Sir.
Again the same non-sense. "Conventional parity".
How does decision making process determine conventional parity? It is a defence oriented forum here, not 'make your own stories' forum. Ridiculous.
LoC Warfare tactics
- Thread starter Levina
- Start date
Sir.
Again the same non-sense. "Conventional parity".
How does decision making process determine conventional parity? It is a defence oriented forum here, not 'make your own stories' forum. Ridiculous.
Sir.
In case of Indian Army, they are consistent. In case of Pakistan Army, they have the additional responsibility to look the other ways when militants sneak across. And to provide covering fire as necessary. But the primary role in Border Guarding, is being fulfilled even by the Pakistan Army.
I told you
decision making + fire power + territory gain decides conventional equilibrium wrt to Pakistan. If this was not taken in consideration before then it should be now.
Update the definition then
Read your sentence here. Do instruct us on how having two land masses separated by the expanse of a hostile nation, enabled Pakistan to achieve a conventional superiority? How does this logic come to fore?
Can you provide a reference for these considerations?
Pakistan took POK in 1948. India gets the hold on Kashmir through accession but was not able to push Pakistani forces out from POK. India loses the land due to UNSC resolution. and Pakistan gained some land and adds to it's administration.
India takes on Dhaka and equalizes the territorial loss w.r.t. Pakistan.
It gives them edge over Indian policy and maintaining the status quo. Because the Politician in India fear any operation inside Pakistan would result into skirmish.
They have fooled americans they will fool the chinese too. Their objective of making Kashmiris pro Pakistani/Freedom. This has worked because their military has carried out offensive covert ops in Kashmir. And many times Indian forces have been caught with their pants down due to lack of backbone in Delhi.
Status quo ante suits the Pakistani narrative because they do not OFFICIALLY claim Kashmir, they say Kashmir wants freedom. And status quo means India out of POK., which India claims! If you maintain status quo you would never get POK back.
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I highly doubt that its as simple as looking the other way and whistling. Logistics for troop movement, recon on patrol parties and studying patterns, engaging posts to deter intercept patrols to detect intrusion all is actively provided by Pakistani Army regulars on the Indian front. On the other side of the border, they have gone to the lengths of embedding forces with Hekymetyaar's Hizb -e-islami to lay siege to kabul. When it comes to internal administration, Pakistani army has been involved in running everything from real estate and sugar mills to political engineering and constitutional amendment. So, no the mandate of Pakistani army and Indian army are no where alike. While the Pakistani military's actions of maintaining sanctity of the border is one of its tasks, it's larger objective remains self preservation against all internal and external threats to it's self ordained mandate.
Indian army on the other hand being different in nature, has the mandate of protection of the state and it's interests, (interests having evolved at a later stage in our history); Indian army's actions are in nature, respond to stimuli (both strategic and tactical) rather than being proactive to meet the goals to achieve certain milestones to a larger road-map of the Pakistan military establishment.
The MO of both armies is essential to avoid trivialization border flareups that we often see. Provocation for flareup can be from either sides, but it is essential to understand the difference between, Indian forces tactical move to plot a machine gun nest or forcing a sniper relocation, vs pinning down a post to disrupt a patrol movement to push insurgents by the Pakistanis. Both are tactical moves, but the underpinning factors are vastly different.
Sir.
Since when has this concept come into play? Conventional Parity you had specifically mentioned, and that you are yet to elaborate on.
Funny.
Incorrect sir. India does not lose the land due to UNSC, but out of own choice as evident in the original move to invole UNSC and then in the negotiations in aftermath of Indo-Pak War of 1971. Amusing to note your attempts at twisting the narrative.
What a funny logic! So how would you explain the loss of Chhamb?
Your post here indicates your incapability to carry out a meaningful discussion. I should have understood this earlier. Funny, that skirmish would be the only thing occurring if we undertake an operation inside Pakistan.
Are you convinced that they have fooled US and China is next? Is not the 70s a decade witness to US ignoring it's own misgivings over Pakistani Nuclear Program and moves to undermine the same, only to be ignored with the 1979 overt intervention in Afghanistan by USSR necessitating the recruitment of Pakistan in fight against USSR and turning a blind eye to it's nuclear programs, a classical case of quid pro quo?
