India Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Missile Developments

September 30 2016. Just after Uri, 29th September 2016.

kargil standoff was in 1999. Risat 1 was not up. Please read your intial post, where you have mistaken the uri event with kargil.
Sorry I meant Doklam Standoff, let me find nasa article too on debris it was in 2017
 
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@LoneWolfSandeep it was Uri (maybe Dolkam not sure), not Kargil. I have read about it but no evidence is there to prove it. At least in public domain. Same happened to a Korean satellite when US placed Thaad in SK. My assumption is this wasn't the first time either. the ASAT project was fast-tracked after 2 incidents I have heard of.
 
@LoneWolfSandeep it was Uri (maybe Dolkam not sure), not Kargil. I have read about it but no evidence is there to prove it. At least in public domain. Same happened to a Korean satellite when US placed Thaad in SK. My assumption is this wasn't the first time either. the ASAT project was fast-tracked after 2 incidents I have heard of.

Risat 1 was down much before Doklam.

Have read the conspiracy theories too. The Pakistanis against who the sat could have been used in Uri, do not have the capability for such an attack. For the Chinese, it would be a really HIGH risk to take out an Indian satellite for Pakistan. The Chinese have been quite circumspect at getting involved with military assets as far as India-Pak go.
 
@LoneWolfSandeep it was Uri (maybe Dolkam not sure), not Kargil. I have read about it but no evidence is there to prove it. At least in public domain. Same happened to a Korean satellite when US placed Thaad in SK. My assumption is this wasn't the first time either. the ASAT project was fast-tracked after 2 incidents I have heard of.
I wrote wrongly - was thinking Doklam writing Kargil - I edited my earlier posts too
 
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Risat 1 was down much before Doklam.
The debris was there near Risat-1 but ISRO didn't claim it was dead yet, I am not getting any fixed date by any article when it died. its been hushed up a bit I think, but it was declared dead later.
I remember reading after ISRO said RISAT-1 is operational after nasa claim & then reading it working sporadically & much later in 2017 it is dead, it was declared dead near Doklam standoff, but not finding articles now or any date of confirmed date of death
 
I don't know how true but a couple of years ago I read a paper on Rand stating a Russian satellite that leaves small robots as debris in the orbital path of other satellites. when a targeted satellite passes by it moves close to it an explodes (something like mines in space). They are small enough and in black color to be detected.
 
I don't know how true but a couple of years ago I read a paper on Rand stating a Russian satellite that leaves small robots as debris in the orbital path of other satellites. when a targeted satellite passes by it moves close to it an explodes (something like mines in space). They are small enough and in black color to be detected.
Anything upto 10 cm can be observed & its path tracked, including reverse tracked when it breakaway from another object (intersect point), ie mine releasing sat, unless mine can alter its path a bit on its own power to lose cookie trail. so the mine has to be navigable mine to avoid getting blamed, as the idea is indirect attack.
 
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I think you misunderstood & haven't gone through the article

300 watts is whats required to blind or dazzle satellite optics, that was 2006
"Lower powered lasers are used to interfere or temporarily blind satellite optical sensors, and can also interfere or blind infrared detectors on early warning satellites used to detect missile launches, and the electro-optical transducers on electro-optical reconnaissance satellites."


Today we are talking about
"Ground-based lasers are believed to have a range of between 310 miles and 620 miles and require an average power greater than 1,000 watts."


1000 watts concentrated will fry a thing permanently.

1000 KW hoga bhai 1000 watts ki to halogen light hua karti hai.
 
A Quick Supplement For Understanding The Role and Context Of Anti-Satellite Weapons
By Lt Gen P.R. Shankar -April 5, 2019

1556280986878.png


Recently, Indian Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi announced that India had become the fourth country in the world to demonstrate anti-satellite (ASAT) capability after the United States (US), Russia and China. In the reams of media analysis that followed, very little context was given to understand the significance of this development. This article therefore will serve as a backgrounder for those who wish to understand the very basics of ASAT weapons and their significance.

To begin with, let us start with the Earth’s Atmosphere itself and the issue of delineating it from what we call ‘Space’.

The Earth’s Atmosphere :

word-image.jpeg

Fig 1. The Five Layers of the Earth’s Atmosphere. Picture Courtesy: NOAA https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/atmosphere.jpg

As we can see in Fig 1. above, the Earth’s atmosphere has five layers – Troposphere, Stratosphere, Thermosphere, Mesosphere and Exosphere. These atmospheric layers have no distinct boundaries but are approximately definable. The region beyond the Exosphere extending up to the orbit of the Moon, which is at an average distance of 384,403 km from the Earth, is called Cislunar Space. Beyond Cislunar Space lies what is generally known as Deep Space.

