The Quad (US, Japan, India, Australia Security Dialogue) : Updates and Discussions

If you say so. :rolleyes: If you keep trying to make enemies instead of friends, you might be the 2nd state of China before long.
 
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Locating Quad in geopolitical history​

For almost six centuries, the leaders of England (and later Great Britain) saw France as their primary strategic challenge. The Anglo-French rivalry was so all-consuming — from the Hundred Years War through the Napoleonic Wars — that it resulted in the consolidation of territory and national identities in both countries, shaped dynastic successions, altered religious and linguistic developments, determined alliances and military involvement, and fuelled colonial competition.

But centuries of rivalry came to an end in 1904, when Britain and France signed a series of agreements, known as the Entente Cordiale. The impetus was the rise of a new European power — Germany — which both France and Britain perceived to be a shared challenge. The Entente Cordiale was not a commitment to each other’s defence. Contradictions remained. Later that year, France’s ally, Russia, and Britain’s ally, Japan, were to wage war against each other. Nonetheless, Germany was sufficiently motivated by the new Anglo-French condominium to attempt to test the Entente. This resulted in a crisis over the status of Morocco, which only brought London and Paris closer.

Understandings such as the Entente Cordiale were, in fact, a common feature of international relations prior to World War II and the nuclear age. The Cold War infused new thinking that alliances had to be credible and watertight to deter adversaries and thereby preserve peace.

Critics argued that this logic was costly, and that it resulted in over-extension, fuelled unnecessary conflict, and gave reason for allies to engage in risky behaviour. Debates about international security commitments — whether in the United States (US) or Europe, or indeed in India or even China — reflect vestiges of these competing worldviews.

But in many respects, we have experienced a reversion to a pre-alliance era. The motivations are different. Democratically elected leaders — or any leadership responsive to its people — will confront difficulties in making open-ended security commitments to another sovereign State.

Publics are more sensitive to the presence of foreign troops on their soil, including the legal complications that might arise. Despite nationalist impulses, public opinion surveys generally reflect a scepticism of overseas military involvements and a preference for greater spending on social welfare and services at a time when defence spending is already at historic lows. (According to the World Bank, 2018 marked the lowest year on record for military expenditure around the world at 2.18% as a proportion of global Gross Domestic Product.)

The need to adapt to new strategic challenges amid fiscal and political constraints is resulting in a return to ententes as an important feature of international relations. Successive governments in the US have now made it clear that the relationship with a non-ally such as India matters much more than some of its formal treaty alliances. Quad — involving India, the US, Japan, and Australia — is emerging as perhaps the most prominent new entente. But the relationship between China and Russia is also exhibiting similar features, much as the China-Pakistan relationship has for decades.

Nonetheless, criticism of these new relationships often continues to raise the bogey of an alliance. For example, some American critics of Quad have implied that this arrangement will somehow contribute to Indian tensions with China and Pakistan, and risks dragging the US into conflicts in the Indian Ocean region. Similarly, Indian critics fear that the US’s free and open Indo-Pacific strategy would entangle India in unnecessary competition in the Pacific.

Such criticism is misleading, and perhaps deliberately so. Priorities will continue to differ among Quad countries. This is clearly reflected in the relative importance India has granted to South Asia and the Indian Ocean when it comes to maritime security, foreign assistance, and vaccine diplomacy.

Ententes are also not useless, as some seem to believe. Those who contend that Quad is simply a talk shop have not been paying sufficient attention to its accompanying activities. Despite last year’s quadrilateral Malabar exercises and the recent announcement of new working groups, Quad cooperation on naval interoperability, critical technologies, and Covid-19 had been manifest previously. Moving forward, arrangements such as Quad could play a pivotal role in coordinating responses, reducing frictions, and enabling participant-States to concentrate more on their core competencies and geographies.

The return of ententes in plain sight (although to little fanfare) reflects the yawning gaps between public opinion, academic scholarship, and actual policy on matters of international relations.

