India - Pakistan Diplomatic Ties

The Importance of India-Pakistan Cross-LoC Trade​

In 2019, the New Delhi government suspended cross-Line of Control trade: the barter exchange between the Indian and Pakistani parts of Kashmir. Thus, while India and Pakistan continue to trade through their officially recognized border, trade through the disputed part of the border, the Line of Control (LoC), is not allowed at the moment.

This subject is one of the areas of expertise of Afaq Hussain, the director and a founding member of the New Delhi-based policy research institute, the Bureau of Research on Industry and Economic Fundamentals (BRIEF). Hussain works in the field of international relations and trade connectivity; his research interests include conflicts, cross-border trade, and development studies. Hussain spoke to The Diplomat’s Krzysztof Iwanek about the significance of this cross-LoC trade. This interview has been lightly edited for clarity.

In your 2017 commentary for The Hindu, you called the cross-LoC trade “one of the most successful CBMS [Confidence Building Measures] between India and Pakistan.” For an external observer, this may be a surprising assessment. How important was this trade for Jammu and Kashmir, as well as New Delhi’s relations with Islamabad?

Cross-Line of Control (LoC) trade through Jammu and Kashmir was a breakthrough Confidence Building Measure (CBM) between India and Pakistan, which helped in creating a peace constituency and connecting the divided families of Jammu and Kashmir through economic engagement. Initiated in 2008, this barter trade achieved a cumulative value of over $1.2 Billion which is a significant amount considering the nature of border economies in Jammu and Kashmir. The engagement of multiple stakeholders like traders, laborers, transporters, etc., in this trade created employment opportunities for the people living in these areas. This trade generated around 170,000 labor days, or $12 million, for laborers and freight of around $88 million. So, all in all, cross-LoC trade helped establish a strong economic dependency between the otherwise politically turbulent neighbors, India and Pakistan.

Apart from the economic and financial gains for the stakeholders in this trade ecosystem, the CBM emerged as a flagbearer of peace between India and Pakistan. The initiation of this trade helped in bridging the trust deficit between the governments of India and Pakistan as well as between the government in New Delhi and the people of Jammu and Kashmir. This trade helped in increasing people-to-people contact and connectivity through Jammu and Kashmir, particularly for the divided families, and resulted in building trust.

What is noteworthy is that when Indo-Pak relations hit its lowest ebb-during the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai in 2008 and Uri attack in 2016, trade across the Line of Control continued. It resulted in creating a constituency of peacemakers and brought together the stakeholders from both sides of the line of control as well as New Delhi and Islamabad. It changed the mindsets of the people in Jammu and Kashmir and the narrative of “blurring borders” could be observed.

Do you think the cross-LOC trade should, and can, be revived?

The suspension of cross-LoC trade has had a profound impact on the border economies, both in terms of social and economic impact. We must also note that this impact has only gotten worse due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Resumption of cross-LoC trade will help these stakeholders to revive their livelihoods. The governments of India and Pakistan should revive this trade and ensure the continuity of the dividends this trade had ensured.

Of late, the government of Pakistan has shown inclination toward resumption of trade, which needs to be fructified. Resumption of cross-LoC trade should also be part of the conversations between India and Pakistan. The governments would also need to re-strategize the framework of this trade to enhance security aspects and induce trust and transparency for this trade to flourish.

Cross-LoC connections can be used as an element of improving India-Pakistan relations. The economic priorities for peace implementation cannot be understated.

Would it be feasible to reroute trade, instead of reviving it through the LoC, to ensure it is monitored better? Can it take place through the India-Pakistan official border? Or would the logistical costs and competition from other traders make such rerouting impossible?

Cross-LoC trade was initiated as a Jammu and Kashmir-centric Confidence Building Measure between India and Pakistan. Cross-LoC trade was a barter trade that was focused on building economic connectivity and enhancing people-to-people contact through the two agreed routes in Jammu and Kashmir. It developed itself as an additional layer of economic engagement between the two countries apart from the regular international trade.

There already exist international trade routes between India and Pakistan through land and sea. The land route is active through Punjab and international trade takes place through this route. It may not be feasible to move the cross-LoC trade routes from Jammu and Kashmir as it will dilute the basis of this initiative.