The upper boundary of the Troposphere ranges from 8 km above the poles and up to 20 Km over the equator. We live and breathe in the planetary boundary layer, which is the lowest part of the troposphere. At an altitude of around 18-19 km is the Armstrong Limit, above which humans need a pressure suit to survive.

Above the Troposphere is the Stratosphere which extends up to an altitude of 50 Km. This layer is ozone rich and shields the Earth’s atmosphere from harmful solar radiations and is a heat trap to keep the Earth warm. Air here is very dry and very thin. Low air resistance makes the lower reaches of the Stratosphere ideally suited for commercial airliners to fly in.

The Mesosphere extends from 50 Km to about 80 Km. Here temperatures dip to minus 90 degrees centigrade (°C) in the outer periphery. In this layer most meteors get burnt up. The air has too little oxygen for jet (gas-turbine powered) aircraft to fly in.

At an altitude of 100 km above the Earth’s surface lies what the Fédération aéronautique internationale calls the Karman Line and for the purposes of convention marks the end of what is called Near Space and the beginning of Outer Space. The Karman Line is important, because it is used by various space-related treaties for the purposes of record keeping.

Thus, the Stratosphere, Mesosphere and lower Thermosphere up to the Karman Line constitute ‘Near Space’. Near Space is essentially the band above the ceiling limits of jet powered aircraft but below that of orbiting satellites and is usually considered to begin at an altitude of 20 km. It is also referred to as the Death Zone. Incidentally, the Karman line is named after Theodore von Karman, who had sought to determine the altitude at which the atmosphere becomes too thin to support aeronautical flight.

The next layer, Thermosphere, extends up to about to an altitude of about 700 Km. Here temperatures shoot up to 1500°C. Though considered as part of the Earth’s atmosphere, the air density is so low that it is treated as Outer Space. The International Space Station orbits Earth in this layer. It is in this layer that the phenomenon of Aurora Borealis and Aurora Australis are observed. Beyond this is the Exosphere where the Earth’s atmosphere merges into Cislunar Space.

Military Commanders’ Needs

Military commanders always want to ‘look over the hill’ and crave ‘precision’ firepower. In the troposphere one uses manned / unmanned aircraft for this purpose. However, the efficacy of aircraft is bound by their footprint; which in turn is dictated by the height and speed at which they fly. The higher they fly, the larger the footprint. The faster they fly, the footprint transits faster while enabling greater area coverage. The longer they endure the better the stability of operations. All in all, manned aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can overcome problems related to area coverage, endurance, sensor accuracy, energy, persistence, detectability and vulnerability to an extent only. They lack an ability to ‘stay and stare’ like artificial satellites can. This implies that one must go higher towards Space.

While Near Space would have been the logical next step, powered flight isn’t exactly easy over there. For instance, the highest altitude that a military UAV has been known to attain is some 19 km by the American RQ-4. Of course, in 2017, there were reports that the Chinese had tested a spy drone capable of flight at an altitude of 25 km. Stratospheric airships or so-called stratellites are a continuing area of research as well.

Be that as it may, one must go beyond the ‘Death Zone’ to get the ability to ‘stay and stare’, as of today. For example, one can cover all of Afghanistan or Pakistan or Tibet in one look from Space. Such persistence and coverage can be achieved in Space only by a well-designed Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellation or distant Geostationary Earth Orbits (GEO). It is therefore time to briefly take a look at various satellite orbits and their characteristics.

Artificial Satellite Orbits

Satellites can be classified as being in LEO, Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), GEO or High Earth Orbit (HEO) based on their distance from earth. Orbits could be equatorial, polar or inclined. Orbits could be circular or elliptical. Each orbit is suited for a purpose /application and coverage area. Fig 2. below depicts various kinds of orbits.
word-image-1.png
word-image-2.png

Fig 2: Various kinds of Earth Orbit based on their broad characteristics.

