There's having principles with some flexibility and having none at all. Russia, China, Iran, DPRK have none at all.
Israel-Hamas Conflict: Updates & Discussions
- Thread starter Ashwin
- Start date
Ceasefire with Hezbollah approved.
www.aljazeera.com
Updates: Israel agrees to Lebanon ceasefire; set to start at 4am
These were the updates on Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and war on Gaza for Tuesday, November 26.
Well, there's an awful lot of UN agencies and 'charities' operating in that conflict that should also be going to the ICC, as should the Iranian Ayatollah. What the arrest warrant against Netanyahu is primarily about is South Africa being butthurt about not being able to invite Putin to a meeting and being antisemitic. South Africa breaks human rights even in peacetime.
World Report 2024: Rights Trends in South Africa
It's like Ted Bundy bringing a murder case against someone.
Last edited:
Que reste-t-il de la flotte russe en mer Méditerranée?
What is left of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean?
With the departure of the Tartous naval base in Syria, temporarily linked to the fall of the Assad regime, the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean faces a host of difficulties. Part of this fleet remains blocked in the ‘Syrian Channel’. From the Spanish coast to the central Mediterranean, the entire naval fleet seems to be affected by major logistical and operational shortcomings.
In the west, the convoy formed by the cargo ship Ursa Major and the cargo ship Sparta suffered a serious setback at the end of December, when the Ursa Major sank off the coast of Spain on 25 December, jeopardising the delivery of military equipment to the Russian navy.
The Yantar in action
In the central Mediterranean, the intelligence-gathering ‘oceanographic vessel’ Yantar (part of the Russian GUGI: a unit that carries out espionage and sabotage missions, particularly against submarine cables) appears to be continuing its missions to target sensitive submarine cables, as evidenced by its prolonged deployment and erratic movements, particularly in the south of Sardinia and in the Sicilian Channel.
The Yantar has also been spotted in recent days close to the position where the Ursa Major sank. The ship was carrying an unusual cargo: 370-tonne cranes, possibly intended to equip a new Russian home port in the region. This is a major loss, especially as the cranes were obviously purchased from a Western European manufacturer.
See alsoWhat we know about the Russian cargo ship that sank in the Mediterranean Sea
At this stage, we can only speculate. Did the crew of the Yantar try to salvage sensitive materials from the wreck? Did they carry out investigations to determine the reasons for the sinking?
The Yantar has sophisticated equipment (drones and underwater robots) enabling it to carry out a wide range of underwater operations. On several occasions, it has been reported in the vicinity of sensitive installations in the Sicilian Channel, before making its way to the eastern Mediterranean and finally returning to the central Mediterranean in early January 2025.
Its modus operandi follows a recurring pattern, consisting of adopting a stationary position at a short distance from submarine cables to carry out what appear to be mapping activities.
Warning shots?
Smoke from warning shots to force the Yantar to divert © Document exclusif via RFI
Senior military officers told RFI that on 9 January, while operating south of Sardinia, a visually identifiable incident - characterised by a sudden emission of smoke a few lengths in front of its bow - forced it to move away from the area. The simultaneous presence of allied military aircraft in the vicinity of the vessel suggests that this was an intimidation manoeuvre designed to force the Yantar to stop its surveys.
In any case, the Yantar appears to have passed through the Straits of Gibraltar towards the Atlantic at the end of last week.
Difficulties off Syria
The most visible impasse remains at Tartous, where several amphibious ships are concentrated in the Syrian Channel, including the Ivan Gren and the Aleksandr Otrakovsky, as well as the cargo ships Sparta and Sparta II, the Baltic Leader and the tanker Skobelev. The logistics ships are unable to load the hundreds of containers and land vehicles that were able to reach the former Russian naval base after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. To date, the new Syrian authorities have not publicly stated their position on the conditions of access to the Tartous port facilities. Without the authorisation of the new masters of Damascus, the prospect of an orderly Russian military disengagement seems out of reach.
