Point de situation des opérations en Ukraine 21 mai 2022—La bataille du Donbass
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Update on operations in Ukraine 21 May 2022 - The Battle of Donbass
Let us recall that the only operational objective displayed by the Russians at the end of March was to complete the complete conquest of Donbass, which was associated with the capture of the areas of the two provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk still under Ukrainian control.
The facts of the matter
In reality, this means taking the port of Mariupol and 250 km further north the two pairs of cities Sloviansk-Kramatorsk (SK) and Severodonetsk-Lysystchansk (SL), which are 80 km apart.
The battle of Mariupol will be analysed separately. At this stage, we should note that it involved about 12 different battle groups (BGs), Russian army, Chechen National Guard, 1st DNR (Donetsk People's Republic) army corps and one or two artillery brigades, for seven weeks. The Russian forces, no doubt badly worn out, could start to be withdrawn in the last ten days of April and reinjected elsewhere after two or three weeks of reconstitution.
The focus will be on the battle for the quadrilateral of four cities of 100,000 inhabitants (SK and SL) to be conquered, which constitute the 'major effect' of 'Operation Donbass'. Once the conquest of these four cities is secured, with perhaps the easier conquest of Propovsk - a road junction in the centre-west of Donetsk oblast, population 65,000 - it will be possible to say that the Russian mission is accomplished, at least in this phase of the war.
This operational area is approached by at least 50 Russian battle groups (BGs), supported by probably seven artillery brigades and about 100 air sorties/day, i.e. half of the Russian expeditionary force in Ukraine, facing 12 manoeuvre brigades, territorial or national guard brigades (at least) and several militia battalions. The overall strength ratio can be estimated at a slight Russian numerical superiority in men, three to two in their favour for combat vehicles and two to one for artillery and even more for air support.
How much does it cost?
Most of the combat units on both sides are worn out from weeks of fighting, and their tactical level is diminished. Even if the Russians have made some adjustments, the Ukrainian units are still on average better than the Russians at the contact points. Benefiting from a general defensive posture and intelligence superiority, Ukrainian units usually open fire effectively first and therefore also win in the majority of cases.
This is reflected in the casualties. If we consider the material losses documented by the Oryx website for the entire theatre of operations, the Russians have lost 400 tanks and armoured infantry vehicles in the past month. It should be remembered that these are only the documented losses and are therefore both lower than the reality (a 30% supplement will be added) with perhaps a bias in favour of the Ukrainians, who a priori provided more documents than the Russians. We can therefore consider as likely the loss of about 10 Russian BGs in one month in the whole theatre, including 6 or 7 in the Donbass, i.e. between 12 and 15% of the potential. Interestingly, these losses are lower than in the previous month - 700 combat vehicle losses documented - which is explained by the considerable damage to the Russians from the Battle of Kiev (which, it will be recalled, is presented as a diversion in the pro-Russian narrative).
At the same time, the ratio of losses between Russians and Ukrainians did not change much from one battle to the other. The Ukrainians lost 100 combat vehicles in the last month, i.e. 1 for every 4 Russians, compared to 150 in the previous month, i.e. 1 for every 4.7, which shows that, despite wear and tear, the difference in tactical level remains. On the other hand, the Ukrainians hit the Russian rear - artillery and logistics - three times less than in the previous month, which can be explained by better Russian protection of this rear compared to the battle of Kiev where the long and thin Russian axes of penetration could be attacked by Ukrainian forces.
Behind these material losses, there are obviously men who suffer. Human losses are very difficult to estimate. After noting the correlation between documented vehicle losses and human losses estimated by unofficial sources, we will take as a basis of calculation that the documented loss of a Russian combat vehicle is correlated to (and not the cause of) 24 definitive losses (dead, seriously wounded, prisoners) for 35 on the Ukrainian side. The difference between the two sides can be explained by the greater Russian material density, with a very high ratio of armoured vehicles to men, and a difference in the source of human losses. It is indeed very likely that the majority of Ukrainian casualties came from artillery and aerial fire and not from direct combat, which is less the case on the Russian side.
With these empirical parameters, we can estimate that the Russians have at this stage definitively lost between 9 and 10,000 men in the Donbass offensive against 3 to 4,000 Ukrainians, excluding the battle of Mariupol which balances this ratio a little. These losses are mainly concentrated on both sides in the melee units and more particularly those of the Russians, who are multiplying attacks of 2 to 3 BG on 5 km of front and of which about three out of four are repulsed with losses. But it was the 1 in 4 that succeeded that allowed the Russians to advance, in the manner of the Allied forces pounding - with far greater success - the German front from July to November 1918.