There are obviously specific cost implications for each type of orbit. For the purposes of this backgrounder, we will however consider only circular orbits. Nonetheless, the simplest way to understand the varied roles satellites play is to look at their orbit based on the distance at which it is located from the Earth.

word-image-3.png


Fig 3. Satellite Orbits based on their altitude with respect to the Earth. Picture Courtesy: NASA
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/ContentFeature/OrbitsCatalog/images/orbits_schematic.png



word-image-4.png


Fig 4: Some standard satellites in use today and their typical orbits. Picture Courtesy: NASAhttps://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/ContentFeature/OrbitsCatalog/images/orbit_velocities.png

LEO Satellites
LEO lies between 160-2000 km above the Earth. It is the kind of orbit easiest to access. There are more than 800 LEO satellites in space, including ISS and the Iridium network of communication satellites. Orbital velocities of LEO satellites are about 7.5 km/s (27,000 km/h). Orbital time period around the earth is between 90-120 minutes. LEOs need lesser power and lower grade sensors for communication and imaging compared to satellites in higher orbits. LEO satellites are best suited for detailed imagery. They are easy to build and launch. Replacement times are quick, and effort is easier. All CubeSats (miniaturized satellites) are in LEO. However, LEO is a crowded orbit where space debris is an issue. LEO satellites have a short lifespan. Most military satellites are LEOs and are vulnerable to Earth based ASAT Weapons as has been demonstrated quite a few times now.

MEO Satellites
MEO is also known as the Intermediate Circular Orbit and extends from 2000 km to right below 35,786 km. MEO satellites have an orbit period between 2-24 hours. This orbit is primarily used for communication, navigation (examples include Galileo and Glonass systems), and to provide a gravity-less environment for scientific experiments. Due to increased height, propagation delayscreep in and power requirements increase. This drives up costs. Lifespans are lesser as compared to a satellite in GEO because MEO lies in proximity to the Van Allen Radiation Belt, a region(s) of highly charged particles maintained by the Earth’s magnetic field, which degrades the performance of satellites.

GEO Satellites
Satellites in this orbit appear stationary from Earth. The orbit is at a precise altitude of 35,786 km, circular, directly over/ oscillating over the equator and revolves in the same direction as the direction in which the Earth rotates i.e. West to East. It is also known as the Clarke’s Orbit, so named after Arthur C.Clarke who first proposed a satellite based communications system using GEO. All GEO satellites have an orbital period equal to Earth’s rotational period i.e. 24 hours. The major benefit of this orbit is the fact that Earth stations and the satellite are fixed in relation to each other and the coverage area from this altitude is pretty good. However, the cost of launching a satellite into GEO is high. Increased distance from Earth stations implies a lag in communication. Signals require more power. This increases the cost further. Its main uses are in direct broadcast TV, communication networks, defence and intelligence applications and global positioning or GPS – which is used for satellite navigation systems.The Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System constellation is also parked in this orbit.
word-image-5.png



FIg 5:Geostationary/ Geosynchronous Orbit or GEO

HEO Satellites
Any Earth orbit beyond GEO is known as HEO. Satellites in high earth orbit have orbital periods longer than 24 hours. Satellites appear to be moving backward / heading in the opposite direction since the Earth rotates at a faster speed. HEOs are useful to study our planet’s magnetosphere and for other astronomical observations.

Military Satellites and Anti-Satellite Weapons
The most common missions for military satellites are communications, command and control (C2), intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR), signals intelligence (SIGINT), positioning, navigation and timing (PNT), meteorology, space-based missile tracking and satellite tracking. Satellites can also be used as platforms for space-based weapons. Unsurprisingly LEO is the most sought-after orbit to park and operate a military satellite from for the reasons delineated above. Of course, GEO is also used for military purposes.

Now, LEO satellite transmissions are in real time and are an important part of the command and Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture of any networked-enabled or network-centric military. As such, LEO satellites are currently prime targets for ASAT systems.

An ASAT weapon is designed to destroy or incapacitate satellites. ASATs are divided into two broad categories- direct ascent (DA) and co-orbital (CO). DA systems are missiles that can be launched from land, air or sea at satellite targets in LEO. As of now, only the United States (US), Russia, China and India have all successfully tested DA systems.

In addition to ground-based launchers, airborne or ship borne systems can also be used for launching ASAT missiles. At present, only the US has successfully demonstrated the capability to knock out a satellite in LEO using a missile launched from a surface ship in the course of Operation Burnt Frost in 2008. During the Cold War years, the US also demonstrated air-launched DA capability, with the last such demonstration taking place on 13 September 1985, when an ASM-135 missile launched from a F-15 fighter was used to complete the successful intercept of a satellite in LEO. Though, Russia may also possess air-launched DA ASAT capability, initially developed during the late Cold War, but at the moment seems to be focusing on a ground-launched system. Russia, China and India have all publicly demonstrated only ground-launched DA ASAT capability till date.

