Rafale DH/EH of Indian Air Force : News and Discussions
- Thread starter Herciv
- Start date
-
- Tags
- indian defence forum
The 6th and beyond gen aircrafts will have an enormous amount of AI. We significantly underestimate our capabilities in this field. For highest level technologies we need to even shake up our premier IIT system. Even if we can shake up the system we will still need to bring back our top brains that leave our country for greener pastures, just like the Chinese have done. Otherwise our platforms will be technologically inferior. Even our current premier education institutes are such that we cannot create a world class environment in a couple of decades
If the IN takes a follow on order of any fighter aircraft, then TEDBF is not a viable option to pursue. It'll be equal or slightly better than contemporary Rafales, and this isn't enough to warrant a development of a separate aircraft especially when we are desperate for resources for AMCA.
Pls refrain from bringing reality in. This is 2022. A lot of good things have been predicted for years for this particular year which all veteran members here have been awaiting with bated breath & you're trying to rain on the parade.
If we've a total of 3 carriers the forthcoming MRCBF will initially function as an augmenting force to the MiG-29 Ks & later with the TEDBF coming in as both augmenting force & replacement.
With 3 carriers even if one is destined to be retired by 2045 , there's a need for 100 + aircraft including trainers. Plus there's the coastal patrolling requirements which is being contested between IN & IAF & then there's the ANC & Lakshadweep which is being developed into a base too.
We haven't even touched upon external bases in say Seychelles, Mauritius, Mozambique etc.
Ok thanks for making me aware of these requirements. But we do not need a carrier capable aircraft for these land bases even if they are under the control of the IN. Rafale / LCA MK2 / AMCA will suffice.
Why utilize IAF aircrafts when they're already reeling under a shortage of combat aircraft & can't spare any for tasks easily & may I add legitimately under the INs domain.
Ideally if we're looking at developing an expeditionary force on the lines of the USMC it should begin it's journey under the IN with the theaterization policy implemented before it's spun off in due course into a separate command where in the aircraft component will play a vital role. That's where TEDBF comes in.
Now while this is a futuristic requirement it's not that far away into the future too & may well see external base operations commence before the decade is out with whatever assets we have ( why ? Because the Chinese are coming in full strength into the IOR ) .
Then of course there's the domestic component which I've already listed & which'd form the bulk of the requirements.
The AMCA will become optionally manned around 2035. One of the objectives of AMCA is to perform most if not all missions without a man in the loop.
Automated takeoff and landing (ATOL), automated missions and auto air-to-air refueling (Auto AAR)
Tejas done, focus on three other fighter jets: two for IAF, one Navy
Three new fighter jets will be flying by 2026, of which two will be for the Air Force and one for the Navy, Girish S Deodhare, chief of Aeronautical Development Agency of the Defence Ministry, which has designed the LCA, told The Indian Express.
indianexpress.com
The problem with 7th gen isn't software, it's hardware. The software will be taken care of with AMCA by 2035 and hardware will come in through ISRO's work on their manned and unmanned space shuttle programs. By the time our 7th gen hits the shelves, contemporary technologies going into it would be in use at least for 10-15 years.
Look, fighter aircraft development follows a logical sequence. It's basically countries reacting to what other countries have achieved. Because of the Su-57, the Americans began the NGAD due to the urgency to respond to it. And the Chinese are responding to the Americans. So they are working with the limits of technology that exist today. For example, they have no choice but to design the aircraft to be manned, so they need a cockpit. Adding a cockpit restricts the jet to certain limits. We have no need to respond to any of the three powers, so we do not have to follow their sequence of development. When we work on our next fighter, it's gonna be based on the limits of technology available in 2040, so that includes space shuttle tech, advanced AI etc. By then, we won't need a cockpit, so our fighter would be built very differently in comparison, up to the very limits of engineering itself.
So what they do between 2025 and 2040, we don't care. And what we do between 2035 and 2050 is obviously going to be very different from what they did. Our starting points aren't the same. And it's pretty dumb to expect that we only plan on duplicating their effort.
26 is too less. You forget that TEDBF cannot be operated from IAC-2, so it doesn't make sense to have only 18 Rafale-Ms capable of operating from it, not counting attrition, downtime and training, which further reduces number. A follow-on order taking the number to a minimum of 45 is inevitable. The alternative is to replace the Rafale-M, but the navy's timeframe is different from the IAF's. There's not going to be much change visible until the late 2040s.
