Line of Actual Control (LAC) : India & Tibet Border Updates

Throw us a bone, will ya? There should be something you can tell us without breaking protocol.
The lack of adequate forces in central command on LAC is so glaring that even a blind can see it. IA does not have blind people. They probably always had a game plan for central command and I do know for sure that out of the mountain strike corps, one was supposed to be for central command. I am just thinking aloud that out of the three strike corps against Pakistan, one is a swing strike corps. May be IA has kept it as surprise for Chinese. The terrain of central LAC suits us for rapid thrusts and as I stated in my earlier posts, thats the neck of Tibet. IA is probably looking to have an OrBat of five strike corps of which two each will be for Pakistan and China border and one will be a swing strike corps.
I have seen the kind of forces we are deploying in Laddakh, seems we might roll out a mountain strike IBG in actual battle.
 
The lack of adequate forces in central command on LAC is so glaring that even a blind can see it. IA does not have blind people. They probably always had a game plan for central command and I do know for sure that out of the mountain strike corps, one was supposed to be for central command. I am just thinking aloud that out of the three strike corps against Pakistan, one is a swing strike corps. May be IA has kept it as surprise for Chinese. The terrain of central LAC suits us for rapid thrusts and as I stated in my earlier posts, thats the neck of Tibet. IA is probably looking to have an OrBat of five strike corps of which two each will be for Pakistan and China border and one will be a swing strike corps.
I have seen the kind of forces we are deploying in Laddakh, seems we might roll out a mountain strike IBG in actual battle.

In the Mountainous Terrain of Uttarakhand , we need Artillery and Heliborne troops

All 3 Strike Corps against Pakistan are Armour intensive
 
The lack of adequate forces in central command on LAC is so glaring that even a blind can see it. IA does not have blind people. They probably always had a game plan for central command and I do know for sure that out of the mountain strike corps, one was supposed to be for central command. I am just thinking aloud that out of the three strike corps against Pakistan, one is a swing strike corps. May be IA has kept it as surprise for Chinese. The terrain of central LAC suits us for rapid thrusts and as I stated in my earlier posts, thats the neck of Tibet. IA is probably looking to have an OrBat of five strike corps of which two each will be for Pakistan and China border and one will be a swing strike corps.
I have seen the kind of forces we are deploying in Laddakh, seems we might roll out a mountain strike IBG in actual battle.

I'm not sure if the swing SC can be used as an SC against both though. If the SC has been designed to deal with Pakistan, then it won't have mountain friendly TOE. So I suppose it will have to be equipped to deal with Pakistan while act as a reserve against China, while the two MSCs will need to do the honours against China.
 
I'm not sure if the swing SC can be used as an SC against both though. If the SC has been designed to deal with Pakistan, then it won't have mountain friendly TOE. So I suppose it will have to be equipped to deal with Pakistan while act as a reserve against China, while the two MSCs will need to do the honours against China.

We can Attach the China oriented Brigades and their equipment to these
3 SC , since they have sufficient infrastructure But what about Acclimatisation of troops and Training in The Mountainous terrain

How will that Happen
 
We can Attach the China oriented Brigades and their equipment to these
3 SC , since they have sufficient infrastructure But what about Acclimatisation of troops and Training in The Mountainous terrain

How will that Happen

Why will acclimitsation and training be an issue? Look at where the Chinese keep their Strike Corps.
 
Throw us a bone, will ya? There should be something you can tell us without breaking protocol.

Well, I will repeat. I hope that both China and Pakistan make a mistake. They will be in for a very rude surprise.
We can Attach the China oriented Brigades and their equipment to these
3 SC , since they have sufficient infrastructure But what about Acclimatisation of troops and Training in The Mountainous terrain

How will that Happen


What mountains?

In a flat terrain, in high altitude, where no exertion is going to take place and you have to push troops on relatively flat area, the only problem I might have is Acute Mountain Sickness. Have drugs for that. Especially if they are motorized/mechanized/armoured formations where there is no practical need to walk endlessly.
 
