On 19th of April 2014. Front page headline of The New York Times read “In Cold War Echo: Obama Strategy Writes Off Putin.’’[1] This is the day that Obama, after a quarter century of decreasing wars, democratization and diminishing weapon expenditures, has divided the world once again into a frightening dichotomy. The American president inform his country about his new long-term approach to Russia that rests on the cold war strategy of containment: “isolating … Russia by cutting off its economic and political ties to the outside world … and effectively making it a pariah state[2].” In short, Baker reports, the White House has adopted “an updated version of the Cold War strategy of containment.” It was a measure of historic proportions that was implemented without any debate: none of the 535 Congressmen publicly expressed any doubt, and the established media response was laudatory.[3]
Many believe the origins of the current conflict lie in the negotiations between George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, during the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1990. Gorbachev had agreed to let go of East Germany, under the condition that NATO would not move “an inch to the East.”[4] However, Gorbachev made NO written agreement on it. This was a sensitive issue; during the Yalta conference of 1945, the allied forces had agreed to give the eastern bloc to the Soviet Union as a buffer-zone, because, with 25 million fatalities, it had made the biggest sacrifice in the history of mankind. Russia had already suffered a long history of hostile relations with the West, including the devastating invasion of Napoleon and another by the United States, Japan, Turkey, and multiple European countries in their effort to roll back Communism in 1918-1921.
Since the hostile relations between the two power blocs had just started to improve, Gorbachev’s demand was very understandable—even more so if you consider his commitment to considerable demilitarization. But despite all this, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (1999), Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia (2004), and Albania and Croatia (2009) are now all NATO members.
In 2008 a prophetic memo was sent with direct precedence to Washington by the US ambassador in Russia. The WikiLeaks cable was titled: “Nyet means Nyet: Russia’s NATO enlargement redlines.” The ambassador stated that “Foreign Minister Lavrov and other senior officials have reiterated strong opposition, stressing that Russia would view further eastward expansion as a potential military threat. In Ukraine … there are fears that the issue could potentially split the country in two, leading to violence or even, some claim, civil war, which would force Russia to decide whether to intervene.” These prophetic assessments echoed those of a US intelligence report in 1994, which warned that regional divisions in Ukraine would eventually lead to civil war. Regardless, two months after the 2008 memo, a NATO summit was held in Bucharest, where they “agreed … that these countries [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO.” Putin reportedly warned the attendees that this would lead to an annexation of Crimea, home to an important Russian military base.
History of Ukraine
For centuries, Ukraine has been split between Russia, Poland, and Austria and ever since Ukraine's history must be seen as part of a greater dilemma of eastern and central Europe. During all their tenuous modern existence, the states of eastern and central Europe have been pawns in the international system. Before 1914 the "non-historical peoples"[5] were long subject to three central European dynastic empires: the Romanovs, the Hohenzollerns, and the Habsburgs. After the collapse of the multi-ethnic monarchies in World War I, these nations have been most directly the pawns of either the German Reich or the Soviet Union.
Ukraine regained its independence in 1991, the country has been a fertile soil for interference by its neighbouring powerhouses. This is partially because Ukraine has, throughout its post-soviet history, been a country divided by political, economic, religious, and ethnolinguistic lines. In the Southern and Eastern provinces, a big Russian-speaking proletariat works in an industry that largely exports to the Russian market. Many have relatives right across the border. In West and Central Ukraine, most people speak Ukrainian at home, and their diaspora is rather aimed at Europe and the United States. The precise number of ethnic and linguistic Russians in Ukraine is subject to interpretation, and often downplayed or inflated based on the political whims of the commentator at hand. In this respect, a literature review by the prominent Polish Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) is enlightening. According to the official 2001 census, 17 percent of Ukrainians considered themselves ethnic Russians, while 29 percent considered Russian their native language. Surveys reveal, however, that the term ‘native language’ carries its ambiguities. A third of Ukrainians considered their best mastered language ‘native’; another third considered it to be the language of their nation; a quarter equated ‘native’ with the language of their parents; percent considered it to be the language they spoke most often. Therefore, different survey questions give different results. When asked which language people felt most comfortable speaking, there has been a stable roughly 50/50 split in Ukraine
Language Law of 2012.
This long-awaited bill allowed government institutions to adopt bilingualism if a minority language was spoken by more than 10 percent of the region’s population. In practice, this meant that, among other things, every Eastern and Southern region would adopt Russian alongside the Ukrainian language. This was not irrelevant: 22 percent of Ukrainian citizens indicated that their mastery of the Ukrainian language was ‘low.’[6] The bill, however, provoked a fistfight in parliament and was followed with riots on the streets by Ukrainian nationalists, who saw the retention of the Russian language as a dangerous post-colonial legacy
The reason that cultural differences could so easily become politicized is partially because their geographical distribution strongly correlates with material realities. The historical roots can be traced to the soil. When the country industrialized under the Soviet Union, the transformations primarily took place in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, where plenty of natural resources were hidden underground. These regions are now characterized by urbanization and heavy industries that were integrated in the post-Soviet economy, and therefore reliant on exports to the Russian market.
In Central and Western Ukraine, on the other hand, most people still live in rural areas where the economy is driven by agriculture, and they have practically no economic stakes in their Eastern neighbour.
Sequence of Events
Since Ukraine’s first elections in 1991, the voting behaviour of Ukraine has neatly correlated with this economic, ethno-linguistic and religious framework. In turn, one of the most important policy issues during most election debates revolves around the question: More Europe, or more Russia? More Russia formed the basis of Yanukovych’s election campaign.
Ukraine was hit hard in 2009 when the economy, under the reign of Yushchenko’s pro-European cabinet, plunged into a crisis with a 15% contraction (the largest in Europe bar Latvia) With the entry of Yanukovych in 2010 the economy recovered that same year with a growth of 4%, pushing through with another 5% in 2011.16 But halfway through 2012 the economy started to stagnate again. Yanukovych promised to accelerate the negotiations for a trade agreement with the EU that were started by Yushchenko in 2008. On the other hand, he tried to gain access to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) – a customs union between five post-Soviet states, including Russia. This way he sought to break down trading barriers with Ukraine’s two most important trading partners and, supposedly, stimulate economic growth and balance the passionate foreign aspirations of the Ukrainian people. Indeed, according to the polls, support for both agreements hovered at around 40%.[7] However, a vast majority of Ukrainians thought the country’s course on foreign policy integration ought to be decided through a national referendum.[8]
In March Yanukovych adopted a plan for European integration that was issued by the national security and defense council of Ukraine.[9] The agreement would be signed on the 21st of November, 2013. The same year a Gallup poll found that nearly twice as many Ukrainians considered NATO a threat rather than offering protection
In August 2013, The Ukrainian employers’ federation, whose members account for 70% of the economy, stated that they have to conform to such extensive quality checks at the Russian border that it practically amounts to an import ban. A close economic advisor of Putin publicly stated that this was just a taste of what’s to come if Ukraine follows the “suicidal path’’ of the EU association agreement.[10]
In Eastern Ukraine the first lay-offs were already taking place and the entire economy fell back into a recession.25 The EU agreement and the accompanying costly reforms were approaching. Yanukovych stated that Ukraine needed a loan of $27 billion. The EU offered him $833 million and referred to the IMF for the remaining sum. But the IMF made harsh demands: a 40% rise in gas prizes, freezing of wages and budget cuts. This ran contrary to Yanukovych’s election promise to lower gas prices. In addition, the Russian sanctions would hit the eastern industry, while the unpopular budget cuts of the IMF had the potential to drag the economy back into a deep recession. Understandably, Yanukovych announced that he would delay signing the agreement, and asked the EU to help negotiate better terms with the IMF
The story that follows is well known. With the taste of an EU-agreement on their lips, disappointed demonstrators took to the streets in Lviv and Kiev. It already started forcefully when, with a peak of 40.000 people on the streets on the 24th of November, the Berkut resorted to batons and tear gas
Yanukovych fled Kiev the next day and soon a new interim government, consisting of the former opposition, took over. According to the polls, however, the Maidan protests did not enjoy a clear majority support in Ukraine
Maidan Uprising
The nature of the Maidan uprising is perhaps best illustrated with systemic protest data from the Centre for Social and Labour Research in Kiev.[11] Before Maidan, for four consecutive years, the most frequent demands were of a socio-economic nature and this trend was increasing. In 2013, before the start of Maidan on the 20th of November, 3419 protests had already occurred, 56 percent of which had socio-economic demands, including 40 worker strikes. This was almost the same amount of protest activity as the entire year of 2012 and nearly twice the amount of the preceding two years
The Maidan uprising, however, was not only backed by ultranationalists and oligarchs. Western states too played a role in the uprising, . In a speech sponsored by the US Ukraine Foundation and held at the National Press Club in Washington on December 13, 2013, Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, expressed her support to the opposition. She proudly stated that the United States had invested over $5 billion in “Ukrainian democracy’’.[12] Today there is ample documentation of the role Western-funded NGOs had played in the Orange revolution of 2004.2[13] In many ways, this was a precedent to the Maidan revolution.
Oligarchs
At this point, it might be useful to assess some of the forces that operate behind the scenes in Ukraine. The roots of the Ukrainian political system traces back to its founding in 1991. Dozens of Ukrainians with connections were able to amass vast riches, while the economy shrank by 60 percent. By comparison, the US economy shrank by just 30 percent during the great depression. Most former Soviet states would suffer the same fate, but (in addition to Kyrgyzstan) only Ukraine has still not recovered to its 1991 GDP level.
Another noteworthy oligarch is the multi-billionaire, Ihor Kolomyskyi, with $6 billion the third richest man in Ukraine. A particularly corrupt figure, he is famous for having built his imperium through literally hostile takeovers, “hiring an army of thugs to descend upon … [a company] with baseball bats, gas and rubber pistols, iron bars and chainsaws … and then a mix of phony court orders (often involving corrupt judges and/or registrars).”[15]
After Maidan, Kolomoyskyi profiled himself as the most “patriotic” businessperson in Ukraine. Inter alia, he offered $10,000 for every caught Russian “saboteur’’, pumped tens of millions of dollars into the creation of several volunteer battalions and proposed to build a 2000 km wall that would separate Ukraine from Russia.[16]
The 25th of May 2014 presidential elections would show that the oligarchs still had a strong grip on the country. They were won with 55% of the votes by “chocolate king’’ Poroshenko. A true chameleon, he was one of the founders of Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and minister under the presidency of both Yanukovych and his predecessor, Yuschchenko. Owning $1.3 billion and one of the four biggest TV stations in Ukraine, he can squarely count himself as part of the oligarchic class.
In fact, the Yushchenko presidency had even undermined Ukraine’s very faith in democracy and capitalism. A 2009 Pew Research survey found that two-thirds of Ukrainian believed life was better under communism (12 percent said it was worse), while only 30 percent still approved of the change to a multiparty system.5 The scepticism towards the Ukrainian political system became nearly universal. Indeed, as time progressed, even many former supporters of the Orange Revolution changed their minds on the former movement, and more and more Ukrainians considered themselves to be losing due to the changes.6 Mass mobilization, it seemed, had been abused by sections of the Ukrainian elite to seize power. Indeed, the Orange president Viktor Yushchenko and prime-minister Yulia Tymoshenko had been familiar faces in Ukrainian politics.
It didn’t take long for Yatsenyuk to reveal the reasons behind Nuland’s preference. The first question in an interview with Bloomberg on the 27th of February was “Your first job as the prime minister of Ukraine is what’’? After some vague promises like stability and peace he clearly responds, “to have the deal with the IMF and the European Union”. Like a real technocrat he proudly stated that “I will be the most unpopular prime minister in the history of my country... We will do everything not to default ... if we get the financial support from the United States, from the European Union, from the IMF, we will do it.”