Though the after-effects of the 1962 Starfish Prime high-altitude nuclear test by the US, showed how high-altitude nuclear explosions could be used to create a belt of ionizing radiation to destroy orbiting satellites, no country is known to have developed an actual weapon using this principle. Earlier US high-altitude nuclear tests had already shown the potential for using nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NEMP) for disabling satellites. But again, no EMP- warhead using DA ASAT missile is known to publicly exist.

CO ASAT or space-based capability has been explored since at least the 1960s. The Soviets pioneered the Istrebitel Sputnik or ‘Fighting Satellite’ program, which led to other follow-ons during the course of the Cold War. Several US CO ASAT concepts also emerged in the course of the Regan-era Strategic Defense Initiative Program. At the moment, neither the US nor Russia publicly declare an existing CO ASAT system.

Overall, as a former artillery officer, while I laud India’s ASAT demonstration, I believe that more work lies ahead to refine the C2 setup for co-ordinated multiple launches and developing a military doctrine for their use. In an environment where satellites in LEOs are operated in constellation, one must destroy more than one satellite to get a desired effect. Countries are also developing the ability to launch a LEO satellite on a quick reaction basis to plug gaps due to ASAT actions. It is a cat and mouse game and a lot lies ahead.

Lieutenant General P.R Shankar (retd.) is a former Director General of the Indian Army’s Artillery Corps.


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A Quick Supplement For Understanding The Role and Context Of Anti-Satellite Weapons | Delhi Defence Review
 
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Now that India has demonstrated its ASAT capabilities, it its time for the country to provide military space the attention, and organization structure, needed for any major space power. (credit: DRDO)
Should India pursue a Space Force?

by Ajey Lele

Monday, May 13, 2019

On March 27, India successfully conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test. India received both praise and flak for undertaking this test. Many nations recognized the rationale for India conducting this test, but some assessments indicated that a few debris pieces reached higher altitudes and would remain there for longer than the government initially claimed.


The most obvious question is whether India needs to conduct more ASAT tests. It does not.

India’s focus for space technology development has always been to use space for societal and commercial purposes. It is well understood that space is vital for human survival and progress. Hence, it is unlikely that India would ever take the space weaponization path. India’s test appears to be about sending a message and a demonstration of deterrence capability and its space technology capabilities. Now India needs to take an initiative towards starting a debate and convincing likeminded countries to commit for the formulation of globally acceptable, verifiable, and legally binding space treaty mechanism.

Simultaneously, it is important for India to realize that by conducting this test it has redefined its strategic stance in the military space domain. The ASAT test is the beginning of that process, not the end.

The most obvious question is whether India needs to conduct more ASAT tests. It does not. A Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV) like that used for the ASAT test is not a great technology for the purposes of disabling a satellite. Owing the problem of space debris, it is definitely not a useable technology. KKV is great for “optics” and it has already served that purpose for India. With the success of the ASAT test, India has elevated its space capabilities. Now, it is important for India to evolve its strategic vision in space with this “new normal.”

Space power is not only about development of offensive and defensive space strategies. It is about a nation’s capabilities to influence various activities. Such influence would be at strategic, political, and economic levels. For attaining economic influence, India needs to use ISRO and its commercial arm and also India’s private space industry. There is a need for of additional policy mandates for wielding strategic and geopolitical influence in the post ASAT era.

Now, India needs to act quickly and plan the next steps. First and foremost, there is a need for a nuanced differentiation by associating the ASAT test more with India’s military policies than with the space policies. Some parallels from the nuclear field could be pertinent. Various issues concerning nuclear energy are mainly associated with the country’s energy policies, while nuclear weapons are an entirely different ballgame.

Similarly, ASAT development is about the strategic capabilities of the country. In the nuclear arena, the nuclear triad is about having weapon delivery systems which involves using missile silos, submarines, or aerial platforms. Hence, for the nuclear warfare domain there is a direct role for the army, navy, and air force. However, this is not the case in respect of handling strategic issues associated with space, including the development of counterspace capabilities like lasers and jamming. Broadly, counterspace capabilities is more about the strategic technologies, vision, and deterrence. This is not to say that counterspace capabilities has no relevance when it comes to arms control and disarmament aspects in the space domain. The shadow of counterspace capabilities on space policy-making would always remain. Aspects like satellite-hardening technologies and space debris removal techniques, on-orbit servicing, space tourism would always be at the part of any counterspace debate. Hence, ASAT development is about military policies with a shade of space policy.