While the ground won can hardly be retaken by the Ukrainians and the 1 in 4 tends to become 1 in 3, the Russians thus retain the hope of eventually winning.
The hammering of the front
The area of action can be divided from west to east into four combat zones running largely along the river Donets and the surrounding forest area: Izium, Lyman, Northwest Severodonetsk, East Severodonetsk and Popasna.
With at least twenty BGs, the Izium pocket was probably considered the main area of action with the Russian will to push in all directions. The first attack took place first towards the west, probably to protect the main communication line to Belgorod and conversely to cut the P78 axis between Kharkiv and Barvinkove then Sloviansk. The attack in this direction progressed for several kilometres before stopping in the face of good Ukrainian resistance. It continued south towards Barvinkove, in front of the 3rd Armoured Brigade, probably with the intention of enveloping the area of operation from the west. The attack seems to have reached its peak at the end of April, without reaching Bervinkove. Instead, attacks shifted eastwards against the 81st Air Assault Brigade in converging attacks towards Sloviansk, with little success to date but perhaps more in the coming days.
The most significant Russian advances have been in the area within a 20km radius of Lyman, a town of 20,000 people, 20km north-east of Sloviansk. Lyman is a key point north of the Sviati Hory Nature Park and the Donets River, which controls the northern axis between Sloviansk and Severodonetsk. The conquest of this whole area against the 57th Motorised Brigade and the 95th and 79th Air Assault Brigades took the whole month of April. The Russians achieved a significant success on 30 April by breaking through towards Ozerne on the Donets River and then taking Yampi a few kilometres south-east of Lyman. Since the beginning of May, Russian efforts focused on taking the villages northwest of Lyman, which was increasingly threatened with encirclement. Once Lyman, the main lock north of Sloviansk, is taken, Russian forces will be able to reach the rather strong northern defences of Sloviansk on the Donets River in the east, the forest in the north and the chain of settlements from Barvinkove in the west by early June.
The north-western part of Severodonetsk was the most difficult area for fighting. The fighting started at the beginning of March, especially from the army of the Luhansk People's Republic, LNR (14,000 men in total), which took advantage of the weakness of the Ukrainian army in the region to take over the rest of the Luhansk province with the help of the Russian 8th Army. The line did not move much until April, when the joint Russian-Chechen-LNR effort focused on conquering the town of Rubizhne (56,000 inhabitants, 37 km2), which was definitively conquered on 13 May, after more than a month of fighting. It was while trying to extend the attack further west that two brigades of the 41st Army crossed the Donets River to approach Lysychansk, immediately west of Severodonetsk, and one of them lost a complete BG on 9 May near Bilohorivka.
Little can be said about the eastern area of Severodonetsk where the forces of the 127th Russian motorised infantry division and 3 LNR brigades are making little progress. There is a high concentration of Russian artillery, with for example the recent arrival of 240mm 2S4 Tyulpan batteries.
The most spectacular Russian advance took place in Popasna (22,000 inhabitants), 50 km south of Sverodonetsk, taken on 7 May after six weeks of fighting. Popasna was clearly the new axis of effort after the failure at Izium. About ten BGs were assembled there, including Russian naval infantry and air assault units, a sign of priority, but also the 150th motorised infantry division, present in Marioupol. The capture of the town, a high point, made it possible to observe and therefore strike with artillery all Ukrainian movements, especially between the road junction of Bakhmut (77,000 inhabitants) and Lysytchansk-Severodonetsk. The Russian and LNR forces then succeeded in continuing in all directions at a rate of several kilometres per day, unseen since the battle of Kiev. The advance to the north already threatens to encircle Ukrainian forces in the small towns of Zolote and Hirske along the front line, before reaching Lysychansk-Severodonetsk (LS) and in the west the main LS supply route in the Soledar region, or even Bakhmut.
Forecasts
One month after the official announcement of the main phase of the battle of Donbass, and in reality already two months of attacks, the Russians are still far from an operational victory. After having envisaged a total envelopment, they have reduced their ambition to the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk and the capture of Lyman before tackling Sloviansk, which they also hope to encircle and take.