To understand what this would entail for a country like Ukraine, let us start with some words about the nature of the IMF. Voting power is determined by a one-dollar-one-vote system. Japan and seven NATO countries have a majority vote, while the United States, with 23.6% of the vote, is the only country with veto power. (Changes to the mandate require an 85% majority).3 By comparison, all the BRICS countries combined—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, who constitute approximately 42 percent of the global population—together have less than 8 percent of the IMF vote.4 Though the IMF and World Bank purport to be international organizations, every managing director of the IMF has come from a NATO country. Even more striking, every single president in the history of its sister institution, the World Bank,
Role of US
The work of Zbigniew Brzezinski offers more clarity on the meaning of this development of recent years.[17] He is one of the most influential American policy planners of the last few decades and is considered an unofficial foreign policy adviser of Barack Obama, who described Brzezinski as a mentor.[18] In 1997, he wrote his magnum opus The Grand Chessboard, where he describes how America can remain the “sole global superpower’’. He explains that there are several “geopolitical pivots’’ which are key: “their geography, … gives them a special role either in denying access to important areas or in denying resources to a significant player … In some cases, a geopolitical pivot may act as a defensive shield for a vital state or even a region … Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey, and Iran play the role of critically important geopolitical pivots.”[19] Brzezinski is also convinced that “Eurasia is … the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played.”[20] Russia is subsequently described as a ’’black hole’’ that should be made subservient to the security policy of NATO and economic institutions like the World Bank and IMF. At a certain point, he even suggests that Russia should be cut in three parts, resulting in a “loosely confederated Russia—composed of a European Russia, a Siberian Republic, and a Far Eastern Republic.”[21]
The 2014 NATO summit in Wales tried to push Russia further into the corner. “NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies’’, they attested.6 Georgia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were specifically mentioned. The fact that “NATO and Ukraine will [also] continue to promote the development of greater interoperability between Ukrainian and NATO forces.’’[22]
Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Secretary of Defense, United States the foremost political strategist of the democratic establishment in Washington, put it bluntly: “One must consider as part of the American system the global web of specialized organizations, especially the ‘international’ financial institutions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank can be said to represent “global” interests, and their constituency may be construed as the world. In reality, however, they are heavily American dominated, and their origins are traceable to American initiative, particularly the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944.’
Further elaborating on the US governmental vetting process, a representative of the Ukrainian presidential administration told RBC-Ukraine: “The crucial positions in government the president discusses with Pyatt. For example, the resignation of Nalivaichenko [head of Security Service of Ukraine] was fully agreed with the [US] ambassador.”
Finally, a Rapid Reaction Force was formed composed of 4000 NATO troops that now patrol the Baltic States. This has a tense relation with the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, in which NATO promised not to deploy any permanent troops in new member states—using the mobility of the Rapid Reaction Force as a loophole. James Carden, former adviser of the American State Department, argues that since this small force cannot possibly stop a Russian invasion, the Rapid Reaction Force is rather being used as a pretext to further militarize the Russian border[23].
Unfortunately, Brzezinski was not alone in his imperial ambitions. For one, the joint vision of the American Department of Defense until 2020 “emphasizes full-spectrum dominance … [which] means the ability of U.S. forces, operating alone or with allies, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the range of military operations.”[24] Indeed, the most recent National Defense Panel Review states that the United States should now be prepared to “fight in any number of regions in overlapping time frames: on the Korean peninsula, in the East or South China Sea, South Asia, in the Middle East, the Trans-Sahel, Sub-Saharan Africa, in Europe, and possibly elsewhere.”[25]
This level of militarism was echoed in the September 2016 report The Future of the Army, where the influential Atlantic Council argued that the US should prepare for the possibility of “the next big war’—involving very capable adversaries, high levels of death and destruction, and perhaps hundreds of thousands of US troops’’—naming Russia and China repeatedly as potential opponents. In an October 2016 speech Mark Milley, the US Army Chief of Staff, even proclaimed that war between nation states in the near future “is almost guaranteed,’’ also repeatedly hinting at Russia and China. In a blunt warning against a potential “high-end enemy,’’ Milley adds that “those who try to oppose the United States ... we will stop you and we will beat you harder than you’ve ever been beaten before.” Notably, Obama’s 2015 National Security Strategy emphasizes that “The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary ... to defend its core interests,’’ later defined as including “a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.’[26]
Ever since 2002, NATO has been trying to remove Russia’s nuclear deterrent with a missile defense shield.14 For years they have claimed that it was aimed against Iran, but now Western politicians are talking in clear language. For one, the Polish minister of defense recently asserted that developments in Ukraine have urged them to speed up their development of the missile defense system.[27]
In another case, American Senator Bob Corker recently proposed a bill that would bind Obama to “prevent further Russian aggression’’ by, among things, “Accelerating implementation of European and NATO missile defense efforts.”[28] This missile defense shield is only capable of intercepting around 60 nuclear warheads, a minuscule fraction of the total amount of nuclear weapons held by Russia. The shield therefore can only be used effectively as an offensive weapon. For decades the Soviet Union and the United States have been trying to attain a so-called first-strike capability, meaning the capacity to neutralize all your opponent’s nuclear warheads in one surprise attack.[29] In the prestigious Foreign Affairs journal of the Council on Foreign Relations, one of the most influential think tanks in America, Lieber and Press wrote in 2006 that America would for the first time in 50 years reach nuclear primacy, because of the “precipitous decline of Russia’s arsenal, and the glacial pace of modernization of China’s nuclear forces.’’[30] They asserted that “If the United States launched a nuclear attack against Russia (or China), the targeted country would be left with a tiny surviving arsenal—if any at all. At that point, even a relatively modest or inefficient missile-defense system might well be enough to protect against any retaliatory strikes, because the devastated enemy would have so few warheads and decoys left.”[31]
In September 2014, President Obama shocked the world by announcing an enormous modernization program of its nuclear arsenal. With a price ticket of $1 trillion over the next 30 years, the program is “comparable to spending for procurement of new strategic systems in the 1980s under President Ronald Reagan,” according to a study by the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies.[32] The nuclear bunker buster remains unmentioned, and Obama is planning only to improve the existing arsenal to uphold his promise not to develop new nuclear weapons. The B61 Model 12 has already entered the production engineering phase and is scheduled to enter full-scale production by 2020.[33]
Already back in 2008, several high-ranking NATO officials pressed for ‘preventive’ nuclear attacks as an integral strategy against Iran, even though it has long been proven— even by the US intelligence community—that the country is not developing any nuclear weapons.[34] In September 2016, the Obama administration seemed unwilling to rule out a first strike, with senior officials specifically mentioning China, Russia and North Korea.[35]
Younger generations might look on these activities as pointless military posturing. Nevertheless, as Peter Kuznick and Oliver Stone extensively documented in The Untold History of the United States, the world has come very close to nuclear catastrophe—and very often at that. The atom bomb has never been gathering dust in military silos. Rather, the United States has been using the nuclear weapons threat continuously—like a crook uses a gun to rob a store—you don’t have to pull the trigger to make a weapon useful. President Nixon explained it like this: “I call it the madman theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that, ‘for god’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communists. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button.’’’[36] Nixon mirrored his practise after Eisenhower, who threatened the Chinese with nuclear weapons during the Korean war.[37]
These threats were hardly hypothetical. The president before him, Harry Truman, had dropped two nuclear bombs on Japan. Contrary to popular belief, literally every single US military leader found it to be “of no material assistance in our war against Japan,” and rather “adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages.”[38] Indeed, it was the entry of the Red Army, famous for defeating the Nazis, that was cited by Japanese government officials as the reason for unconditional surrender. This is confirmed by a study conducted by the U.S. War Department in January 1946, which found “little mention … of the use of the atomic bomb by the United States in the discussions leading up to the … decision … it [is] almost a certainty that the Japanese would have capitulated upon the entry of Russia into the war.”[39] Truman simply wanted to show the world—and the Soviet Union in particular—that the US was not constrained by humanitarian concerns in its quest for global domination.
Early documents show that Germany was initially also considered as a target, but that “comparatively flimsy wooden houses’’ in some Japanese cities would better demonstrate the destructive power of the atomic bomb.[40] In addition, “the possibility of eliminating a large fraction of the Fire Force of a Japanese town [in the initial blast] … is attractive and realistic … the probability of a devastating fire, spreading well beyond the limits of the blast damage, will be greatly increased.”[41]
Obama’s modernization program would supposedly lead to a reduction of nuclear weapons after thirty years’ time. Yet this eventual reduction is completely dependent on the political will of multiple subsequent presidents, therefore a very uncertain prospect. As Andy Weber, former assistant secretary of defence for nuclear, chemical, and biological defence. programs from 2009 to 2014, explained in an interview: “It doesn’t violate the treaty because there’s a loophole in the treaty called the bomber counting rule … So each of our 60-ish bombers only counts as one warhead, even though they can carry up to 20 of these air launch cruise missiles each.”[42] Notably, already back in 2007, Putin vocally expressed his frustration at a G8 press conference:
An arms race really is unfolding. Well, was it we who withdrew from the ABM Treaty? We must react to what our partners do. We already told them two years ago, “don’t do this … You are destroying the system of international security. You must understand that you are forcing us to take retaliatory steps.” … Then we heard about them developing low-yield nuclear weapons and they are continuing to develop these charges.
… [They] lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons, and thereby put humankind on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. But they are not listening to us. We are saying: do not deploy weapons in space. We don’t want to do that. No, it continues: “whoever is not with us is against us”. What is that? Is it a dialogue or a search for compromise? The entire dialogue can be summed up by: whoever is not with us is against us. …
We implemented the CFE, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty [the treaty signed by the former head of the Soviet Union Gorbachev, which aims to demilitarize Europe]. ... And in response we get bases and a missile defense system in Europe. So what should we do?
You talked about public opinion. Public opinion in Russia is in favor of us ensuring our security. Where can you find a public in favor of the idea that we must completely disarm, and then perhaps, according to theorists such as Zbignew Brzezinski, that we must divide our territory into three or four parts.[43]
Russia
Russia has announced new nuclear modernization programs of its own and also engaged in dangerous nuclear posturing.[44] NATO and Russia have been holding massive military exercises with nuclear-capable forces around their borders, at one point simultaneously, mere kilometers away from each other.[45] Formal channels of communication between NATO and Russian militaries have all but seized to exist, and so has scientific co-operation in nuclear defense.[46] This is especially dangerous because both countries still maintain their nuclear weapons on ‘hair-trigger alert,’ which allows for a fifteen minute window to launch nuclear missiles if anything is detected on the radar systems; a policy that has repeatedly threatened global catastrophe. In 1983, for example, such a threat was evaded because one Russian official, Stanislav Petrov, refused to notify his superiors when six missiles appeared on his screen, which turned out to be a glitch in the computer system.[47] There have been hundreds of such false alarm cases.[48] According to estimates from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the time required for Russia’s technical nuclear launch procedures is some six to ten minutes— leaving even less time, mere minutes, for human deliberation.
Putin has never been a socialist—and Russia remains one of the most unequal countries in the world.[49] Nevertheless, by reining in the worst excesses of the Yeltsin regime—which shrank the economy by 26 percent—and then enjoying a period of historically high energy prices, the country was stabilized and a growth of 433 percent established in 15 years’ time, according to the World Bank.[50] Despite the persisting inequalities, the poverty rate declined from 40 percent in 1999 to 11 percent in 2013, as documented by the CIA World Fact Book.[51] Moreover, the ‘middle class,’ defined by the World Bank as those living on more than $10 a day, grew from 30 to 60 percent of the population between 2001 and 2010, while life expectancy was raised by five years between 2000 and 2014.[52] In addition, IMF statistics show that under Putin, the level of public debt went from 89 percent to just 12 percent of GDP in 2014.[53] No wonder that, despite his authoritarian rule, the approval ratings of Putin—as measured by the American Gallup Center—are, at 83%, as high as ever.[54]
Putin is, in fact, a wartime politician. He became acting president after Yeltsin resigned on December 31,1999—and won his elections on the back of a brutal assault on Chechnya, finishing what Yeltsin had started in 1994. The Chechens had already endured centuries of oppression. Like the Crimean Tatars, they were deported wholesale under Stalin. An estimated third of them died in overcrowded trucks heading for labor camps in Kazakhstan. After Yeltsin’s invasion failed to defeat the Chechen drive for self-determination—having killed between 40,000 and 100,000 people in a region of 1.3 million—a referendum on independence was agreed upon, to be held in Chechnya on the 31st of December 2001.68[55] This agreement, however, would soon be terminated. In September 1999, apartment buildings were bombed in Moscow, killing over 200 people.
