European Naval Forces : News, Views and Discussion

This simply expresses that France is not a vassal of the United States, that we want to have our own assessment of the situation and that we do not automatically endorse the warmongering adventures of the United States. This was already the case during the second war in Iraq under the pretext that they had weapons of mass destruction when they did not. This does not mean that we abandon East Asia, if the cause is just we will be there.

This has nothing to do with becoming a vassal. It's not about attacking other countries, it's about preventing China from attacking others.

France doesn't want to get dragged into a war with China over Taiwan or Japan, or even the SCS, hence the abandonment of East Asia.

Yeah, France will definitely protect New Caledonia or French Polynesia, but that's after all those other countries are out of the picture. France can also take an independent stance on China, irrespective of US' stance. But, at this time, there is none.

So the double standard is evident. When NATO wanted to take a stance against China, Macron stepped in. The French CDS's words echoed the establishment's, not NATO's. But when the German navy chief said the same about Russia, he gets kicked out. In both cases, France and Germany wanted to sit out of confrontations that are not good for them. In a more just world, the reaction would have been the opposite.
 
Ironically , Trump's policies of forcing the EU / NATO countries to cough up more towards spending on their own security was a wise policy which taken to it's logical conclusion would've ensured decreased US commitment to NATO , increased European contribution & commitment towards it's own security apart from making Europe masters of it's own destiny in such matters thereby defusing the tension with Russia coming to a certain accomodation with the latter thus avoiding the current round of tensions & freed the US to devote it's full attention towards China .

I just wonder who were the people in the Trump administration behind such policies for I haven't seen any write up in the SM or MSM either from the US or Europe on this matter . Goes to show that in the bulk of the TTs concentrated in such places independent policy making , it's appreciation & appraisal is strangely lacking. It seems amply clear then these establishments exist & thrive in their own little cocoons & echo chambers. This os especially true of the US & doesn't exactly show it's counterparts in Europe in good light too though the latter assessment could be mistaken as I've no access to what such TTs in Germany or France or any of the other prominent European nations think on the matter given the obvious linguistic barrier & lack of access to such papers.

Frankly, I don't know what exactly does the US or more precisely the Democratic establishment seek to gain with renewed tensions with Russia by incorporating the Ukraine & other ex Soviet / Warsaw Pact nations into NATO apart from increasing European dependency on the US for security guarantees & commitment.

The flip side of this is nations like Germany which ought to be spending more on building up a military & an MIC proportionate to it's status as a leading power & shouldering it's share of the responsibilities in Europe has cynically exploited this situation to curb such expenditure thereby increasing it's dependency on the US for security related matters.

In this respect both Japan & SK seem to have derived the right lessons with their focus shifting to bolstering up both their militaries as well as their MICs respectively apart from sewing up regional alliances.

In the long run the burden it puts on the US is unsustainable & ironically works in Russia's favour as it ensures a permanently weak & emaciated European component in NATO

It's a self defeating proposition for all parties concerned especially the US as it's attention & resources would be divided between 2 fronts where the Russian front is totally avoidable & unnecessary besides making an implacable foe of Russia especially Putin .
 
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Japon - 6e communiqué conjoint des ministres des Affaires étrangères et de la défense de la République française et du Japon (Visioconférence, 20 janvier 2022)

This is an example of our agreements with East Asian countries and I think we have the same kind of agreements with others. Only the text is very long so I have extracted the most significant passages.

Japan - 6th Joint Communiqué of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the French Republic and Japan (Videoconference, 20 January 2022)

The four ministers affirmed their desire to strengthen Franco-Japanese cooperation, particularly in the fields of security and defence. They expressed their willingness to continue to pursue their close cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, on regional issues, particularly in the Indo-Pacific area, and to respond to the challenges facing our world,

3. The four Ministers affirmed their commitment to pursue cooperation aimed at contributing to a free and open Indo-Pacific space based on the rule of law, as well as their willingness to strengthen specific cooperation not only bilaterally but also with allied and partner countries.

In this regard, the four Ministers welcomed achievements such as the first Franco-Japanese Comprehensive Maritime Dialogue in September 2019 and the first Indo-Pacific Working Group in October 2020.

In addition, the four Ministers welcomed the participation of New Caledonia and French Polynesia in the ninth Pacific Islands Leaders' Summit (PALM 9) in July 2021, and reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen Franco-Japanese cooperation in the South Pacific. The four Ministers recalled that the year 2022 marks the 130th anniversary of Japanese immigration to New Caledonia and welcomed the Japanese intention to open a Japanese consulate in Noumea.