This implies first of all being able to continue a sustained effort for several weeks at the cost of significant losses. It would also be necessary to be able to resupply the forces as they progressed in the area between LS and SK, a mission that was always difficult when moving away from the railways and exposing the logistical axes to Ukrainian harassment. The problem is much the same for the seven Ukrainian brigades in the cauldron, which are very worn and difficult to supply.
It is difficult to imagine that the Ukrainians will remain without reaction to the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk and will undoubtedly come and fight for the ground, perhaps by trying to retake Popasna. It remains to be seen whether this reinforcement will come at the cost of weakening other sectors and, above all, what effect it will have.
Assuming the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk is achieved, it will then be necessary to take these two localities which have been preparing for a siege for two months and have forces superior to those defending Marioupol. It is difficult to see how, with a lot of effort and unless there is a Ukrainian collapse, the Russians could take the two cities before the end of July. Will they be able to sustain a parallel fight to encircle Sloviansk-Kramatorsk, which will probably not happen before the end of June at this rate, and then an investment in the two cities that is even more difficult than in Lysychansk-Severodonetsk, because they are even better defended and especially close to Ukrainian forces?
All this seems difficult, but not insurmountable if the other fronts - Kharkiv, Zaprojjia, Kherson - hold out against the Ukrainian attacks. If one breaks down, especially on the Kherson side, the whole economy of forces in the theatre of operations will be called into question. The Donbass operation will be compromised. If the other fronts hold and if the Russian army is able to supply the theatre with a rotation of units reconstituted in Belgorod or Rostov with sufficient equipment and relatively well-trained volunteers, and by innovating (for example by modifying the structure of the battle groups), the conquest of the Donbass could be a reality at the end of August. At that point, casualties on both sides will be very heavy and more balanced than at present with prisoners from captured towns. It is likely that Russia will then consider shifting to a general defensive posture with perhaps a negotiated peace proposal, at least until it is possible to restart an offensive towards Odessa.
The problem for the Russians is that the Ukrainians will not let this happen and that with their human mobilisation and American material aid, they can also feed the front in a similar disorder as the Russians, but above all envisage forming new units, battalions at first and new brigades in a few months, and thus have a strong offensive capacity which they will not fail to use.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Update on operations in Ukraine 21 May 2022 - The Battle of Donbass
Let us recall that the only operational objective displayed by the Russians at the end of March was to complete the complete conquest of Donbass, which was associated with the capture of the areas of the two provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk still under Ukrainian control.
The facts of the matter
In reality, this means taking the port of Mariupol and 250 km further north the two pairs of cities Sloviansk-Kramatorsk (SK) and Severodonetsk-Lysystchansk (SL), which are 80 km apart.
The battle of Mariupol will be analysed separately. At this stage, we should note that it involved about 12 different battle groups (BGs), Russian army, Chechen National Guard, 1st DNR (Donetsk People's Republic) army corps and one or two artillery brigades, for seven weeks. The Russian forces, no doubt badly worn out, could start to be withdrawn in the last ten days of April and reinjected elsewhere after two or three weeks of reconstitution.
The focus will be on the battle for the quadrilateral of four cities of 100,000 inhabitants (SK and SL) to be conquered, which constitute the 'major effect' of 'Operation Donbass'. Once the conquest of these four cities is secured, with perhaps the easier conquest of Propovsk - a road junction in the centre-west of Donetsk oblast, population 65,000 - it will be possible to say that the Russian mission is accomplished, at least in this phase of the war.
This operational area is approached by at least 50 Russian battle groups (BGs), supported by probably seven artillery brigades and about 100 air sorties/day, i.e. half of the Russian expeditionary force in Ukraine, facing 12 manoeuvre brigades, territorial or national guard brigades (at least) and several militia battalions. The overall strength ratio can be estimated at a slight Russian numerical superiority in men, three to two in their favour for combat vehicles and two to one for artillery and even more for air support.
How much does it cost?
Most of the combat units on both sides are worn out from weeks of fighting, and their tactical level is diminished. Even if the Russians have made some adjustments, the Ukrainian units are still on average better than the Russians at the contact points. Benefiting from a general defensive posture and intelligence superiority, Ukrainian units usually open fire effectively first and therefore also win in the majority of cases.