History underscores the fact that Russia, in many respects, does not differ too much from the West. Indeed, the United States has by far the biggest military budget, the world’s highest incarceration rate and the largest volume of arms exports, often selling to the same clients as Russia—including Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel and the United Arab Emirates, among others.82 As Sakwa notes: “this is not a second Cold War. Russia is neither a consistent ideological nor strategic foe. Instead, cooperation has continued over Afghanistan—the Northern Distribution Network across Russia continued to channel 40 per cent of supplies and personnel to and from Afghanistan throughout the Ukraine crisis—and in the Middle East, and there have even been signs of cooperation over Syria in the face of the Islamic State’’.
There is no comparison between US and Russia. The combined CSTO military budget as of 2014 is not even onetenth the size of NATO’s.[56] In 2015, according to Special Operations Command spokesman Ken McGraw, U.S. Special Operations forces deployed to a record-shattering 147 countries –75% of the nations on the planet… On any day of the year, in fact, America’s most elite troops can be found in 70 to 90 nations.”[57] Perhaps most telling, the last published US intelligence budget (2010)— which includes both analytical and operational agencies—was substantially larger than that of the entire Russian military establishment.[58] The total GDP of CSTO countries constitute less than twelve percent of the NATO-zone economy. Despite all the column inches spent on the rise of China, economic disparities remain vast there too. Comparing NATO economies with the signatories of the SCO—again, a much less binding security co-operation— the SCO countries still constitute but 59 percent of the NATO zone’s GDP.[59] These comparisons also ignore the production of manufactured goods. Russia is largely a supplier of raw materials to Europe—an obvious sign that its integration into the global economy has come from an inferior position.[60]
Why Ukraine?
Russia’s effort to resolve the ‘frozen conflicts,’ even popular claims to independence remained unrecognized for nearly two decades—and in the case of Transnistria to this very day. Abkhazia and South Ossetia—both on internationally recognized territory of Georgia—were only recognized by Moscow in 2008, after an attempt by Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili to seize South Ossetia by force.[61] Georgia had applied for NATO membership shortly before its aggression against South-Ossetia. In addition, Saakashvili received extensive military aid from the United States, including about 150 military advisers whose role in the conflict remains unexamined. Rather than strength, however, these Russian moves showed increasing desperation. As US President Obama remarked after the annexation of Crimea: “Russia is a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate neighbors—not out of strength but out of weakness. … The fact that Russia felt it had to go in militarily and lay bare these violations of international law indicate less influence, not more.”[62] Indeed, it is exactly Russia’s weakness that forces it to become a “profoundly conservative power’’ which seeks to “maintain the status quo.’’ As Professor Sakwa explains:
Russia under Putin had been the opposite of a land-grabbing state. … In October 2004 Putin achieved a definitive agreement with China over their 4,400-kilometre-long border, in exchange for the transfer of several major islands in the Ussuri River to Chinese jurisdiction. In September 2010 agreement was finally reached with Norway over the long-contested maritime delineation of the Barents Sea, agreeing to a split down the middle, which turned out to grant Norway the bulk of the energy resources. Under Putin agreement was finally reached over the borders with Estonia and Latvia, although both retained popular aspirations to have part of Russia’s neighbouring Pskov region restored to them, which had been part of the interwar republics. Putin even offered to return to the 1956 agreement with Japan and to restore two of the four Kurile Islands (Northern Territories) to that country. Admittedly, these were the two smallest, but in mathematical terms honours would be even. … Russia under Putin is a profoundly conservative power, and its actions are designed to maintain the status quo, hence the effort Moscow put into ratifying its existing borders. It was the West that was perceived to be the revisionist power.[63]
Putin would kept his reported promise, to annex Crimea, from 2008. The first steps of the brand-new interim government threw Crimea right into the hands of Putin. The Parliament in Kiev voted overwhelmingly for the abolition of Russian as the second language of the eastern Ukrainian provinces. No steps were taken to rein in the ultranationalists. In fact, they were granted high-level positions in the interim government. Although the Ukrainian interim president vetoed the attack on the Russian language a week after the vote, in response to protest activities, it proved to be too little, too late. In a dozen cities the relatively passive eastern Ukrainians took to the streets in thousands. The biggest, a 30,000 strong demonstration, took place in Sevastopol, Crimea
On February 27, 2014 the Crimean parliament sacked the regional government, voted in favour of a referendum on greater autonomy, and appointed Sergey Aksyonov as prime minster, whose Russian Unity party had only gained four percent of the vote during the previous elections in 2010. Indeed, the conditions under which the votes were taken resembled those of Yanukovych’s impeachment and, in fact, they were worse.
The referendum went ahead anyway. Representatives of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe—a panEuropean co-operation body that often observes elections—were invited but refused to show, because they found the referendum to be illegal. The results were overwhelming: 97% of the voters wanted to join Russia with a turnout of 83 percent. Crimea’s accession to Russia was subsequently formalized on the 28th of March 2014
During his field research on the Donbass insurgency, Ukrainian scholar Serhiy Kudelia found that local officials helped to lay the ground for the independence referenda, among other things, long before militants arrived on the scene—in a very chaotic process which he dubs a “quiet secessionism:’ “there was clearly no hierarchical subordination to any elite actor at the very top. And a lot of the decisions that were taken by local officials were taken on their own.”
The failure of Western diplomacy in Ukraine was severe. The crimes of Kiev were legitimized by western political and military support.[64] NATO praised Kiev for its “restraint’’ while the American ambassador Jen Psaki even defended Yatsenyuk’s use of the term “subhumans’’ to refer to Russians.[65] Presidential aides told The New York Times in April 2014 that “Mr. Obama has concluded that even if there is a resolution to the current standoff over Crimea and eastern Ukraine, he will never have a constructive relationship with Mr. Putin.”[66]
This cold war mentality escalated further when the MH17 passenger plane with 298 people on board was shot down. Sanctions against Russia were immediately put in place even though little of what had happened was known at the time.
Present Situation
It seems clear that, throughout the Ukraine conflict, US and EU agendas have differed. We have seen German and French intelligence officers disagreeing with US ‘propaganda,’ and even leaking this to the press. The schism is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that the United States has been absent from all peace negotiations, starting with Yanukovych during Maidan and continuing later with Minsk I and II. In the leaked call with the US ambassador, Victoria Nuland expressed her contempt for Europe very clearly when she told Pyatt, “you know, *censored* the EU.’’ This antagonism between the EU and the United States underlies a fundamental reality: European economies are deeply intertwined with Russia’s.
The most important pipeline supplying Western Europe with Russian gas was built in the early 80s, despite heavy protest from the Reagan administration, which then included US sanctions against Western Europe.[67]
The head of Stratfor—a private intelligence contractor once dubbed the ‘shadow CIA’ by Barron magazine for its close co-operation with the agency—described US policy in relation to the Ukraine crisis as follows:
For all of the last 100 years Americans have pursued a very consistent foreign policy. Its main goal: to not allow any state to amass too much power in Europe. First, the United States sought to prevent Germany from dominating Europe, then it sought to prevent the USSR from strengthening its influence.
The essence of this policy is as follows: to maintain as long as possible a balance of power in Europe, helping the weaker party, and if the balance is about to be significantly disrupted—to intervene at the last moment. And so, in the case of the First World War, the United States intervened only after the abdication of Nicholas II in 1917, to prevent Germany from gaining ground. And during WWII, the US opened a second front only very late (in June 1944), after it became clear that the Russians were prevailing over the Germans. [This strategy was most explicitly articulated by soon-to-be president Truman in 1941, when he proposed: “If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible.]’’
What is more, the most dangerous potential alliance, from the perspective of the United States, was considered to be an alliance between Russia and Germany. This would be an alliance of German technology and capital with Russian natural and human resources.[68]
Europe’s Eastern Partnership initiative—which led to the association agreement with Ukraine, and also includes the post-Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova—was designed and proposed by the Polish and Swedish ministers of foreign affairs in 2008, Carl Bildt and Radoslaw Sikorski. [69]
Expansion to the East was piloted by Washington: in every case, the former Soviet satellites were incorporated into NATO, under US command, before they were admitted to the EU. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had joined NATO already in 1999, five years before entry into the Union; Bulgaria and Romania in 2004, three years before entry; even Slovakia, Slovenia and the Baltics, a gratuitous month—just to rub in the symbolic point? —before entry (planning for the Baltics started in 1998). Croatia, Macedonia and Albania are next in line for the same sequence.[70]
Russian Aims
The Russian Aims in this conflict are very clear:
We have seen absolutely nothing in their campaign so far to indicate that the strategic objectives have changed – decapitation of the Ukrainian political leadership, defeat of the Ukrainian armed forces and the destruction of Ukraine as a functioning independent state. In the words of the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, “they want to break our nationhood”.
So how then will the Russian high command achieve these goals? In the early 19th century, strategist Karl von Clausewitz advised that only “by constantly seeking out the centre of his power, by daring all to win all, will one really defeat the enemy”. Zelensky has defined himself – and by extension his government – as that “centre” with every stirring, epoch-making speech he makes.
There has been lot of talk and threat from US for sanctions against India. I do NOT think this is possible at this juncture when the US economy has yet to recover, and India is a key partner for US battle with China. India will have a short term effect as some of the weapons especially for Navy are supplied by Ukraine, but then the industrial areas of Ukraine are Not being affected.
[1] Baker, P. (2014). In cold war echo, Obama strategy writes off Putin. The New York Times, p. 20.
[2] A pariah state (also called an international pariah or a global pariah) is a nation considered to be an outcast in the international community. A pariah state may face international isolation, sanctions or even an invasion by nations who find its policies, actions, or even its very existence unacceptable.
[3] Heuvel, K., Van den, & Cohen, S. (2014, May 01). Cold War Against Russia—Without Debate. Retrieved from Cold War Against Russia—Without Debate - NYU Jordan Center
[4] Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault. Foreign Affairs, 93(5), pp. 77-89.
[5] The term is attributed to Friedrich Engels; for a discussion, see Józef Chlebowczyk, On Small and Young Nations in Europe, trans. Janina Dorosz (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossoliniskich, 1980); Ivan Rudnytsky, "Observations on the Problem of 'Historical' and 'Non-Historical' Nations," Harvard Ukrainian Studies 5, no. 3 (September 1981): 358-68
[6] Olszański, T. A. (2012). The Language Issue in Ukraine: An Attempt at a new Perspective. OWS Studies, pp. 21-22.
[7] Which way Ukraine Should go - Which Union should Ukraine join? (26 November 2013). Retrieved from Press releases and reports - Which way Ukraine should go - which union should join? (population preferences for two weeks before the Vilnius summit)
[8] Thoughts population of Ukraine regarding who should decide what course to choose for Ukraine’s foreign policy integration. (10 October 2013). Retrieved from
Press releases and reports - Thoughts population of Ukraine regarding who should decide what course to choose Ukraine's foreign policy integration
[9] Presidential Decree number 127/2013. Retrieved from
Wayback Machine , http://www.president.gov.ua/ru/documents/15520.html
[10] Trading insults. (2013, August 24). Retrieved from
Trading insults
[11] Center for Social and Labour Research. (2015, December). Repressions against protests April-August 2015. Retrieved from
http://cslr.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ProtestRepressionsApril-August2015-ecj-edits.pdf
[12] Victoria Nuland’s Admits Washington Has Spent $5 Billion to “Subvert Ukraine” (2014, February 09). Retrieved from
[13] Traynor, I. (2004, November 25). US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev. Retrieved from Ian Traynor: US campaign behind the turmoil in Kiev ; Sussman, G., & Krader, S. (2008). Template revolutions: Marketing US regime change in Eastern Europe. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture,5(3)
[14] Mendick, R., & Malnick, E. (2013, February 10). Revealed: Tony Blair and the oligarch bankrolling his charity. Retrieved from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/pol...and-the-oligarch-bankrolling-his-charity.html ; Ukraine: Yatensyuk, Rising Politician. (2008, July 03). Retrieved from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KYIV1300_a.html
[15] Nadeau, J. (2014, January 15). Ukraine’s real problem: Crony capitalism. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/195549-ukraines-real-problem-crony-capitalism For a detailed examination of corporate raiding in Ukraine, consult Rojansky, M. (2014). Corporate raiding in Ukraine: Causes, methods and consequences. Demokratizatsiya, 22(3), pp. 411-444.