The way I see it, we will start a next gen naval fighter, 6th gen presumably, in 2030, and a 7th gen air force fighter after 2035. So the naval fighter can be used on IAC-3, 4, 5 etc from 2045 onwards, while the air force fighter will replace the MKI after 2050.
KHAMSIN, a high intensity training
The training sequence named KHAMSIN, as an element within mission SHIKRA, started on 10 January 2022 in Djibouti.
Scramble Magazine reported on the first phase of mission SHIKRA, exercise MARATHON, which consisted of the non-stop flight on 5 January 2022 of two Rafale B fighters and one Airbus A330MRTT Phénix (Phoenix) to La Réunion (Reunion Island).
On 8 January, the detachment left La Réunion for Base Aérienne 188 (BA188) at Djibouti/Ambouli to be part of the training exercise.
A second power projection mission, exercise MINOTAURE, started on 10 January involving two EC01.004 Gascogne Rafale B, two EC01.002 Cigognes Mirage 2000-5F, three EC03.003 Ardennes Mirage 2000D escorted by an A330MRTT Phénix flying the 5,000 km stretch non-stop from France to Djibouti/Ambouli.
When arriving in Djiboutian airspace the contingent was challenged by the earlier mentioned Rafales that arrived from La Réunion and the locally based Mirage 2000-5 from EC03.011 Corse. The interceptors were assisted by ground-to-air defence systems and simulated denial of access to the incoming fighters, whose crews were treated and trained to a high intensity fight after more than eight hours of flight.
The KHAMSIN training exercise continued for several days in a favourable environment. The operational support at BA188 allows the military to meet operational preparation conditions like those of current external operations. Local units such as the Air Operations Coordination Centre and the based EC03.011 fighter squadron facilitated the crews arriving from France.
The following aircraft were noted participating in the execrcise:
Incoming force
Rafale B: 342/4-FI and 355/4-FV operated by EC01.004 Gascogne
Mirage 2000-5F: 71/2-EE and 57/2-ET operated by EC01.002 Cigognes
Mirage 2000D: 635/3-AS, 661/3-XI and 629/3-XO operated by EC03.003 Ardennes
A330MRTT: 045/F-UJCK operated by ERVTS01.031 Bretagne
Defending force
Rafale B: 323/4-HT and 325/4-HX operated by EC01.004 Gascogne
Mirage 2000-5: unknown number operated by EC03.011 Corse
The following aircraft were also noted, but it is not known if these participated in the exercise:
A330MRTT: 044/F-UJCJ operated by ERVTS01.031 Bretagne (returned to France on 11 January 2022)
C-135FR: 735/31-CG operated by ERV04.031 Sologne
The training sequence named KHAMSIN, as an element within mission SHIKRA, started on 10 January 2022 in Djibouti.
Scramble Magazine reported on the first phase of mission SHIKRA, exercise MARATHON, which consisted of the non-stop flight on 5 January 2022 of two Rafale B fighters and one Airbus A330MRTT Phénix (Phoenix) to La Réunion (Reunion Island).
On 8 January, the detachment left La Réunion for Base Aérienne 188 (BA188) at Djibouti/Ambouli to be part of the training exercise.
A second power projection mission, exercise MINOTAURE, started on 10 January involving two EC01.004 Gascogne Rafale B, two EC01.002 Cigognes Mirage 2000-5F, three EC03.003 Ardennes Mirage 2000D escorted by an A330MRTT Phénix flying the 5,000 km stretch non-stop from France to Djibouti/Ambouli.
When arriving in Djiboutian airspace the contingent was challenged by the earlier mentioned Rafales that arrived from La Réunion and the locally based Mirage 2000-5 from EC03.011 Corse. The interceptors were assisted by ground-to-air defence systems and simulated denial of access to the incoming fighters, whose crews were treated and trained to a high intensity fight after more than eight hours of flight.
The KHAMSIN training exercise continued for several days in a favourable environment. The operational support at BA188 allows the military to meet operational preparation conditions like those of current external operations. Local units such as the Air Operations Coordination Centre and the based EC03.011 fighter squadron facilitated the crews arriving from France.
