India- Myanmar relations

 
(i did post it in the Myanmar navy's thread because i couldn't find the A&N one)
 
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(i did post it in the Myanmar navy's thread because i couldn't find the A&N one)
I'm not sure to what extent Myanmar would support either China or India in this tussle. We have pretty good bilateal relations with them and have 10 MoUs as well. Most likely they would prefer not to choose sides although nothing can be ruled out.

 
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I'm not sure to what extent Myanmar would support either China or India in this tussle. We have pretty good bilateal relations with them and have 10 MoUs as well. Most likely they would prefer not to choose sides although nothing can be ruled out.

The Burmese are like the Iranians. Untrustworthy.
 
I'm not sure to what extent Myanmar would support either China or India in this tussle. We have pretty good bilateal relations with them and have 10 MoUs as well. Most likely they would prefer not to choose sides although nothing can be ruled out.

They don't have the choice. They're stuck between a trench & ditch. Chinese have the upper hand there.
The Burmese are like the Iranians. Untrustworthy.
Wrong and full of assumptions.
 
I'm not sure to what extent Myanmar would support either China or India in this tussle. We have pretty good bilateal relations with them and have 10 MoUs as well. Most likely they would prefer not to choose sides although nothing can be ruled out.

Myanmar is very, very dependent on China. And it is strategic for the Chinese:
"(...) Since Myanmar opened its door to foreign investment in 1988, the approved Chinese investment amounted to 26 percent of total FDI in Myanmar till 2019. China has been investing consistently in physical infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). Several projects under the CMEC, for instance, the Mee Ling Gyaing LNG terminal, Kyaukphyu SEZ, deep seaport, upgrading of the Mandalay-Muse Road that will facilitate the Muse-Mandalay railway line are examples of Chinese economic interest within the nation.(...)"
In contrast, how is the Kaladan project progressing? :(
 
In contrast, how is the Kaladan project progressing? :(

Maybe fully operational very soon. Not sure to be honest but we are facing this problem with all of our neighbours at the moment whether it's Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or Myanmar. The Chinese are simply able to outspend us on all fronts and their infrasturcture expertise is well ahead of ours. On the plus side, they are overstreched with investments across East Asia , Central Asia and Africa and CPEC is not really as successful as it was touted to be. Sri Lanka is broke and not too happy about having to lease Hambantota port out to them.
 
i read: "currently, all the construction works have been completed (...)". this means the Zorinpui-Paletwa road is finally finished being built.
this is great news for the territories in the "south of the north east". Congrats!
... and i agree with you about the rest of your message.
 
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i read: "currently, all the construction works have been completed (...)". this means the Zorinpui-Paletwa road is finally finished being built.
this is great news for the territories in the "south of the north east". Congrats!
... and i agree with you about the rest of your message.
Nothing's happening there ever since the recent military coup. Even prior to that there were insurgency threats to the road leading upto to Kaladan from India by the Arakanese Army . Work proceeded in an erratic manner plus there were strong rumours of the Chinese instigating local insurgents against the project which resulted in kidnappings & a few casualties too a few yrs ago.
 
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Nothing's happening there ever since the recent military coup. Even prior to that there were insurgency threats to the road leading upto to Kaladan from India by the Arakanese Army . Work proceeded in an erratic manner plus there were strong rumours of the Chinese instigating local insurgents against the project which resulted in kidnappings & a few casualties too a few yrs ago.
This is unfortunately more in line with my idea of the local situation.
 
Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport project (KMTTP) is set to become operational next month . deep-water port at Sittwe is part of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project . Once ready, it will also provide a strategic alternate link connecting the landlocked northeastern states to the rest of India and easing the pressure on the existing narrow Siliguri corridor. From Paletwa, a 110 km road is being built to connect to Zorinpui at Mizoram on the Indo-Myanmar border.

 
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(...) China is the only outside power that has close relations with Myanmar’s strongest ethnic armed resistance groups. In late February, Deng Xijun, China’s special envoy to Myanmar, held meetings in the border areas with representatives from the Kachin Independence Army, the United Wa State Army and the National Democratic Alliance Army in Shan State. On Feb. 27, a Shan website quoted a local analyst as saying that the reason for the meeting was to express China’s concerns over the opening of an office in Washington for Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), which is made up of former members of parliament and pro-democracy activists, and to presumably warn those ethnic armies not to have close contacts with the obviously pro-Western NUG. China may be close to the Myanmar junta, but several of the ethnic armies are also equipped with weapons obtained from Chinese suppliers. Indeed, a certain degree of continued instability in Myanmar’s frontier areas is in China’s interests because it can keep the country weak and vulnerable, and makes it possible to play all sides in tandem with official, diplomatic niceties about “friendship” and “non-interference.” As a long-time observer of Myanmar politics put it: “It looks to me as if the Chinese are working, as they often do, to keep a foot of some sort in all camps.”
China’s interests are long-term with the China Myanmar Economic Corridor, and access to the Indian Ocean is the central theme. The Chinese are playing many cards to outmaneuver possible rivals in Myanmar, and there is precious little that the outside world can do about it — unless there is a sudden and dramatic change inside Myanmar, which would have to come from within the military. But there have so far been no signs of divisions in the armed forces.
Since the coup, the geopolitical balance has tilted to the advantage of China, and whether that was Min Aung Hlaing’s intention when he sent his tanks into Yangon and the new capital Naypyidaw, it is the reality of his ill-thought-out action two years ago. Myanmar is back to square one as an international pariah — and a country that that will find it hard to resist the advances of its powerful northern neighbor.
 