This is reflected in the casualties. If we consider the material losses documented by the Oryx website for the entire theatre of operations, the Russians have lost 400 tanks and armoured infantry vehicles in the past month. It should be remembered that these are only the documented losses and are therefore both lower than the reality (a 30% supplement will be added) with perhaps a bias in favour of the Ukrainians, who a priori provided more documents than the Russians. We can therefore consider as likely the loss of about 10 Russian BGs in one month in the whole theatre, including 6 or 7 in the Donbass, i.e. between 12 and 15% of the potential. Interestingly, these losses are lower than in the previous month - 700 combat vehicle losses documented - which is explained by the considerable damage to the Russians from the Battle of Kiev (which, it will be recalled, is presented as a diversion in the pro-Russian narrative).
At the same time, the ratio of losses between Russians and Ukrainians did not change much from one battle to the other. The Ukrainians lost 100 combat vehicles in the last month, i.e. 1 for every 4 Russians, compared to 150 in the previous month, i.e. 1 for every 4.7, which shows that, despite wear and tear, the difference in tactical level remains. On the other hand, the Ukrainians hit the Russian rear - artillery and logistics - three times less than in the previous month, which can be explained by better Russian protection of this rear compared to the battle of Kiev where the long and thin Russian axes of penetration could be attacked by Ukrainian forces.
Behind these material losses, there are obviously men who suffer. Human losses are very difficult to estimate. After noting the correlation between documented vehicle losses and human losses estimated by unofficial sources, we will take as a basis of calculation that the documented loss of a Russian combat vehicle is correlated to (and not the cause of) 24 definitive losses (dead, seriously wounded, prisoners) for 35 on the Ukrainian side. The difference between the two sides can be explained by the greater Russian material density, with a very high ratio of armoured vehicles to men, and a difference in the source of human losses. It is indeed very likely that the majority of Ukrainian casualties came from artillery and aerial fire and not from direct combat, which is less the case on the Russian side.
With these empirical parameters, we can estimate that the Russians have at this stage definitively lost between 9 and 10,000 men in the Donbass offensive against 3 to 4,000 Ukrainians, excluding the battle of Mariupol which balances this ratio a little. These losses are mainly concentrated on both sides in the melee units and more particularly those of the Russians, who are multiplying attacks of 2 to 3 BG on 5 km of front and of which about three out of four are repulsed with losses. But it was the 1 in 4 that succeeded that allowed the Russians to advance, in the manner of the Allied forces pounding - with far greater success - the German front from July to November 1918.
While the ground won can hardly be retaken by the Ukrainians and the 1 in 4 tends to become 1 in 3, the Russians thus retain the hope of eventually winning.
The hammering of the front
The area of action can be divided from west to east into four combat zones running largely along the river Donets and the surrounding forest area: Izium, Lyman, Northwest Severodonetsk, East Severodonetsk and Popasna.
With at least twenty BGs, the Izium pocket was probably considered the main area of action with the Russian will to push in all directions. The first attack took place first towards the west, probably to protect the main communication line to Belgorod and conversely to cut the P78 axis between Kharkiv and Barvinkove then Sloviansk. The attack in this direction progressed for several kilometres before stopping in the face of good Ukrainian resistance. It continued south towards Barvinkove, in front of the 3rd Armoured Brigade, probably with the intention of enveloping the area of operation from the west. The attack seems to have reached its peak at the end of April, without reaching Bervinkove. Instead, attacks shifted eastwards against the 81st Air Assault Brigade in converging attacks towards Sloviansk, with little success to date but perhaps more in the coming days.
The most significant Russian advances have been in the area within a 20km radius of Lyman, a town of 20,000 people, 20km north-east of Sloviansk. Lyman is a key point north of the Sviati Hory Nature Park and the Donets River, which controls the northern axis between Sloviansk and Severodonetsk. The conquest of this whole area against the 57th Motorised Brigade and the 95th and 79th Air Assault Brigades took the whole month of April. The Russians achieved a significant success on 30 April by breaking through towards Ozerne on the Donets River and then taking Yampi a few kilometres south-east of Lyman. Since the beginning of May, Russian efforts focused on taking the villages northwest of Lyman, which was increasingly threatened with encirclement. Once Lyman, the main lock north of Sloviansk, is taken, Russian forces will be able to reach the rather strong northern defences of Sloviansk on the Donets River in the east, the forest in the north and the chain of settlements from Barvinkove in the west by early June.