The following aircraft were noted participating in the execrcise:
Incoming force
Rafale B: 342/4-FI and 355/4-FV operated by EC01.004 Gascogne
Mirage 2000-5F: 71/2-EE and 57/2-ET operated by EC01.002 Cigognes
Mirage 2000D: 635/3-AS, 661/3-XI and 629/3-XO operated by EC03.003 Ardennes
A330MRTT: 045/F-UJCK operated by ERVTS01.031 Bretagne
Defending force
Rafale B: 323/4-HT and 325/4-HX operated by EC01.004 Gascogne
Mirage 2000-5: unknown number operated by EC03.011 Corse
The following aircraft were also noted, but it is not known if these participated in the exercise:
A330MRTT: 044/F-UJCJ operated by ERVTS01.031 Bretagne (returned to France on 11 January 2022)
C-135FR: 735/31-CG operated by ERV04.031 Sologne
That's a good effort. It must have been hard for them to get 4 Rafales into the air. With only about a 50% serviceability rate and now a smaller force. After selling off some Rafales from the fleet. Does it embarrass you? That even compared to Australia, France's air force is second rate. Lacking on many levels.
@WHOHE. The service men are fine. It's the design and manufacturing that falls down. They can't even keep a helicopter in the air. Australia, along with others, are scrapping the Tiger and NH90. As well as poor serviceability, the cost per flight hour is up there with a fighter aircraft and getting worse.
@WHOHE. The service men are fine. It's the design and manufacturing that falls down. They can't even keep a helicopter in the air. Australia, along with others, are scrapping the Tiger and NH90. As well as poor serviceability, the cost per flight hour is up there with a fighter aircraft and getting worse.
Last edited:
You are right about helos. Since airbus is not 100% french and there is a german part, everything is getting bad.
About Rafale, you are wrong. picdelamirandoil explained how the availability was cumputed in the french forces.
About Rafale, you are wrong. picdelamirandoil explained how the availability was cumputed in the french forces.
Haute intensité : L'aviation de combat française présente des fragilités qui peinent à se réduire - Zone Militaire
Alors que l'éventualité d'un engagement de "haute intensité" n'est plus une vue de l'esprit, l'armée de l'Air & de l'Espace aura-t-elle les moyens de
www.opex360.com
You can't blame the engine on Germany.
“Taking into account engine-related issues and the level of operational support [NSO], the operational technical availability [DTO] of the Rafale [air and navy] reached 55.8%"
Last edited:
Yes, we have very few resources, but thanks to the versatility of the Rafale, the French air force can easily fulfil its operational contract, and there is room for improvement because the availability of the Rafale can be as high as 98%.Instead of Pic and his fantasies. I think I will go with a government source. After you take off the 14 that are being cannibalised for parts and the ones sold secondhand. It seems out of 102. They now have 64 left and with about 35 serviceable rate. They can't even put up 2 squadronsHaute intensité : L'aviation de combat française présente des fragilités qui peinent à se réduire - Zone Militaire
Alors que l'éventualité d'un engagement de "haute intensité" n'est plus une vue de l'esprit, l'armée de l'Air & de l'Espace aura-t-elle les moyens de
You can't blame the engine on Germany.
“Taking into account engine-related issues and the level of operational support [NSO], the operational technical availability [DTO] of the Rafale [air and navy] reached 55.8%"
That said, it is good that people like Mr Ferrara are defending the air force by pointing out all the shortcomings so that budgets can be voted to improve the situation. But of course the game is to exaggerate the problems while ignoring the solutions already provided.
CAATSA helps us sell Rafales to the Middle East
Moscow struggles to sell fighter jets in the Mideast
Read more: Moscow struggles to sell fighter jets in the Mideast
Moscow struggles to sell fighter jets in the Mideast
Read more: Moscow struggles to sell fighter jets in the Mideast
According to initial plan, French Minister of Armed Forces will come down to Jakarta on 22 January 2022. The visit final confirmation will be determined by other factors includes Covid development. It seems she's going to push for Rafale, Scorpene to her Indonesian counterpart.
Yes, I will do so by translating an official report prepared for the SENAT which is a kind of French parliament.