[16] Luhn, A. (2014, April 17). Ukrainian oligarch offers bounty for capture of Russian ‘saboteurs’ Retrieved from
http://www.theguardian.com/world/20...rs-financial-rewards-russians-igor-kolomoisky ; Cullison, A. (2014, June 27). Ukraine’s Secret Weapon: Feisty Oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky. Retrieved from
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-secret-weapon-feisty-oligarch-ihor-kolomoisky-1403886665 ; Kolomoisky suggests Ukraine build 2,000-kilometers wall against Russia. (2014, June 13). Retrieved from http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/kolomoisky-suggests[ukraine-build-2000-kilometers-wall-against-russia-351751 .
[17] Scott, P. D. (2009, August 11). The Real Grand Chessboard and the Profiteers of War. Retrieved from http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-real-grand-chessboard-and-the-profiteers-of-war/1467
[18] Obama: I’ve learned an immense amount from Dr. Brzezinski. (2008, March 13). Retrieved from
[19] Brzezinski, Z. (1997). The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives. (New York, NY: Basic Books), p. 41
[20] Ibid, p. 31.
[21] Ibid, p. 202.
[22] Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. (2014, September 4). Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112695.htm
[23] Carden, J. (2014, September 08). The 2014 NATO Summit: Giving War a Chance. Retrieved from http://www.thenation.com/article/181521/2014-nato-summit-giving-war-chance
[24] Garamone, J. (2000, June 02). Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-spectrum Dominance. Retrieved from http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45289
[25] Perry, W. J., & Abizaid, J. P. (2014). Ensuring a Strong US Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. United States Inst. of Peace, Washington, DC, p. 2
[26] National Security Strategy (Rep.). (2015, February). Retrieved https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_ strategy.pdf , p. 2, 8
[27] Goettig, M., & Shalal, A. (2014, March 20). Poland speeds up missile defence plan amid Ukraine crisis. Retrieved from http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-poland-defence-idUKBREA2J26K20140320
[28] S. S. 2277, 113th Cong. (2014). Retrieved from
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s2277is/html/BILLS-113s2277is.htm
[29] From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating nuclear weapons. (n.d.). Retrieved from
http://fas.org/pub-reports/counterf...licy-path-toward-eliminating-nuclear-weapons/
[30] Membership Roster. (2016, February 12). Retrieved from
http://www.cfr.org/about/membership/roster.html ; Lieber, K. A., & Press, D. G. (2006). The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy. Foreign Affairs, 85(2), 42. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2006-03-01/rise-us-nuclear-primacy , p. 42
[31] bid., p. 52
[32] Cited in Chomsky, N. (2014, August 06). As Hiroshima Day dawns, why are we still tempting nuclear fate? Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/06/hiroshima-day-nuclear-weapons-cold-war-usa-bomb
[33] Ziezulewicz, B. G. (2016, August 02). B61-12 life extension program receives NNSA approval. Retrieved from http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Se...program-receives-NNSA-approval/3261470147434/
[34] Traynor, I. (2008, January 22). Pre-emptive nuclear strike a key option, Nato told. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jan/22/nato.nuclear ; The Iran Nuclear Straw Man. (2015, July 17). Retrieved from http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/07/17/the-iran-nuclear-straw-man/
[35] Sanger, D. E., & Broad, W. J. (2016, September 05). Obama Unlikely to Vow No First Use of Nuclear Weapons. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/science/obama-unlikely-to-vow-no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapon
[36] Stone, O., & Kuznick, P. (2013). The untold history of the United States. (Simon and Schuster), p. 466.
[37] Ibid.
[38] American Military Leaders Urge President Truman not to Drop the Atomic Bomb. (2010). Retrieved from http://www.colorado.edu/AmStudies/lewis/2010/atomicdec.htm
[39] Stone, O., & Kuznick, P. (2013). The untold history of the United States. (Simon and Schuster), pi 293-294,
[40] Wellerstein, Alex (2012, August 8). The Height of the Bomb. Retrieved from http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/08/08/the-height-of-the-bomb
[41] Ibid.
[42] Raphael, T. J. (2016, January 15). Why President Obama is moving ahead with the biggest modernization of US nuclear weapons in decades. Retrieved from http://www.pri.org/stories/2016-01-...gest-modernization-us-nuclear-weapons-decades
[43] Putin, V. (2007, June 8). TLAXCALA : Putin sagt—Pressekonferenz im Anschluß an den G 8 Gipfel. Retrieved from http://www.tlaxcala.es/pp.asp?reference=3039
[44] Kristensen, H. M., & Norris, R. S. (2017, February 28). Russian nuclear forces, 2017. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 73(2), pp. 115-126
[45] Hallam, J. et al. (2016, December 11). Letter on the need for urgent measures to avert a nuclear war. Retrieved from http://www.defenddemocracy.press/letter-on-the-need-for-urgent-measures-to-avert-a-nuclear-war/
[46] Cohen, J. (2016, November 11). Commentary: The number one reason to fix U.S.-Russia relations. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nuclear-commentary-idUSKBN1351SD
[47] Westberg, G. (2016, May 23). Close calls: We were closer to nuclear destruction than we knew. Retrieved from https://peaceandhealthblog.com/2016/05/23/close-calls/
[48] Chomsky, N. (2012, October 15). Cuban missile crisis: how the US played Russian roulette with nuclear war. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/15/cuban-missile-crisis-russian-roulette
[49] Hemment, J. (2009). Soviet-Style Neoliberalism? Problems of Post-Communism,56(6), pp.36-50
[50] World Bank. (n.d.). GDP per capita, PPP (current international $). Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP. PP.CD
[51] CIA, E. (2001). The world factbook 2001. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC;
CIA, E. (2015). The world factbook 2015. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC
[52] Breslow, J. M. (2015, January 23). Retrieved from
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/inequality-and-the-putin-economy-inside-the-numbers/ ; Russian Federation. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/country/russian-federation
[53] Abbas, A. S., Belhocine, N., ElGanainy, A. A., & Horton, M. A. (2010, November 1). A Historical Public Debt Database. Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=24332.0;
Abbas, S. M., Belhocine, N., ElGanainy, A. A., & Horton, M. (2010). A historical public debt database. IMF Working Papers, pp. 1-26.
[54] Ray, J., & Esipova, N. (2014, July 18). Russian Approval of Putin Soars to Highest Level in Years. Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/173597/russian-approval-putin-soars-highest-level-years.aspx
[55] Ahmed, Nafeez Mosaddeq, The Smashing of Chechnya—An International Irrelevance: A Case Study of the Role of Human Rights in Western Foreign Policy, Islamic Human Rights Commission, London, April 1999
[56] SIPRI’s databases. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/databases
[57] Turse, N. (2015, october 25). Nick Turse, Success, Failure, and the “Finest Warriors Who Ever Went Into Combat”. Retrieved from
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Special Ops “Successes” - TomDispatch.com
[58] DNI Releases Budget Figure for 2010 National Intelligence Program. (2010, October 28). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/news/2010/10/dni102810.html ; DOD Releases Military Intelligence Program 2010 Topline Budget. (2010, October 28). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/news/2010/10/dod102810.html ; SIPRI’s databases. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/databases
[59] World Bank Data.
[60] Morozov, V. (2015). Russia’s Postcolonial Identity: A Subaltern Empire in a Eurocentric World. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 67-102.
[61] Klußmann, U. (2009, June 15). A Shattered Dream in Georgia: EU Probe Creates Burden for Saakashvili. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/international...-eu-probe-creates-burden-for-saakashvili-a-63
[62] Wilson, S. (2014, March 25). Obama dismisses Russia as ‘regional power’ acting out of weakness. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-dismisses-russia-as- regional-power-acting-out-of-weakness/2014/03/25/1e5a678eb439-11e3-b899-20667de76985_story.html
[63] Sakwa, R. (2014). Frontline Ukraine: crisis in the borderlands. (IB Tauris), pp. 122-123
[64] Pugliese, D. (2014, September 20). No safeguards stopping Canadian equipment from falling into wrong hands in Ukraine, opposition MPs say. Retrieved from
http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/0...to-wrong-hands-in-ukraine-opposition-mps-say/ ; Harper, S. (2014, August 7). Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada announcing security assistance to Ukraine. Retrieved from
http://web.archive.org/web/20150324220432/ http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/08/07...canada-announcing-security-assistance-ukraine ; Rampton, R., Mason, J., & Stonestreet, J. (2014, June 04). Obama says Poroshenko a wise choice for Ukraine, pledges aid. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/04/us-ukraine-crisis-obama-idUSKBN0EF0P020140604 ; Nato.int. (2014, September 4). NATO leaders pledge support to Ukraine at Wales Summit. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112459.htm ; Sukhotski, K., Balmforth, R., & Heneghan, T. (2014, September 14). NATO countries have begun arms deliveries to Ukraine: Defense minister. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-heletey-idUSKBN0H90PP20140914
[65] Spaki, J. (2014, June 16). Daily Press Briefing: June 16, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/06/227650.htm#UKRAINE
[66] Baker, P. (2014, April 19). In Cold War Echo, Obama Strategy Writes Off Putin. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/world/europe/in-cold-war-echo-obama-strategy-writes-off-putin.html
[67] Wikipedia. (n.d.). Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhgorod pipeline. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhgorod_pipeline ; Greer, B. I., & Russell, J. L. (1982). European Reliance on Soviet Gas Exports: The Yamburg-Urengoi Natural Gas Project. The Energy Journal, 3(3), 15-37.; Hogselius, P., Åberg, A., & Kaijser, A. (2013). Natural Gas in Cold War Europe: The Making of a Critical Infrastructure. In The Making of Europe’s Critical Infrastructure. (Palgrave Macmillan UK), pp. 27-61
[68] Chernenko, E., & Gabuev, A. (2015, January 17). `In Ukraine, U.S interests are incompatible with the interests of the Russian Federation` Stratfor chief George Friedman on the roots of the Ukraine crisis. Retrieved from
http://us-russia.org/2902-in-ukrain...edman-on-the-roots-of-the-ukraine-crisis.html
[69] Notably, Europe’s Eastern Partnership initiative—which led to the association agreement with Ukraine, and also includes the post-Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova—was designed and proposed by the Polish and Swedish ministers of foreign affairs in 2008, Carl Bildt and Radoslaw Sikorski.12 Both are fiercely anti-Russian, going so far as to make comparisons between Russia and Nazi-Germany, which were then echoed by several senior US and British politicians, such as Hillary Clinton and David Cameron.13 In fact, Carl Bildt was one of the founding members of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, advocating for the 2003 invasion alongside senior US neo-cons. Sikorski, on the other hand, has lived for years in the United States and the United Kingdom. He’s been a British citizen for nearly 20 years, with his citizenship only revoked in 2006 upon becoming minister of defense in Poland. During his time at Oxford, he was taught by the same tutor as former US president Bill Clinton and was admitted to the same exclusive student society as British prime minister David Cameron. His wife, Anne Applebaum, is an American citizen and journalist. We see a similar pattern in the Baltic States. The current president of Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, lived most of his life in the United States. He worked for nearly ten years at Radio Free Europe, which was funded by the CIA for 17 years until it was taken over by the US Congress. Valdas Adamkus, the former president of Lithuania, who ruled for ten years, has worked for the US government for 28 years, serving in the Environmental Protection Agency and before that as a senior officer within a US military intelligence unit. Lastly, the former president of Latvia, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, who was also re-elected for a second term, was brought up in Canada. Obviously, the ties of these Eastern European leaders to North America are very strong, and their states have all been at the forefront in “countering the Russian aggression.’’
[70] Anderson, P. (2009). The New Old World. (Verso Books), p. 69
Many believe the origins of the current conflict lie in the negotiations between George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, during the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1990. Gorbachev had agreed to let go of East Germany, under the condition that NATO would not move “an inch to the East.”[4] However, Gorbachev made NO written agreement on it. This was a sensitive issue; during the Yalta conference of 1945, the allied forces had agreed to give the eastern bloc to the Soviet Union as a buffer-zone, because, with 25 million fatalities, it had made the biggest sacrifice in the history of mankind. Russia had already suffered a long history of hostile relations with the West, including the devastating invasion of Napoleon and another by the United States, Japan, Turkey, and multiple European countries in their effort to roll back Communism in 1918-1921.