I'm not sure if the swing SC can be used as an SC against both though. If the SC has been designed to deal with Pakistan, then it won't have mountain friendly TOE. So I suppose it will have to be equipped to deal with Pakistan while act as a reserve against China, while the two MSCs will need to do the honours against China.
Let me tell you something which I found very surprising. I agree with @Falcon regarding his assesment of Ravi Rikhaye. But it seems that his knowledge is dated in 2014 or so. The present deployment of PLA as shown by many OSINT handles is exactly as per the book written by Ravi Rikhaye in 2018. This means that his book is based on how IA was and what the future plans of IA were as in a period before 2018. His book has very little to offer about how IAF will add to the fighting potential of IA.
Please have a look at the deployment of PLA in Aksai Hind especially in Pangong Tso area, Gogra, Hotsprings and Chusul. They seem more of defensive nature and primed to fight holding Battles with a Brigade each in these areas. But they have something sinister up north and that is where IA can counter pressure from central command.
The battle this time will be exact replica of 1962 but with IAF butchering PLAAF. Irrespective what anyone may say, I know what IAF is capable of and the kind of tactical advantage they enjoy over PLAAF. Yesterday in my post I had stated that it will be difficult for IA to come down from mountains to fight PLA in plains. But if IA can breakthru from mountains to plains and that too like that of Aksai Hind with air superiority, With multiple thrust from Central command and NE, we can butcher PLA and librate Tibet within about three weeks. Dash to Lhasa will become easy once we surround PLA in southern Aksai Hind from Central Command and make thrust from Sikkim towards Lhasa. Did you even notice the breaks in their deployment pattern? They are not mutually supportive.
 
Well, I will repeat. I hope that both China and Pakistan make a mistake. They will be in for a very rude surprise.



What mountains?

In a flat terrain, in high altitude, where no exertion is going to take place and you have to push troops on relatively flat area, the only problem I might have is Acute Mountain Sickness. Have drugs for that. Especially if they are motorized/mechanized/armoured formations where there is no practical need to walk endlessly.

The mountains of Uttarakhand and Ladakh

Both Armies will try to occupy the Vantage Heights to Direct Artillery Fire

Also MMG positions on peaks can stop entire Company level troops as they did in Kargil

How different it will be from Kargil
Let me tell you something which I found very surprising. I agree with @Falcon regarding his assesment of Ravi Rikhaye. But it seems that his knowledge is dated in 2014 or so. The present deployment of PLA as shown by many OSINT handles is exactly as per the book written by Ravi Rikhaye in 2018. This means that his book is based on how IA was and what the future plans of IA were as in a period before 2018. His book has very little to offer about how IAF will add to the fighting potential of IA.
Please have a look at the deployment of PLA in Aksai Hind especially in Pangong Tso area, Gogra, Hotsprings and Chusul. They seem more of defensive nature and primed to fight holding Battles with a Brigade each in these areas. But they have something sinister up north and that is where IA can counter pressure from central command.
The battle this time will be exact replica of 1962 but with IAF butchering PLAAF. Irrespective what anyone may say, I know what IAF is capable of and the kind of tactical advantage they enjoy over PLAAF. Yesterday in my post I had stated that it will be difficult for IA to come down from mountains to fight PLA in plains. But if IA can breakthru from mountains to plains and that too like that of Aksai Hind with air superiority, With multiple thrust from Central command and NE, we can butcher PLA and librate Tibet within about three weeks. Dash to Lhasa will become easy once we surround PLA in southern Aksai Hind from Central Command and make thrust from Sikkim towards Lhasa. Did you even notice the breaks in their deployment pattern? They are not mutually supportive.