Now, with India being an ASAT-capable state, the time has come to divide the overall Indian space agenda into civilian and military spheres.

With this backdrop, it is important for India to recalibrate both its military policies and space policies. It is important to evolve specific policy and administrative structures. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has been the sole guardian of India’s space program since its inception (1960s). In general, they are able to fulfil some of the military requirements by launching dual-use Earth observation satellites and few military-specific communication satellites. Recently, India has decided to upgrade its present administrative structure dealing with military aspects of space, called the Space Cell, to a Defence Space Agency, a step short of establishing a Space Command. This structure is suitable when satellite technologies are viewed as valuable additions to the existing military architecture. But, with the ASAT test, India has raised the bar further and needs to focus more on strategic aspects associated with space.

ISRO’s basic mandate is to ensure space is used for socioeconomic developments. They have established excellent relationships with various global space agencies operating in the civilian domain. Now, with India being an ASAT-capable state, the time has come to divide the overall Indian space agenda into civilian and military spheres. To cater to India’s military interests and strategic interests in space, it is important to establish a separate policy and organizational architecture. India needs to look seriously towards the possibility of establishing a separate military service after the Indian Army, Indian Navy, and Indian Air Force, called the Indian Space Force.

The idea of establishment of a separate military arm called Indian Space Force prompts two key questions: the need for it, and its cost. There could be a view that India is merely seeking to copy other nations, notably the US, since it is proposing to form a Space Force as the sixth branch of their armed forces. In addition, it also could be argued that since, India has already in place the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), which is responsible for tactical and strategic nuclear issues, why not use the same structure for space?

India’s economy gets dubbed as a developing economy and there is mostly a major global focus on the poverty and social disparities. However, India is today the third largest economy in the world by purchasing power parity (PPP). India topped the World Bank’s growth outlook in fiscal year 2015–16, during which the economy grew at 7.6 percent. For next five to ten years India’s economy is expected to grow approximately in the range of 6.5 to 7.5 percent. Hence, cost should not be a factor if India decides to form a new force.

Identification of the need for a Space Force is a very subjective matter and could be argued from both sides. For years, India was looking at the use of space technologies to support military operations. But, by demonstrating its ASAT capabilities, now India is actually showcasing its strategic intent. Now India needs to develop suitable structures for implementing their strategic agenda.

For the US, to have a Space Force is actually about asserting its domination is space. India’s Space Force would have more operational tasks at hand since it has to start almost from scratch, unlike the US or any other major player. Obviously, SFC cannot handle such a mammoth additional task. The Indian army, navy, and air force should have their independent space agencies that identify their military requirements and collaborating with Space Force.


India’s ASAT test has provided an opportunity for the country to recalibrate its defense structures.

Apart from military requirements, there are multiple reasons for India to establish a Space Force. First and foremost, such a force would offer protection for all types of satellites, would address vulnerabilities in space, and identify the strategic issues in the military space domain. For example, while India has a very successful remote sensing program however, from a defense perspective the small number of satellites makes the ability to timely revisit the same place an issue. Hence, India needs to add a significant number of such satellites, as well as military communication satellites, to its inventory. The primary mandate for India’s Defence Research Organisation (DRDO) is not about satellite development, hence, there is a significant dependence on ISRO for development of military systems. But, ISRO also cannot fulfil the needs of the armed forces because of its other important commitments. The Indian Space Force needs to have its own research, development, and production ecosystem. ISRO’s assistance could be provided for launching the satellites. Also, there is a need to appreciate that, in the current era, state-controlled innovation and development has limited relevance. Thus, the Space Force should seek assistance from private space industry as well as from global space players. This could also lead to the development of norms and rules for engaging such agencies.

At present, only limited work is underway on various space aspects associated with the country’s strategic and military needs. There is an urgent need to holistically address issues like launch on demand, space situational awareness (SSA), advanced communications, and many more. There will also be a need for the launch of military-specific satellites, including space systems for various types of intelligence gathering, from time to time.

One challenge will be the universal reality of turf wars. It is obvious that there will be internal debates and opposition to the idea of establishing a separate Space Force in India. In order to minimize those disputes, the country’s political, military, and technological leadership must act astutely.


