Assault in Zaporijjia
It is not enough to have a manoeuvring force. You have to use it effectively. It is not a question of the Ukrainians "correcting" the front like the Russians, but of breaking through and seizing a distant objective: Melitopol, Berdiansk, Mariupol, Donetsk, Horlivka, Lysychansk-Severodonetsk or Starobilsk. If there is not at least one of these targets with a Ukrainian flag after the offensive, it will be considered a minor victory even if the Ukrainians managed to make significant progress on the ground.
This is a difficult thing. Only two breakthroughs have been made in this war: in Popasna by the Russians in May 2022 and especially in Kharkiv province by the Ukrainians in September. The positions on both sides, especially on the Russian side, are now much stronger than they were then.
In concrete terms, there are two successive problems for the Ukrainians to solve: to seize the entrenched positions as quickly as possible and to exploit this conquest. Let's see what this means in the province of Zaporijjia, the most likely area of attack.
In position
Entrenched positions are a network of section strongpoints buried or set up in localities, protected and linked by successive lines of mines, trenches and obstacles such as "dragon's teeth". Normally, terrain permitting, these strongpoints are organised in a triangle with a front base (two sections in front, one behind - two companies in front, one behind, etc.) so that they can support each other and apply fire to those attempting to cross the obstacles. At this stage, heavy machine guns and mortars are the main weapons.
This is a far cry from the line densities of the two world wars, but a Russian entrenched position can be several kilometres deep. Worse, in some areas, such as in Zaporijjia province, there is a second parallel position five and six kilometres back and defensive poles around the towns. This second position is then occupied by the second echelon of the large units in charge of defence and sometimes divisional or brigade artillery. Further back, the army reserve units and the long-range artillery are located. This artillery obviously has the double mission in defence to counter-attack the Ukrainian artillery and to hit any concentration of forces in front of the first defence position or, failing that, to place barrages of shells in front of it.
The Zaporrijia 'front', in the sense of the Russian command structure, thus had a first echelon composed of a 'composite division' (DNR regiments, Wagner) near the Dnieper and the 19th and 42nd motorised divisions of the 58th army up to the administrative limit of the province. This first position was based particularly in the west on the town of Vassylivka and the cuts in the rivers that flowed into the Dnieper, in the centre on a group of villages on the heights (150 m above sea level) around Solodka Balka and in the east on the town of Polohy.
The second position, five to ten kilometres behind, was organised first on the line parallel to the Dnieper-Mykhaïlivka-Tokmak front, then on the road leading from Tokmak to Polohy. There were two National Guard regiments, Wagner, the 11th Air Assault Brigade (at Tokmak) and possibly the 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade as well as the 45th Special Forces Brigade, used as infantry, and divisional and further back army artillery. Although Wagner's attitude is not well known, the whole sector can be considered the responsibility of the 58th Army, which had been there since the early days of the war.
Further back, probably constituting the reserves of the front, were the 36th Army (two brigades only) in the area of the Enerhodar nuclear power station, the 68th Army Corps with the 18th Machine Gun Division and the 39th Brigade in Melitopol and finally the 36th Army (two brigades) in the Verkhnii Tokmak road junction 20 km south of Polohy and 30 km east of Tokmak. And if that is not enough, the Russians can still call on reinforcements from the 49th and 29th armies in Kherson province or, above all, from the 8th army in Donetsk, especially in the conglomeration of forces south of Vuhledar.
In depth
Reaching Melitopol, 60 km from the Ukrainian lines, will require the organisation of the most complex operation in the history of the Ukrainian army. It will have to involve at least the equivalent of twenty combat or artillery brigades and air squadrons organised in three forces supported by a particularly agile logistical network.
The first force will be called a "reconnaissance-frapple complex" (CRF), according to Soviet terminology. It is made up of an integrated set of sensors and effectors capable of striking autonomously in the depth of the enemy system. It includes combat aircraft and helicopters, missiles, drones, long-range artillery brigades, special forces and partisans. The Ukrainian CRF has existed since the summer of 2022. Its mission before D-Day of the offensive will be to weaken the enemy as much as possible by attacking its bases, command posts, depots and logistic flows, etc. This was done successfully during the Kherson campaign. Its mission on D-Day will be to interdict and at least hinder all movements to the rear of the main combat zone.
