Global growth rate was higher too, at 4+%. And before the housing crisis, global growth rate was almost 5%. So China grew at more than twice the speed of the global rate, and today India is growing at more than twice the rate too. And this is as a net importer.
Sure, I think real estate revenue is for local govts anyway.
60% is what the private sector contributes directly, not 40%.
Here:
www.hks.harvard.edu
CHINA’S PRIVATE SECTOR is often summed up with a combination of four numbers: 60/70/80/90. Private firms contribute approximately 60% of China’s GDP, 70% of its innovative capacity, 80% of urban employment and 90% of new jobs.
You are calculating it wrong. Revenue is only generated on profits and salaries. If SoE business revenue is $100B and profit is $1, then then SoE is paying nothing in taxes. But if my business is $1B and profit is $500M, then I will end up paying $50-100M in taxes. SoEs running on losses or limited profits will not generate sufficient corporate revenue for the govt while generating the bulk of the GDP.
Here SoE is generating GDP, but my business is generating corporate revenue. SoE is contributing tax revenue through employee salaries instead.
If SoE salaries are increased, then consumption will increase, and my company will generate more corporate revenue while SoE will generate more salary tax revenue.
That's how private sector contributes 60% and SoEs contribute 40% of GDP in China. In India, it's 75-25. In US, it's 88-12.
I don't know what you mean there, but India's service-based economy is quite robust. External shocks have failed to weaken it over many decades 'cause it's driven by domestic consumption. I don't know how you consider it a bubble when it's considered by economists to have a significantly stronger foundation than China's.
Private household consumption in India is 61% compared to US' 68%. China's is at 40%.
Friend, in the 1940s, India was far richer than China. Now, how does India compare to China in terms of wealth? How did you end up falling behind? And now you come to discuss the prosperity of the Indian economy — what is the point of such a false proposition?
Second, private sector domestic credit (as a percentage of GDP — a ratio that represents the degree of freedom for bank lending to private enterprises for financing). Among the world’s top 10 economies, three belong to China, of which the mainland is at 194% while India is at 40%. This shows that Indian banks simply dare not lend to your private enterprises. Meanwhile, Chinese banks lend all their money to the private sector, not to state-owned enterprises — and it is particularly important to note that all banks in China are state-owned enterprises. In other words, it is China’s state-owned enterprises that lend money to private enterprises to carry out production. Government revenue as a percentage of GDP represents the total share of state-owned enterprises and government tax revenue in GDP. China’s is very low, only 15%; in other words, the remaining 85% of GDP is generated by the private sector.
When discussing issues, one must first understand the facts and the basic meaning of all kinds of data, rather than relying on what your brain imagines. Moreover, the discussion here is based on a consistent standard; if the data are not under the same standard, what is the value of your discussion? What 60% versus 40%, 30% versus 70% — what meaning is there if they are not under the same caliber?
Yet, the most laughable component of your discourse remains your commentary on real estate—a section so thoroughly detached from history that it is reduced to an object of absolute intellectual derision. Prior to the sweeping real estate structural reforms of the late 1990s and early 2000s, property prices across China, from Tier-1 metropolises like Beijing to underdeveloped western municipalities, were anchored strictly between 800 and 2,000 RMB per square meter. Before 2006, housing was largely distributed as a decommodified public welfare benefit by the state and industrial factories, meaning a speculative market price did not even exist. The hyper-inflationary property bubbles seen today in major metropolitan centers are the direct, structural consequence of aggressive late-stage capitalization.
Historically, these parcels of land were allocated to enterprises under sovereign mandates at zero cost; subsequently, these firms constructed residential units to be distributed to their workforce as non-market public welfare assets. Consequently, the labor force acquired housing under a framework of absolute zero-capital expenditure.
Under this framework, the state's land was allocated to the state's enterprises, which in turn constructed housing for the state's sovereign masters—the working class. This dynamic represents the inherent jurisprudential logic of sovereign collective ownership. How, then, can the mere physical aggregation of low-value aggregate and silicate cement be speculatively weaponized to command prices scaling into the thousands or tens of thousands?
Furthermore, under China’s constitutional framework, all land is held in collective and sovereign public ownership; you then naively assert that the capital generated from constructing housing should automatically belong to the state? Your desperate, logically bankrupt rationalization leaves me utterly speechless.
I am forced to conclude that your entire intellectual worldview is merely a degenerative symptom of a deep-seated, post-colonial comprador ideology.