The north-western part of Severodonetsk was the most difficult area for fighting. The fighting started at the beginning of March, especially from the army of the Luhansk People's Republic, LNR (14,000 men in total), which took advantage of the weakness of the Ukrainian army in the region to take over the rest of the Luhansk province with the help of the Russian 8th Army. The line did not move much until April, when the joint Russian-Chechen-LNR effort focused on conquering the town of Rubizhne (56,000 inhabitants, 37 km2), which was definitively conquered on 13 May, after more than a month of fighting. It was while trying to extend the attack further west that two brigades of the 41st Army crossed the Donets River to approach Lysychansk, immediately west of Severodonetsk, and one of them lost a complete BG on 9 May near Bilohorivka.
Little can be said about the eastern area of Severodonetsk where the forces of the 127th Russian motorised infantry division and 3 LNR brigades are making little progress. There is a high concentration of Russian artillery, with for example the recent arrival of 240mm 2S4 Tyulpan batteries.
The most spectacular Russian advance took place in Popasna (22,000 inhabitants), 50 km south of Sverodonetsk, taken on 7 May after six weeks of fighting. Popasna was clearly the new axis of effort after the failure at Izium. About ten BGs were assembled there, including Russian naval infantry and air assault units, a sign of priority, but also the 150th motorised infantry division, present in Marioupol. The capture of the town, a high point, made it possible to observe and therefore strike with artillery all Ukrainian movements, especially between the road junction of Bakhmut (77,000 inhabitants) and Lysytchansk-Severodonetsk. The Russian and LNR forces then succeeded in continuing in all directions at a rate of several kilometres per day, unseen since the battle of Kiev. The advance to the north already threatens to encircle Ukrainian forces in the small towns of Zolote and Hirske along the front line, before reaching Lysychansk-Severodonetsk (LS) and in the west the main LS supply route in the Soledar region, or even Bakhmut.
Forecasts
One month after the official announcement of the main phase of the battle of Donbass, and in reality already two months of attacks, the Russians are still far from an operational victory. After having envisaged a total envelopment, they have reduced their ambition to the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk and the capture of Lyman before tackling Sloviansk, which they also hope to encircle and take.
This implies first of all being able to continue a sustained effort for several weeks at the cost of significant losses. It would also be necessary to be able to resupply the forces as they progressed in the area between LS and SK, a mission that was always difficult when moving away from the railways and exposing the logistical axes to Ukrainian harassment. The problem is much the same for the seven Ukrainian brigades in the cauldron, which are very worn and difficult to supply.
It is difficult to imagine that the Ukrainians will remain without reaction to the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk and will undoubtedly come and fight for the ground, perhaps by trying to retake Popasna. It remains to be seen whether this reinforcement will come at the cost of weakening other sectors and, above all, what effect it will have.
Assuming the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk is achieved, it will then be necessary to take these two localities which have been preparing for a siege for two months and have forces superior to those defending Marioupol. It is difficult to see how, with a lot of effort and unless there is a Ukrainian collapse, the Russians could take the two cities before the end of July. Will they be able to sustain a parallel fight to encircle Sloviansk-Kramatorsk, which will probably not happen before the end of June at this rate, and then an investment in the two cities that is even more difficult than in Lysychansk-Severodonetsk, because they are even better defended and especially close to Ukrainian forces?
All this seems difficult, but not insurmountable if the other fronts - Kharkiv, Zaprojjia, Kherson - hold out against the Ukrainian attacks. If one breaks down, especially on the Kherson side, the whole economy of forces in the theatre of operations will be called into question. The Donbass operation will be compromised. If the other fronts hold and if the Russian army is able to supply the theatre with a rotation of units reconstituted in Belgorod or Rostov with sufficient equipment and relatively well-trained volunteers, and by innovating (for example by modifying the structure of the battle groups), the conquest of the Donbass could be a reality at the end of August. At that point, casualties on both sides will be very heavy and more balanced than at present with prisoners from captured towns. It is likely that Russia will then consider shifting to a general defensive posture with perhaps a negotiated peace proposal, at least until it is possible to restart an offensive towards Odessa.
The problem for the Russians is that the Ukrainians will not let this happen and that with their human mobilisation and American material aid, they can also feed the front in a similar disorder as the Russians, but above all envisage forming new units, battalions at first and new brigades in a few months, and thus have a strong offensive capacity which they will not fail to use.