A closer examination of the long history of “strategic partnerships short of mutual defence” would be instructive. For example, the Anglo-French partnership, which became the Triple Entente with the addition of Russia, failed to deter Germany, resulting in the outbreak of World War I. But it contributed significantly to the victorious outcome for its members (although at great cost, especially to Russia and France). By contrast, it was the seemingly more ironclad Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, which crumbled.

The parallel suggests that debates about the wisdom of international partnerships and commitments are unlikely to abate. But a sense of precision and perspective about the nature of new and emerging strategic arrangements is sorely needed.
www.hindustantimes.com

Locating Quad in geopolitical history

Despite last year’s quadrilateral Malabar exercises and the recent announcement of new working groups, Quad cooperation on naval interoperability, critical technologies, and Covid-19 had been manifest previously.
www.hindustantimes.com www.hindustantimes.com
 
#ASSOCHAM organised a Virtual Panel Discussion on "Economic Opportunities in the Quad Framework" to analyse the emerging economic opportunities and challenges in the Quad Framework.

The Quad is a non-military alliance between the US, Japan, Australia & India. The dialogue was initiated in 2007 based on a shared vision of security & prosperity in a free, open & inclusive Indo Pacific.

Since 2017, The Quad partnership has evolved significantly into a multifaceted partnership aimed to foster practical cooperation on a panorama of contemporary global issues. The key takeaways from the discussion are:

An economic investment cooperation framework is imminent for the realisation of the Quad partnership for supply chain resilience & strategic sector partnerships in critical technologies, 5G & 6G, digital infrastructure, STEM education at the core of the #quadleaderssummit agenda.

Covid-19 has demonstrated the need for building strategic reserves for medicines and vaccines. India must capitalise its position as the “Pharmacy of the World” and become the partner of choice of the Quad for vaccines and therapeutics.


A host of opportunities await in advanced technologies including Open Random-Access Network (RAN), Internet of Things (IoT), automation and manufacturing.

Quad partners must focus on reducing protectionism & building collaboration on standards & compliances. Building trust & reliable partnerships is essential for resilient trade regimes for ensuring a smooth & regular flow of strategic supplies.

Next 10 years are critical for India to leverage its position as a strategic partner in the Quad & emerge as a reliable manufacturing hub in the re-emerging geoeconomic world order. Enhanced competitiveness with reduced regulatory burden & CoDB will further enhance India’s EoDB.


Within the ambit of #Climate Action, India must leverage the opportunities in renewables, green infra and green shipping, the Global Hydrogen Coalition & International Solar Alliance.
https://twitter.com/x/status/1455093256027402249
 

‘Quad’ Will Continue to Push Back Against Chinese Aggression in Indo-Pacific, Panel Says​

The more China pursues its ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, the more the United States, Japan, India and Australia will do to push back against Beijing’s bullying, a panel of regional security experts said Tuesday.


Michael Green, senior vice president for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said President Xi Jinping “is not putting on his Mr. Nice face” in looking abroad, as he heads into the next party Congress.


“These four navies [in the Quad] are very powerful” and when acting together send a message to China that they intend to secure trade routes and, as democracies, uphold the rule of law in international disputes, as in the case of Taiwan, he said.


Speaking from Canberra, Susannah Patton, a research fellow at the United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney, said “the Quad does [thwart Chinese ambitions] just by existing. It’s a positive partnership” that showed its value to the region in the past year by distributing COVID-19 vaccines to control the pandemic.


She added later that Australians view the Quad and the Australia, United Kingdom, United States, or AUKUS, agreement as “two completely separate arrangements.” The Quad has a diplomatic role in Canberra’s view, while AUKUS is related to military security.


“I think there is real support for a Quad Plus,” Green said, where Canada, France, South Korea and potentially others participate in exercises like Malabar and strengthen trade agreements with other democracies and Southeast Asian nations. He added he did not see the Quad or a Quad Plus becoming “a formal security arrangement,” like NATO, any time soon.


