Cementing India’s Intelligence Edge Against Pakistan After Operation Sindoor
On 12 May 2025, Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi addressed the Indian people. In a speech that notably declared any further Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism to constitute an act of war against India, the PM not only highlighted the resilience and unity of the Indian people during Operation Sindoor – India’s calculated response to the terrorist attack abetted by Pakistan in Pahalgam over two weeks prior—but also openly expressed his appreciation of the role played by the nation’s intelligence services.
As the dust settles, a growing body of evidence points towards the stellar role played by India’s intelligence services during Operation Sindoor. These achievements have augmented India’s strategic advantage over Pakistan and paved the way for the country’s security agencies to maintain long-term pressure on Islamabad and build upon their successes in recent weeks.
Akashteer and the successes of Indian intelligence.
The success of India’s Akashteer air defence system during Operation Sindoor illustrates the growing sophistication of India’s technological intelligence (TECHINT) capabilities. Informed in real-time by India’s network of Cartosat satellites, the Akashteer systems reportedly achieved
near-perfect success rates when deployed against waves of Pakistani drone swarms targeting civilian infrastructure along the border and within the hinterland. More than just a testament to India’s growing technological prowess, the engineering and operational performance of the Akashteer system inactive conflict underscores the seamless integration between higher-level strategic intelligence (exemplified by the collection and processing of real-time satellite imagery) and immediate tactical application. The result has been fewer civilian casualties than might otherwise have been expected, and negligible grounds for the Pakistani military to claim even a semblance of success.
the success of the Akashteer air defence systems captured India’s growing autonomy as an intelligence actor. In stark contrast to the 1999 Kargil War, when the United States actively degraded the accuracy of India’s non-military GPS receivers through the policy of ‘selective availability’ for political leverage
More importantly, however, the success of the Akashteer air defence systems captured India’s growing autonomy as an intelligence actor. In stark contrast to the 1999 Kargil War, when the United States actively degraded the accuracy of India’s non-military GPS receivers through the policy of ‘
selective availability’ for political leverage, Akashteer utilised the indigenously developed NAVIC navigation system. This significantly diminished the capacity of external actors such as the US to play any meaningful operational role in the conflict. By the early hours of 10 May, the Indian Air Force had
struck PAF Base Nur Khan in Rawalpindi – located a short distance away from
the secretariat of Pakistan’s nuclear command authority, the Strategic Plans Division – thus successfully re-establishing the deterrence objective that lay at the heart of Operation Sindoor.
Counterintelligence: Into Uncharted Waters
Since 11 May, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) have made numerous arrests across India of individuals suspected of aiding Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The backgrounds of those detained shed light on Islamabad’s evolving intelligence priorities in India while also highlighting the steps that India’s counterintelligence services must take to meet these emerging threats.
The arrest of
Jyoti Malhotra – a social media influencer – suggests a greater focus by the ISI on recruiting agents of influence to disseminate disinformation in both peacetime and wartime, as suggested by
police sources. Such efforts are likely to continue alongside the ISI’s traditional focus on recruiting those in lower-level managerial positions with access to information of strategic value, as well as underpaid civilians in strategically sensitive areas of the country. Past examples include ex-Brahmos engineer
Nishant Agarwal and
Mujeeb Rahman, arrested for impersonating a government official to gather intelligence on the movements of INS Vikrant at the height of Operation Sindoor.
Indian authorities have banned social media profiles of Chinese and Turkish state media outlets, given their role in promoting ISI-aligned narratives during the conflict.
Early indications suggest that India’s counterintelligence services recognise these challenges and have begun taking steps to counteract them. Some of these efforts appear to be bearing fruit already—for instance, the recent arrest of an
18-year-old man in Gujarat on charges of ‘cyber terrorism’ and for abetting Pakistani cyberattacks against government websites during Operation Sindoor. In parallel, Indian authorities have also taken action against the amplification of Pakistani disinformation by third-party states, treating this as a counterintelligence concern of the highest order. Indian authorities have banned social media profiles of
Chinese and Turkish state media outlets, given their role in promoting ISI-aligned narratives during the conflict.
Intelligence Liaison: Scope for expansion
It is equally vital that India take advantage of the ongoing suspension in active hostilities to derive the greatest strategic advantage possible through intelligence liaison with partner countries. In recent days, External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar has spoken to Afghan Foreign Minister
Amir Khan Muttaqi – the first official call between the two since the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 2021. National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval has also spoken with his Iranian counterpart,
Ali Akbar Ahmadian. Both countries have a shared mistrust of Pakistan and its destabilising role in the region – ties between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban are at an
all-time low, and Iran has a history of both
border skirmishes as well as
spying on Pakistan. A mutual recognition of shared concerns may be conducive to the expansion of existing liaison frameworks, allowing New Delhi to exert greater pressure on Pakistan and preclude its ability to employ terrorism as a tool of state policy. However, any intelligence-sharing agreement with these countries must carefully account for the risk of classified information being compromised via Pakistan’s access through China, given both
Afghanistan’s and
Iran’s increasing alignment with Beijing in recent years.