In the reports of your think tank, BRIEF, such as ones from 2017 and the 2021, you also mention concerns about this trade – including that it could lead to a growth of illicit trade. That the cross-LoC trade could be misused to smuggle weapons or narcotics (thus presumably also strengthening terrorist groups) was given as the official reason by the Indian government to suspend this trade in 2021. How justified are those concerns in your opinion?

Illicit trade is a severe and growing threat to our societies. It is not a national phenomenon, but an international one. Across the world, certain irregularities do exist in the trade ecosystem, which abuses the trading system and legal frameworks around the same. However, the endeavor of the government and the regulatory agencies has been focused on strengthening oversight to curb on such misuse.

For a few years prior to the suspension of cross-LoC trade, it became notoriously known for facilitating illicit trading and other irregularities. We must remember that negative narratives pertaining to this trade also emanated from various security and operational concerns. Some of these concerns were linked to the infrastructural and policy level deficiencies. Given the barter nature of this trade, cross-LoC trade did not follow regular international trade practices and financial accounting protocols. This resulted in scope for irregularities in the trade system, which was exploited as well. It may also be noted that there have been instances of narcotics and smuggling at other trade borders as well (for example, ICP Attari between India and Pakistan). The regulatory and security agencies at these borders would strengthen the ecosystem to stop such instances in future and not suspend the trade as was done in the case of cross-LoC trade.

This trade would not have survived the political disruptions for a decade if the cross-LoC trade had not created its own “emotional capital” through people-to-people connections and economic dividends on the border economies in Jammu and Kashmir. The trade volumes may be minimal in the overall economic spectrum of India and Pakistan, but it needs to be looked at through the lens of the conflict and the benefits to the people living in these border areas. That is when the result of this trade are magnified and one appreciates the positive impact.

As and when the governments of India and Pakistan decide to re-initiate this trade, they need to keep in mind the security and policy concerns that have been raised over the last decade. The revised protocols for this trade should address any loophole that exists for misuse of this trade. Infrastructure upgradation, both physical and digital, will need to be put in place to ensure transparency while also looking at policy gaps in the areas of product identification through HS codes, implementation of digital platforms, clarity of tax regulations and “rule of origin,” etc.
thediplomat.com

The Importance of India-Pakistan Cross-LoC Trade

The barter trade across the disputed border “helped in creating a peace constituency and connecting the divided families of Jammu and Kashmir through economic engagement.”
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‘It’s shocking’ — India calls upon Pakistan to stop discrimination towards religious minorities​

New Delhi: India on Thursday called on Pakistan to stop its discriminatory approach toward minorities, including Hindus, Sikhs and Christians after a Sikh girl was forcibly abducted and converted to Islam on the evening of August 20.

In a weekly media briefing, the Ministry of External Affairs official spokesperson, Arindam Bagchi said, “We have seen media reports on kidnapping, forced conversion and marriage. It was also reported that police refused to file FIR, following which the family and Sikh community members staged a protest. We strongly condemn the targeting of minorities, including Hindus, Sikhs and Christians. The Government of India has been raising such issues through diplomatic channels with the Government of Pakistan and we call upon Pakistan to end this discriminatory approach towards minorities and discharge its responsibilities to ensure the safety, security and well-being of all its citizens.”

Dina Kaur, daughter of Gurucharan Singh, was reported to be abducted at gunpoint, raped and married to her abductor with the help of local administration and police.

Seeing the discrimination and oppression, hundreds of Sikhs and other locals blocked the road and demanded justice.

“These issues worry us a lot. It’s shocking to see this level of religious intolerance in Pakistan. The apathy of law enforcement agencies towards religious minorities is of course part of that system and we see this as yet another instance of religious persecution faced by the minority community in Pakistan,” said the MEA spokesperson on the abduction of a Sikh woman in Pakistan.

"As you are aware there have been unfortunately similar incidents of targeted attacks on minorities in the recent past in Pakistan, including two Sikh traders in Peshawar in May, the killing of an 18-year-old Hindu girl for resisting abduction in Sukkur in March 2022 and brutal murder of Christian pastor in Peshawar in February. These instances reveal the atmosphere of insecurity faced by religious minorities in Pakistan,” said Bagchi.

Speaking about reports on Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s desire of peaceful ties with India, he said, “This is nothing new, we too want good relations, India desires peaceful, friendly and cooperative relations with Pakistan, which requires an environment free from violence and terror. We want peaceful relations with our neighbours, but you know what are the problems of Pakistan and they should take steps to develop peaceful relations."