4. The four Ministers welcomed the entry into force of the Mutual Logistic Support Agreement (MLSA) in June 2019 and the signing of the Memorandum of Cooperation between the French Air Force and the Japanese Air Self-Defence Force in May 2020, which heralds increased air cooperation between the two countries.

They also exchanged views on ways to secure information exchanges between the two countries. They also welcomed the numerous bilateral and multilateral interactions conducted since the last "2+2" dialogue, including the anti-submarine exercise carried out in December 2020 involving the French, Japanese and American navies in the Pacific, the joint exercise "Lapérouse 21" involving the French, Japanese, American, Australian and Indian navies in April 2021, the joint anti-piracy exercise between France and Japan in the Gulf of Aden in May, the "ARC 21" exercise organised in western Kyushu on the occasion of the Jeanne d'Arc mission's stopover in May and the Franco-Japanese exercise "Oguri-Verny" in September 2021 in New Caledonia.

They reaffirmed their commitment to actively contribute to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region by continuing joint exercises and manoeuvres and to strengthen the interoperability of their forces by seizing the upcoming opportunities created by the major French (Pegasus, Jeanne d'Arc mission) and Japanese (IndoPacific Deployment) deployments.

8. The four Ministers welcomed the adoption by the European Union of its strategy for the Indo-Pacific and the publication by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region on 16 September 2021. The Japanese Ministers welcomed France's leading role in the development of this strategy and expressed their support for the development of the presence and engagement of the Union and its Member States in the Indo-Pacific region, including through their willingness to develop the naval presence of Member States in the Indo-Pacific area by implementing Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMPs). The French Ministers welcomed the contributions made by Japan, in particular through the participation of its Ministers in the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union in January 2021 or in the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Defence in June 2021. They also welcomed the numerous joint interactions and exercises conducted by the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Forces with the EU's Operation Atalanta assets.

9. The four Ministers reiterated their deep concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas. They also reiterated their strong opposition to unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or by creating faits accomplis, and to coercion, which aggravate tensions and undermine the international order. The four Ministers reiterated their opposition to claims not in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), militarisation and coercive activities in the South China Sea. They stressed the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. The four Ministers stressed the importance of the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS, which sets out the legal framework for all activities at sea. They also stressed that any claim to maritime interests must be based on the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. They also recalled the July 2016 decision of the Philippines-China arbitral tribunal established under UNCLOS, which marks an important step and provides a useful basis for the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea. The four Ministers also stated that they would ensure that the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) under discussion between China and ASEAN is consistent with UNCLOS and does not undermine the rights and interests of any third party in the South China Sea. The four Ministers expressed their shared deep concern about the recent situation in Hong Kong as well as the human rights situation, in particular with regard to the Uighurs in the Xinjiang region. They stressed the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and reiterated their commitment to encourage a peaceful resolution of cross-strait relations.

12. The four Ministers reaffirmed that both countries have a common interest in maintaining a sustained and high-level dialogue with Russia, with the aim of ensuring security. The Four Ministers continue to follow with great concern the Russian military build-up near the Russian and Belarusian borders with Ukraine and call on Russia to avoid any escalation of tensions and to comply with its international commitment on transparency of military activities. The four Ministers reiterated their strong support for the full respect of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and stressed the importance of the full implementation of the Minsk agreements which remain the only way to achieve a lasting political solution to the Ukrainian crisis. The Japanese Ministers reconfirmed their support for the framework of the Normandy format and the Trilateral Contact Group. The four Ministers reiterated their condemnation of the Belarusian authorities' forcible repression of their citizens and the orchestration of irregular migration to the European Union as a hybrid tactic in Belarus.
 

This, in particular, is relevant:
[Former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN, and the African Union Gurjit] Singh noted that France is heavily inclined towards multilateral relations in this region. He explained the reason for this, saying that “while France does not want China to have complete influence in the Indo-Pacific, it also does not want the US to dominate the region.
 
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This, in particular, is relevant:
[Former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN, and the African Union Gurjit] Singh noted that France is heavily inclined towards multilateral relations in this region. He explained the reason for this, saying that “while France does not want China to have complete influence in the Indo-Pacific, it also does not want the US to dominate the region.

But France would rather have the US dominating the region than China.
 
Because you think US domination would preserve the status quo? In truth, both the US and China are inimical to French interests in the region.
 