The summary of the document is as follows:
THE ESSENTIAL
I. THE SCAF, A COOPERATION PROGRAMME NECESSARY FOR EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
A. A COMMON CAPABILITY REQUIREMENT BETWEEN FRANCE, GERMANY AND SPAIN BY 2040
1. The replacement of the Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon
a) The capability requirement
b) Consequences for the future aircraft carrier
2. Keeping a "sovereign" aircraft, maintaining advanced skills
B. A PROJECT TO DEEPEN FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION
1. The impetus given by the Aachen Treaty
2. Prospects for strengthening Franco-German operational cooperation to be confirmed
3. Recent progress in Franco-German capability cooperation
C. A SPANISH PARTNER STRONGLY MOTIVATED BY THE PROJECT
1. A strong bilateral defence and security relationship
2. A valuable contribution to the SCAF
D. A COOPERATIVE PROJECT TO SHARE COSTS AND ACHIEVE STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
1. A project probably too costly for one country alone
2. A project guided by the need for national and European strategic autonomy
a) Becoming competitive again in the export market
(1) Aiming for "exportability" from the start of the programme
(2) The necessary "de-ITARisation
b) A cooperation project encouraged by the changing international context
c) Towards European strategic autonomy?
(1) A project of great importance for European industry
(2) A long-term commitment to European strategic autonomy, which involves the issue of interoperability
(d) The SCAF and NATO
II. THE SCAF : FROM SYSTEM TO "SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
A. A COMMONLY DEFINED NEED
B. THINKING IN TERMS OF A "SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS": A NEW REQUIREMENT
1. The SCAF architecture
2. Necessary innovations
3. The challenges of connectivity and the combat cloud
4. Artificial intelligence
5. The challenge of designing a new engine
a) A strategic autonomy issue
b) A technical challenge
6. A necessarily incremental approach
C. THE POLITICAL AND INDUSTRIAL STAGES OF THE SCAF
1. The common concept study
2. The organisation in pillars, phase 1A of the demonstrator
a) Why a demonstrator(s)?
b) A delay of several months due to difficulties in the Franco-German negotiation
c) The 7 pillars of the demonstrator
d) Work that is progressing despite the coronavirus crisis
3. Ad hoc governance and an innovative organisation of State/industry relations
a) A specific organisation
b) The role of the Defence Innovation Agency
III. MEETING THE CHALLENGES, MAKING THE SCAF A SUCCESS
A. DON'T GET THE WRONG PROJECT
1. Putting artificial intelligence and autonomous capabilities at the heart of SCAF development
2. The crucial importance of data links and combat cloud and sensor pillars
3. Which engine for the demonstrator?
4. The environmental dimension
B. MAKING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION MORE FLUID
1. A different prioritisation of political, operational and industrial priorities
2. Different strategic approaches between France and Germany
a) Different strategic approaches
b) "Cultural" misunderstandings between the two partners
c) A more complex German decision-making process
d) The need for a longer-term commitment to avoid repeated blockages of the programme
3. The exportability of the SCAF as a key issue
a) Germany's specific approach to arms exports.
b) Towards pragmatic solutions in the framework of the Aachen Treaty.
C. IMPROVING INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
1. The "geographical return" and "best athlete" principles
2. The still unresolved issue of industrial property
3. What place for ONERA?
4. Extending the project to new partners after completion of the demonstrator
D. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS: CONTRIBUTING TO ECONOMIC RECOVERY THROUGH INVESTMENT IN THE SCAF
E. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXISTENCE OF THE TEMPEST PROGRAMME
1. Originally an aborted Franco-British cooperation project
2. Tempest, an international cooperation project
3. A clear political will, an uncertain future
4. Is a rapprochement between the SCAF and the Tempest possible?
The answer to your question will be inside:
THINKING IN TERMS OF A "SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS": A NEW REQUIREMENT
But I will translate all the report on a new topic so you will have to wait a little bit !!
FCAS Program, Specification, development
Last edited:
Yes, I will do so by translating an official report prepared for the SENAT which is a kind of French parliament.
