India's Entry to International Groups.

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India joins Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) as a founding member to support the responsible and human-centric development and use of AI
India today joined the league of leading economies including USA, UK, EU, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore to launch the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI or Gee-Pay). GPAI is an international and multi-stakeholder initiative to guide the responsible development and use of AI, grounded in human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation, and economic growth. This is also a first initiative of its type for evolving better understanding of the challenges and opportunities around AI using the experience and diversity of participating countries. In order to achieve this goal, the initiative will look to bridge the gap between theory and practice on AI by supporting cutting-edge research and applied activities on AI-related priorities.

In collaboration with partners and international organizations, GPAI will bring together leading experts from industry, civil society, governments, and academia to collaborate to promote responsible evolution of AI and will also evolve methodologies to show how AI can be leveraged to better respond to the present global crisis around COVID-19.

It is pertinent to note that India has recently launched National AI Strategy and National AI Portal and have also started leveraging AI across various sectors such as education, agriculture, healthcare, e-commerce, finance, telecommunications, etc. with inclusion and empowerment of human being approach by supplementing growth and development. By joining GPAI as a founding member, India will actively participate in the global development of Artificial Intelligence, leveraging upon its experience around use of digital technologies for inclusive growth.

GPAI will be supported by a Secretariat, to be hosted by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, as well as by two Centers of Expertise- one each in Montreal and Paris.
 
India joins Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) as a founding member to support the responsible and human-centric development and use of AI
India today joined the league of leading economies including USA, UK, EU, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore to launch the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI or Gee-Pay). GPAI is an international and multi-stakeholder initiative to guide the responsible development and use of AI, grounded in human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation, and economic growth. This is also a first initiative of its type for evolving better understanding of the challenges and opportunities around AI using the experience and diversity of participating countries. In order to achieve this goal, the initiative will look to bridge the gap between theory and practice on AI by supporting cutting-edge research and applied activities on AI-related priorities.

In collaboration with partners and international organizations, GPAI will bring together leading experts from industry, civil society, governments, and academia to collaborate to promote responsible evolution of AI and will also evolve methodologies to show how AI can be leveraged to better respond to the present global crisis around COVID-19.

It is pertinent to note that India has recently launched National AI Strategy and National AI Portal and have also started leveraging AI across various sectors such as education, agriculture, healthcare, e-commerce, finance, telecommunications, etc. with inclusion and empowerment of human being approach by supplementing growth and development. By joining GPAI as a founding member, India will actively participate in the global development of Artificial Intelligence, leveraging upon its experience around use of digital technologies for inclusive growth.

GPAI will be supported by a Secretariat, to be hosted by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, as well as by two Centers of Expertise- one each in Montreal and Paris.
Launch of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence by 15 founding members (15 Jun. 20)
Realizing the full potential of artificial intelligence (AI) that benefits all citizens requires international collaboration, Canada and France are launching with Australia, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the European Union the Global Partnership on Artificial (GPAI) to support and guide the responsible development of artificial intelligence that is grounded in human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation, and economic growth.

GPAI is an international and multistakeholder initiative to guide the responsible development and use of AI, grounded in human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation, and economic growth. In order to achieve this goal, the initiative will look to bridge the gap between theory and practice on AI by supporting cutting-edge research and applied activities on AI-related priorities.

In collaboration with partners and international organizations, GPAI will bring together leading experts from industry, civil society, governments, and academia to collaborate across four Working Group themes: 1) Responsible AI; 2) Data Governance; 3) The Future of Work; and 4) Innovation & Commercialization. Critically, in the short term, GPAI’s experts will also investigate how AI can be leveraged to better respond to and recover from COVID-19.

GPAI will be supported by a Secretariat, to be hosted by the OECD in Paris, as well as by two Centres of Expertise – one each in Montréal and Paris. The relationship with the OECD will bring strong synergies between GPAI’s scientific and technical work and the international AI policy leadership provided by the OECD, strengthening the evidence base for policy aimed at responsible AI. The Centres will provide administrative and research support for the practical projects undertaken or assessed by Working Group experts from various sectors and disciplines. The Centres will also plan the annual GPAI Multistakeholder Experts Group Plenary, the first of which will be hosted by Canada in December 2020.