The reality, Green said, is that across the Indo-Pacific China is a major trading partner with nations in the region, and even allies like Seoul do not go out of their way to antagonize Beijing. They do not want to suffer the punishing tariffs and embargoes that China has placed on Australia.


Speaking at the CSIS online forum, he and the other panelists saw support in Japan, India and Australia for the Quad, the informal security, diplomatic and economic arrangement among the democracies that started in 2006-2007 with the U.S., Japan and Australia coordinating disaster and humanitarian relief efforts regionally.


Green said over the next 15 years the informal arrangement, which later included India, had its ups and downs.


“There’s not a lot of pushback against the Quad” in Japan, he added, “for good reason [because Tokyo realized] it can’t handle China alone.” He estimated that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force was now about one-third the size of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and Japan needed more partners to deter China.


As for India, Richard Rossow, a senior CSIS adviser, said Delhi was at first skeptical about the Quad’s goals. Were the U.S. and Japan primarily trying to draw India into conflicts in the East China and South China Seas and not address Delhi’s concerns over China’s challenges in the Himalayas and its growing commercial presence in the Indian Ocean, he asked rhetorically.


What the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi realized is that “India continues to lose ground” to Beijing militarily and economically, he said, and an informal arrangement could work to its benefit. Modi’s government has made the U.S. its largest partner in military exercises and has entered into a number of technology-sharing agreements with Washington.


Green and Rossow said this tighter arrangement between the two nations will not necessarily lead to a formal security arrangement. Green noted India has historically remained non-aligned in great power competition. It’s also one of Russia’s largest military sales customers, including India’s purchase of the sophisticated S-400 air defense system.


As for involvement with Taiwan, the source of the greatest tension in the Indo-Pacific, Rossow said “there are some natural synergies” and technologies India is interested in advancing. “Let Taiwan take the lead” on building the relationship. It “has a lot more at stake than India has” in any confrontation with China.


In Australia, Patton said that although public opinion does not favor Canberra’s involvement in an active defense of Taiwan, if the island is invaded “there can be little doubt Australia would be involved in some way” under its treaty arrangements with Washington.
news.usni.org

'Quad' Will Continue to Push Back Against Chinese Aggression in Indo-Pacific, Panel Says - USNI News

The more China pursues its ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, the more the United States, Japan, India and Australia will do to push back against Beijing’s bullying, a panel of regional security experts said Tuesday. Michael Green, senior vice president for Asia at the Center for Strategic and...
news.usni.org news.usni.org
 
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Japan may host next in-person Quad summit next spring​

The leaders of Japan, the United States, Australia and India may hold their second in-person summit in Japan next spring, according to sources familiar with the matter, in a show of strengthening ties among the "Quad" members amid China's growing assertiveness.

The Japanese government has sounded out the idea of hosting the talks, the sources said. If realized, it will be the first time for Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who took office in October, to attend such a gathering.

During their first in-person meeting in September in Washington, the leaders of the four countries committed to a "free and open Indo-Pacific" and agreed to hold a Quad summit annually.

Kishida has been calling for strengthening economic security by building resilient supply chains of critical technologies, among other measures. Beefing up cooperation among the Quad members in the area is likely to be a key focus when the summit takes place.

The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden has elevated the engagement of the four major Indo-Pacific democracies to the leaders' level as it seeks to rally U.S. allies and like-minded countries to counter China's rise.

In March, they held their first summit in virtual format amid the coronavirus pandemic and gathered in person in September.

Both meetings were attended by Biden, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga.

The areas they have agreed to cooperate on have expanded, ranging from COVID-19 vaccine production and infrastructure development in the region to supply-chain security for semiconductors.
english.kyodonews.net

Japan may host next in-person Quad summit next spring: sources

The leaders of Japan, the United States, Australia and India may hold their second in-person summit in Japan next spring, according to sources familiar with the matter, in a show of strengthening ties among the "Quad" members amid China's growing assertiveness.
english.kyodonews.net english.kyodonews.net
 
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