The 2 Weapons that IF we had in MORE
NUMBERS --- Mirage 2000 and SMERCH
MBRLs ; had we acquired more of these two weapon systems ; we would have
Kicked them out by now
 
Let me tell you something which I found very surprising. I agree with @Falcon regarding his assesment of Ravi Rikhaye. But it seems that his knowledge is dated in 2014 or so. The present deployment of PLA as shown by many OSINT handles is exactly as per the book written by Ravi Rikhaye in 2018. This means that his book is based on how IA was and what the future plans of IA were as in a period before 2018. His book has very little to offer about how IAF will add to the fighting potential of IA.
Please have a look at the deployment of PLA in Aksai Hind especially in Pangong Tso area, Gogra, Hotsprings and Chusul. They seem more of defensive nature and primed to fight holding Battles with a Brigade each in these areas. But they have something sinister up north and that is where IA can counter pressure from central command.
The battle this time will be exact replica of 1962 but with IAF butchering PLAAF. Irrespective what anyone may say, I know what IAF is capable of and the kind of tactical advantage they enjoy over PLAAF. Yesterday in my post I had stated that it will be difficult for IA to come down from mountains to fight PLA in plains. But if IA can breakthru from mountains to plains and that too like that of Aksai Hind with air superiority, With multiple thrust from Central command and NE, we can butcher PLA and librate Tibet within about three weeks. Dash to Lhasa will become easy once we surround PLA in southern Aksai Hind from Central Command and make thrust from Sikkim towards Lhasa. Did you even notice the breaks in their deployment pattern? They are not mutually supportive.
Have you read Ravi Rikhye's book on the 2 front war? If I'm not mistaken apart from the ORBAT of the IA, he's detailed the IAF battle plans too. Though you're right about him not having considered the para military, I don't see what major value addition these CAPF's - for that's what they are - will bring .

Besides while they may number 4-5 lakh odd, I doubt more than 50k can be spared for war, assuming we're in a really right spot & even then their efficacy would be questionable.
 
Well, I will repeat. I hope that both China and Pakistan make a mistake. They will be in for a very rude surprise.
Sir, my personal rudest surprise is the utter lethargy in force modernization that has been accumulating for God knows how many decades and is still not being covered properly. I mean, if we are running short of funds then government should sell war bonds (I and many others will happily buy them) or impose additional cess on income (I personally come in all the cess heading for my earnings in India and will be happy to pay 100% cess if it comes to that) to specifically support force modernization. The fact that we have limited war fighting ammunition reserves is simply cringe worthy. This was seen in early 2000s and TILL date there is no fix for it.

I don't see any sweeping changes in procurement policies to cut down procurement time. I don't see the white elephants of OFBs and HALs being put to task. I don't see expansion of private weapon manufacturing.

Last night I was reading about MANPADs. IA felt the need of more modern MANPADs in 1999. The tender was floated in 2003s or so but for some freaken reason cancelled in 2006. It was again highlighted in 2010s and finally contract was signed in 2018 with Russia to buy Igla-S of all missiles. Thats freaken 19 years. Japan in 1979 (lol yeah that old) started on developing a new MANPAD Type 91. It was their first MANPAD domestically produced. In 1991, they had their missile developed. In 1994, it was deployed in numbners. Thats 15 year for a brand new system. I don't freaken know what these guys in OFBs, BDLs, HALs etc are doing.
 
Have you read Ravi Rikhye's book on the 2 front war? If I'm not mistaken apart from the ORBAT of the IA, he's detailed the IAF battle plans too. Though you're right about him not having considered the para military, I don't see what major value addition these CAPF's - for that's what they are - will bring .

Besides while they may number 4-5 lakh odd, I doubt more than 50k can be spared for war, assuming we're in a really right spot & even then their efficacy would be questionable.
I did read parts of it and his assesment about the role of IAF needs many things to be desired. Do you even know what a flight of 4 Jaguars supported and escorted by M2k/ Su-30MKI with stand off Jammers can do to the armour and arty of PLA in any area?
Sir, my personal rudest surprise is the utter lethargy in force modernization that has been accumulating for God knows how many decades and is still not being covered properly. I mean, if we are running short of funds then government should sell war bonds (I and many others will happily buy them) or impose additional cess on income (I personally come in all the cess heading for my earnings in India and will be happy to pay 100% cess if it comes to that) to specifically support force modernization. The fact that we have limited war fighting ammunition reserves is simply cringe worthy. This was seen in early 2000s and TILL date there is no fix for it.

