Just what France needs, another chronically underfunded aircraft program that lags behind
Future Combat Air System (FCAS) - France/Germany
- Thread starter randomradio
- Start date
Developing the military cloud (sensor federation, data fusion, distributed commands, embedded/edge AI), plus escort drones (loyal wingmen + expendable) under the auspices of the Rafale F5/F6 programme in parallel with a national NGF is both realistic and pragmatic — provided that the functional divisions, governance and interfaces are properly designed.
Below is a concise plan detailing what needs to be done, why it works, the main risks and immediate operational recommendations.
Why it is relevant
Developing first (and in parallel) the tactical cloud and accompanying drones under the Rafale F5/F6 banner is not only feasible but tactically advantageous. We must accept architectural discipline, reserve dedicated resources and firmly govern interfaces and security to transform these developments into an accelerator of ‘system-of-systems’ availability before the arrival of the NGF.
Below is a concise plan detailing what needs to be done, why it works, the main risks and immediate operational recommendations.
Why it is relevant
- Increased operational availability: the functions of information superiority and mass effect (drones) can be deployed before the arrival of the NGF, improving the Rafale fleet's employability.
- Technical-programme decoupling: cloud + drones are reusable building blocks that can then be integrated into the NGF (reducing the technical risk of the NGF).
- Economies of scale & exports: offering a ‘Rafale+LoyalWingman+Cloud system’ accelerates sales/exports and shares R&D costs.
- Industrial-political effect: gives concrete form to the shaping of digital sovereignty and reduces the pressure to ‘cooperate on everything’ with the NGF.
- Open systems architecture (API/message servers, sovereign internal standardised data bus) to enable Rafale ↔ drones ↔ NGF integration.
- Precise contractual interfaces: define aircraft/drone/cloud interfaces (messages, security, QoS, latency) from the outset.
- Sovereignty of critical components: encryption, key management, critical embedded software, RF/antenna elements.
- Sovereign & resilient datalink: distributed network, LPI/LPD, multi-mode comms (line-of-sight, beyond-LOS via relay).
- Software modularity: microservices, containerisation, CI/CD, ‘digital twin’ for testing.
- Tactical cloud (edge + edge server): sensor fusion, mission planning, drone assignment, AI decision support.
- Datalink & comms: sovereign protocol, QoS for commands and telemetry.
- Loyal Wingmen: 2 families — (A) reusable multi-mission (surveillance, jamming, light SEAD), (B) cheap expendables (saturation, decoys, survivability).
- Rafale F5/6 integration: mission computer integration slot, drone control API, pilot HMI (optional control), collaborative autonomy functions.
- Simulator & test benches: software integration benches, multi-domain simulation, flight test range.
- Immediate increase in A2/AD penetration thanks to study/LEAPP drones (EW/SEAD) and distributed effects.
- Reduced need for man-in-the-loop immersion for dangerous missions.
- Capacity for evolution and reverse engineering of software shared between Rafale F5 and NGF.
- Indicative budget & schedule (orders of magnitude, ranges)
- Initial R&D budget (cloud + drones + Rafale integration): several hundred million euros for the first phase (prototype/simulation), then rising to ~€1–3 billion for industrialisation within 5–8 years, depending on ambitions. (indicative estimate).
- 0–18 months: specifications, architecture, datalink PoC and software demonstrators.
- 18–48 months: drone prototypes (loyal wingman 1) + Rafale-integrated cloud demos on flying test benches.
- 48–72 months: drone industrialisation, deployment of first integrated F5 batches, doctrine.
- NGF integration: use cloud/datalink artefacts to accelerate NGF system qualification.
- (ranges vary according to priorities and funding)
- Complex system integration: more interfaces = more testing required. Control via digital twin & test benches.
- Security/cyber: increased attack surface; require security by design, independent audit.
- Industry capacity overload: ramp-up plan (engineers, test benches, factories).