You are surely mistaken here, no?
Reference all your claims here sir.
Incorrect. Their PM very recently confirmed the fact that "azadi" is not an option for them.
Pak PM Shahid Khaqan Abbasi Rejects Idea Of An 'Independent Kashmir', Says 'It's Not Based On Reality'
Silence of Hurriyat Conference – Kashmir Trends
Amusing.
This is the concept which IA should follow. Otherwise every one is aware that how much bureaucracy has been fed into Military.
keep moaning
Pakistani forces thrust into fertile region and keeps 120 sqr miles of territory till date. And India retains some territory which belonged to Pak as per you, in Kargil.
And never was able to make them evacuate the region. I am sure People like you might have asked for refrence in the book whether to go in or not . Haha
Keep asking for refrence dude. I am sure people like you are those retired fellows who enjoyed sitting on chair rather than making robust policy. The new generation will never forgive kaamchors like you.
No I am not mistaken,
I have made a point and you need to update your knowledge about Pakistan.
December 29, 2017: Pakistan fears the United States and India will carry out more unauthorized attacks inside Pakistan against Islamic terrorist targets. Pakistan is particularly concerned with protecting the Haqqani Network, an Afghan led group that has prospered under Pakistani protection and is now believed to control the leadership of the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan has long denied any connection with Haqqani, much less control of the group, but there is much evidence that ISI (Pakistani Intelligence) works closely with Haqqani. Growing American (and international) pressure has forced Pakistan to say it is acting against Haqqani. There is little evidence of that. Meanwhile Pakistan insists that most Islamic terrorism inside Pakistan is the work of India with the help of the Americans and Israelis. Pakistan now describes this as an American secret strategy of creating perpetual instability in South Asia. Pakistan is the only South Asian nation that agrees with this analysis. Actually the foreign policy of the Pakistani military is to stage such attacks itself, in Afghanistan and India. This is now the Pakistani military justifies and perpetuates its dominant position in Pakistani politics and the economy. It is how the Pakistani military manages (successfully so far) to run the government without actually being the government. Power without responsibility plus generous retirement benefits, immunity from prosecution for most crimes and all those nifty uniforms and parades. No wonder a military career is so popular among the best families.
Yet there are sometimes unpleasant things that must be done, no matter how senior your rank. For example the head of the Pakistani military (army general Qamar Bajwa) recently spoke before parliament to brief the legislators on the state of Pakistani military security and the military efforts against Islamic terrorism and other enemies of Pakistan. The Pakistani military, especially its senior general, rarely reports to parliament. The last time this happened was after the 2011 American raid that killed Osama bin Laden in his Pakistani hideout and left with the bin Laden corpse and massive amounts of documents, many of them detailing how the Pakistani military had lied to the world about secret support for al Qaeda and many other Islamic terror groups.
After 2011 the military made a few changes involved things like going to war with Islamic terror groups that carried out unauthorized (by the military) attacks inside Pakistan. This included shutting down sanctuaries these groups (particularly the Pakistani Taliban) had long used. The army literally invaded the main sanctuary (North Waziristan) in mid-2014 and is still fighting there and nearby areas. This greatly reduced Islamic terror related deaths inside Pakistan. There was still such violence inside Pakistan but most of it was done without permission from the military. What Islamic terrorism the military still used inside Pakistan had a specific purpose. Case in point is the growing use of blasphemy charges by Islamic religious parties against those who threaten military power. Most of these parties are either allies of the military or literally on the army payroll. This program includes the new Islamic political parties formed by Islamic terror groups that have long worked for the military to carry out attacks inside India. The Pakistani military wants to protect these Islamic terror groups and turning them into political parties is the latest ploy. The covert violence against foreign (Afghan and Indian targets) is against Pakistani and international law and the Pakistani military continues to claim that it is not involved.
To obtain the cooperation of Pakistani politicians the military uses a slightly different form of Islamic terrorism. This was in full view during late 2017 when the army refused government orders to help restore free access to the capital. General Bajwa was appearing before parliament, in part, to explain what was going on with that. It was a masterful performance. First he admitted that the military is, according to Pakistani law, subordinate to the elected government. General Bajwa then pointed out that as a good Moslem he was obliged take religious considerations into account. That was how he justified the recent refusal to provide troops to assist in removing thousands of civilians who were blocking the main roads into the capital.