India’s ASAT test has provided an opportunity for the country to recalibrate its defense structures. It’s now clear that India needs to establish the fourth arm of its defense structure, the Indian Space Force.


Dr. Ajey Lele is a senior fellow at the Institute For Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), a New Delhi-based think tank on security issues. He is a postgraduate in physics and has a doctorate in international relations. His research focus is on strategic technologies and WMD related issues. He has several publications to his credit.

The Space Review: Should India pursue a Space Force?
 
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View attachment 6591
Now that India has demonstrated its ASAT capabilities, it its time for the country to provide military space the attention, and organization structure, needed for any major space power. (credit: DRDO)
Should India pursue a Space Force?

by Ajey Lele

Monday, May 13, 2019

On March 27, India successfully conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test. India received both praise and flak for undertaking this test. Many nations recognized the rationale for India conducting this test, but some assessments indicated that a few debris pieces reached higher altitudes and would remain there for longer than the government initially claimed.


The most obvious question is whether India needs to conduct more ASAT tests. It does not.

India’s focus for space technology development has always been to use space for societal and commercial purposes. It is well understood that space is vital for human survival and progress. Hence, it is unlikely that India would ever take the space weaponization path. India’s test appears to be about sending a message and a demonstration of deterrence capability and its space technology capabilities. Now India needs to take an initiative towards starting a debate and convincing likeminded countries to commit for the formulation of globally acceptable, verifiable, and legally binding space treaty mechanism.

Simultaneously, it is important for India to realize that by conducting this test it has redefined its strategic stance in the military space domain. The ASAT test is the beginning of that process, not the end.

The most obvious question is whether India needs to conduct more ASAT tests. It does not. A Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV) like that used for the ASAT test is not a great technology for the purposes of disabling a satellite. Owing the problem of space debris, it is definitely not a useable technology. KKV is great for “optics” and it has already served that purpose for India. With the success of the ASAT test, India has elevated its space capabilities. Now, it is important for India to evolve its strategic vision in space with this “new normal.”

Space power is not only about development of offensive and defensive space strategies. It is about a nation’s capabilities to influence various activities. Such influence would be at strategic, political, and economic levels. For attaining economic influence, India needs to use ISRO and its commercial arm and also India’s private space industry. There is a need for of additional policy mandates for wielding strategic and geopolitical influence in the post ASAT era.

Now, India needs to act quickly and plan the next steps. First and foremost, there is a need for a nuanced differentiation by associating the ASAT test more with India’s military policies than with the space policies. Some parallels from the nuclear field could be pertinent. Various issues concerning nuclear energy are mainly associated with the country’s energy policies, while nuclear weapons are an entirely different ballgame.

Similarly, ASAT development is about the strategic capabilities of the country. In the nuclear arena, the nuclear triad is about having weapon delivery systems which involves using missile silos, submarines, or aerial platforms. Hence, for the nuclear warfare domain there is a direct role for the army, navy, and air force. However, this is not the case in respect of handling strategic issues associated with space, including the development of counterspace capabilities like lasers and jamming. Broadly, counterspace capabilities is more about the strategic technologies, vision, and deterrence. This is not to say that counterspace capabilities has no relevance when it comes to arms control and disarmament aspects in the space domain. The shadow of counterspace capabilities on space policy-making would always remain. Aspects like satellite-hardening technologies and space debris removal techniques, on-orbit servicing, space tourism would always be at the part of any counterspace debate. Hence, ASAT development is about military policies with a shade of space policy.

Now, with India being an ASAT-capable state, the time has come to divide the overall Indian space agenda into civilian and military spheres.

With this backdrop, it is important for India to recalibrate both its military policies and space policies. It is important to evolve specific policy and administrative structures. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has been the sole guardian of India’s space program since its inception (1960s). In general, they are able to fulfil some of the military requirements by launching dual-use Earth observation satellites and few military-specific communication satellites. Recently, India has decided to upgrade its present administrative structure dealing with military aspects of space, called the Space Cell, to a Defence Space Agency, a step short of establishing a Space Command. This structure is suitable when satellite technologies are viewed as valuable additions to the existing military architecture. But, with the ASAT test, India has raised the bar further and needs to focus more on strategic aspects associated with space.