In the same sector, technical failures are piling up. The watermaker on the Aleksandr Otrakovsky is said to have broken down, while the ship's fuel tanks are leaking. The damage increased with each passing day spent at anchor, without the benefit of the infrastructure essential for the maintenance of military vessels.
The loss of the port of Tartous made it necessary to make refuelling stops in various ports in the region, particularly in Egypt and Libya.
These fragmented logistics highlight the fragility of Russia's position. Deprived of its Syrian sanctuary, the Russian navy now has to disperse and deal with several temporary support points.
A chain of logistical failures
Reorganisation of the Russian oil supply chain, which is vital to the successful disengagement from Syria.
Russia's maritime capabilities in the Mediterranean are facing supply problems. After a stopover in Egypt, the support ship Vyazma, which was supposed to supply the various Russian units with fuel and food, reportedly no longer has sufficient stocks to support the naval group, according to French military sources.
Russian ships deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean are also likely to suffer from a prolonged wait. It should be noted that the length of the round trips to Russia (which can take up to seven weeks) complicates the delivery of food and fuel supplies.
No submarine support
For several weeks now, Russia has had no submarine capacity in the Mediterranean since the withdrawal of the Kilo-class submarine Novorossyisk, which was forced to leave Tartous on 8 December last year due to a lack of technical support on the quayside. After one hundred and sixteen days of deployment, the submarine was forced to surface in order to reach its home port by crossing the Straits of Gibraltar.
With no specialised tugboat in the area, in early January the Novorossyisk had to surface along the French Atlantic coast, under the constant vigilance of Western navies, before returning to the Baltic Sea.
Russia also tried to deploy the Krasnodar, another Kilo-class submarine, from the Baltic Sea at the beginning of January. However, it became stuck in the Danish Straits following a technical incident with its escort vessel, the workshop ship Sergey Balk. Despite the arrival of support ships and tugs dispatched from Kaliningrad, the naval group was unable to resume its progress, and the Krasnodar finally turned back alongside the frigate Soobrazitelniy and the tug Evgeniy Churov on 8 January.
The Russian navy therefore no longer seems to be able, either totally or with great difficulty, to articulate a coherent presence for its fleet in the highly strategic Mediterranean Sea.
What is left of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean?
With the departure of the Tartous naval base in Syria, temporarily linked to the fall of the Assad regime, the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean faces a host of difficulties. Part of this fleet remains blocked in the ‘Syrian Channel’. From the Spanish coast to the central Mediterranean, the entire naval fleet seems to be affected by major logistical and operational shortcomings.
In the west, the convoy formed by the cargo ship Ursa Major and the cargo ship Sparta suffered a serious setback at the end of December, when the Ursa Major sank off the coast of Spain on 25 December, jeopardising the delivery of military equipment to the Russian navy.
The Yantar in action
In the central Mediterranean, the intelligence-gathering ‘oceanographic vessel’ Yantar (part of the Russian GUGI: a unit that carries out espionage and sabotage missions, particularly against submarine cables) appears to be continuing its missions to target sensitive submarine cables, as evidenced by its prolonged deployment and erratic movements, particularly in the south of Sardinia and in the Sicilian Channel.
The Yantar has also been spotted in recent days close to the position where the Ursa Major sank. The ship was carrying an unusual cargo: 370-tonne cranes, possibly intended to equip a new Russian home port in the region. This is a major loss, especially as the cranes were obviously purchased from a Western European manufacturer.
See alsoWhat we know about the Russian cargo ship that sank in the Mediterranean Sea
At this stage, we can only speculate. Did the crew of the Yantar try to salvage sensitive materials from the wreck? Did they carry out investigations to determine the reasons for the sinking?
The Yantar has sophisticated equipment (drones and underwater robots) enabling it to carry out a wide range of underwater operations. On several occasions, it has been reported in the vicinity of sensitive installations in the Sicilian Channel, before making its way to the eastern Mediterranean and finally returning to the central Mediterranean in early January 2025.
Its modus operandi follows a recurring pattern, consisting of adopting a stationary position at a short distance from submarine cables to carry out what appear to be mapping activities.
