakistan Energy Commission (PAEC) have been continuing to supply restricted items such as 'Monel' and 'Inconel' material to North Korea in violation of UN sanctions.


The sources said that nuclear materials supplied to the PAEC by Chinese entities have also found their way to North Korea, with the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) recently receiving a written complaint that supplies of a Chinese company, Beijing Suntech Technology Company Limited, to Pakistan were being diverted to North Korea by the Pakistani authorities.

The Chinese Government hushed up the matter as it could have consequences for Beijing's bid to support Pakistan at the NSG. But this information leaked out of North Korea and came to the knowledge Of Western Governments who are members of the NSG.

In another alarming revelation, informed sources said Pakistan has been giving North Korea equipment which has a direct bearing on producing nuclear weapons. Sources said the Beijing Suntech Technology Company Limited manufactures Vacuum Induction Melting (VIM) furnaces which find application in refining hard metals such as uranium and plutonium, which are used in making nuclear warhead cores. Pakistan is known to have procured these items from China and has passed them along to North Korea.

When asked if this evidence of Pakistan's illicit nuclear trade with North Korea has been brought to the notice of NSG nations, US sources said all proof and evidence which confirms the violation of sanctions against North Korea and more so the ongoing dangerous nuclear trade has been brought to the notice of "those who need to be informed at the NSG level."

Behind the scenes Pakistan is aware that it's nuclear trade with North Korea has been uncovered, but is counting on China to keep the global pressure at bay, said sources.

Giving details of North Korea's nuclear commerce links with Pakistan, informed sources mentioned that two North Korean diplomats - Kim Yong Choi and Jang Yong Son – posted in the North Korean Embassy in Tehran visited Pakistan eight times between 2012 and 2015. They were associated With the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation ( KOMID ) - an entity sanctioned several times by the United Nations Security Council since 2005 for its involvement in North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programme.

These diplomats met with Pakistani officers involved in the nuclear program. They were tracked and investigated by the Western authorities as yet another proof of Pakistan's continuing nuclear links with North Korea.

Based on Western inputs on these links, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 1718 Committee, which is monitoring the implementation of sanctions against North Korea, sought information from Pakistan in November 2015 regarding the frequent visits of the two North Korean diplomats from Tehran to Islamabad and Karachi.

At first, say informed sources, Pakistan denied it, but when confronted with photographs and other recorded evidence, Pakistan acknowledged that the two North Korean officials under investigation had indeed visited Islamabad and Karachi.

Highly placed sources said that the West has so far kept this information under wraps in recognition of Pakistan's value in the war against terror.

But now, when Pakistan has gone into overdrive to upset the equilibrium of the NSG, Western nations of the grouping are saying that Islamabad needs to "look at itself in the mirror " and ask "how can it run with the hare and hunt with the foxes", meaning it can't claim to fulfill the NSG's requirements, and at the same time, sell nuclear weapons materials to North Korea.

Pakistan continuing to sell nuclear materials to North Korea, reveal US sources

Further, two North Korean diplomats, Kim Yong Choi and Jang Yong Son, posted in the North Korean Embassy in Tehran till 2016, and affiliated to Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) — a UN Security Council-designated North Korean weapons trading firm – were frequent visitors to Pakistan between 2012 and 2015. They met with Pakistani officers involved in the country’s nuclear programme.

According to international observers, the North Korea-Pakistan nexus is being sustained by transportation networks, using cargo ships in the ports of Dalian in China, Wonsan in North Korea and Qasim in Pakistan. Indian intelligence also has satellite imagery to show that the Karakoram Highway has been used to supply illicit nuclear material and dual-use items for missiles. This brings us to India’s threat perceptions regarding Pakistan’s nuclear capability.

Recently, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi claimed that his country has short-range nuclear weapons to counter the 'Cold Start' doctrine ‘adopted’ by the Indian Army. This would indicate that Rawalpindi has successfully miniaturized nuclear warheads. This needs to be assessed in tandem with Kim Jong–Un’s claims that North Korea has miniaturized nuclear warheads, and also has adequate knowledge of programming and controlling thermonuclear/hydrogen fission bombs. This is a matter for serious disquiet, given Pakistan’s long-standing nuclear and missile-related trade with North Korea.

From an article by Prabha Rao - How North Korea was armed & all other articles with sources
 
Project Alpha has obtained Pakistani shipping records which can be used to help further corroborate the Indian allegations. These shipping records make clear that Beijing Suntech has indeed supplied dual-use goods to Pakistani customers, including entities involved in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme.

The documents obtained by Project Alpha state that Beijing Suntech has made multiple shipments of goods to a Pakistani company, Galaxy Corporation PVT LTD, which we assess to be a probable front for the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) or another entity within Pakistan’s nuclear programme.21 It is PAEC that the Indian allegations accuse of being responsible for shipping equipment to the DPRK.

Beijing Suntech’s recorded shipments to Galaxy Corporation between January and April 2016 have included dual-use goods with potential utility in the nuclear fuel cycle and WMD-related applications. The documents do not, however, detail any shipments of vacuum furnaces, Inconel or Monel, nor does it show any shipments of goods from Beijing Suntech or Galaxy Corporation to the DPRK as per the allegations. Still, the shipping information does verify that Beijing Suntech has supplied dual-use equipment to Pakistan, and probably to Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Whether any of this equipment has then been diverted to the DPRK is unknown.