The Centre of Expertise in Paris, piloted by Inria, will support two working groups of experts on 3) future of work and 4) innovation & commercialization. It will work in cooperation with the Centre of Expertise in Montréal, which will support the other working groups.

This launch crowns two years of work by the French digital diplomacy and Canadian partners in order to implement the appeal made in the Canada-France Statement on AI of June 2018.

Quick facts
  • The creation of an International Panel on Artificial Intelligence announced by the Right Honourable Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, and Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic, prior to the 2018 G7 Summit, is a key outcome of the Canada-France Statement on AI.
  • As a first step toward establishing IPAI, Prime Minister Trudeau, Minister Bains and France’s Secretary of State for Digital Affairs announced the mandate for the International Panel on Artificial Intelligenceat the G7 Multistakeholder Conference on AI in December 2018.
  • In August 2019, during the G7 Summit in Biarritz, Heads of States and Governments acknowledge the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) proposed by Canada and France in the Biarritz Strategy for an Open, Free and Secure Digital Transformation.
  • On October 2019, during the Global Forum on AI for Humanity in Paris, President of the French Republic Emmanuel Macron announced that the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence will be supported by two Centre of Expertise in Paris, piloted by Inria, and in Montréal, and by a secretariat hosted at the OECD. At this occasion, experts and stakeholders from around the world, drawn from the public and private sectors, academic and scientific communities, as well as civil society more broadly discussed about possible priority topics for GPAI.
  • In May 2020, during the G7 ministerial meeting on Science & Technology, G7 countries agreed on launching the Global Partnership on AI to enhance multi-stakeholder cooperation in the advancement of AI that reflects our shared democratic values and addresses shared global challenges, with an initial focus that includes responding to and recovering from COVID-19, and committing to the responsible and human-centric development and use of AI in a manner consistent with human rights, fundamental freedoms, and our shared democratic values.
 
India expands Maritime Security footprint in IOR! Joins Djibouti Code of Conduct, Jeddah Amendment as an Observer
This comes amidst the growing tensions between India and China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh.
The Indian Navy has picked up the increased presence of the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). (Representative image)
The Indian Navy has picked up the increased presence of the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). (Representative image)

India has joined the Djibouti Code of Conduct/ Jeddah Amendment (DCOC/JA), as an Observer. This was following the high-level virtual meeting of the Grouping in last week of August.

What does it mean for India?
This comes amidst the growing tensions between India and China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh. The Indian Navy has picked up the increased presence of the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

Highly placed sources have told Financial Express Online “There is no term or duration laid out for being an Observer, and India will work with the DCOC Member States for enhancing maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean Region.”

Though India has been undertaking measures to enhance maritime security and safety in the IOR, joining the DCOC/JA will further enable India’s participation on a coordinated multilateral track, and efforts to enhance maritime security would include assistance through training, capacity building, and information exchange. Also, this will help in providing greater transparency in the maritime domain by assisting in upgrading existing information sharing mechanisms and by connecting them to present a transparent and seamless maritime picture.

“This is not is not related to India’s bilateral relations with Djibouti or access to ports in Djibouti or any other country in the region,” the source clarified.

The very fact that India request for Observer status to the DCOC/JA was accepted by consensus is indicative of her bilateral relations with the DCOC/JA member States along with the work done in enhancing maritime security in the region.”

What is DCOC/JA?
It is a grouping of 18 member states which are adjoining the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, the East coast of Africa and Island countries in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

Aimed at repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean Region, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, the DCOC was established in January 2009.

The Jeddah Amendment to DCOC came into effect during its meeting in January 2017.

This amendment has helped in enhancing the scope of the DCOC and will include repression of illicit maritime activity, including maritime terrorism and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

India has now joined Japan, Norway, the UK and the US as Observer to the DCOC/JA.