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Analysis: Why do Turkey’s upcoming Reis-class submarines have potential to affect balances in the region?​

There is no doubt that the Turkish Navy attaches a great importance to the Reis-class (Type 214 TN) submarines. In addition to increasing the power of Turkey's submarine fleet, the €2 billion project is bound to have an impact on the region's military balances in both the Aegean sea and Black sea.​




Fighting a submarine is similar to fighting a ghost. Because you have a feeling that there is a threat around, you receive signals, but you cannot see it. While you are trying to devise and apply countermeasures to the unseen foe, you detect a weapon coming at you at high speed, either underwater or from the air. This is the submarines’ kiss of death.

Submarines are strategic assets in Naval Warfare​

Dakar-class submarine TKMS
Official rendering of the recently unveiled Dakar-class submarine. TKMS image.

Although the dizzying advancements in naval warfare weaponry and sensors offer more convenience in detecting and classifying hostile elements at sea, the underwater environment remains blurred. Because, while there are several sensors for detecting surface and air contacts, the primary underwater sensor is still various types of sonar, which are limited by the rules of underwater physics.

Each time carrying out anti-submarine warfare operations, seasonal fluctuations in the waters (salinity, pressure, and temperature) affect the sonar performance in different ways. Due to the difficulties in detecting a submarine, a naval fleet needs to allocate a significant ASW force, composed of surface and air assets, to seek and destroy even for one submarine. Yet, a submarine can hear a surface ship long before the surface ship can detect the submarine, and therefore it can take evasive action before its detected.

While on patrol, new modern submarines may stay below for weeks or even months and move relatively undetected. Many submarines produce less noise than the surrounding water.

Finding the submarine in the ocean is akin to seeking a needle in a haystack.

Because of these roughly stated difficulties, the presence of submarines, regardless of kind, is a critical parameter that alters regional balances itself. As the submarines’ unique capabilities to change the course of the war by attacking the enemy’s center of gravity and breaking the opponent’s will to fight, make submarines “strategic” assets.

What are the key benefits of Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) Submarines?​

Main propulsion systems and weapons of the submarines are used to sort them into various subclasses. Diesel-electric submarines (SSK), often known as “classical submarines,” have been in use for decades by numerous countries. Despite the benefits of being submerged in complete silence, modern submarines are forced to return to snorkel depth on a regular basis to recharge their batteries. During the snorkeling process, submarines are sensitive for detection and engagement.

Nuclear submarines (SSN) are larger and more advanced, allowing them to maneuver more effectively and carry more weapons. The noise from nuclear reactors and other operational equipment is the most significant disadvantage of nuclear submarines, as it causes them to be detected from a larger distance than diesel-electric submarines. SSNs have no limitations on how long they can stay underwater.

Hellenic Navy Signs Heavyweight Torpedo Deal with Atlas Elektronik
Hellenic Navy’s Type 214 AIP submarine “Papanikolis”. Hellenic Navy picture.

AIP offers a new approach to combining the advantages of silence and remaining submerged for significantly extended periods. Though current AIP submarines cannot match with SSNs in terms of weapon load, submerged endurance, and maneuverability, their capabilities have been improving year after year.

Non-AIP diesel-electric submarines can’t match the underwater endurance of AIP submarines. Since AIP submarines rarely surface or return to periscope depth, they are less to be mentioned in intelligence reports, which is one of the most critical instruments for finding and tracking submarines. Silence underwater for such extended periods is a serious threat to the adversaries.

Turkey meets AIP technology with Reis-class project​

Turkey floats out its first AIP submarine Piri Reis
TCG Piri Reis (Turkish MoD photo)

The Turkish Navy will have AIP technology based on the proven Howaldswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) fuel cell with the Reis-class submarines. The AIP system employs fuel cell technology, including a PEM Fuel Cell (2x120kw) and high capacity batteries (232 units), allowing the submarine to sustain long-endurance deployments without snorkeling.

The Turkish Navy will receive six Type 214 TN AIP submarines as part of this program. On March 23, 2021, the Golcuk Naval Shipyard floated out the leading boat of the project, TCG Piri Reis, which is scheduled to enter service in 2022. For the next five years, the remaining boats will be built and commissioned. The Reis class submarines will be capable to deploy heavyweight torpedoes (DM2A4, indigenous AKYA, and MK48 Mod 6AT), anti-ship missiles (Sub-Harpoon, maybe indigenous ATMACA in after the first sub), and mines.