Indeed, Operation Sindoor has provided a brief window of opportunity for India to expand its influence as an intelligence liaison partner to key allies. It is an advantage that could be leveraged for immediate diplomatic or economic benefits. The debris of intercepted Chinese PL-15E missiles and Turkish drones employed by Pakistan provides India with the opportunity to understand both Chinese and Turkish weapons systems—intelligence that may be used by New Delhi or traded with interested global partners. Sources suggest that countries such as France and the member-states of the Five Eyes alliance (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the US) have
already expressed interest in acquiring such intelligence.
Challenges and Next Steps
However, much more remains to be done within the intelligence space if India is to cement the gains achieved in deterring Pakistan through Operation Sindoor. While the specific details of each strategy will vary depending on its context and objectives, an offensive posture—encompassing gathering intelligence through both human and technical sources, as well as the active deployment of deception and kinetic operations—may be best suited to sustaining the deterrence recently established against Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorism.
Intelligence collection priorities must also emphasise unilateral operations, given the internal security vulnerabilities of many regional governments and their growing geopolitical alignment with both Turkey and China.
A key component of deterring Pakistan against future misadventures involves developing a clearer understanding of its longstanding strategic alignment with both Turkey and China, which Operation Sindoor brought into
sharper public focus. As such, India must expand intelligence collection efforts aimed at mapping where and how the three countries’ interests converge or diverge, particularly concerning Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism. This may require dedicating increased resources to intelligence collection in third-party geographies—where Islamabad’s, Beijing’s, and Ankara’s interests and activities most visibly intersect. In particular, Central Asia and the Caucasus are critical regions, given that both Turkey and China have
expanded their economic and political footprint here, and that Pakistan has
recruited and trained anti-India terrorists here in the recent past. Identifying where Pakistan’s interests and policies most closely align or differ from those of its two closest strategic partners may provide Indian policymakers with a fuller picture of key vulnerabilities that may be exploited through an array of means, both overt and covert, to preserve the long-term deterrence sought at the outset of Operation Sindoor. While liaison with regional partners may help pursue this strategy (as noted previously), intelligence collection priorities must also emphasise unilateral operations, given the
internal security vulnerabilities of many regional governments and their growing geopolitical alignment with both
Turkey and
China.
It is similarly recommended that counter-OSINT (open-source intelligence) capabilities be prioritised, given the corrosive effect of Pakistani disinformation, often augmented by Turkish and Chinese state media. Just as the 26/11 attacks resulted in the establishment of the NIA two years later to primarily address counterterrorism issues and to liaise between India’s various security agencies, a dedicated counter-OSINT agency may help achieve a similar goal against disinformation. Lessons may be drawn from
Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency, established in 2022 to counter the threat posed by Russian and Chinese disinformation campaigns. A similar Indian agency could potentially working closely with sister services such as the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO, India’s primary signals intelligence agency, which played a
critical role during Operation Sindoor), or even collaborate with private sector initiatives, such as the
task force formed by the Data Security Council of India to examine the nature of and vulnerabilities targeted by Pakistani digital threat actors during the confict.
Equally, Indian intelligence agencies can preserve the gains made during Operation Sindoor through the sustained pursuit of covert action—both in counter-deception and kinetic operations. The targeted neutralisation of Pakistani terrorists may not only serve to decapitate the leadership of such groups, but also signal the futility of relying on the generosity of a state incapable of ensuring their physical security. Proactive steps by Indian counterintelligence services to address Pakistan’s efforts to recruit agents of influence through the creative use of deception and counterespionage – perhaps in coordination with the abovementioned, hypothetical counter-OSINT services – could significantly increase confusion within the adversary’s strategic circles. Such an approach will serve to constrain any gains made through the recruitment of Indian citizens for spying.
India’s intelligence services have undoubtedly played a vital role in aiding the achievement of its strategic goals under the banner of Operation Sindoor. However, to ensure that these successes are not reversed, a more proactive strategy—built on the momentum of recent gains—must be prioritised. A combination of patience, confidence, strategic clarity, and a healthy dollop of scepticism may go a long way in helping India maintain the deterrence that it has established in recent weeks.