Since the hostile relations between the two power blocs had just started to improve, Gorbachev’s demand was very understandable—even more so if you consider his commitment to considerable demilitarization. But despite all this, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (1999), Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia (2004), and Albania and Croatia (2009) are now all NATO members.
In 2008 a prophetic memo was sent with direct precedence to Washington by the US ambassador in Russia. The WikiLeaks cable was titled: “Nyet means Nyet: Russia’s NATO enlargement redlines.” The ambassador stated that “Foreign Minister Lavrov and other senior officials have reiterated strong opposition, stressing that Russia would view further eastward expansion as a potential military threat. In Ukraine … there are fears that the issue could potentially split the country in two, leading to violence or even, some claim, civil war, which would force Russia to decide whether to intervene.” These prophetic assessments echoed those of a US intelligence report in 1994, which warned that regional divisions in Ukraine would eventually lead to civil war. Regardless, two months after the 2008 memo, a NATO summit was held in Bucharest, where they “agreed … that these countries [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO.” Putin reportedly warned the attendees that this would lead to an annexation of Crimea, home to an important Russian military base.
History of Ukraine
For centuries, Ukraine has been split between Russia, Poland, and Austria and ever since Ukraine's history must be seen as part of a greater dilemma of eastern and central Europe. During all their tenuous modern existence, the states of eastern and central Europe have been pawns in the international system. Before 1914 the "non-historical peoples"[5] were long subject to three central European dynastic empires: the Romanovs, the Hohenzollerns, and the Habsburgs. After the collapse of the multi-ethnic monarchies in World War I, these nations have been most directly the pawns of either the German Reich or the Soviet Union.
Ukraine regained its independence in 1991, the country has been a fertile soil for interference by its neighbouring powerhouses. This is partially because Ukraine has, throughout its post-soviet history, been a country divided by political, economic, religious, and ethnolinguistic lines. In the Southern and Eastern provinces, a big Russian-speaking proletariat works in an industry that largely exports to the Russian market. Many have relatives right across the border. In West and Central Ukraine, most people speak Ukrainian at home, and their diaspora is rather aimed at Europe and the United States. The precise number of ethnic and linguistic Russians in Ukraine is subject to interpretation, and often downplayed or inflated based on the political whims of the commentator at hand. In this respect, a literature review by the prominent Polish Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) is enlightening. According to the official 2001 census, 17 percent of Ukrainians considered themselves ethnic Russians, while 29 percent considered Russian their native language. Surveys reveal, however, that the term ‘native language’ carries its ambiguities. A third of Ukrainians considered their best mastered language ‘native’; another third considered it to be the language of their nation; a quarter equated ‘native’ with the language of their parents; percent considered it to be the language they spoke most often. Therefore, different survey questions give different results. When asked which language people felt most comfortable speaking, there has been a stable roughly 50/50 split in Ukraine
Language Law of 2012.
This long-awaited bill allowed government institutions to adopt bilingualism if a minority language was spoken by more than 10 percent of the region’s population. In practice, this meant that, among other things, every Eastern and Southern region would adopt Russian alongside the Ukrainian language. This was not irrelevant: 22 percent of Ukrainian citizens indicated that their mastery of the Ukrainian language was ‘low.’[6] The bill, however, provoked a fistfight in parliament and was followed with riots on the streets by Ukrainian nationalists, who saw the retention of the Russian language as a dangerous post-colonial legacy
The reason that cultural differences could so easily become politicized is partially because their geographical distribution strongly correlates with material realities. The historical roots can be traced to the soil. When the country industrialized under the Soviet Union, the transformations primarily took place in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, where plenty of natural resources were hidden underground. These regions are now characterized by urbanization and heavy industries that were integrated in the post-Soviet economy, and therefore reliant on exports to the Russian market.
In Central and Western Ukraine, on the other hand, most people still live in rural areas where the economy is driven by agriculture, and they have practically no economic stakes in their Eastern neighbour.
Sequence of Events
Since Ukraine’s first elections in 1991, the voting behaviour of Ukraine has neatly correlated with this economic, ethno-linguistic and religious framework. In turn, one of the most important policy issues during most election debates revolves around the question: More Europe, or more Russia? More Russia formed the basis of Yanukovych’s election campaign.
Ukraine was hit hard in 2009 when the economy, under the reign of Yushchenko’s pro-European cabinet, plunged into a crisis with a 15% contraction (the largest in Europe bar Latvia) With the entry of Yanukovych in 2010 the economy recovered that same year with a growth of 4%, pushing through with another 5% in 2011.16 But halfway through 2012 the economy started to stagnate again. Yanukovych promised to accelerate the negotiations for a trade agreement with the EU that were started by Yushchenko in 2008. On the other hand, he tried to gain access to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) – a customs union between five post-Soviet states, including Russia. This way he sought to break down trading barriers with Ukraine’s two most important trading partners and, supposedly, stimulate economic growth and balance the passionate foreign aspirations of the Ukrainian people. Indeed, according to the polls, support for both agreements hovered at around 40%.[7] However, a vast majority of Ukrainians thought the country’s course on foreign policy integration ought to be decided through a national referendum.[8]
In March Yanukovych adopted a plan for European integration that was issued by the national security and defense council of Ukraine.[9] The agreement would be signed on the 21st of November, 2013. The same year a Gallup poll found that nearly twice as many Ukrainians considered NATO a threat rather than offering protection
In August 2013, The Ukrainian employers’ federation, whose members account for 70% of the economy, stated that they have to conform to such extensive quality checks at the Russian border that it practically amounts to an import ban. A close economic advisor of Putin publicly stated that this was just a taste of what’s to come if Ukraine follows the “suicidal path’’ of the EU association agreement.[10]
In Eastern Ukraine the first lay-offs were already taking place and the entire economy fell back into a recession.25 The EU agreement and the accompanying costly reforms were approaching. Yanukovych stated that Ukraine needed a loan of $27 billion. The EU offered him $833 million and referred to the IMF for the remaining sum. But the IMF made harsh demands: a 40% rise in gas prizes, freezing of wages and budget cuts. This ran contrary to Yanukovych’s election promise to lower gas prices. In addition, the Russian sanctions would hit the eastern industry, while the unpopular budget cuts of the IMF had the potential to drag the economy back into a deep recession. Understandably, Yanukovych announced that he would delay signing the agreement, and asked the EU to help negotiate better terms with the IMF
The story that follows is well known. With the taste of an EU-agreement on their lips, disappointed demonstrators took to the streets in Lviv and Kiev. It already started forcefully when, with a peak of 40.000 people on the streets on the 24th of November, the Berkut resorted to batons and tear gas
Yanukovych fled Kiev the next day and soon a new interim government, consisting of the former opposition, took over. According to the polls, however, the Maidan protests did not enjoy a clear majority support in Ukraine
Maidan Uprising
The nature of the Maidan uprising is perhaps best illustrated with systemic protest data from the Centre for Social and Labour Research in Kiev.[11] Before Maidan, for four consecutive years, the most frequent demands were of a socio-economic nature and this trend was increasing. In 2013, before the start of Maidan on the 20th of November, 3419 protests had already occurred, 56 percent of which had socio-economic demands, including 40 worker strikes. This was almost the same amount of protest activity as the entire year of 2012 and nearly twice the amount of the preceding two years
The Maidan uprising, however, was not only backed by ultranationalists and oligarchs. Western states too played a role in the uprising, . In a speech sponsored by the US Ukraine Foundation and held at the National Press Club in Washington on December 13, 2013, Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, expressed her support to the opposition. She proudly stated that the United States had invested over $5 billion in “Ukrainian democracy’’.[12] Today there is ample documentation of the role Western-funded NGOs had played in the Orange revolution of 2004.2[13] In many ways, this was a precedent to the Maidan revolution.
Oligarchs
At this point, it might be useful to assess some of the forces that operate behind the scenes in Ukraine. The roots of the Ukrainian political system traces back to its founding in 1991. Dozens of Ukrainians with connections were able to amass vast riches, while the economy shrank by 60 percent. By comparison, the US economy shrank by just 30 percent during the great depression. Most former Soviet states would suffer the same fate, but (in addition to Kyrgyzstan) only Ukraine has still not recovered to its 1991 GDP level.
- This is especially damning if one considers that Ukraine was a major industrial base of the Soviet Union, and still leads in many high-technology sectors such as aircraft, rocket and shipbuilding industries, while boasting a well-educated workforce coming fourth in the world in terms of IT professionals.
- Ukraine also has significant energy resources and huge agricultural potential with 30 percent of the world’s black earth soil.
- Regardless, as of 2010, a quarter of its population struggled below the poverty line, while the wealth of fifty oligarchs equalled nearly half of the country’s GDP, and they owned most of the major media channels.
- One in five Ukrainians told a 2010 survey they were willing to sell their vote.
- A 120-page report by the Polish think tank OSW concludes that “big business at present does not have such a strong influence on politics in any other Eastern European country as it does in Ukraine.”
Another noteworthy oligarch is the multi-billionaire, Ihor Kolomyskyi, with $6 billion the third richest man in Ukraine. A particularly corrupt figure, he is famous for having built his imperium through literally hostile takeovers, “hiring an army of thugs to descend upon … [a company] with baseball bats, gas and rubber pistols, iron bars and chainsaws … and then a mix of phony court orders (often involving corrupt judges and/or registrars).”[15]
After Maidan, Kolomoyskyi profiled himself as the most “patriotic” businessperson in Ukraine. Inter alia, he offered $10,000 for every caught Russian “saboteur’’, pumped tens of millions of dollars into the creation of several volunteer battalions and proposed to build a 2000 km wall that would separate Ukraine from Russia.[16]
The 25th of May 2014 presidential elections would show that the oligarchs still had a strong grip on the country. They were won with 55% of the votes by “chocolate king’’ Poroshenko. A true chameleon, he was one of the founders of Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and minister under the presidency of both Yanukovych and his predecessor, Yuschchenko. Owning $1.3 billion and one of the four biggest TV stations in Ukraine, he can squarely count himself as part of the oligarchic class.
In fact, the Yushchenko presidency had even undermined Ukraine’s very faith in democracy and capitalism. A 2009 Pew Research survey found that two-thirds of Ukrainian believed life was better under communism (12 percent said it was worse), while only 30 percent still approved of the change to a multiparty system.5 The scepticism towards the Ukrainian political system became nearly universal. Indeed, as time progressed, even many former supporters of the Orange Revolution changed their minds on the former movement, and more and more Ukrainians considered themselves to be losing due to the changes.6 Mass mobilization, it seemed, had been abused by sections of the Ukrainian elite to seize power. Indeed, the Orange president Viktor Yushchenko and prime-minister Yulia Tymoshenko had been familiar faces in Ukrainian politics.
It didn’t take long for Yatsenyuk to reveal the reasons behind Nuland’s preference. The first question in an interview with Bloomberg on the 27th of February was “Your first job as the prime minister of Ukraine is what’’? After some vague promises like stability and peace he clearly responds, “to have the deal with the IMF and the European Union”. Like a real technocrat he proudly stated that “I will be the most unpopular prime minister in the history of my country... We will do everything not to default ... if we get the financial support from the United States, from the European Union, from the IMF, we will do it.”