Reis-class submarines & Regional Balances​

While naval forces are not the only instruments for regional balance, they should be regarded as key actors due to their roles of “supporting government policies” in peacetime and striking capabilities during conflicts. As a result, the countries conduct comprehensive naval modernization and acquisition programs in accordance with their economic situation and infrastructure.

Submarines, whose strategic importance has already been highlighted, have a direct impact on the countrys’ A2/AD capabilities. As a result, the quantity, types, capabilities, and weapon power of the submarine fleet affect regional balances. Because, the increased number of submarines allows for greater control over larger maritime areas while remaining undetected, and because these submarines may remain underwater for extended periods of time, causing the fleets of other countries to face increased uncertainty.

  • Aegean Sea and the East Mediterranean
major-naval-bases-in-the-east-med-1024x673.png
Major Naval Bases in the Eastern Mediterranean

One important example of this issue is Greece’s Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias’ repeated warnings to Germany to block the sale of Type 214 class submarines to Turkey. He repeatedly stated that acquiring these submarines will tip the regional balance in Turkey’s favor.

“The Hellenic Navy currently has four such vessels, which give us a strategic advantage in the Southeast Mediterranean and the Aegean. If Germany delivers [these vessels], Turkey will again have an advantage against Greece,”

Nikos Dendias, Foreign Minister of Greece

Russia, Greece, Israel, and Egypt have the most significant fleets in Turkey’s neighboring seas. Only Greece and Israel have AIP-capable submarines among these states. Greece currently operates four Type 214 AIP submarines and one Type 209 AIP upgraded submarine. Israel operates two Dolphin-II class AIP submarines, one Dolphin-II submarine is currently under construction, and has recently ordered three Dakar-class submarines from TKMS.

Turkey, which will have six AIP-capable Reis-class submarines after 2027, will have the most AIP submarines in the region with Israel (although the schedule of Dakar class submarines is not yet known), compared to Greece’s five. In addition, Turkey aims to commission 4-6 national submarines (MILDEN), which will be AIP capable and possibly armed with indigenous GEZGIN strategic missiles. In the second half of the 2030s, the delicate balance of the region is likely to change in favor of Turkey in terms of AIP submarines. (MILDENs will replace Turkey’s aging Type 209/1200 (AY class) submarines.)

  • Black Sea
Following the invasion of Crimea, Russia strengthened the Black Sea Fleet at the Sevastopol Naval Base to preserve a strategic balance against NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and the wider Black Sea region. According to open-source statements, the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s warships increased from 34 to 49, while submarines increased from 1 to 7.

The Russian Black Sea force operates improved Kilo-class submarines that can launch Kalibr land-attack missiles but are not AIP-capable.

Second-Improved-Kilo-class-Project-636.3-Submarine-Launched-for-Russias-Pacific-Fleet-1-1024x683.jpg
The launch ceremony of the second Improved Kilo-class Project 636.3 Submarine (USC picture.)

The Reis-class submarine’s commissioning is likely to have an impact on the Black Sea balance as well. The Turkish Navy currently has 12 diesel-electric submarines, and after the Reis-class is operational, the total number of submarines will be 18 (6 AIP + 12 non-AIP). This submarine force would be capable to penetrate Russia’s strong A2/AD in the Black Sea.

According to the Montreux Convention, which governs the straits’ transit regime as well as regulating the tonnage and types of naval assets deployed in the Black Sea by non-Black Sea states, the non-Black Sea countries are not permitted to deploy submarines in the region. As a result, as a NATO ally, Turkey’s submarine fleet is the only asset capable of countering the Russian Navy’s ambitions on behalf of NATO. Thus, the Reis-class submarine project could be considered as a factor to affect NATO-Russia balance in the Black Sea.

Rohde & Schwarz to equip German Navy’s NH90 MRFH with secure communications​

Rohde & Schwarz press release




Rohde & Schwarz will equip the German Navy’s NH90 Multi-Role Frigate Helicopter (MRFH), with SOVERON family airborne radios that include embedded COMSEC. Each aircraft is fitted with three VHF/UHF transceivers plus spares.




The navy will receive 31 helicopters – a naval version of the NH90 – that offer close-range protection, anti-surface-warfare (ASuW) and anti-submarine-warfare (ASW), transport, and search and rescue capabilities.



Rohde & Schwarz to equip German Navy's NH90 MRFH with secure communications
The NH90 MRFH for the German Navy will be flying with Rohde & Schwarz software-defined airborne radios. (Image: R & S)
The SOVERON family airborne transceiver uses state-of-the-art communications algorithms that were standardized throughout NATO, particularly for naval applications. The transceiver’s interfaces allow external devices or an external encryption device to be connected and guard the naval distress frequency, thereby remaining future-proof.