The summary of the document is as follows:
THE ESSENTIAL
I. THE SCAF, A COOPERATION PROGRAMME NECESSARY FOR EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
A. A COMMON CAPABILITY REQUIREMENT BETWEEN FRANCE, GERMANY AND SPAIN BY 2040
1. The replacement of the Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon
a) The capability requirement
b) Consequences for the future aircraft carrier
2. Keeping a "sovereign" aircraft, maintaining advanced skills
B. A PROJECT TO DEEPEN FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION
1. The impetus given by the Aachen Treaty
2. Prospects for strengthening Franco-German operational cooperation to be confirmed
3. Recent progress in Franco-German capability cooperation
C. A SPANISH PARTNER STRONGLY MOTIVATED BY THE PROJECT
1. A strong bilateral defence and security relationship
2. A valuable contribution to the SCAF
D. A COOPERATIVE PROJECT TO SHARE COSTS AND ACHIEVE STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
1. A project probably too costly for one country alone
2. A project guided by the need for national and European strategic autonomy
a) Becoming competitive again in the export market
(1) Aiming for "exportability" from the start of the programme
(2) The necessary "de-ITARisation
b) A cooperation project encouraged by the changing international context
c) Towards European strategic autonomy?
(1) A project of great importance for European industry
(2) A long-term commitment to European strategic autonomy, which involves the issue of interoperability
(d) The SCAF and NATO
II. THE SCAF : FROM SYSTEM TO "SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
A. A COMMONLY DEFINED NEED
B. THINKING IN TERMS OF A "SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS": A NEW REQUIREMENT
1. The SCAF architecture
2. Necessary innovations
3. The challenges of connectivity and the combat cloud
4. Artificial intelligence
5. The challenge of designing a new engine
a) A strategic autonomy issue
b) A technical challenge
6. A necessarily incremental approach
C. THE POLITICAL AND INDUSTRIAL STAGES OF THE SCAF
1. The common concept study
2. The organisation in pillars, phase 1A of the demonstrator
a) Why a demonstrator(s)?
b) A delay of several months due to difficulties in the Franco-German negotiation
c) The 7 pillars of the demonstrator
d) Work that is progressing despite the coronavirus crisis
3. Ad hoc governance and an innovative organisation of State/industry relations
a) A specific organisation
b) The role of the Defence Innovation Agency
III. MEETING THE CHALLENGES, MAKING THE SCAF A SUCCESS
A. DON'T GET THE WRONG PROJECT
1. Putting artificial intelligence and autonomous capabilities at the heart of SCAF development
2. The crucial importance of data links and combat cloud and sensor pillars
3. Which engine for the demonstrator?
4. The environmental dimension
B. MAKING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION MORE FLUID
1. A different prioritisation of political, operational and industrial priorities
2. Different strategic approaches between France and Germany
a) Different strategic approaches
b) "Cultural" misunderstandings between the two partners
c) A more complex German decision-making process
d) The need for a longer-term commitment to avoid repeated blockages of the programme
3. The exportability of the SCAF as a key issue
a) Germany's specific approach to arms exports.
b) Towards pragmatic solutions in the framework of the Aachen Treaty.
C. IMPROVING INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
1. The "geographical return" and "best athlete" principles
2. The still unresolved issue of industrial property
3. What place for ONERA?
4. Extending the project to new partners after completion of the demonstrator
D. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS: CONTRIBUTING TO ECONOMIC RECOVERY THROUGH INVESTMENT IN THE SCAF
E. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXISTENCE OF THE TEMPEST PROGRAMME
1. Originally an aborted Franco-British cooperation project
2. Tempest, an international cooperation project
3. A clear political will, an uncertain future
4. Is a rapprochement between the SCAF and the Tempest possible?
The answer to your question will be inside:
THINKING IN TERMS OF A "SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS": A NEW REQUIREMENT
But I will translate all the report on a new topic so you will have to wait a little bit !!
FCAS Program, Specification, development
III E 1 shouldn't have been dropped.
So is it possible for FCAS and Tempest to combine?
Hellfire doesn't go around giving nicknames to people.
He-who-shall-not-be-named gave me that nickname.
For example in 2021:
The French Rafale have 55% availability for 25,000 flight hours, or 250 flight hours per aircraft. Operational contract (activity) fulfilled.
A higher availability would bring nothing more than daily flexibility (instant availability) at a higher cost; having aircraft maintained available but not flying is not economical.
Wanna talk about servicability? Operational contract is fulfilled, with an average 250 hours flight/Rafale/year. Servicability have different metrics. How much hours/year do fly F-35? Right from my pocket (did not check the nmbers), it is about 150. Personnaly i prefer to have aplane that flies 250 hours with 55% servicability than one that flies 150 with 200%...