To understand what this would entail for a country like Ukraine, let us start with some words about the nature of the IMF. Voting power is determined by a one-dollar-one-vote system. Japan and seven NATO countries have a majority vote, while the United States, with 23.6% of the vote, is the only country with veto power. (Changes to the mandate require an 85% majority).3 By comparison, all the BRICS countries combined—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, who constitute approximately 42 percent of the global population—together have less than 8 percent of the IMF vote.4 Though the IMF and World Bank purport to be international organizations, every managing director of the IMF has come from a NATO country. Even more striking, every single president in the history of its sister institution, the World Bank,
Role of US
The work of Zbigniew Brzezinski offers more clarity on the meaning of this development of recent years.[17] He is one of the most influential American policy planners of the last few decades and is considered an unofficial foreign policy adviser of Barack Obama, who described Brzezinski as a mentor.[18] In 1997, he wrote his magnum opus The Grand Chessboard, where he describes how America can remain the “sole global superpower’’. He explains that there are several “geopolitical pivots’’ which are key: “their geography, … gives them a special role either in denying access to important areas or in denying resources to a significant player … In some cases, a geopolitical pivot may act as a defensive shield for a vital state or even a region … Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey, and Iran play the role of critically important geopolitical pivots.”[19] Brzezinski is also convinced that “Eurasia is … the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played.”[20] Russia is subsequently described as a ’’black hole’’ that should be made subservient to the security policy of NATO and economic institutions like the World Bank and IMF. At a certain point, he even suggests that Russia should be cut in three parts, resulting in a “loosely confederated Russia—composed of a European Russia, a Siberian Republic, and a Far Eastern Republic.”[21]
The 2014 NATO summit in Wales tried to push Russia further into the corner. “NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies’’, they attested.6 Georgia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were specifically mentioned. The fact that “NATO and Ukraine will [also] continue to promote the development of greater interoperability between Ukrainian and NATO forces.’’[22]
Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Secretary of Defense, United States the foremost political strategist of the democratic establishment in Washington, put it bluntly: “One must consider as part of the American system the global web of specialized organizations, especially the ‘international’ financial institutions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank can be said to represent “global” interests, and their constituency may be construed as the world. In reality, however, they are heavily American dominated, and their origins are traceable to American initiative, particularly the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944.’
Further elaborating on the US governmental vetting process, a representative of the Ukrainian presidential administration told RBC-Ukraine: “The crucial positions in government the president discusses with Pyatt. For example, the resignation of Nalivaichenko [head of Security Service of Ukraine] was fully agreed with the [US] ambassador.”
Finally, a Rapid Reaction Force was formed composed of 4000 NATO troops that now patrol the Baltic States. This has a tense relation with the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, in which NATO promised not to deploy any permanent troops in new member states—using the mobility of the Rapid Reaction Force as a loophole. James Carden, former adviser of the American State Department, argues that since this small force cannot possibly stop a Russian invasion, the Rapid Reaction Force is rather being used as a pretext to further militarize the Russian border[23].
Unfortunately, Brzezinski was not alone in his imperial ambitions. For one, the joint vision of the American Department of Defense until 2020 “emphasizes full-spectrum dominance … [which] means the ability of U.S. forces, operating alone or with allies, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the range of military operations.”[24] Indeed, the most recent National Defense Panel Review states that the United States should now be prepared to “fight in any number of regions in overlapping time frames: on the Korean peninsula, in the East or South China Sea, South Asia, in the Middle East, the Trans-Sahel, Sub-Saharan Africa, in Europe, and possibly elsewhere.”[25]
This level of militarism was echoed in the September 2016 report The Future of the Army, where the influential Atlantic Council argued that the US should prepare for the possibility of “the next big war’—involving very capable adversaries, high levels of death and destruction, and perhaps hundreds of thousands of US troops’’—naming Russia and China repeatedly as potential opponents. In an October 2016 speech Mark Milley, the US Army Chief of Staff, even proclaimed that war between nation states in the near future “is almost guaranteed,’’ also repeatedly hinting at Russia and China. In a blunt warning against a potential “high-end enemy,’’ Milley adds that “those who try to oppose the United States ... we will stop you and we will beat you harder than you’ve ever been beaten before.” Notably, Obama’s 2015 National Security Strategy emphasizes that “The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary ... to defend its core interests,’’ later defined as including “a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.’[26]
Ever since 2002, NATO has been trying to remove Russia’s nuclear deterrent with a missile defense shield.14 For years they have claimed that it was aimed against Iran, but now Western politicians are talking in clear language. For one, the Polish minister of defense recently asserted that developments in Ukraine have urged them to speed up their development of the missile defense system.[27]
In another case, American Senator Bob Corker recently proposed a bill that would bind Obama to “prevent further Russian aggression’’ by, among things, “Accelerating implementation of European and NATO missile defense efforts.”[28] This missile defense shield is only capable of intercepting around 60 nuclear warheads, a minuscule fraction of the total amount of nuclear weapons held by Russia. The shield therefore can only be used effectively as an offensive weapon. For decades the Soviet Union and the United States have been trying to attain a so-called first-strike capability, meaning the capacity to neutralize all your opponent’s nuclear warheads in one surprise attack.[29] In the prestigious Foreign Affairs journal of the Council on Foreign Relations, one of the most influential think tanks in America, Lieber and Press wrote in 2006 that America would for the first time in 50 years reach nuclear primacy, because of the “precipitous decline of Russia’s arsenal, and the glacial pace of modernization of China’s nuclear forces.’’[30] They asserted that “If the United States launched a nuclear attack against Russia (or China), the targeted country would be left with a tiny surviving arsenal—if any at all. At that point, even a relatively modest or inefficient missile-defense system might well be enough to protect against any retaliatory strikes, because the devastated enemy would have so few warheads and decoys left.”[31]
In September 2014, President Obama shocked the world by announcing an enormous modernization program of its nuclear arsenal. With a price ticket of $1 trillion over the next 30 years, the program is “comparable to spending for procurement of new strategic systems in the 1980s under President Ronald Reagan,” according to a study by the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies.[32] The nuclear bunker buster remains unmentioned, and Obama is planning only to improve the existing arsenal to uphold his promise not to develop new nuclear weapons. The B61 Model 12 has already entered the production engineering phase and is scheduled to enter full-scale production by 2020.[33]
Already back in 2008, several high-ranking NATO officials pressed for ‘preventive’ nuclear attacks as an integral strategy against Iran, even though it has long been proven— even by the US intelligence community—that the country is not developing any nuclear weapons.[34] In September 2016, the Obama administration seemed unwilling to rule out a first strike, with senior officials specifically mentioning China, Russia and North Korea.[35]
Younger generations might look on these activities as pointless military posturing. Nevertheless, as Peter Kuznick and Oliver Stone extensively documented in The Untold History of the United States, the world has come very close to nuclear catastrophe—and very often at that. The atom bomb has never been gathering dust in military silos. Rather, the United States has been using the nuclear weapons threat continuously—like a crook uses a gun to rob a store—you don’t have to pull the trigger to make a weapon useful. President Nixon explained it like this: “I call it the madman theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that, ‘for god’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communists. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button.’’’[36] Nixon mirrored his practise after Eisenhower, who threatened the Chinese with nuclear weapons during the Korean war.[37]
These threats were hardly hypothetical. The president before him, Harry Truman, had dropped two nuclear bombs on Japan. Contrary to popular belief, literally every single US military leader found it to be “of no material assistance in our war against Japan,” and rather “adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages.”[38] Indeed, it was the entry of the Red Army, famous for defeating the Nazis, that was cited by Japanese government officials as the reason for unconditional surrender. This is confirmed by a study conducted by the U.S. War Department in January 1946, which found “little mention … of the use of the atomic bomb by the United States in the discussions leading up to the … decision … it [is] almost a certainty that the Japanese would have capitulated upon the entry of Russia into the war.”[39] Truman simply wanted to show the world—and the Soviet Union in particular—that the US was not constrained by humanitarian concerns in its quest for global domination.
Early documents show that Germany was initially also considered as a target, but that “comparatively flimsy wooden houses’’ in some Japanese cities would better demonstrate the destructive power of the atomic bomb.[40] In addition, “the possibility of eliminating a large fraction of the Fire Force of a Japanese town [in the initial blast] … is attractive and realistic … the probability of a devastating fire, spreading well beyond the limits of the blast damage, will be greatly increased.”[41]
Obama’s modernization program would supposedly lead to a reduction of nuclear weapons after thirty years’ time. Yet this eventual reduction is completely dependent on the political will of multiple subsequent presidents, therefore a very uncertain prospect. As Andy Weber, former assistant secretary of defence for nuclear, chemical, and biological defence. programs from 2009 to 2014, explained in an interview: “It doesn’t violate the treaty because there’s a loophole in the treaty called the bomber counting rule … So each of our 60-ish bombers only counts as one warhead, even though they can carry up to 20 of these air launch cruise missiles each.”[42] Notably, already back in 2007, Putin vocally expressed his frustration at a G8 press conference:
An arms race really is unfolding. Well, was it we who withdrew from the ABM Treaty? We must react to what our partners do. We already told them two years ago, “don’t do this … You are destroying the system of international security. You must understand that you are forcing us to take retaliatory steps.” … Then we heard about them developing low-yield nuclear weapons and they are continuing to develop these charges.
… [They] lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons, and thereby put humankind on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. But they are not listening to us. We are saying: do not deploy weapons in space. We don’t want to do that. No, it continues: “whoever is not with us is against us”. What is that? Is it a dialogue or a search for compromise? The entire dialogue can be summed up by: whoever is not with us is against us. …
We implemented the CFE, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty [the treaty signed by the former head of the Soviet Union Gorbachev, which aims to demilitarize Europe]. ... And in response we get bases and a missile defense system in Europe. So what should we do?
You talked about public opinion. Public opinion in Russia is in favor of us ensuring our security. Where can you find a public in favor of the idea that we must completely disarm, and then perhaps, according to theorists such as Zbignew Brzezinski, that we must divide our territory into three or four parts.[43]
Russia
| The United States of America has … 1. Attempted to overthrow more than 50 governments, most of which were democraticallyelected. 2. Attempted to suppress a populist or nationalist movement in 20 countries. 3. Grossly interfered in democratic elections in at least 30 countries. 4. Dropped bombs on the people of more than 30 countries. 5. Attempted to assassinate more than 50 foreign leaders.53 |
Putin has never been a socialist—and Russia remains one of the most unequal countries in the world.[49] Nevertheless, by reining in the worst excesses of the Yeltsin regime—which shrank the economy by 26 percent—and then enjoying a period of historically high energy prices, the country was stabilized and a growth of 433 percent established in 15 years’ time, according to the World Bank.[50] Despite the persisting inequalities, the poverty rate declined from 40 percent in 1999 to 11 percent in 2013, as documented by the CIA World Fact Book.[51] Moreover, the ‘middle class,’ defined by the World Bank as those living on more than $10 a day, grew from 30 to 60 percent of the population between 2001 and 2010, while life expectancy was raised by five years between 2000 and 2014.[52] In addition, IMF statistics show that under Putin, the level of public debt went from 89 percent to just 12 percent of GDP in 2014.[53] No wonder that, despite his authoritarian rule, the approval ratings of Putin—as measured by the American Gallup Center—are, at 83%, as high as ever.[54]
Putin is, in fact, a wartime politician. He became acting president after Yeltsin resigned on December 31,1999—and won his elections on the back of a brutal assault on Chechnya, finishing what Yeltsin had started in 1994. The Chechens had already endured centuries of oppression. Like the Crimean Tatars, they were deported wholesale under Stalin. An estimated third of them died in overcrowded trucks heading for labor camps in Kazakhstan. After Yeltsin’s invasion failed to defeat the Chechen drive for self-determination—having killed between 40,000 and 100,000 people in a region of 1.3 million—a referendum on independence was agreed upon, to be held in Chechnya on the 31st of December 2001.68[55] This agreement, however, would soon be terminated. In September 1999, apartment buildings were bombed in Moscow, killing over 200 people.
History underscores the fact that Russia, in many respects, does not differ too much from the West. Indeed, the United States has by far the biggest military budget, the world’s highest incarceration rate and the largest volume of arms exports, often selling to the same clients as Russia—including Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel and the United Arab Emirates, among others.82 As Sakwa notes: “this is not a second Cold War. Russia is neither a consistent ideological nor strategic foe. Instead, cooperation has continued over Afghanistan—the Northern Distribution Network across Russia continued to channel 40 per cent of supplies and personnel to and from Afghanistan throughout the Ukraine crisis—and in the Middle East, and there have even been signs of cooperation over Syria in the face of the Islamic State’’.