ISRO’s basic mandate is to ensure space is used for socioeconomic developments. They have established excellent relationships with various global space agencies operating in the civilian domain. Now, with India being an ASAT-capable state, the time has come to divide the overall Indian space agenda into civilian and military spheres. To cater to India’s military interests and strategic interests in space, it is important to establish a separate policy and organizational architecture. India needs to look seriously towards the possibility of establishing a separate military service after the Indian Army, Indian Navy, and Indian Air Force, called the Indian Space Force.

The idea of establishment of a separate military arm called Indian Space Force prompts two key questions: the need for it, and its cost. There could be a view that India is merely seeking to copy other nations, notably the US, since it is proposing to form a Space Force as the sixth branch of their armed forces. In addition, it also could be argued that since, India has already in place the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), which is responsible for tactical and strategic nuclear issues, why not use the same structure for space?

India’s economy gets dubbed as a developing economy and there is mostly a major global focus on the poverty and social disparities. However, India is today the third largest economy in the world by purchasing power parity (PPP). India topped the World Bank’s growth outlook in fiscal year 2015–16, during which the economy grew at 7.6 percent. For next five to ten years India’s economy is expected to grow approximately in the range of 6.5 to 7.5 percent. Hence, cost should not be a factor if India decides to form a new force.

Identification of the need for a Space Force is a very subjective matter and could be argued from both sides. For years, India was looking at the use of space technologies to support military operations. But, by demonstrating its ASAT capabilities, now India is actually showcasing its strategic intent. Now India needs to develop suitable structures for implementing their strategic agenda.

For the US, to have a Space Force is actually about asserting its domination is space. India’s Space Force would have more operational tasks at hand since it has to start almost from scratch, unlike the US or any other major player. Obviously, SFC cannot handle such a mammoth additional task. The Indian army, navy, and air force should have their independent space agencies that identify their military requirements and collaborating with Space Force.


India’s ASAT test has provided an opportunity for the country to recalibrate its defense structures.

Apart from military requirements, there are multiple reasons for India to establish a Space Force. First and foremost, such a force would offer protection for all types of satellites, would address vulnerabilities in space, and identify the strategic issues in the military space domain. For example, while India has a very successful remote sensing program however, from a defense perspective the small number of satellites makes the ability to timely revisit the same place an issue. Hence, India needs to add a significant number of such satellites, as well as military communication satellites, to its inventory. The primary mandate for India’s Defence Research Organisation (DRDO) is not about satellite development, hence, there is a significant dependence on ISRO for development of military systems. But, ISRO also cannot fulfil the needs of the armed forces because of its other important commitments. The Indian Space Force needs to have its own research, development, and production ecosystem. ISRO’s assistance could be provided for launching the satellites. Also, there is a need to appreciate that, in the current era, state-controlled innovation and development has limited relevance. Thus, the Space Force should seek assistance from private space industry as well as from global space players. This could also lead to the development of norms and rules for engaging such agencies.

At present, only limited work is underway on various space aspects associated with the country’s strategic and military needs. There is an urgent need to holistically address issues like launch on demand, space situational awareness (SSA), advanced communications, and many more. There will also be a need for the launch of military-specific satellites, including space systems for various types of intelligence gathering, from time to time.

One challenge will be the universal reality of turf wars. It is obvious that there will be internal debates and opposition to the idea of establishing a separate Space Force in India. In order to minimize those disputes, the country’s political, military, and technological leadership must act astutely.


India’s ASAT test has provided an opportunity for the country to recalibrate its defense structures. It’s now clear that India needs to establish the fourth arm of its defense structure, the Indian Space Force.


Dr. Ajey Lele is a senior fellow at the Institute For Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), a New Delhi-based think tank on security issues. He is a postgraduate in physics and has a doctorate in international relations. His research focus is on strategic technologies and WMD related issues. He has several publications to his credit.

The Space Review: Should India pursue a Space Force?

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Was this posted before ? I guess we missed this, nothing new though.

With Fire From Missile & Space Program, India Tests Anti-Satellite Weapon

Shiv Aroor, Mar 27 2019, 3:02 pm

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Nearly a decade after Indian military scientists first declared that an anti-satellite weapon capability was within reach, India today conducted the first test of the weapon system, under the aegis of a project codenamed Mission Shakti. While official specifics of the weapon haven’t been revealed so far, Livefist learns that the weapon was a derivative of the Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) missile interceptor developed for the country’s ballistic missile defence (BMD) program. The test was conducted this morning from the Integrated Test Range off India’s eastern seaboard.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in a televised announcement just weeks before the country’s national election, said that the missile had destroyed a low earth orbit (LEO) satellite at an altitude of 300 km. In a statement, India’s Ministry of External Affairs said, “This was a technological mission carried out by DRDO. The satellite used in the mission was one of India’s existing satellites operating in lower orbit. The test was fully successful and achieved all parameters as per plans. The test required an extremely high degree of precision and technical capability. The significance of the test is that India has tested and successfully demonstrated its capability to interdict and intercept a satellite in outer space based on complete indigenous technology. With this test, India joins an exclusive group of space faring nations consisting of USA, Russia and China.”

