British/Italian Tempest (GCAP) Fighter : News and Discussion

The only way is Tempest

Tempest was designed to be export-orientated from the start (BAE Systems)

If you want to know the reasoning and the rationale behind the (so far) three-nation GCAP/ Tempest programme, look no further than the strapline for the:

‘Freedom of action, freedom of modification, and freedom of export.’

So what? Well, if the three nations (Italy, Japan and the UK) could get any of these from the F-35 programme, why on earth would any of them be committing to spending many billions of Pounds/Euros/Yen in developing a totally new, different next-generation combat air system?

If F-35 was where it is at, there would be absolutely no point in this expense. But this is the point: F-35 is not where it’s at. Indeed, it is looking like a financial and operational liability for those operators who have had it longest.

To take ‘freedom of action’ first, I won’t even attempt to go into the ‘kill switch’ debate – that several Middle East nations say that there is such is enough to leave it with.

However, the wording of the UK’s recent accident investigation report on the crash of the F-35B off the deck of HMS Queen Elizabeth in November 2021 is worth noting:

“The F-35 Special Access Programme (SAP) prevented unauthorised and uncontrolled access to all elements of the F-35 system. The GSSO team’s task was to supervise SAP facilities…They were responsible for the Ship’s SAP compartments, as well as F-35B dedicated hardware and software installed on QNLZ.

“On rare occasions, if flying activity was not being conducted, the deck was opened for recreation to other personnel. Such events added another dimension to the requirement to ensure aircraft were physically protected, and ensure security was maintained.

On one of these recreation days a DASOR was raised due to recreational activities infringing aircraft security.”

So, despite the Royal Navy talking about the carriers as being ‘eight acres of sovereign territory’, the truth is that the use of its prime strike asset is firmly under US control, and access of RN sailors to the hangar and flight deck is dictated by US regulations.

Very sovereign! ‘Freedom of modification’ is vital to GCAP as there is absolutely no such facility in the F-35 programme whatsoever. You might – just might – be able to buy, at significant cost, a derogation to adapt F-35, but to do this, a country will have to hand over all its software for, say, a new missile, to Lockheed Martin/Joint Program Office to do the integration.

Crown Jewels? Handed over… This is before one even considers the fact that industrially, a US F-35 company, let alone the Pentagon, might not want a weapon/electronic system on F-35 that is a competing option for an export customer, and so smothers it – this happens all too frequently on other US platforms.

‘Freedom of export’ doesn’t need any explanation – it speaks for itself. And the ‘15% of every F-35 is British’ claim is a tired saw. The largest, by value British F-35 system, the BAE Systems electronic warfare suite, is made in New Hampshire.

This results in jobs, revenue, IP and taxes all benefiting the US.
The next biggest, the F-35B R-R LiftFan, is more than 80% built in the US, and the final assembly line is in Indianapolis. So, the idea that British companies benefit massively from F-35 export sales is empty.

Some claim: “The development costs for GCAP will be at least $50bn, $60bn – that’s what F-35 has cost!” No: F-35 cost that because the US procurement system only has two metrics: jobs in which States, and the size (the bigger the better).

Just because F-35 cost $50bn to develop (and with TR-3 and Block 4, it’ll be up to more than $80bn), there is absolutely no reason why GCAP will cost that – the waste levers that dominate US procurement are not present with GCAP.

Luckily, GCAP has an unexpected patron saint in St Frank of Kendall, the USAF Secretary. In his March 2023 speech at the Air Warfare Symposium, he stated that the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter for the USAF would have an offtake of around 200, a one-for-one replacement for the F-22.

At the same time, he was also stating that 200 offtake was perfectly economic for such a platform. In which case, can one see the current three GCAP partners buying 200 Tempests? Yes, it is very easy, and this is before other partners come along. GCAP is an economic programme.

I was recently in e-mail discussion with an old acquaintance, who has followed the F-35 programme near man and boy, and has worked in US companies deeply involved with designing and building the type.

He had just read the September Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on F-35 support, and said: “Stephen King never wrote anything as long or as full of horrors.”

He ended his message by summing up the GAO report by saying: “If the Hurricane and Spitfire had been supported that way [in the same manner as the F-35], Ich würde heute Deutsch sprechen.”

If one required a simple, two-sentence summation as to why GCAP is going ahead, these two sentences are as good as you’ll get: The GCAP partners have woken up – they’ve had more experience with operating the F-35 than those who have rushed to buy it over the past two/three years, and their solution? Build a new fighter system.

So what are the threats to GCAP? An awakened US administration that tries to pressure all the partners to drop Tempest (think TSR-2/F-111 and Blue Steel/Skybolt – there is form for this pressure.

More insidious? His Majesty’s Treasury, home of short-sightedness and short-termism. For GCAP to succeed, it needs to proceed at a pace that will not fit the templates that the Treasury like to bind capital programmes with.

In 1982, at the start of the Falklands War, then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, denied the Treasury a seat at the War Cabinet table – whoever is prime minister come late-2024 needs to copy her.
 
“The F-35 Special Access Programme (SAP) prevented unauthorised and uncontrolled access to all elements of the F-35 system. The GSSO team’s task was to supervise SAP facilities…They were responsible for the Ship’s SAP compartments, as well as F-35B dedicated hardware and software installed on QNLZ.

“On rare occasions, if flying activity was not being conducted, the deck was opened for recreation to other personnel. Such events added another dimension to the requirement to ensure aircraft were physically protected, and ensure security was maintained. On one of these recreation days a DASOR was raised due to recreational activities infringing aircraft security.”