I don't see any sweeping changes in procurement policies to cut down procurement time. I don't see the white elephants of OFBs and HALs being put to task. I don't see expansion of private weapon manufacturing.

Last night I was reading about MANPADs. IA felt the need of more modern MANPADs in 1999. The tender was floated in 2003s or so but for some freaken reason cancelled in 2006. It was again highlighted in 2010s and finally contract was signed in 2018 with Russia to buy Igla-S of all missiles. Thats freaken 19 years. Japan in 1979 (lol yeah that old) started on developing a new MANPAD Type 91. It was their first MANPAD domestically produced. In 1991, they had their missile developed. In 1994, it was deployed in numbners. Thats 15 year for a brand new system. I don't freaken know what these guys in OFBs, BDLs, HALs etc are doing.
Do you know what biggest problem is? If Indian Armed Forces deliver a surprise in a two front war, the baboos in MOD will say that they were right all thru by blocking the wish list of Forces and whatever was demanded by Indian Armed forces was outlandish. A victory will go against Indian Armed forces in a two front war. What the baboos will never realise is that Armed forces must have a strength to ensure that the adversory is not even able to think about getting into a military confrontation with you. Modi was right when he stated that prelude to peace is strong armed forces. But will our babbos learn it and change? what happens when Modi is gone?
We are destined to fight wars with WHATEVER WE HAVE AND NOT WITH WHAT WE SHOULD HAVE.
 
I did read parts of it and his assesment about the role of IAF needs many things to be desired. Do you even know what a flight of 4 Jaguars supported and escorted by M2k/ Su-30MKI with stand off Jammers can do to the armour and arty of PLA in any area?
No, I don't. But from the way things are panning out, I'm sure we'd get to witness the Package you've described. I just hope it lives up to your expectations of it. For the sake of our nation & the men out there.
 
Let me tell you something which I found very surprising. I agree with @Falcon regarding his assesment of Ravi Rikhaye. But it seems that his knowledge is dated in 2014 or so. The present deployment of PLA as shown by many OSINT handles is exactly as per the book written by Ravi Rikhaye in 2018. This means that his book is based on how IA was and what the future plans of IA were as in a period before 2018. His book has very little to offer about how IAF will add to the fighting potential of IA.
Please have a look at the deployment of PLA in Aksai Hind especially in Pangong Tso area, Gogra, Hotsprings and Chusul. They seem more of defensive nature and primed to fight holding Battles with a Brigade each in these areas. But they have something sinister up north and that is where IA can counter pressure from central command.
The battle this time will be exact replica of 1962 but with IAF butchering PLAAF. Irrespective what anyone may say, I know what IAF is capable of and the kind of tactical advantage they enjoy over PLAAF. Yesterday in my post I had stated that it will be difficult for IA to come down from mountains to fight PLA in plains. But if IA can breakthru from mountains to plains and that too like that of Aksai Hind with air superiority, With multiple thrust from Central command and NE, we can butcher PLA and librate Tibet within about three weeks. Dash to Lhasa will become easy once we surround PLA in southern Aksai Hind from Central Command and make thrust from Sikkim towards Lhasa. Did you even notice the breaks in their deployment pattern? They are not mutually supportive.

There is a lack of understanding amongst many people about the capability of modern precision weapons (stuff far beyond the Paveway II) and their effect on the battlefield. So the Rafale with AASM or Typhoon with Brimstone, also the Apache with the Longbow radar, people haven't actually seen what these precision weapons can do.


And this one...

People won't even realise how many missions were combined in just that one video. And the Rafale can do the same.

You bring technology in, one will realise that Ravi Rikhye has overestimated the need for the number of divisions needed to fight a two-front war. Especially considering the overwhelming advantage we have over Pakistan already.