The relationship between the two countries worsened in 2019 after India revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir. Since then the diatic ties have been downgraded, bilateral trade suspended and there has been no structured dialogue.

Earlier, Sharif said that his country desired peaceful ties with India including “a just and peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions.”


He made the remarks during a meeting with the newly appointed Australian High Commissioner to Pakistan Neil Hawkins, who had called on him in Islamabad, reported The Express Tribune.

“A just and peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions and the wishes of the Kashmiri people is indispensable for peace and stability in the region,” said PM Shehbaz.


Sharif also said that his country wants long-lasting peace with India and war is not an option for either of the two neighbours.

“We want permanent peace with India through dialogue as war is not an option for either of the countries,” he said while talking to a group of students from Harvard University, US, reported The News International. —ANI.
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'It's shocking' — India calls upon Pakistan to stop discrimination towards religious minorities

The move came after media reports surfaced about police in Pakistan refusing to file FIR against those who forcibly abducted and converted a Sikh girl to Islam.
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India-Pakistan Ties Are Warming—but Don't Get Excited Just Yet​

When the historic floods inundating large parts of Pakistan prompted worldwide offers of assistance, they included a rare public outreach from Pakistan's arch-nemesis, India. In an exchange of tweets in late August, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi wrote he hoped for “an early restoration of normalcy,” and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif thanked Modi for his condolences, adding that Pakistan “shall, InshaAllah, overcome.” The two governments were also reportedly in discussions for New Delhi to begin sending humanitarian relief. But in the end, the usual logjams appear to have prevailed. Islamabad has so far refused to accept the aid due to continued bilateral disputes over the status of Jammu and Kashmir. Following the tweets, Sharif described India's policies in the disputed region as “genocide” and lamented that “Kashmiris have been denied their rights.”

The status of Jammu and Kashmir, awarded to India during Partition in 1947 and subsequently the object of multiple border wars and skirmishes between the two countries, has remained the one key stumbling block in improved India-Pakistan relations. In recent years, however, a quiet but determined warming trend has become apparent between New Delhi and Islamabad; the volley of well-wishing tweets after the disastrous floods is simply the thaw's latest evidence. That two nuclear-armed sworn enemies are getting along better is incredibly significant news—yet it has received little media attention in the West.

Remarkably, as late as February 2019, India and Pakistan were bracing for war. That month, a suicide terrorist attack in the Pulwama district on the Indian-administered side of Jammu and Kashmir left 40 Indian police officers dead. Pakistan condemned the attack, but the Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed claimed responsibility. In retaliation, a few days later, India carried out airstrikes in Balakot, Pakistan, against a Jaish-e-Mohammed facility. During the operation, Pakistani forces shot down one of India's fighter jets and captured the pilot. In a gesture of goodwill, Islamabad released the pilot a few days later, and tensions eased.

Ever since this harrowing episode, bilateral ties have been on the mend—even when faced with daunting new challenges. For example, in August 2019, Modi unilaterally revoked the special autonomy status of Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, which had been enshrined under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, and converted it into a union territory directly administrated by New Delhi. Such a move would normally have prompted a Pakistani response, but silence reigned across the border, perhaps in a bid to avoid reescalation. Then, starting in May 2020, Indian and Chinese troops engaged in the most violent clashes since 1967 along their disputed land border in the Himalayas. As a declared “iron brother” of China, Pakistan could have tried to exploit India's distraction on its eastern flank to wreak havoc on its western flank, but again it chose restraint.

By late February 2021, the Indian and Pakistani militaries released a rare joint statement renewing a cease-fire along their line of control separating Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. By all accounts, this cease-fire has overwhelmingly held up, save for one minor violation earlier this month.

This recent border incident aside, bilateral ties continue to show signs of durability and even progress. For instance, in March, the Indian military launched a missile into Pakistan, by all appearances an accident. Fortunately, there were no casualties, and Islamabad did not respond in kind. Last month, New Delhi fired the three officers involved, showing that it plans to be accountable for its actions.

Meanwhile, on the very sensitive issue of counterterrorism, New Delhi for the first time will allow Pakistani counterterrorism forces to train alongside the Indian military in India next month. Granted, the exercise will take place under the banner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and include the bloc's other members: China, Russia, Iran, and several Central Asian states. But this represents a significant step toward building mutual trust.