- Regulatory/export barriers: define export rules compatible with sovereignty and partnerships.
- Risk of fragmentation: freeze vital requirements (production launch/kill/go criteria).
- Rafale F5/6 programme responsible for piloting Cloud+Drones; State (DGA) guarantor of interfaces and security.
- National technical committee (Dassault system architect / Thales sensors & comms / Safran prop + integrate / MBDA armaments / ONERA/CEA research) — decisions on APIs and standards.
- State arbitration for IP, exports and rules of engagement.
- Immediate recommendations (actions to be taken immediately)
- Launch two rapid PoCs (proof of concept) (6–12 months): a) sovereign datalink mesh, b) loyal wingman scale-1/3 demonstrator controlled from simulated Rafale.
- Create a software sandbox (digital twin + CI/CD) shared between manufacturers and the DGA to validate integrations without flying.
- Freeze 6–8 key interfaces (message set, security, HMI, autonomy mandates) to avoid continuous drift in specifications.
- Allocate a dedicated programme budget (cloud+drone R&D) separate from the NGF budget to avoid internal competition for resources.
- Testing & security plan: establish a cyber-validation lab and test camps.
Developing first (and in parallel) the tactical cloud and accompanying drones under the Rafale F5/F6 banner is not only feasible but tactically advantageous. We must accept architectural discipline, reserve dedicated resources and firmly govern interfaces and security to transform these developments into an accelerator of ‘system-of-systems’ availability before the arrival of the NGF.
I think your sentence is well adapted to Aukus.
You found short fins Barracuda costly, and finally for 4x the costs you may have, perhaps, 8 subs, very very late, and with only 5 to built in Australia instead of 12.
Sure Australia can give advice....
French and Australian cribbing about each other's defense projects' funding & timeline, in an INDIAN forum 
Irony
Irony
lmaoFrench and Australian cribbing about each other's defense projects' funding & timeline, in an INDIAN forum
Irony
The New Generation Fighter Engine (NGFE) is expected to have an afterburning thrust of approximately 100-140kn of thrust.
For amca's engine. The first versions are expected to generate 120 kiloNewtons (kN) of thrust, with later variants scaled up to 140 kN, suitable for advanced combat aircraft requirements.
Coincidence? I think not.
also this means fcas won't be that much larger compared to amca mk2, especially if French wanna retain good supercruise performance.
FCAS was always intended to be around AMCA size since it had to carrier capable as well. The full size model of FCAS was 18 m in length compared to 17.6 m length AMCA. Both AMCA & FCAS are going to be similar performance aircrafts.
Maybe we can collaborate with French on a next gen stealth carrier fighter, successor project of TEDBF which is in limbo.
To enter service in ~2040.
I'm sure by that time requirement of ~100+ such carrier fighters will be there for Indian navy to be fulfilled between 2040-2050 time period, that ~100+ requirement will probably be equal or more than the combined requirement of French navy and airforce
Or a domestic Navalised amca.
Système de Combat Aérien Français de Pointe: SCAF-P => French Air Combat Top System: FACTS
1) FACTS breaks with the fictitious temporality of the ‘Future’
The word Future has become a rhetorical tool.
It allows us to:
2) FACTS defines a hierarchy, not a promise.
Where ‘Future’ programmes pile up theoretical capabilities, FACTS introduces a clear functional hierarchy.
The ‘top’ is not:
3) FACTS is an industrial doctrine in disguise
Implicitly, FACTS expresses a very French vision of combat aeronautics:
FACTS assumes:
4) FACTS as anti-capability propaganda
This is where FACTS becomes a powerful intellectual pivot.
Capability propaganda is based on a deliberate confusion between:
In FACTS logic:
5) FACTS in the face of contemporary strategic chaos
The real world is no longer linear:
A Top System is:
6) FACTS as a credible French trajectory
Finally, FACTS makes it possible to reformulate the French position without controversy:
FACTS is:
7) Conclusion: why FACTS is a true pivotal concept
FACTS functions as a pivot because it:
1) FACTS breaks with the fictitious temporality of the ‘Future’
The word Future has become a rhetorical tool.