The Secretariat of the DCOC/JA of this organization is supported by the International Maritime Organisation. And the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the EU, INTERPOL and Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) are represented at the meetings.

India has been engaged in bilateral as well as multilateral cooperation with countries of the Indian Ocean region including through the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS).

In support of the spirit of collective solutions for maritime challenges, India announced, in November 2019, at East Asia Summit the ‘Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative’ — with its seven pillars including maritime ecology; maritime security; marine resources; capacity building and resource sharing; disaster risk reduction and management; science, technology and academic cooperation; and, trade, connectivity and maritime transport.

India has signed white shipping agreements under IFC-IOR with many countries in the IOR and shares maritime information with all the partner countries.

Expert View
Sharing his views with Financial Express Online, former spokesperson of the Indian Navy, Capt DK Sharma says, “As we are all aware that the menace of Piracy had shown it’s ugly head in the `Gulf of Aden’ a decade or so back, (precisely in 2008) and since then Indian Navy has been patrolling those piracy infested waters 24X7. India has a big stake in curbing the menace as a big chunk of worlds economy flows through that area viz. The Red Sea and onward into the Mediterranean Sea and beyond.”

“Keeping the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) which traverse through the Indian Ocean Region is the responsibility of the nation-state closer to those lanes and has been entrusted to Indian Navy.,” the former Navy Captain adds.

“In spite of all the efforts by India and various other Navies, the threat has been reduced to a large extent and the cases of Piracy have also reduced to almost negligible. However, the threat remains alive and thus the efforts by the world’s Navies are an ongoing process.”

According to Capt Sharma “On India joining the DCOC/JA as an Observer, I think it’s a logical step as the charter is now beyond Piracy and has included illegal fishing/trawling, human trafficking, Contraband trafficking etc. And, it would facilitate us to keep a check and coordinate/contribute towards the maritime security of IOR.”

“This construct under the aegis of IMO would also cater to environmental issues. Also, the fora would be able to counter the illegal and 7nregulated fishing, maritime terrorism and other illegal activities at sea and we know who are the countries who are active in this,” he concludes.
 

NATO: India’s next geopolitical destination​

When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders meet later this year, they will debate the recommendations from a group of experts (which I co-chaired) that advocates, among other things, extending a formal offer of partnership to India. Such an idea has been discussed before but has always foundered on India’s aversion to entanglement in rival geopolitical blocs. It’s time to overcome this obstacle.

China’s meteoric rise has dramatically heightened India’s need for closer security relationships with politically reliable, like-minded states. As China’s aggressive actions in the Galwan Valley and other border areas demonstrate, Beijing is increasingly willing to depart from its hide-and-bide strategy to directly challenge even the largest of its neighbours. This behavioural shift is likely to accelerate as China’s military capabilities expand. Already, China spends more on its military than all of its immediate neighbours combined, and nearly three times as much as India.

In these circumstances, India’s longstanding strategy of careful equi-distancing, punctuated by tilts toward China and Russia, is not viable; inevitably, New Delhi will have to undertake more deliberate efforts to counter-balance the juggernaut of Chinese power. To this end, it has already begun to deepen bilateral defence ties with Japan, the United States (US), and other regional players threatened by China, including through Quad.

Becoming a NATO partner would be a natural extension of this evolution with several upsides and few risks.

In the near-term, India would derive strategic-signalling value from even the appearance of drawing closer to the Western Alliance at a crucial, early phase of Beijing’s transition to a more aggressive posture. The mere fact of opening partnership talks would send the message that India’s leaders will redouble coalition-building efforts, more or less in direct proportion to Chinese aggression. The signal will hold all the more value precisely because it has heretofore bordered on geopolitical taboo.

Longer-term, India would derive military-strategic benefits from partnership with the world’s most powerful alliance. While NATO partnerships do not carry the Article 5 guarantee of collective defence against armed attack, they nevertheless come with regular defence dialogues, military-to-military planning, and joint exercises that improve readiness, interoperability and predictability. In the event of a conflict, India would benefit from having prior planning and arrangements in place for cooperating with NATO and its Mediterranean partners (including Israel, with which India has a close strategic relationship) to secure its western flank and the approaches to the Red Sea.