The CRF has seen a significant qualitative leap in recent months with the delivery of Polish and Slovak Mig-29s capable of firing JDAM-ER guided bombs (over 70km range) and GLSDBs (Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs), 270kg GBU-39 flying bombs that can be launched by HIMARS at 150km with great accuracy. However, the actual quantity of ammunition is not known, as these are the most conventional, although the needs are very great. If the ammunition stockpile is rather small, it will be necessary to reserve it for D-Day and to be satisfied with striking the highest-value targets beforehand, with the constraint of striking all over the front line so as not to give any clues as to the attack zone.
There is also the possibility of ground attacks, commandos and/or partisans behind the enemy. The density of Russian forces in an open space (few large conurbations or forests) and the strong pressure exerted on the population (coercive surveillance, possible reprisals) make the clandestine circulation of fighters and equipment complicated. It is therefore also difficult to organise non-suicide attacks (suicide attacks are greatly simplified by the absence of retreat, the most difficult part to organise). One cannot exclude certain 'coups' but one should not expect a major action on this side, as could be the sabotage offensives preceding the major operations of the Red Army in 1943-1944. The interest of the clandestine network is mainly intelligence.
In the box
The second force, which is not yet fully in place, will be responsible for seizing defensive positions. It must be particularly dense and especially made up of powerful brigades. In the sector that interests us here, facing the 58th Russian army, there are six Ukrainian brigades from Kamianske on the Dnieper to Houliapole north of Polohy. This is probably not enough, but the sudden arrival of new brigades would obviously be suspect, unless reinforcements were also taking place simultaneously in other sectors and in particular opposite the province of Luhansk, the other probable sector of attack. Eight brigades would be a somewhat more appropriate density.
The most important thing is that these brigades are strong enough to advance five kilometres each in depth in a dense defence and over a width of ten kilometres. It should be noted that of the six brigades currently in place, there are two territorial brigades and one national guard brigade, which are in principle intended to defend a sector rather than attack it. They should be replaced by manoeuvre brigades, not necessarily among the newly formed ones, but perhaps among the most experienced and solid ones, provided they are rested after the withdrawal from the Donbass. Failing that, perhaps the territorial and national guard brigades can be used as masks, with considerable reinforcement. In any case, these assault brigades must be almost fully staffed organically, but also heavily reinforced so that each can defeat a fortified Russian regiment. They absolutely need an engineer battalion instead of a company and probably a second artillery battalion as well as a mechanised infantry battalion. In order to organise the very complex combat that was to come, it would be a good idea for these assault brigades to be grouped together and commanded by divisional headquarters, or army corps, facing each of the three main axes of the offensive: along the Dnieper, in the centre towards Tokmat and against Polohy.
The battle of these assault brigades will be to combine the action of their organic artillery and small fleet of drones with that of the assault battalions, a mixture of engineers to clear obstacles, heavily armoured mechanised infantry equipped with collective weapons, possibly including mortars, to protect, reconnoitre and occupy, and tanks as assault guns. Each battalion normally operates in a box a few hundred metres wide. The classic action pattern is as follows:
- Artillery strikes on the first enemy lines to neutralise the defenders and destroy some obstacles.
- Deferring artillery strikes beyond the box to close it off to any enemy intrusion to the rear. To support the assault units in the box, direct fire from cannons and especially heavy machine guns placed on the sides of the assault battalion is then relied upon. As the battalion progressed, this direct fire spread out and eventually partitioned the box on the sides. Indirect fire, on the other hand, mortars and sometimes machine guns in curved fire, are permanent in front of the assault troops.