It allows us to:
- postpone decisions,
- accept permanent immaturity,
- dilute industrial responsibilities,
- justify the lack of real capabilities with roadmaps.
- it does not describe what will come, but what is at the top of what is controllable.
- a level of integration achieved,
- architectural consistency,
- industrial sustainability,
- the ability to be committed without depending on a hypothetical future.
2) FACTS defines a hierarchy, not a promise.
Where ‘Future’ programmes pile up theoretical capabilities, FACTS introduces a clear functional hierarchy.
The ‘top’ is not:
- the most ambitious on paper,
- the most technologically dense,
- nor the most conceptually disruptive.
- what works over time,
- what is sustainable on a large scale,
- what can be produced, maintained and modernised,
- what remains operational when the environment becomes chaotic.
3) FACTS is an industrial doctrine in disguise
Implicitly, FACTS expresses a very French vision of combat aeronautics:
- continuity rather than abrupt disruption,
- controlled increments rather than technological ‘big bangs’,
- aircraft piloted at the centre of the system,
- spiral evolution (F4 → F5 → beyond),
- national control of the core (airframe, flight controls, mission system).
FACTS assumes:
- a single system architect,
- clearly assigned responsibility,
- the ability to say no to unrealistic demands.
4) FACTS as anti-capability propaganda
This is where FACTS becomes a powerful intellectual pivot.
Capability propaganda is based on a deliberate confusion between:
- what is designed,
- what is planned,
- and what is actually available.
In FACTS logic:
- an unintegrated capability does not exist,
- an uncertified capability is not counted,
- a capability dependent on an uncertain future is not claimed.
- Blocks that are supposed to ‘catch up’ with the initial definition,
- physical capabilities (thermal, energy) that are saturated too early,
- critical solutions ‘under definition’ .
5) FACTS in the face of contemporary strategic chaos
The real world is no longer linear:
- fragile supply chains,
- protracted conflicts,
- attrition,
- erratic political decisions,
- possible alliance breakdowns.
A Top System is:
- resilient in the face of chaos,
- tolerant of imperfection,
- capable of lasting,
- capable of being adapted without being completely rebuilt.
- the IAF favours delivery over perfection,
- the air forces seek proven systems,
- fleet extensions take precedence over uncontrolled disruptions.
6) FACTS as a credible French trajectory
Finally, FACTS makes it possible to reformulate the French position without controversy:
- France is not giving up on cutting-edge air combat.
FACTS is:
- compatible with deterrence,
- compatible with strategic autonomy,
- compatible with exports,
- compatible with a long war,
- compatible with a sustainable national industry.
7) Conclusion: why FACTS is a true pivotal concept
FACTS functions as a pivot because it:
- links technology, industry and strategy,
- provides a single framework for interpreting scattered debates,
- allows criticism without attack,
- contrasts facts with promises,
- and restores concrete meaning to the notion of air superiority.
Germany walks away
REPORT CARD
France doesn't play well with others
REPORT CARD
France doesn't play well with others
Sure your Aukus deal is far more interesting.....
Late, over priced, with less australian content. A pure success.
If at the end there 2 differents jets it's not so worrying. It is is like EF2000 frame versus Rafale frame we will habe the best product.
Fortunately for Germany they will have access to a high thrust engine, if not.....
What engine France is planning for FCAS, M88Trex or new engine with higher thrust?
We will see if this goes forward, It would be better for all if there were common engines, computers and sensors, given Germany is talking about a larger aircraft, it may not be possible
EUMET (European Military Engine Team) joint venture between Safran and MTU.
EUMET (European Military Engine Team) joint venture between Safran and MTU.
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A new engine with T-REX technology and a variable dilution rate to reduce consumption.