Partnering with NATO also carries technological benefits. Under a provision in the US 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, India now enjoys the same technology-sharing and cost-sharing perks as other non-NATO US allies for purposes of the Arms Export Control Act. But adding NATO partner status could also position India to benefit from possible future programmes aimed at lowering the barriers for cooperation in emerging technologies between NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners. It could also help to offset the growing concerns and negative scrutiny that India is increasingly attracting in Congress for its disproportionate reliance on Russian military equipment.

Partnering with NATO would not significantly constrain India’s broader geostrategic options. Egypt and Israel are both NATO partners who maintain defence relationships with Russia. Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, and Austria are all NATO partners with long-standing neutralist traditions. NATO’s partnerships are highly customised arrangements. In India’s case, the sheer size and importance of the country may warrant a new and special category of partnership — one that combines periodic high-level dialogue, technological cooperation and defence planning for maritime contingencies.

However, the obstacles to partnership are not only on the Indian side; in the past, some NATO allies have effectively blocked discussion of the matter by insisting that any offer of partnership to India be accompanied by similar invitations to Pakistan. This may have seemed attractive to some in the era when NATO militaries were mainly focused on conducting operations in Afghanistan. But with the winding down of operations there, NATO has little in common with a Pakistan that is increasingly radicalised at home and aligned with, and beholden to, China.

By contrast, the case for NATO partnership with India — a large maritime democracy with concerns and interests that tend to overlap with those of the US and many European allies — has only grown more compelling as China’s rise has accelerated.

For all of these reasons, NATO leaders should extend to India an offer of opening partnership talks. Doing so would signal that it is seriously evaluating all of its tools, including partnerships, according to how well they equip its members for dealing with a new era of great-power competition in which large states such as China and Russia pose, by far, the greatest threat to their security.

In this emerging competition, India is a vital player in its own right and should be treated as such. But Indians should be under no illusions that a truly non-aligned path remains a viable option.

Strengthening ties with NATO now, while China is still in the early phase of a shift to a more assertive posture toward both South Asia and Europe, could pay dividends in dissuading aggression and ensuring that, should China continue on its current trajectory, India has as many friends as possible in the right places.

A Wess Mitchell served as US assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia from 2017-2019 and as co-chair of the NATO 2030 Reflection Process. He currently serves as a principal at the Marathon Initiative.

The views expressed are personal.
 
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NATO: India’s next geopolitical destination​

When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders meet later this year, they will debate the recommendations from a group of experts (which I co-chaired) that advocates, among other things, extending a formal offer of partnership to India. Such an idea has been discussed before but has always foundered on India’s aversion to entanglement in rival geopolitical blocs. It’s time to overcome this obstacle.

China’s meteoric rise has dramatically heightened India’s need for closer security relationships with politically reliable, like-minded states. As China’s aggressive actions in the Galwan Valley and other border areas demonstrate, Beijing is increasingly willing to depart from its hide-and-bide strategy to directly challenge even the largest of its neighbours. This behavioural shift is likely to accelerate as China’s military capabilities expand. Already, China spends more on its military than all of its immediate neighbours combined, and nearly three times as much as India.

In these circumstances, India’s longstanding strategy of careful equi-distancing, punctuated by tilts toward China and Russia, is not viable; inevitably, New Delhi will have to undertake more deliberate efforts to counter-balance the juggernaut of Chinese power. To this end, it has already begun to deepen bilateral defence ties with Japan, the United States (US), and other regional players threatened by China, including through Quad.

Becoming a NATO partner would be a natural extension of this evolution with several upsides and few risks.

In the near-term, India would derive strategic-signalling value from even the appearance of drawing closer to the Western Alliance at a crucial, early phase of Beijing’s transition to a more aggressive posture. The mere fact of opening partnership talks would send the message that India’s leaders will redouble coalition-building efforts, more or less in direct proportion to Chinese aggression. The signal will hold all the more value precisely because it has heretofore bordered on geopolitical taboo.