There is no comparison between US and Russia. The combined CSTO military budget as of 2014 is not even onetenth the size of NATO’s.[56] In 2015, according to Special Operations Command spokesman Ken McGraw, U.S. Special Operations forces deployed to a record-shattering 147 countries –75% of the nations on the planet… On any day of the year, in fact, America’s most elite troops can be found in 70 to 90 nations.”[57] Perhaps most telling, the last published US intelligence budget (2010)— which includes both analytical and operational agencies—was substantially larger than that of the entire Russian military establishment.[58] The total GDP of CSTO countries constitute less than twelve percent of the NATO-zone economy. Despite all the column inches spent on the rise of China, economic disparities remain vast there too. Comparing NATO economies with the signatories of the SCO—again, a much less binding security co-operation— the SCO countries still constitute but 59 percent of the NATO zone’s GDP.[59] These comparisons also ignore the production of manufactured goods. Russia is largely a supplier of raw materials to Europe—an obvious sign that its integration into the global economy has come from an inferior position.[60]
Why Ukraine?
Russia’s effort to resolve the ‘frozen conflicts,’ even popular claims to independence remained unrecognized for nearly two decades—and in the case of Transnistria to this very day. Abkhazia and South Ossetia—both on internationally recognized territory of Georgia—were only recognized by Moscow in 2008, after an attempt by Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili to seize South Ossetia by force.[61] Georgia had applied for NATO membership shortly before its aggression against South-Ossetia. In addition, Saakashvili received extensive military aid from the United States, including about 150 military advisers whose role in the conflict remains unexamined. Rather than strength, however, these Russian moves showed increasing desperation. As US President Obama remarked after the annexation of Crimea: “Russia is a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate neighbors—not out of strength but out of weakness. … The fact that Russia felt it had to go in militarily and lay bare these violations of international law indicate less influence, not more.”[62] Indeed, it is exactly Russia’s weakness that forces it to become a “profoundly conservative power’’ which seeks to “maintain the status quo.’’ As Professor Sakwa explains:
Russia under Putin had been the opposite of a land-grabbing state. … In October 2004 Putin achieved a definitive agreement with China over their 4,400-kilometre-long border, in exchange for the transfer of several major islands in the Ussuri River to Chinese jurisdiction. In September 2010 agreement was finally reached with Norway over the long-contested maritime delineation of the Barents Sea, agreeing to a split down the middle, which turned out to grant Norway the bulk of the energy resources. Under Putin agreement was finally reached over the borders with Estonia and Latvia, although both retained popular aspirations to have part of Russia’s neighbouring Pskov region restored to them, which had been part of the interwar republics. Putin even offered to return to the 1956 agreement with Japan and to restore two of the four Kurile Islands (Northern Territories) to that country. Admittedly, these were the two smallest, but in mathematical terms honours would be even. … Russia under Putin is a profoundly conservative power, and its actions are designed to maintain the status quo, hence the effort Moscow put into ratifying its existing borders. It was the West that was perceived to be the revisionist power.[63]
Putin would kept his reported promise, to annex Crimea, from 2008. The first steps of the brand-new interim government threw Crimea right into the hands of Putin. The Parliament in Kiev voted overwhelmingly for the abolition of Russian as the second language of the eastern Ukrainian provinces. No steps were taken to rein in the ultranationalists. In fact, they were granted high-level positions in the interim government. Although the Ukrainian interim president vetoed the attack on the Russian language a week after the vote, in response to protest activities, it proved to be too little, too late. In a dozen cities the relatively passive eastern Ukrainians took to the streets in thousands. The biggest, a 30,000 strong demonstration, took place in Sevastopol, Crimea
On February 27, 2014 the Crimean parliament sacked the regional government, voted in favour of a referendum on greater autonomy, and appointed Sergey Aksyonov as prime minster, whose Russian Unity party had only gained four percent of the vote during the previous elections in 2010. Indeed, the conditions under which the votes were taken resembled those of Yanukovych’s impeachment and, in fact, they were worse.
The referendum went ahead anyway. Representatives of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe—a panEuropean co-operation body that often observes elections—were invited but refused to show, because they found the referendum to be illegal. The results were overwhelming: 97% of the voters wanted to join Russia with a turnout of 83 percent. Crimea’s accession to Russia was subsequently formalized on the 28th of March 2014
During his field research on the Donbass insurgency, Ukrainian scholar Serhiy Kudelia found that local officials helped to lay the ground for the independence referenda, among other things, long before militants arrived on the scene—in a very chaotic process which he dubs a “quiet secessionism:’ “there was clearly no hierarchical subordination to any elite actor at the very top. And a lot of the decisions that were taken by local officials were taken on their own.”
The failure of Western diplomacy in Ukraine was severe. The crimes of Kiev were legitimized by western political and military support.[64] NATO praised Kiev for its “restraint’’ while the American ambassador Jen Psaki even defended Yatsenyuk’s use of the term “subhumans’’ to refer to Russians.[65] Presidential aides told The New York Times in April 2014 that “Mr. Obama has concluded that even if there is a resolution to the current standoff over Crimea and eastern Ukraine, he will never have a constructive relationship with Mr. Putin.”[66]
This cold war mentality escalated further when the MH17 passenger plane with 298 people on board was shot down. Sanctions against Russia were immediately put in place even though little of what had happened was known at the time.
Present Situation
It seems clear that, throughout the Ukraine conflict, US and EU agendas have differed. We have seen German and French intelligence officers disagreeing with US ‘propaganda,’ and even leaking this to the press. The schism is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that the United States has been absent from all peace negotiations, starting with Yanukovych during Maidan and continuing later with Minsk I and II. In the leaked call with the US ambassador, Victoria Nuland expressed her contempt for Europe very clearly when she told Pyatt, “you know, *censored* the EU.’’ This antagonism between the EU and the United States underlies a fundamental reality: European economies are deeply intertwined with Russia’s.
The most important pipeline supplying Western Europe with Russian gas was built in the early 80s, despite heavy protest from the Reagan administration, which then included US sanctions against Western Europe.[67]
The head of Stratfor—a private intelligence contractor once dubbed the ‘shadow CIA’ by Barron magazine for its close co-operation with the agency—described US policy in relation to the Ukraine crisis as follows:
For all of the last 100 years Americans have pursued a very consistent foreign policy. Its main goal: to not allow any state to amass too much power in Europe. First, the United States sought to prevent Germany from dominating Europe, then it sought to prevent the USSR from strengthening its influence.
The essence of this policy is as follows: to maintain as long as possible a balance of power in Europe, helping the weaker party, and if the balance is about to be significantly disrupted—to intervene at the last moment. And so, in the case of the First World War, the United States intervened only after the abdication of Nicholas II in 1917, to prevent Germany from gaining ground. And during WWII, the US opened a second front only very late (in June 1944), after it became clear that the Russians were prevailing over the Germans. [This strategy was most explicitly articulated by soon-to-be president Truman in 1941, when he proposed: “If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible.]’’
What is more, the most dangerous potential alliance, from the perspective of the United States, was considered to be an alliance between Russia and Germany. This would be an alliance of German technology and capital with Russian natural and human resources.[68]
Europe’s Eastern Partnership initiative—which led to the association agreement with Ukraine, and also includes the post-Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova—was designed and proposed by the Polish and Swedish ministers of foreign affairs in 2008, Carl Bildt and Radoslaw Sikorski. [69]
Expansion to the East was piloted by Washington: in every case, the former Soviet satellites were incorporated into NATO, under US command, before they were admitted to the EU. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had joined NATO already in 1999, five years before entry into the Union; Bulgaria and Romania in 2004, three years before entry; even Slovakia, Slovenia and the Baltics, a gratuitous month—just to rub in the symbolic point? —before entry (planning for the Baltics started in 1998). Croatia, Macedonia and Albania are next in line for the same sequence.[70]
Russian Aims
The Russian Aims in this conflict are very clear:
- To have ports on the Black Sea for trade and stationing its fleet
- Get the industrial Areas of Donstek and Rich iron ore reserves located in the vicinity of Kryvyy Rih, Kremenchuk, Bilozerka, Mariupol, and Kerch form the basis of Ukraine's large iron-and-steel industry. One of the richest areas of manganese-bearing ores in the world is located near Nikopol.
- Have a corridor along the Northern Bank of black Sea connecting up to Romania
- Ensuring NO further expansion of NATO to the East and NOT allowing deployment of Missiles in Ukraine.
- Make amendments to the constitution according to which Ukraine would reject any aims to enter any bloc.
- Recognise that Crimea is Russian territory and that they need to recognise that Donetsk and Lugansk are independent states.
We have seen absolutely nothing in their campaign so far to indicate that the strategic objectives have changed – decapitation of the Ukrainian political leadership, defeat of the Ukrainian armed forces and the destruction of Ukraine as a functioning independent state. In the words of the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, “they want to break our nationhood”.
So how then will the Russian high command achieve these goals? In the early 19th century, strategist Karl von Clausewitz advised that only “by constantly seeking out the centre of his power, by daring all to win all, will one really defeat the enemy”. Zelensky has defined himself – and by extension his government – as that “centre” with every stirring, epoch-making speech he makes.
- So on to the second of Putin’s aims – “demilitarisation”. Clausewitz goes on to say: “Still, no matter what the central feature of the enemy’s power may be – the point on which your efforts must converge – the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin.” It is indeed the best way to begin – but the Russians have failed to achieve this yet.
- The Battleground is Kyiv. I personally think that there are legacy issues at play here. I think Putin is thinking long term. I think he believes that he is the last Russian leader who would be willing to take such risks to reassert Russia's role as a great power. And so I think for him, the time is, his clock is ticking, time is ticking. And so he is getting ready to break things. I mean, I think he really sees this. He sees the West as being in decline. He sees the United States is distracted. He sees the transatlantic relationship as under strain and he is leaning in now, I think, to accomplish these very maximalist objectives because I think that he views this as the opportune moment to do that.
- US will NOT intervene in the battle as it does not want to enter in quagmire. Putin in the end appears to be achieving its goal.
There has been lot of talk and threat from US for sanctions against India. I do NOT think this is possible at this juncture when the US economy has yet to recover, and India is a key partner for US battle with China. India will have a short term effect as some of the weapons especially for Navy are supplied by Ukraine, but then the industrial areas of Ukraine are Not being affected.
[1] Baker, P. (2014). In cold war echo, Obama strategy writes off Putin. The New York Times, p. 20.
[2] A pariah state (also called an international pariah or a global pariah) is a nation considered to be an outcast in the international community. A pariah state may face international isolation, sanctions or even an invasion by nations who find its policies, actions, or even its very existence unacceptable.
[3] Heuvel, K., Van den, & Cohen, S. (2014, May 01). Cold War Against Russia—Without Debate. Retrieved from Cold War Against Russia—Without Debate - NYU Jordan Center
[4] Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault. Foreign Affairs, 93(5), pp. 77-89.
[5] The term is attributed to Friedrich Engels; for a discussion, see Józef Chlebowczyk, On Small and Young Nations in Europe, trans. Janina Dorosz (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossoliniskich, 1980); Ivan Rudnytsky, "Observations on the Problem of 'Historical' and 'Non-Historical' Nations," Harvard Ukrainian Studies 5, no. 3 (September 1981): 358-68
[6] Olszański, T. A. (2012). The Language Issue in Ukraine: An Attempt at a new Perspective. OWS Studies, pp. 21-22.
[7] Which way Ukraine Should go - Which Union should Ukraine join? (26 November 2013). Retrieved from Press releases and reports - Which way Ukraine should go - which union should join? (population preferences for two weeks before the Vilnius summit)
[8] Thoughts population of Ukraine regarding who should decide what course to choose for Ukraine’s foreign policy integration. (10 October 2013). Retrieved from
Press releases and reports - Thoughts population of Ukraine regarding who should decide what course to choose Ukraine's foreign policy integration
[9] Presidential Decree number 127/2013. Retrieved from
Wayback Machine , http://www.president.gov.ua/ru/documents/15520.html
[10] Trading insults. (2013, August 24). Retrieved from
Trading insults
[11] Center for Social and Labour Research. (2015, December). Repressions against protests April-August 2015. Retrieved from
http://cslr.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ProtestRepressionsApril-August2015-ecj-edits.pdf
[12] Victoria Nuland’s Admits Washington Has Spent $5 Billion to “Subvert Ukraine” (2014, February 09). Retrieved from
[14] Mendick, R., & Malnick, E. (2013, February 10). Revealed: Tony Blair and the oligarch bankrolling his charity. Retrieved from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/pol...and-the-oligarch-bankrolling-his-charity.html ; Ukraine: Yatensyuk, Rising Politician. (2008, July 03). Retrieved from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KYIV1300_a.html
[15] Nadeau, J. (2014, January 15). Ukraine’s real problem: Crony capitalism. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/195549-ukraines-real-problem-crony-capitalism For a detailed examination of corporate raiding in Ukraine, consult Rojansky, M. (2014). Corporate raiding in Ukraine: Causes, methods and consequences. Demokratizatsiya, 22(3), pp. 411-444.