Kaladan Waterway India’s strategic stamp in Myanmar. Now work at breakneck speed, beat China​

In a significant boost to strategic, diplomatic and economic engagement between India and Myanmar, the waterway section of the ambitious Rs 3,200 crore Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, KMTTP, is all set to become operational this week. After a trial run of rice shipment to Bangladesh, a shipload of cement from Kolkata to Sittwe port in Myanmar will be the first official cargo after Naypiydaw gave necessary permission for regular commercial operations from the port completed by the Shipping Ministry’s Inland Waterways Authority of India in 2018.

The Kaladan project proposed about two decades ago began with the Detailed Project Report (DPR) prepared by RITES in 2003 and the subsequent signing of the 2008 agreement between India and Myanmar. The project envisaged four important stages – Kolkata to Sittwe waterway, Sittwe to Paletwa inland (River Kaladan) waterway, Paletwa to India-Myanmar border post in Myanmar and finally linking the road to Lawngtlai in Mizoram as part of the project’s last leg.

India unveiled the Look East Policy under the then government led by P V Narasimha Rao in early 90s with a view to ensure economic development of India’s Northeast and build a bridge between the region and the rest of East Asia. The Look East Policy, India’s outreach towards East Asia and the economic development of the region were interlinked. India’s trade with East and South Asia was no doubt being conducted through Indian Ocean and overland routes like by air. But it was necessary to strengthen land connectivity and integrate the economic development on the Northeast with that of Bangladesh and Myanmar. Such linkages would also increase India’s strategic footprints in East Asia and more importantly in our immediate neighbourhood.

Where India lost time

Soon after Independence, both India and China had a policy of deeper engagement with countries in the immediate neighbourhood and with East and South Asia. While a democratic India had to maintain a balance between regional geopolitics and the global expectations towards support to democracy movement, China had no such compulsions. China has been one of the few countries, and the only major power to have provided unwavering support to successive regimes in Myanmar when the Western world and even the UNSC imposed sanctions on the country.

In its misplaced enthusiasm to superimpose Western democracy among Asian countries and particularly in Myanmar, the US and other EU nations imposed highly restrictive sanctions on Myanmar every time there was a regime change and military takeover of the political power. In addition, there were withholding of EU financial assistance directly going to the government and freezing of all EU assistance that may be seen as legitimising the military junta. In the present, sanctions on individuals include the Minister for Energy, prominent businessmen who have supported the regime’s repression with arms and dual use goods, and high-ranking officers in the Myanmar armed forces that are closely associated with the regime. China has cleverly taken advantage of these selective sanctions to the best of its advantage.

Primarily, China has three strategic and commercial interests in Myanmar: energy security, border security and access to the Indian Ocean through the Bay of Bengal. China is also Myanmar’s largest buyer of crude and gas reserves. Besides, Beijing is seriously working to exploit Myanmar’s hydro-electric potential. Unlike Nepal, where China’s investments in hydro-electric projects do not help it due to heavy transmission losses, Myanmar provides easy transmission possibilities.

As part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), one of the flagship projects of China-Myanmar cooperation is the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). CMEC will connect Yunnan province in China to the economic hubs of Mandalay, Yangon New City and Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone in Myanmar. This makes Myanmar a major access route for China to the Indian Ocean and also an effective strategy for China to overcome its “Malacca Dilemma.”

Don’t rest

Considering China’s aggressive policies in getting a foothold in India’s neighbourhood, the Kaladan is a game changer for India. But much more needs to be done.

India has to hasten the road linkage projects, tackle the local resistance to development not only in the Northeast but also deal with the regime in Myanmar, diplomatically and politically. As a member of BIMSTEC, Myanmar requires a good amount of hand holding, both economically and in building strong democratic institutions. Sanctions will not work. New Delhi supporting West-based sanctions helped China rush in and occupy the strategic spaced vacated by India.

However, New Delhi has of late been concentrating on economic engagement with East and South Asian neighbours. In this engagement, India should use BIMSTEC to the maximum and extend facilities such as digital payments and UPI to member countries. Kaladan is a good beginning for India to regain its lost strategic space, provided it works at a breakneck speed.
 
(TheIrrawaddy, jan.08)

Assamese Journalist Shines Light on One of Asia’s Murkiest Conflicts​

Northeastern India is one of Asia’s oldest yet least-known conflict-ridden areas. The Naga people, a tribal and predominantly Christian community, rose in rebellion in the 1950s, followed by the Mizo, another Christian tribe, in the 1960s. In the 1970s and 1980s, left-wing guerrillas wreaked havoc among the Hindu Meitei population in the Imphal Valley in Manipur. But the most serious threat to the Indian state came from the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) in Assam, the largest and most populous state in India’s northeast. Founded in 1979, ULFA grew out of a popular, student-led movement against an influx of foreigners, mainly Bangladeshis, into Assam, which the activists said threatened the ethnic integrity of their state. (…)