Longer-term, India would derive military-strategic benefits from partnership with the world’s most powerful alliance. While NATO partnerships do not carry the Article 5 guarantee of collective defence against armed attack, they nevertheless come with regular defence dialogues, military-to-military planning, and joint exercises that improve readiness, interoperability and predictability. In the event of a conflict, India would benefit from having prior planning and arrangements in place for cooperating with NATO and its Mediterranean partners (including Israel, with which India has a close strategic relationship) to secure its western flank and the approaches to the Red Sea.

Partnering with NATO also carries technological benefits. Under a provision in the US 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, India now enjoys the same technology-sharing and cost-sharing perks as other non-NATO US allies for purposes of the Arms Export Control Act. But adding NATO partner status could also position India to benefit from possible future programmes aimed at lowering the barriers for cooperation in emerging technologies between NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners. It could also help to offset the growing concerns and negative scrutiny that India is increasingly attracting in Congress for its disproportionate reliance on Russian military equipment.

Partnering with NATO would not significantly constrain India’s broader geostrategic options. Egypt and Israel are both NATO partners who maintain defence relationships with Russia. Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, and Austria are all NATO partners with long-standing neutralist traditions. NATO’s partnerships are highly customised arrangements. In India’s case, the sheer size and importance of the country may warrant a new and special category of partnership — one that combines periodic high-level dialogue, technological cooperation and defence planning for maritime contingencies.

However, the obstacles to partnership are not only on the Indian side; in the past, some NATO allies have effectively blocked discussion of the matter by insisting that any offer of partnership to India be accompanied by similar invitations to Pakistan. This may have seemed attractive to some in the era when NATO militaries were mainly focused on conducting operations in Afghanistan. But with the winding down of operations there, NATO has little in common with a Pakistan that is increasingly radicalised at home and aligned with, and beholden to, China.

By contrast, the case for NATO partnership with India — a large maritime democracy with concerns and interests that tend to overlap with those of the US and many European allies — has only grown more compelling as China’s rise has accelerated.

For all of these reasons, NATO leaders should extend to India an offer of opening partnership talks. Doing so would signal that it is seriously evaluating all of its tools, including partnerships, according to how well they equip its members for dealing with a new era of great-power competition in which large states such as China and Russia pose, by far, the greatest threat to their security.

In this emerging competition, India is a vital player in its own right and should be treated as such. But Indians should be under no illusions that a truly non-aligned path remains a viable option.

Strengthening ties with NATO now, while China is still in the early phase of a shift to a more assertive posture toward both South Asia and Europe, could pay dividends in dissuading aggression and ensuring that, should China continue on its current trajectory, India has as many friends as possible in the right places.

A Wess Mitchell served as US assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia from 2017-2019 and as co-chair of the NATO 2030 Reflection Process. He currently serves as a principal at the Marathon Initiative.

The views expressed are personal.

Partners​


NATO cooperates with a range of international organisations and countries in different structures. Below is a list of these partners with links to web pages on their relations with NATO as well as links to their information servers.

International organisations​

In addition to its partnerships with countries, NATO cooperates with a range of international organisations.

 

India in Nato?

WHILE it is not fair to impute motives to a writer, one cannot help wondering if he is flying a kite, especially given his background. A. Wess Mitchell was US assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia from 2007-2019 and co-chair of the Nato 2020 Reflection Process. Nato has long been in a reflective mood regarding its own fatuous irrelevance.


That did not inhibit him from writing recently in an Indian publication, “When the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) leaders meet later this spring, they will debate the recommendations from a group of experts [which Mitchell co-chaired] that advocates, among other things, extending a formal offer of partnership to India. Such an idea has been discussed before but has always foundered on India’s aversion to entanglement in rival geopolitical blocs. It’s time to overcome this obstacle.


Non-alignment is a worn-out misnomer.

“China’s meteoric rise has dramatically heightened India’s need for closer security relationships with politically reliable, like-minded states. …Beijing is increasingly willing to depart from its hide-and-bide strategy to directly challenge even the largest of its neighbours.”