Relatedly, earlier this month, Islamabad accepted the remains of a Pakistani-based terrorist who died in Indian custody—the first time it has done so in at least two decades. The terrorist was a member of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group that prioritizes attacks against Indian targets, and he was reportedly directed by Pakistani intelligence to attack an Indian post in Jammu and Kashmir. By accepting his remains, Islamabad tacitly acknowledged culpability for the attack through one of its terrorist proxies.

Bilateral ties are also increasingly bullish on trade. In the last quarter alone, for instance, Indian imports from Pakistan were $17.6 million, compared to $340,000 for the same quarter last year. India, in turn, exported $205 million worth in goods to Pakistan during the first quarter, up 72 percent from the same quarter last year. Although these numbers are small compared to most other bilateral trade volumes around the world, the point is that they are rising—and doing so in spite of strict mutual restrictions on trade access. For example, India taxes Pakistani goods at 200 percent. New Delhi also revoked Islamabad's “most favored nation” trading status following the Pulwama attack. In 2019, Pakistan banned Indian imports outright, but then allowed Indian pharmaceuticals and drugs to enter the country during the COVID-19 pandemic, which paved the way for additional access.

One key factor for quietly improving relations is that India has lately been brimming with confidence. Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have done quite well for India. Modi, elected in 2014 and reelected by a landslide in 2019, will preside over a projected 7.5 percent growth rate in GDP this year despite mounting global uncertainties. Modi and his BJP government have also pursued an ultrarealist foreign policy, not only within India's neighborhood but globally as well, most recently by deftly navigating the fallout from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. India now has an unprecedentedly strong partnership with the United States, as well as countries throughout Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. China and Russia are simultaneously courting India. All this has put New Delhi at the crossroads of strategic competition and on the world stage for the first time, as I've written in Foreign Policy.

Such achievements have probably made engaging constructively with Pakistan less politically sensitive in New Delhi than in the past. In other words, Modi's and the BJP's detractors will be hard-pressed to credibly criticize them when things are going so well. And because the BJP is a Hindu nationalist party, the public overwhelmingly trusts the current government never to go soft on Pakistan—which gives Modi leeway his Indian National Congress party predecessors never had.

Another possibility is that New Delhi, through stepped-up engagement, may seek to persuade Islamabad to end or limit its support for terrorist proxies targeting India. This has become particularly crucial given Pakistan's longstanding support of the Taliban and the latter's reconquest of neighboring Afghanistan after last year's U.S. withdrawal. India worries that Afghanistan could once again become a safe haven and launching pad for future terrorist attacks against India. Productive working relations with Islamabad could complicate or disrupt terrorist activities and planning there.

On the Pakistani side, there are also good reasons to engage with India. For one thing, Pakistan has become highly dependent economically on China through Belt and Road Initiative investments, infrastructure projects, and trade. Many have argued that Pakistan is headed into a so-called debt trap with China. Thus, diversification to countries like India simply makes sense. Also, ever since the United States decided to suspend most security assistance to Pakistan under the Trump administration, the Pakistani military, which de facto runs the country, has been looking to get back into Washington's good graces as a counterbalance to Beijing. Given that India is an integral partner in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, Pakistan probably figures that peace with its neighbor might convince Washington to reset ties.

It is important to consider the state of Pakistani politics, too. Until his ouster in April, Prime Minister Imran Khan, a recalcitrant populist, tried to fundamentally alter Pakistani policies. On foreign policy, he stressed the need for Islamabad to pursue an “independent foreign policy” by exploring new opportunities. Khan was the first Pakistani leader to visit Russia in over 20 years, deepening ties while taking an increasingly anti-American position. All the while, he was moderating his India policy; at times, he even praised New Delhi, notwithstanding sharp criticism on Jammu and Kashmir. Significantly, Khan's approach on India reflected the views of his chief ally and patron, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, according to one of my Pakistani interlocutors.

However, after losing a no-confidence vote in parliament in April, Khan was forced to step down and make way for Sharif. One of the most pro-Indian politicians in Pakistan, Sharif began his tenure by stating, “We want peace with India.” Still, the extent to which he will actually pursue this policy remains unclear.