Warning shots?
Smoke from warning shots to force the Yantar to divert © Document exclusif via RFI
Senior military officers told RFI that on 9 January, while operating south of Sardinia, a visually identifiable incident - characterised by a sudden emission of smoke a few lengths in front of its bow - forced it to move away from the area. The simultaneous presence of allied military aircraft in the vicinity of the vessel suggests that this was an intimidation manoeuvre designed to force the Yantar to stop its surveys.
In any case, the Yantar appears to have passed through the Straits of Gibraltar towards the Atlantic at the end of last week.
Difficulties off Syria
The most visible impasse remains at Tartous, where several amphibious ships are concentrated in the Syrian Channel, including the Ivan Gren and the Aleksandr Otrakovsky, as well as the cargo ships Sparta and Sparta II, the Baltic Leader and the tanker Skobelev. The logistics ships are unable to load the hundreds of containers and land vehicles that were able to reach the former Russian naval base after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. To date, the new Syrian authorities have not publicly stated their position on the conditions of access to the Tartous port facilities. Without the authorisation of the new masters of Damascus, the prospect of an orderly Russian military disengagement seems out of reach.
In the same sector, technical failures are piling up. The watermaker on the Aleksandr Otrakovsky is said to have broken down, while the ship's fuel tanks are leaking. The damage increased with each passing day spent at anchor, without the benefit of the infrastructure essential for the maintenance of military vessels.
The loss of the port of Tartous made it necessary to make refuelling stops in various ports in the region, particularly in Egypt and Libya.
These fragmented logistics highlight the fragility of Russia's position. Deprived of its Syrian sanctuary, the Russian navy now has to disperse and deal with several temporary support points.
A chain of logistical failures
Reorganisation of the Russian oil supply chain, which is vital to the successful disengagement from Syria.
Russia's maritime capabilities in the Mediterranean are facing supply problems. After a stopover in Egypt, the support ship Vyazma, which was supposed to supply the various Russian units with fuel and food, reportedly no longer has sufficient stocks to support the naval group, according to French military sources.
Russian ships deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean are also likely to suffer from a prolonged wait. It should be noted that the length of the round trips to Russia (which can take up to seven weeks) complicates the delivery of food and fuel supplies.
No submarine support
For several weeks now, Russia has had no submarine capacity in the Mediterranean since the withdrawal of the Kilo-class submarine Novorossyisk, which was forced to leave Tartous on 8 December last year due to a lack of technical support on the quayside. After one hundred and sixteen days of deployment, the submarine was forced to surface in order to reach its home port by crossing the Straits of Gibraltar.
With no specialised tugboat in the area, in early January the Novorossyisk had to surface along the French Atlantic coast, under the constant vigilance of Western navies, before returning to the Baltic Sea.
Russia also tried to deploy the Krasnodar, another Kilo-class submarine, from the Baltic Sea at the beginning of January. However, it became stuck in the Danish Straits following a technical incident with its escort vessel, the workshop ship Sergey Balk. Despite the arrival of support ships and tugs dispatched from Kaliningrad, the naval group was unable to resume its progress, and the Krasnodar finally turned back alongside the frigate Soobrazitelniy and the tug Evgeniy Churov on 8 January.
The Russian navy therefore no longer seems to be able, either totally or with great difficulty, to articulate a coherent presence for its fleet in the highly strategic Mediterranean Sea.
Trump wants Jordan and Egypt to accept more Palestinian refugees and floats plan to 'clean out' Gaza
Trump said he discussed his vision on a call earlier in the day with King Abdullah II of Jordan and would speak Sunday with President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi of Egypt.
apnews.com
Trump asks Egypt & Jordan to accept Palestinian refugees no doubt at the behest of his shlomo SiL Jared Kusher while Satanyahoo who was facing prosecution & dismissal from the office of the Prime Minister in October '23 , is laughing his way to the next election.
Revenge is sweet eh shlhomo sweetie . Ja? @Innominate