India hasn’t specified which particular satellite it hit, though experts and observers speculate it could likely be DRDO’s Microsat-R. That it was launched just in January this year has led to speculation that the satellite was launched specifically to be a target. The Microsat-R was placed in orbit on Jan 24 by the PSLV-C44 rocket — 13 minutes 26 seconds after lift-off, Microsat-R was injected into an orbit at an altitude of 274 km.

What we know for certain is that today’s A-SAT weapon derives from an interceptor missile developed under India’s Ballistic Missile Defence program — and is therefore also an explicit demonstration of an anti-missile capability. The following slide was up on Livefist in 2010, providing a roadmap of the BMD’s intended capabilities.

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In a statement that made this quite plain, the Indian MoD said, “A DRDO-developed Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Interceptor Missile successfully engaged an Indian orbiting target satellite in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) in a ‘Hit to Kill’ mode. The interceptor missile was a three-stage missile with two solid rocket boosters. Tracking data from range sensors has confirmed that the mission met all its objectives.”

In what is proving to be a historically no-holds-barred election season, the declaration of today’s A-SAT test swiftly became the centrepiece of a fresh political joust, with the opposition Congress Party suggesting that the Prime Minister had announced the test of a weapon that had been in the works long before the latter’s party came to power in 2014. Wars over credit for military accomplishments and weapons tests are far from uncommon in India, and stand hugely amplified during an election campaign.

What the current government will likely emphasise is that the previous government, under the Congress Party, plainly didn’t have the political will to pull the trigger on demonstrating the anti-satellite weapon — a suggestion strongly indicated in 2010 by the then DRDO chief, V.K. Saraswat. At the time, he had told Livefist, “We already have a design study of such a weapon, but at this stage the country does not require such a platform in its strategic arsenal. Testing such a weapon also has a lot of repercussions which have to be taken into consideration. But testing is not an issue — we can always rely on simulations and ground test. We can see in the future if the government wants such a weapon. If so, our scientists are fully ready to deliver it.

Nine years later, in an interview to Livefist today, Dr Saraswat said, “When we carried out the Agni-V development and capability demonstration, it was political decision. The government of the day (the Congress-led UPA) gave us clearance to proceed. In the case of the A-SAT, clearance was once again needed for such an exercise. I remember making presentations to ministers (AK Antony was defence minister) at the time and the National Security Advisor (Shivshankar Menon) saying please give us clearance and finances for this, it will be a great deterrent and strategic capability. Unfortunately, the clearance we sought wasn’t forthcoming. When we did the nuclear tests in 1998, it was the political will of Prime Minister Vajpayee. Similarly, with Agni-V, it was the political will of PM Manmohan Singh. But for reasons not shared with us, we didn’t get clearance for A-SAT. Prime Minister Modi and NSA Ajit Doval had a real appreciation of the need for such a capability, and our scientists had the ability to demonstrate it.”

Saraswat’s comments, while those of a professional scientist, may also be read in the context of his own career in the DRDO. In 2013, following a special audit that found problems with his exercise of financial powers (leading to a curtailment of these powers), his expected extension as DRDO chief was declined by the Congress-led government at the time. In 2015, Saraswat received post-retirement work from the current government, which appointed him a full member of the NITI Aayog.

The Congress-led government’s concerns over the A-SAT are understood to have pertained to technology embargoes in place at that time. MTCR.

Former director of the DRDO’s Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL) that leads India’s strategic missile development, Dr. Avinash Chander has also told journalists that the decision to demonstrate the A-SAT is a recent one, even if the building blocks existed earlier. In an interview to Times of India, Dr. Chander says, “While we had been working on this technology for long, the current program was initiated sometime recently.”

In an interview to Livefist in 2013, Dr. Chander spoke in detail about the ballistic missile technologies that have likely gone into the anti-satellite weapon demonstrated today.

https://www.livefistdefence.com/201...rogram-india-tests-anti-satellite-weapon.html