While the warming trend in India-Pakistan ties is encouraging, it makes sense to keep a healthy check on expectations. Events could easily derail progress. A terrorist attack connected to Pakistan and Indian retaliation, for example, could make both countries reconsider their approaches. This is precisely what happened soon after the image of Modi hugging then–Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif went around the world in 2015 and instilled newfound hope the two nuclear-armed states might finally be getting along. Then the Pathankot and Uri terrorist attacks set bilateral ties back once again.

Additionally, any slight, real or perceived, could easily escalate to renewed tensions, especially if it suggests disrespect for either Hinduism or Islam. The United States, too, could inadvertently deepen divisions. For example, Washington's latest sale of an F-16 fighter aircraft upgrade package to Islamabad has irked New Delhi, which believes the United States is purposefully arming Pakistan to fight India.

Despite their thawing relationship, neither India nor Pakistan has fundamentally changed its threat perception of the other.

But the most important caveat is that despite their thawing relationship, neither India nor Pakistan has fundamentally changed its threat perception of the other. For instance, Islamabad's first-ever National Security Policy, released (PDF) in January, briefly mentions the importance of forging peace with India but focuses the vast majority of discussion on New Delhi's “hegemonic” goals and Indian oppression of Kashmiris. India has also been reluctant to seize the initiative and pursue peace, waiting instead for Pakistan to make the first move. Indeed, the last couple of weeks have featured dueling speeches by Indian and Pakistani leaders at both the SCO summit and United Nations General Assembly, suggesting the relationship will remain chilly for the foreseeable future.

There are, however, additional positive steps both sides could take to keep the increasingly friendly momentum going. One could be reappointing their respective high commissioners, the equivalent of ambassador among members of the British Commonwealth, which both countries still are. The last ones were sacked in August 2019 over Modi's decision on revoking constitutional autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir. Another might be to remove some of the many restrictions on bilateral trade and investment. Ultimately, it will take trust for India and Pakistan to normalize their relationship, especially around the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. Unfortunately, trust can only develop organically over time. There is simply no way to speed up that process—or even know what might derail it.
www.rand.org

India-Pakistan Ties Are Warming—but Don't Get Excited Just Yet

While the warming trend in India-Pakistan ties is encouraging, it makes sense to keep a healthy check on expectations. Events could easily derail progress. Ultimately, it will take trust for India and Pakistan to normalize their relationship, and developing trust takes time.
www.rand.org www.rand.org
 

How spymasters from India and Pakistan almost made a secret peace deal on Kashmir​

On 28 August 2015 the late A.K. Verma, former Indian foreign Intelligence chief, wrote an op-ed in a national daily about the two rounds of secret talks in Amman and Geneva between chiefs of ISI and R&AW. He wrote a third person account of this meeting instead of saying that the Indian side was represented by him. He said that the initiative came from Gen. Zia himself early in 1988 as he felt that precious resources were being wasted on Defence budget due to Indo-Pakistan tensions.



He then approached the then Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan to use his good offices to convince the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Prince Hassan, who was removed from this position three weeks before the death of King Hussein of Jordan on 9 February 1999, had married Sarvath Ikramullah, daughter of Mohammad Ikramullah, the first Foreign Secretary of Pakistan. Former Indian Vice-President Mohammad Hidayatullah (1979-84) was Ikramullah’s younger brother.


Verma wrote this piece after the death of Hamid Gul on 15 August 2015: “Former head of Inter-Services Intelligence Gen. Hamid Gul who died recently, has been described in the Indian media as a monster, the originator and perpetrator of terrorism against India. Yet, there is another side of his personality which needs to be disclosed.”


The agreement finalised in these meetings would have resolved many bilateral disputes such as Siachen and stimulated confidence building measures such as the reduction of Pakistani and Indian troops all over including at LOC and Siachen. Gul started the talks by frankly admitting that Pakistan was fomenting terrorism against India as it was afraid of India’s size. He said that it was the responsibility of India to instil confidence in a smaller country like Pakistan. Verma did not mention this in his op-ed piece but he had told me this at that time as I was working as his chief staff officer.