[16] Luhn, A. (2014, April 17). Ukrainian oligarch offers bounty for capture of Russian ‘saboteurs’ Retrieved from
http://www.theguardian.com/world/20...rs-financial-rewards-russians-igor-kolomoisky ; Cullison, A. (2014, June 27). Ukraine’s Secret Weapon: Feisty Oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky. Retrieved from
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-secret-weapon-feisty-oligarch-ihor-kolomoisky-1403886665 ; Kolomoisky suggests Ukraine build 2,000-kilometers wall against Russia. (2014, June 13). Retrieved from http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/kolomoisky-suggests[ukraine-build-2000-kilometers-wall-against-russia-351751 .
[17] Scott, P. D. (2009, August 11). The Real Grand Chessboard and the Profiteers of War. Retrieved from http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-real-grand-chessboard-and-the-profiteers-of-war/1467
[18] Obama: I’ve learned an immense amount from Dr. Brzezinski. (2008, March 13). Retrieved from
[20] Ibid, p. 31.
[21] Ibid, p. 202.
[22] Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. (2014, September 4). Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112695.htm
[23] Carden, J. (2014, September 08). The 2014 NATO Summit: Giving War a Chance. Retrieved from http://www.thenation.com/article/181521/2014-nato-summit-giving-war-chance
[24] Garamone, J. (2000, June 02). Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-spectrum Dominance. Retrieved from http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45289
[25] Perry, W. J., & Abizaid, J. P. (2014). Ensuring a Strong US Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. United States Inst. of Peace, Washington, DC, p. 2
[26] National Security Strategy (Rep.). (2015, February). Retrieved https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_ strategy.pdf , p. 2, 8
[27] Goettig, M., & Shalal, A. (2014, March 20). Poland speeds up missile defence plan amid Ukraine crisis. Retrieved from http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-poland-defence-idUKBREA2J26K20140320
[28] S. S. 2277, 113th Cong. (2014). Retrieved from
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s2277is/html/BILLS-113s2277is.htm
[29] From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating nuclear weapons. (n.d.). Retrieved from
http://fas.org/pub-reports/counterf...licy-path-toward-eliminating-nuclear-weapons/
[30] Membership Roster. (2016, February 12). Retrieved from
http://www.cfr.org/about/membership/roster.html ; Lieber, K. A., & Press, D. G. (2006). The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy. Foreign Affairs, 85(2), 42. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2006-03-01/rise-us-nuclear-primacy , p. 42
[31] bid., p. 52
[32] Cited in Chomsky, N. (2014, August 06). As Hiroshima Day dawns, why are we still tempting nuclear fate? Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/06/hiroshima-day-nuclear-weapons-cold-war-usa-bomb
[33] Ziezulewicz, B. G. (2016, August 02). B61-12 life extension program receives NNSA approval. Retrieved from http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Se...program-receives-NNSA-approval/3261470147434/
[34] Traynor, I. (2008, January 22). Pre-emptive nuclear strike a key option, Nato told. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jan/22/nato.nuclear ; The Iran Nuclear Straw Man. (2015, July 17). Retrieved from http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/07/17/the-iran-nuclear-straw-man/
[35] Sanger, D. E., & Broad, W. J. (2016, September 05). Obama Unlikely to Vow No First Use of Nuclear Weapons. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/science/obama-unlikely-to-vow-no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapon
[36] Stone, O., & Kuznick, P. (2013). The untold history of the United States. (Simon and Schuster), p. 466.
[37] Ibid.
[38] American Military Leaders Urge President Truman not to Drop the Atomic Bomb. (2010). Retrieved from http://www.colorado.edu/AmStudies/lewis/2010/atomicdec.htm
[39] Stone, O., & Kuznick, P. (2013). The untold history of the United States. (Simon and Schuster), pi 293-294,
[40] Wellerstein, Alex (2012, August 8). The Height of the Bomb. Retrieved from http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/08/08/the-height-of-the-bomb
[41] Ibid.
[42] Raphael, T. J. (2016, January 15). Why President Obama is moving ahead with the biggest modernization of US nuclear weapons in decades. Retrieved from http://www.pri.org/stories/2016-01-...gest-modernization-us-nuclear-weapons-decades
[43] Putin, V. (2007, June 8). TLAXCALA : Putin sagt—Pressekonferenz im Anschluß an den G 8 Gipfel. Retrieved from http://www.tlaxcala.es/pp.asp?reference=3039
[44] Kristensen, H. M., & Norris, R. S. (2017, February 28). Russian nuclear forces, 2017. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 73(2), pp. 115-126
[45] Hallam, J. et al. (2016, December 11). Letter on the need for urgent measures to avert a nuclear war. Retrieved from http://www.defenddemocracy.press/letter-on-the-need-for-urgent-measures-to-avert-a-nuclear-war/
[46] Cohen, J. (2016, November 11). Commentary: The number one reason to fix U.S.-Russia relations. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nuclear-commentary-idUSKBN1351SD
[47] Westberg, G. (2016, May 23). Close calls: We were closer to nuclear destruction than we knew. Retrieved from https://peaceandhealthblog.com/2016/05/23/close-calls/
[48] Chomsky, N. (2012, October 15). Cuban missile crisis: how the US played Russian roulette with nuclear war. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/15/cuban-missile-crisis-russian-roulette
[49] Hemment, J. (2009). Soviet-Style Neoliberalism? Problems of Post-Communism,56(6), pp.36-50
[50] World Bank. (n.d.). GDP per capita, PPP (current international $). Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP. PP.CD
[51] CIA, E. (2001). The world factbook 2001. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC;
CIA, E. (2015). The world factbook 2015. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC
[52] Breslow, J. M. (2015, January 23). Retrieved from
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/inequality-and-the-putin-economy-inside-the-numbers/ ; Russian Federation. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/country/russian-federation
[53] Abbas, A. S., Belhocine, N., ElGanainy, A. A., & Horton, M. A. (2010, November 1). A Historical Public Debt Database. Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=24332.0;
Abbas, S. M., Belhocine, N., ElGanainy, A. A., & Horton, M. (2010). A historical public debt database. IMF Working Papers, pp. 1-26.
[54] Ray, J., & Esipova, N. (2014, July 18). Russian Approval of Putin Soars to Highest Level in Years. Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/173597/russian-approval-putin-soars-highest-level-years.aspx
[55] Ahmed, Nafeez Mosaddeq, The Smashing of Chechnya—An International Irrelevance: A Case Study of the Role of Human Rights in Western Foreign Policy, Islamic Human Rights Commission, London, April 1999
[56] SIPRI’s databases. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/databases
[57] Turse, N. (2015, october 25). Nick Turse, Success, Failure, and the “Finest Warriors Who Ever Went Into Combat”. Retrieved from
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Special Ops “Successes” - TomDispatch.com
[58] DNI Releases Budget Figure for 2010 National Intelligence Program. (2010, October 28). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/news/2010/10/dni102810.html ; DOD Releases Military Intelligence Program 2010 Topline Budget. (2010, October 28). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/news/2010/10/dod102810.html ; SIPRI’s databases. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.sipri.org/databases
[59] World Bank Data.
[60] Morozov, V. (2015). Russia’s Postcolonial Identity: A Subaltern Empire in a Eurocentric World. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 67-102.
[61] Klußmann, U. (2009, June 15). A Shattered Dream in Georgia: EU Probe Creates Burden for Saakashvili. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/international...-eu-probe-creates-burden-for-saakashvili-a-63
[62] Wilson, S. (2014, March 25). Obama dismisses Russia as ‘regional power’ acting out of weakness. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-dismisses-russia-as- regional-power-acting-out-of-weakness/2014/03/25/1e5a678eb439-11e3-b899-20667de76985_story.html
[63] Sakwa, R. (2014). Frontline Ukraine: crisis in the borderlands. (IB Tauris), pp. 122-123
[64] Pugliese, D. (2014, September 20). No safeguards stopping Canadian equipment from falling into wrong hands in Ukraine, opposition MPs say. Retrieved from
http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/0...to-wrong-hands-in-ukraine-opposition-mps-say/ ; Harper, S. (2014, August 7). Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada announcing security assistance to Ukraine. Retrieved from
http://web.archive.org/web/20150324220432/ http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/08/07...canada-announcing-security-assistance-ukraine ; Rampton, R., Mason, J., & Stonestreet, J. (2014, June 04). Obama says Poroshenko a wise choice for Ukraine, pledges aid. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/04/us-ukraine-crisis-obama-idUSKBN0EF0P020140604 ; Nato.int. (2014, September 4). NATO leaders pledge support to Ukraine at Wales Summit. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112459.htm ; Sukhotski, K., Balmforth, R., & Heneghan, T. (2014, September 14). NATO countries have begun arms deliveries to Ukraine: Defense minister. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-heletey-idUSKBN0H90PP20140914
[65] Spaki, J. (2014, June 16). Daily Press Briefing: June 16, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/06/227650.htm#UKRAINE
[66] Baker, P. (2014, April 19). In Cold War Echo, Obama Strategy Writes Off Putin. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/world/europe/in-cold-war-echo-obama-strategy-writes-off-putin.html
[67] Wikipedia. (n.d.). Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhgorod pipeline. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhgorod_pipeline ; Greer, B. I., & Russell, J. L. (1982). European Reliance on Soviet Gas Exports: The Yamburg-Urengoi Natural Gas Project. The Energy Journal, 3(3), 15-37.; Hogselius, P., Åberg, A., & Kaijser, A. (2013). Natural Gas in Cold War Europe: The Making of a Critical Infrastructure. In The Making of Europe’s Critical Infrastructure. (Palgrave Macmillan UK), pp. 27-61
[68] Chernenko, E., & Gabuev, A. (2015, January 17). `In Ukraine, U.S interests are incompatible with the interests of the Russian Federation` Stratfor chief George Friedman on the roots of the Ukraine crisis. Retrieved from
http://us-russia.org/2902-in-ukrain...edman-on-the-roots-of-the-ukraine-crisis.html
[69] Notably, Europe’s Eastern Partnership initiative—which led to the association agreement with Ukraine, and also includes the post-Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova—was designed and proposed by the Polish and Swedish ministers of foreign affairs in 2008, Carl Bildt and Radoslaw Sikorski.12 Both are fiercely anti-Russian, going so far as to make comparisons between Russia and Nazi-Germany, which were then echoed by several senior US and British politicians, such as Hillary Clinton and David Cameron.13 In fact, Carl Bildt was one of the founding members of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, advocating for the 2003 invasion alongside senior US neo-cons. Sikorski, on the other hand, has lived for years in the United States and the United Kingdom. He’s been a British citizen for nearly 20 years, with his citizenship only revoked in 2006 upon becoming minister of defense in Poland. During his time at Oxford, he was taught by the same tutor as former US president Bill Clinton and was admitted to the same exclusive student society as British prime minister David Cameron. His wife, Anne Applebaum, is an American citizen and journalist. We see a similar pattern in the Baltic States. The current president of Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, lived most of his life in the United States. He worked for nearly ten years at Radio Free Europe, which was funded by the CIA for 17 years until it was taken over by the US Congress. Valdas Adamkus, the former president of Lithuania, who ruled for ten years, has worked for the US government for 28 years, serving in the Environmental Protection Agency and before that as a senior officer within a US military intelligence unit. Lastly, the former president of Latvia, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, who was also re-elected for a second term, was brought up in Canada. Obviously, the ties of these Eastern European leaders to North America are very strong, and their states have all been at the forefront in “countering the Russian aggression.’’
[70] Anderson, P. (2009). The New Old World. (Verso Books), p. 69