China’s military spending is three times that of India. India’s policy of equidistance, with tilts towards Russia and China, is not viable enough to meet the juggernaut of China’s power. Hence its moves for ties with the US, Japan and Australia in the Quad. Now for the moth-eaten carnet:


“While Nato partnerships do not carry the Article 5 guarantee of collective defence against armed attack, they nevertheless come with regular defence dialogues, military-to-military planning and joint exercises that improve readiness, interoperability and predictability. In the event of a conflict, India would benefit from having prior planning and arrangements in place for cooperating with Nato and its Mediterranean partners… .”


Nato has spread a web of partners, namely Egypt, Israel, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland and Finland.


Now comes the crunch. “However, the obstacles to partnership are not only on the Indian side; in the past, some Nato allies have effectively blocked discussion of the matter insisting that any offer of partnership to India be accompanied by similar invitations to Pakistan. This may have seemed attractive to some in the era when Nato militaries were mainly focused on conducting operations in Afghanistan. But with the winding down of operations there, Nato has little in common with a Pakistan that is increasingly radicalised at home and aligned with, and beholden to, China.


“…Nato leadership should extend to India an offer of opening partnership talks. Doing so would signal that it is seriously evaluating all of its tools, including partnerships, according to how well they equip its members for dealing with a new era of great-power competition… .


“In this emerging competition, India is a vital player in its own right and should be treated as such. But Indians should be under no illusions that a truly non-aligned path remains a viable option.”


Non-alignment is a worn-out misnomer. India’s non-alignment did not prevent Jawaharlal Nehru from seeking covertly — behind the back of India’s ambassador Asaf Ali — a written alliance with the US in 1948.


Note that the Nato partnership is shorn of guarantee of help in Article 5 of the NATO treaty of 1949, which reads “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently, they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force… .”


This is a worthless guarantee as its prime architect, the US secretary of state Dean Acheson said. He told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “This naturally does not mean that the United States would automatically be at war if one of the other signatory nations were the victim of an armed attack. Under the treaty we would be bound to make an honest judgement as to what action was necessary to attain that end and consequently to take such action. That action might or might not include the use of armed force.”


As De Gaulle remarked, treaties, like roses and pretty girls, last only as long as they last. How did Pakistan’s pacts with the US help, in its moments of crisis in the 1965 and 1971 wars?


Treaties are concluded in the national interest purely. Help is extended in the same spirit. In 1962, it took the US long to support India’s case on the border and even that was confined to the McMahon Line; not the Aksai Chin in Ladakh.


India has unwisely let skirmishes on an undefined border ratchet its dialogue and diplomacy.
 
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India defeats China for ReCAAP elections with Quad on its side​

India gave a major defeat to China when the director general of Coast Guard, K Natarajan, was elected as the next executive director of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). The regional body has its headquarters in Singapore.

Minister for external affairs Dr S Jaishankar congratulated Natarajan, saying it is a fitting recognition of India's contribution to maritime security.

"Congratulate DG Coast Guard for his election as the next Executive Director of ReCAAP, Singapore. A fitting recognition of our contribution to maritime security," Jaishankar said in his tweet.

The Indian candidate obtained a two-thirds majority receiving 14 votes out of a total of 21 member countries of ReCAAP. China received four votes and the Philippines got three. The next executive director is expected to take charge in 2022.

The preliminary assessment of the voting showed that Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka stood with the Modi government, while other Southeast Asian countries like Thailand voted for China. Client states like Cambodia and Laos obviously voted for Beijing.

Almost all the western countries, including members of the Quad - like the United States, Australia and Japan - voted for India, the diplomats said. The other western countries like Denmark, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Germany and Norway also voted for India.


ReCAAP is the first regional government-to-government agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia.

The agreement was launched in November 2006 with 14 Asian contracting parties. The number has increased to 21 today, including European countries like Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States.

The 12th governing council meeting in 2018 announced that ReCAAP ISC has met the criteria to be a centre of excellence for information sharing in combating piracy and armed robbery against ships at sea.