However, various events intervened before the two governments could take follow up steps to crystallise the gains of this meeting. The suspicious death of Gen. Zia, the removal of Gen. Gul from the ISI post and the mysterious death of the then Pakistan High Commissioner Niaz Naik contributed to the suspicion in India that Pakistan military had torpedoed these conciliation efforts. It may be recalled that Gen. Zia who had agreed to this dialogue had died in a terror incident on 17 August 1988. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who succeeded Gen. Zia removed Gen. Gul from the ISI post on 4 October 1989.



The late Verma mentioned that the then Pakistan High Commissioner Niaz Naik, who was the only one privy to these talks, also died in mysterious circumstances. When the Indian side tried to follow up, Pakistan told them that they had no papers on these secret talks. Verma also cited the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s last interview to Barbara Crosette of The New York Times, a few hours before his assassination on 21 May 1991, that “we were close to finishing agreement on Kashmir; we had the maps and everything ready to sign.” And then he was killed. Verma concluded: “It is thus clear that Pakistani generals will go to any extent to prevent a new page opening up in Indo-Pakistan relations.” I must however add here that Niaz Naik died years later, no doubt under suspicious circumstances, on 8 August 2009. I do not know whether it is correct to link this with Gul-Verma talks. It is however true that he was involved in back-channel talks even during Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee’s period. “Dawn” (Aug 9, 2009) said that he had even travelled to New Delhi incognito to avoid detection.


Hein G. Kiessling, a German author of the Ludwig Maximilian University, who has written the most authentic history of ISI by far, has a different version. I had reviewed this book for Indian readers. He says that Gen. Zia’s Hercules C-130 crash was attributed to a mechanical malfunction by the American side of the Joint Investigation Team. However, the Pakistan side maintained that it was a criminal act or sabotage. Americans had as much interest in the case as Pakistan, as their Ambassador to Pakistan, Arnold Raphael, and Brig. General Herbert Wassom, the senior Pentagon figure in American embassy at that time, had also died along with Pakistan’s Chief of General Staff, Gen. Akhtar, and eight Pakistani generals.


Kiessling says that it was the US Ambassador in India, John Gunther Dean, who was convinced that Zia’s death was an Indian Israeli plan assisted by the KGB and the Afghan Secret Service KHAD, with help from Pakistan. He says: “When Dean made his theory public, he was ordered back to the State Department; and when he held strongly to his conviction, he was declared mentally incompetent and prematurely dismissed from the diplomatic service.”


When the Congress-led coalition was in power, Home Minister P. Chidambaram tried out an experiment in 2012 of including Intelligence and key investigating agencies in the Home Secretary level talks. Thus, IB director Nehchal Sandhu, CBI director A.P. Singh, and NIA Director S.C. Sinha were included in the team led by HomeSecretary R.K. Singh (present minister in the BJP government) for the talks held at Islamabad on 24-25 May 2012. This was a one-time experiment and not intelligence liaison. No assessment is available in public domain on the results of this experiment.
theprint.in

How spymasters from India and Pakistan almost made a secret peace deal on Kashmir

In 'Intelligence Over Centuries', Vappala Balachandran gives lesser-known information about secret talks between chiefs of ISI and R&AW on Kashmir.
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Pak high commission issues 96 visas to Indian pilgrims​

Pakistan on Monday issued 96 visas to a group of Indian pilgrims to visit the Katas Raj Temple during December 20-25, Pakistan high commission said on Monday.

Visas are issued to Sikh and Hindu pilgrims from India in line with the Pakistan government’s efforts to facilitate visits to religious shrines, the Pakistan high commission in New Delhi said in a statement.

Each year, a sizeable number of Sikh and Hindu pilgrims from India visit Pakistan to participate in various religious festivals and occasions. “A large number of Indian Hindus are also issued visas by the Pakistan high commission to visit their families and friends in Pakistan,” the statement said.

Charge d’affaires Aftab Hasan Khan, the senior-most diplomat at the Pakistani mission, wished the Indian pilgrims a “spiritually rewarding pilgrimage and underlined that Pakistan remains committed to preserving sacred religious sites and providing all possible assistance to the visiting pilgrims of all faiths.”

The visit of Indian pilgrims to the Katas Raj Temple is covered under the bilateral Protocol on Visits to Religious Shrines of 1974.
www.hindustantimes.com

Pak high commission issues 96 visas to Indian pilgrims

The visit of Indian pilgrims to the Katas Raj Temple is covered under the bilateral Protocol on Visits to Religious Shrines of 1974
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