So, despite the Royal Navy talking about the carriers as being ‘eight acres of sovereign territory’, the truth is that the use of its prime strike asset is firmly under US control, and access of RN sailors to the hangar and flight deck is dictated by US regulations. Very sovereign! ‘Freedom of modification’ is vital to GCAP as there is absolutely no such facility in the F-35 programme whatsoever. You might – just might – be able to buy, at significant cost, a derogation to adapt F-35, but to do this, a country will have to hand over all its software for, say, a new missile, to Lockheed Martin/Joint Program Office to do the integration. Crown Jewels? Handed over… This is before one even considers the fact that industrially, a US F-35 company, let alone the Pentagon, might not want a weapon/electronic system on F-35 that is a competing option for an export customer, and so smothers it – this happens all too frequently on other US platforms.

This is just sad. After paying so much and even investing in R&D this is what they get.
 


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UK GCAP fighter effort can only survive if more funds are allocated, expert warns​

The urgency to address chronic issues of cost overruns and delays in UK defence procurement, particularly in complex and important initiatives like the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), have underscored the need for upfront honesty about project costs.

Industry and the UK MoD should be “much more honest” about the actual costs of UK military procurement programmes upfront when it comes to programmes like the triliteral Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a think tank expert has warned. Ensuring strict adherence to the fighter jet’s service entry date is imperative to prevent Japan, a key partner in the project, from walking away.

A parliamentary hearing on 6 March highlighted the persistent problem of unrealistic cost estimations and delayed schedules affecting the UK's defence procurement efforts – issues that could be mitigated with more transparent planning.
 

A better uncertainty

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Are the biggest risks to GCAP political and financial, rather than technological or industrial?(BAE Systems)

GCAP is the outcome of unexpected reverse-ferrets in both British and Japanese combat aircraft planning. The 2015 UK Defence Review indicated that Britain was still committed to buying 138 F-35s, and the conventional wisdom at the time was that the most the British industry could expect would be a future UCAV programme based on the BAE Systems Taranis demonstrator. However, in the summer of 2018, the government was able to announce that the FCAS project was underway, Italy was on board as part of the industrial team, and there was a firm plan to fly the Tempest aircraft. It was mentioned at the time that the UK was talking to Japanese government and industry about a joint approach to FCAS and Japan’s F-X, but given the US-Japan relationship, this seemed a long shot. Indeed, in December 2020 the Japanese MoD announced that it had chosen Lockheed Martin to work with MHI, but by 2022 the policy was seen to be reversing itself and the story of a new UK-Japan connection broke in July.

This collaboration is new, ambitious, expensive and definitely contains uncertainties, but there are reasons why the GCAP partners may think that maintaining national capability is worth the money. Designing a stealth-optimised fighter with better performance than the F-35 is no riskier than any new aircraft. The F-35’s shape is more than 25 years old, and it is compromised by STOVL, CATOBAR and other specific ship-related requirements. The overall length was determined by the size of the elevator on the RN’s Invincible-class carriers, the F-35A/B wingspan was dictated by USMC deck-size limits, and CV landing characteristics dictated a quad-tail. A single large engine located unusually far forward (STOVL-driven) means that internal systems are wrapped around the engine bay, a design challenge that was a contributor to weight gain.

So, while Tempest’s two engines might seem to add complexity, that’s offset by a cleaner systems configuration. The modified tailless delta planform reminds me of the Boeing X-32’s relatively thick transonic wing – that smaller wing could hold 20,000lbs of fuel, and available volume goes up with the cube of the span. Tempest, therefore, promises longer range than the F-35A and a very large improvement over the -B, which is heavier and carries much less fuel. A bigger issue is avionics. GCAP will follow the lead set a decade ago by Saab, who designed a partitioned architecture for the JAS 39E Gripen: mission systems are separated from the flight-critical functions of flight and propulsion control and vehicle management. On the F-22 and F-35, everything is integrated through dual integrated common processor banks, which demands extensive ‘regression testing’, validated in flight, to ensure that changes have not had undesirable and unintended effects on critical systems.

That’s a major reason why the R&D costs of the F-35 Technology Refresh 2 ICP and display upgrade and the associated Block 4 changes are at $16.5bn (and counting), and why the B-21 Raider has taken the partitioned approach. An even larger issue is sovereignty. For Japan, that came down to a clear-cut decision: with a strong electronics industry and a little-discussed capability in guided weapons, a ‘right to modification and upgrade’ was firmly embodied in its requirements for an F-X partner. Most likely, this was the issue on which the Lockheed Martin deal failed: the US government and Lockheed Martin may have assumed that Japan did not have another valid choice.

In the UK, there was a detectable sense of disenchantment about F-35, mostly within the RAF, after the 2012 reversal of the decision to acquire the F-35C. Specific concerns, other than the B’s short legs include the ‘black box’ nature of the sensor-fusion system which, despite its legally important role in determining whether or not a target is legitimate under prevailing rules of engagement, the ability to record, offload and exploit sensor data and share it with other assets is restricted. The US also has tight control over mission data files (MDFs), including electronic order-of-battle data. MDFs for the UK, Italy, Japan and other F-35 operators are exclusively generated by the USAF’s 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing at Eglin AFB, Florida.

A final overarching argument for sovereignty in critical military capabilities has existed since November 2016, when the US electorate awarded the presidency to Donald Trump who has a fascination for autocrats and autocracy and utter contempt for allies and alliances. It could happen again in 2024, and radical isolationism is a more powerful force in US politics than at any time since 1940. People in government might not talk about this danger, but it would be grand misfeasance to ignore it.

BILL SWEETMAN
 
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