A link chart showing the known and alleged connections between Beijing Suntech, Galaxy Corporation, and the DPRK is shown below.

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Figure 5. Beijing Suntech Corporation, Galaxy Corporation, Pakistan and the DPRK

Verification using ship-tracking information
According to one of the accusations made in June by the Indian press, ‘nuclear missile materials are being transported by Pakistan to North Korea by sea, using cargo ships.’22 Another report states that:
‘America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had recently tipped off friendly countries, including India, about…illicit nuclear trade between Pakistan and North Korea and asked them to heighten surveillance of cargo ships carrying white goods emanating from Pakistan. On its part, the CIA is also tracking such movements in the region… Merchant cargo and empty ships originating from Pakistan and sailing to other South East Asian countries are also being kept under surveillance to track nuclear trade, the sources said.”

It should be noted that a few days before these reports, talks between India and the US about maritime safety were held, including discussions on monitoring ' ‘white [i.e. non-military] shipping’' in the region.24 These talks may have been the forum in which alleged illicit shipments between Pakistan and the DPRK were discussed.

Ship-tracking information and other shipping databases give some insights into sea cargo flows between Pakistan and the DPRK. An enquiry using SeaRates, a shipping database, shows that the last regular sea cargo route between Pakistan and North Korea was in 2010:

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But even today, despite existing sanctions, it is apparently possible for at least one shipping company to offer shipments from Pakistan to North Korea and to ask for the appropriate modalities:

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These apparent offers for shipping from Pakistan to the DPRK may only be a function of this website’s search engine, but it is possible to place requests for shipping, so that other interested shippers or carriers may contact the requester. And data on this website seems to indicate that cargo shipments have been made to the North Korean port of Nampo as recently as June from Ukraine and Russia, suggesting that sea transport to the DPRK is possible

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Keeping the relevant ports near China under surveillance it becomes clear how difficult it is to find shipments going to or coming from North Korea. Many North Korean smaller vessels ship to Dalian, which is a busy Chinese port. Among them are even fisher boats, which can function as sanction busters and which are used in the smuggling business as well. Beside the technical problems to track a vessel25, North Korean vessels are re-named or they ship under a foreign flag.

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The Ryu Gyong belongs to the Sinhung Shipping Company, based in Pyongyang.26 Ships from this company have probably been previously involved in shipments of illicit cargo. In 2009, the Sinhung-owned Hyang Ro27 ‘was found stationary in Indian waters when it was supposed to be sailing to Karachi, Pakistan. Coast Guard and naval personnel boarded the ship but found it was carrying no cargo.’28 Suspicions remain that this ship was involved in an illicit transfer of one sort. In a later case, the UN Security Council’s Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group found that the Hyang Ro Bong discharged a cargo originating in Pakistan in the Somali port of Mogadishu, before proceeding to the port of Kismaayo, which was at that time controlled by the insurgent group Al-Shabaab. The Monitoring Group stated: “while the Monitoring Group does not have specific evidence that the movements of this vessel were linked to a violation of the sanctions regime, it considers them to be of a suspicious nature and to merit further monitoring”.29 These shipments may have involved transfers of arms or other illicit cargo.

Source - http://projectalpha.eu/wp-content/u...Pak_allegation_case_study_-_Project_Alpha.pdf
 
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Meanwhile in North Korea -
...scuse me-what the!
hey! watch out, this is no toy

25550444_1750711708572059_6411100314450198227_n.jpg
 
Will you provide details of those MilSpec transistors and transmitter which used by Pak and North Korea in 80s and 90s?

Further, the link of website which sold these in 80s and 90s.
Thank You
What I'm saying is that its irrelevant since they're such common items. How do you even know they're military spec? Plenty of weapons have off-the-shelf items in them. I mean, do we blame Japan for global terrorism just because the Toyota pick-up is the vehicle of choice for most terrorists? And yet that pick-up is infinitely more technical than a sodding resistor. A pressure transmitter? Look at any process plant or gas facility and you'll find many of them. My bicycle pump has one. We're talking about items that are barely one level of technology up from a wire here.
 
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There is astonishing quiet in the world about how North Korea acquired nuclear tech and delivery systems.Role of Chi-Pak has been openly highlighted only by India and indirectly by Japan and recently,USA
 
What I'm saying is that its irrelevant since they're such common items. How do you even know they're military spec? Plenty of weapons have off-the-shelf items in them. I mean, do we blame Japan for global terrorism just because the Toyota pick-up is the vehicle of choice for most terrorists? And yet that pick-up is infinitely more technical than a sodding resistor. A pressure transmitter? Look at any process plant or gas facility and you'll find many of them. My bicycle pump has one. We're talking about items that are barely one level of technology up from a wire here.
Then there shouldn't be any problems in providing the details of those which used in nuclear weapons.

Please provide information with source.
 