“We are very proud to have our equipment deployed on this major naval asset of our national customer. With 8000+ SOVERON family airborne radios in use worldwide on over 70 different airborne platforms, we ensure that we deliver a safe, future-ready investment for today’s navies on time and on budget.”

Stefan Pleyer, Vice President of Market Segment Avionics

About Rohde Schwarz Software Defined Radio Systems​




Rohde & Schwarz software-defined radios (SDR) are used in fixed and mobile ground stations, towers, vehicles, ships, aircraft, and even in highly mobile handheld applications. The wide portfolio range includes SDR systems in different power classes with useful options, accessories, and auxiliary equipment.




The software-defined radios have satisfying RF characteristics, even under harsh environmental conditions, and comply with common military and civil communications standards. The customized multiband, multimodal, multirole radio systems enable reliable, safe, and secure communications 24/7.




Together with innovative IP capable waveforms, software-defined radios cover use cases such as clear voice communications for air traffic control (ATC), secure data transmission for situational awareness as well as governmental and military command and control scenarios. They are available in VHF/UHF and in the HF range for line-of-sight (LOS) or beyond LOS (BLOS) communications.




Software-defined radios from Rohde & Schwarz are available under the SOVERON® brand for military applications and the CERTIUM® brand for civilian applications.




The primary features of the SOVERON radios, which will be fitted to the German Navy’s NH-90 MRFH, are indicated below;


  • HF, VHF/UHF radios in different power classes
  • In line with civil and military standards
  • Wide portfolio from handheld, via mobile to fixed applications
  • Multi-Waveform capable
  • Embedded encryption (optional)
 
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One of the great questions is: are submarines really undetected from satellites ?
If not, we are facing a big problem and defense doctrines should be completely rewritten....
 
One of the great questions is: are submarines really undetected from satellites ?
Submarines are basically near-impossible to detect through electromagnetic waves from a satellite. You have to deal with the atmosphere being in the way first, and then the water being in the way.

800px-Atmospheric_electromagnetic_opacity.svg.png

The-spectrum-of-absorption-coefficient-of-liquid-water-2.png


So how can one detect a submarine? You can try using magnetic anomaly detectors. But the strength of a magnetic field decrease according to the inverse cube of the distance from its source. In other words, it decreases very quickly. That approach, too, cannot be used from a satellite. And obviously a sonar wouldn't work either.

Don't forget that the ray has to bounce vertically off the submarine and then do the whole trip back up through the water column and then through the atmosphere to go back to the satellite.
 
If you have geostationary satellites, you can continuously scan the same area, with multiple sensors.
How good are state of the art magnetic detectors ? Some nations may have discovered a particular way to improve the sensors so much that despite the very low level of the magnetic field it could be possible to detect the submarines

Deep learning algorithms could help detecting and tracking a submarine

And what about quantum radars ? Could it be efficient in that domain ?
 
Submarines are basically near-impossible to detect through electromagnetic waves from a satellite. You have to deal with the atmosphere being in the way first, and then the water being in the way.

800px-Atmospheric_electromagnetic_opacity.svg.png

The-spectrum-of-absorption-coefficient-of-liquid-water-2.png


So how can one detect a submarine? You can try using magnetic anomaly detectors. But the strength of a magnetic field decrease according to the inverse cube of the distance from its source. In other words, it decreases very quickly. That approach, too, cannot be used from a satellite. And obviously a sonar wouldn't work either.

Don't forget that the ray has to bounce vertically off the submarine and then do the whole trip back up through the water column and then through the atmosphere to go back to the satellite.
What I understand is that Magnetic anomaly detector works upto 500 feet hight approx at max, above that altitude it's not of much use. That's the specific reason US P8A doesn't have MAD as P8 is not shown the good results at very low altitudes due to salt water content in the air over sea. Have no idea if that was resolved any way for Indian P8Is.
If you have geostationary satellites, you can continuously scan the same area, with multiple sensors.
How good are state of the art magnetic detectors ? Some nations may have discovered a particular way to improve the sensors so much that despite the very low level of the magnetic field it could be possible to detect the submarines

Deep learning algorithms could help detecting and tracking a submarine

And what about quantum radars ? Could it be efficient in that domain ?
Using MAD on P3, it was possible to track submarines when they were not that deep but with P8 it seems to be negligible even if possible. By satellite with MAD, impossible practically.