- The assault units advance, perhaps preceded by stalker drones that provide information and strike a few dozen to hundreds of metres ahead. The advance is basically at the pace of the sappers who open passages in the mines or set up bridges. Groups of infantrymen, where machine guns and anti-tank rocket launchers predominate, protect the sappers by saturating the defences, and exploit the small gaps they make. The battle is fought as much as possible in heavily armoured vehicles and on foot that vehicles cannot pass.
An advance of 100 metres or more per hour in a fortified position will be considered lightning fast. It all depends on the value of the resistance. It can collapse immediately, and the defenders can flee, as was sometimes seen during the Kharkiv offensive or around the Kherson bridgehead. But they can also resist, and if they resist (i.e. if they can fire collective weapons without being neutralised) the progression is immediately much slower. As this is all a bit random, you can expect a discontinuous line to form with no advance in some places and pockets in others. The art then lies in manoeuvring not only axially, but also laterally in order to threaten the rear of the enemy pockets. The threat is generally enough to make them give in (provided they know they are threatened) but this manoeuvre requires a great deal of coordination if only to avoid fratricidal fire. All positional combat in general requires a great deal of tactical skill and firepower, which can only be acquired through experience and intensive training, especially in entrenched positions reconstituted in the rear. Do the Ukrainians have this critical mass of skills? This is the first condition for success. You progress until you have breaches in the first enemy position and if you still have enough forces until you conquer the second position.
Forward
As soon as there is the possibility of advancing a few kilometres, you have to go for it. This is where the exploitation force comes in, less powerful than the assault force but more mobile. It is not necessarily right behind the assault force on D-Day but must be able to join it in a few hours, like the 1st armoured brigade for example, which is north of Hulvaipole, or the mechanised brigades close by or in the large town of Zaporijjia. In order to have a chance of achieving significant results, at least eight other brigades were needed, which would come to join the three army corps in line at the last moment.
The mission of the exploitation force was to push as far as possible until it could no longer advance in the face of a new line of defence or encounter enemy reserves, which gave rise to what was known as 'encounter' fighting. The first difficulty is to cross the first enemy position conquered by the assault force. It was possible to pass through the latter, but this was again a very delicate manoeuvre, or to exploit a hole in the system and then 'radiate' along all the axes, with very fast light forces in the lead to provide information and reconnaissance battalions to overcome the lightest resistance. Behind them came the armoured-mechanised battalions, a systematic mix of tank and infantry companies.
And there was great uncertainty. The fighting at the two extremities at Vassylivka and Polohy could turn into urban combat, very fast or very slow, depending on whether the Russians decided to resist or not. These are, especially the first one, essential key points which condition a lot the continuation of the events. The Russians should therefore try to hold them, but we have seen in the past that they hesitate in front of an urban defence that could turn out to be a trap. It is not clear what their attitude will be. On the other hand, in the great central plain north of Tokmak, there may be mobile fighting between the Ukrainian exploitation force and Russian brigades engaged in counter-attack, all of which is overflown by drones and guided shells. This would be a first on this scale in Ukraine. In this case, we can bet on a victory for the Ukrainians, who are apparently better suited to this type of combat. But the Russians could also be satisfied with defending on a new line by calling in all their reinforcements. As in the case of the offensive in Kharkiv in September, there will be a race between the Ukrainian advance and the formation of this new defence line.
Unless the Russian army collapses, which is regularly predicted but never happens, this new line is bound to happen. If the Ukrainians take Vassylivka, Tokmat and Polohy, perhaps push on to Enerhodar and its nuclear power plant, and then stop in the face of Russian resistance, this will be considered a victory, but far from decisive. If they reach Melitopol, it will be a major victory, but again the Ukrainians will be far from their current strategic goal of recapturing all occupied territory. To have a real strategic effect, they will have to mount a new major offensive, towards Berdiansk and Marioupol? Towards the province of Kherson and the border of Crimea? In another region? This will still take a long time to organise, provided that all the offensive potential, especially in terms of ammunition, has not already been consumed. However, the limits of the beginning of the war could be reached again. As in the Korean War, this could serve as a basis for an armistice.