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NoKo's current tests feels more like Joe-4. Infact there is not sure-fire way to know that. I hazard a guess that NoKo has developed a decent Fusion boosted fission bomb, like swan device of '56. The device shown in picture with the fatty is most probably a dummy shaped to look like W-88. The yield of 100-300 KT is tell tale sign. Its a mid/large boosted device alright. Had it been a real H-bomb, fatty would have ordered a megaton test, just to show off.
 
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Then there shouldn't be any problems in providing the details of those which used in nuclear weapons.

Please provide information with source.
I don't know who but I think the names are redacted simply because it's bad PR. If there was anything more sinister, you can be sure the US would be having words with our PM, long before someone whinged about it on an internet forum.

What kind of source are you looking for? A source which proves that the common resistor and pressure transducer aren't hi-tech components? If it was fitted with a UK-made laser-ring, vibrating structure gyro and AIRS system, then I'd be far more concerned.

This...
20Mresistor.jpg

I'm not worried about.
 
I don't know who but I think the names are redacted simply because it's bad PR. If there was anything more sinister, you can be sure the US would be having words with our PM, long before someone whinged about it on an internet forum.

What kind of source are you looking for? A source which proves that the common resistor and pressure transducer aren't hi-tech components? If it was fitted with a UK-made laser-ring, vibrating structure gyro and AIRS system, then I'd be far more concerned.

This...
20Mresistor.jpg

I'm not worried about.

So why North Korea making front companies to import those?

BTW, u still shying away to provide details.
 
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So why North Korea making front companies to import those?

BTW, u still shying away to provide details.
This has now become idiotic. Why would the UK be helping the craziest person in the world develop a nuclear missile that can hit it?

As I've already said, I don't know who the companies are.

The front companies are to side-step economic sanctions. It's about money not missiles.

It is obvious who's helped North Korea develop ICBMs. Only one other country in that area has them. This is not rocket science, if you'll pardon the pun.
 
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Australian Tried to Sell Missile Parts for North Korea, Police Say

DEC. 17, 2017
SYDNEY, Australia — The federal police said Sunday that they had arrested an Australian man who was charged with acting as an economic agent for North Korea by trying to help the isolated country sell its missile parts and other military technology abroad.

The man, Chan Han Choi, 59, was arrested on Saturday in the Sydney suburb of Eastwood, where he lives. The police accused him of violating both United Nations sanctions and Australian law by attempting to conduct trade deals on behalf of North Korea — the first time such charges have been filed in Australia.

The arrest comes as tensions in the region have risen over a series of North Korean nuclear and missile tests, which have defied international sanctions aimed at curtailing the weapons programs.

Speaking to reporters, Neil Gaughan, the assistant commissioner for the Australian Federal Police, said Mr. Choi was charged with trying to broker the sale of missile components, including software for the guidance of ballistic missiles, and other unspecified North Korean military expertise to “international entities,” which he did not identify.

He also said Mr. Choi was “discussing the supply of weapons of mass destruction,” in reference to the attempted sale of the missile components described by the police.

Mr. Choi was a naturalized Australian citizen who had lived in the country for more than 30 years, the police said. They did not elaborate, but some Australian news media reports said he was born in South Korea.

“We think he’s acting as an economic agent on behalf of North Korea,” Mr. Gaughan said at a news conference. “He’s doing it out of a patriotic purpose. I think at the end of the day, he’d sell whatever he could to make money back for the North Korean government.”

The police said evidence suggested that Mr. Choi had been in “contact with high-ranking officials in North Korea” but would not comment further.

Mr. Choi was also charged with attempting to sell North Korean coal in countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam, the police said, adding that there was no evidence of involvement by those countries’ governments or officials. Such sales would violate international sanctions aimed at cutting off North Korea from the global economy.

The investigation started this year after the police received information from a foreign law enforcement partner about a different matter.

After months of “careful and methodical” investigation, the police said, they uncovered evidence that led them to believe that Mr. Choi was working to generate income for the North Korean government from abroad as recently as this year.

If he is found guilty, Mr. Choi could face up to 10 years in prison.

“He seems to be a fellow traveler willing to take the risk to try and exploit whatever loopholes exist with surveillance and sanctions,” said Euan Graham, the director of the international security program at the Lowy Institute. “It means the North Koreans are still trying to access whatever componentry they can, even in a high-risk country like Australia.”

For years, North Korea has found ways to skirt sanctions to obtain technology and earn hard currency by selling not just weapons but also counterfeit money and drugs.

North Korea no longer has an embassy in Australia in part because of one such moneymaking mission gone wrong: In 2003, the Pong Su, a North Korean cargo ship that ran aground on an Australian beach, was found to be filled with about 275 pounds of heroin. The crew was arrested and later deported, and the North Korean embassy closed five years later.

When North Korea asked for it to be reopened in 2013, Australia refused.

Mr. Gaughan, the police official, called Mr. Choi’s arrest a sign of Australia’s commitment to upholding international sanctions on North Korea.

“This investigation shows that the United Nations and Australian sanctions will be rigorously enforced in Australia,” he said.

Australian Tried to Sell Missile Parts for North Korea, Police Say
 
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