This blockade was part of an effort to force a senior government official to resign for his involvement in a new law (not passed) that made a minor (to the rest of the world and most Pakistanis) change to the oath new officials take. For Islamic political parties deciding what is blasphemy and acting on it is why such parties exist. The Islamic political parties represent less than ten percent of the voters and want to impose Islamic (Sharia) law on all Pakistanis. Most Pakistanis, and especially the military, don’t agree with that but cannot express those views openly. The military has turned this threat to their advantage by controlling enough of these Islamic political parties to terrorize those who oppose the military. That includes most of the people in parliament. General Bajwa even took some questions, which men in his position rarely do. He said he wanted to make peace with India but when asked about army support for Islamic terror groups like Lashkar i Taiba to turn themselves into political parties he said it was legal and the army would not interfere. He also added that while the army did not support Islamic terror attacks on India men like Hafiz Saeed, the leader of Lashkar i Taiba, do and the army has no control over that. General Bajwa was indirectly telling parliament to not interfere. And it wasn’t just about reusing to help clear the roads.
It was army influence and pressure that, by November, got Islamic terrorist leader Hafiz Saeed freed from house arrest. This was a very unpopular decision inside Pakistan and around the world. Saeed is a known and quite notorious Islamic terrorist but since he works for the Pakistani military he is protected. Up to a point. In 2012 the U.S. announced a $10 million bounty for the arrest or conviction of Hafiz Saeed, who is accused of organizing the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks as well as 2001 attack on the Indian parliament. India and the United States have presented compelling evidence to implicate Saeed, but the Pakistani government refuses to prosecute. Inside Pakistan, many politicians and media outlets admit that Saeed is a major Islamic terrorist leader and the man behind the Mumbai attack and numerous other atrocities. Saeed has dared the U.S. to come and get him, which the current American government might actually do. Saeed has long headed the Islamic terror group Lashkar i Taiba, which in turn was organized and long supported by the Pakistani military, mainly to organize and carry out terrorist attacks in India. Note that the reward offer is only good if Saeed is delivered alive. That is a useful condition and justifies the plan to turn its favorite Islamic terror groups (mainly the ones that attack India and do so because of Kashmir) into political parties to give these groups and their leaders even more protection from domestic or foreign interference. The major fear the Pakistani generals have is that the Americans will, as they did with bin Laden, apply “dead or alive” conditions to the reward. So far the Pakistani military has been able to protect Saeed although he has not been an international criminal for as long as bin Laden was before he was taken down.
One of the ironies of this situation is that what was used to protect bin Laden and, even more so, guys like Saeed are blasphemy laws. Like many Moslem majority nations Pakistan has laws that actually encourage religious violence and the military has regarded that as a useful tool. The most damaging instance of this are the blasphemy laws enacted in the 1970s. These allow for prosecution of anyone accused of speaking or acting against Islam. While no one had ever been officially executed because of these laws, many are accused and jailed each year, and often condemned to death (and later reprieved). But a growing number of those accused have been murdered by Islamic fanatics, who are a large, and violent, minority of the population. Accusations of blasphemy are mostly used by Moslems against innocent non-Moslems (usually Christians) but also against each other. For example the Pakistani Taliban is a Sunni group that encourage attacks on “blasphemers”. This usually means Shia but there are other non-Sunni Moslem groups that will do, as well as Christians and Jews. Hindus are considered pagans and require no encouragement for a devout Moslem to go after. The Taliban also considers any Sunni who does not support them a heretic and deserving of punishment.
Efforts to repeal these laws, or at least limit their misuse, are violently resisted by Islamic political parties and the military. It was the military that created these laws back when it decided to turn Islamic terrorism into a secret weapon for use against its enemies. The military still uses false blasphemy charges as an excuse to silence (often by death) media and political opponents. This sort of thing has gotten worse as the Pakistani military is put under more pressure to cease supporting Islamic terrorism.
For example, in late 2012 Islamic political parties in Pakistan forced the government to block over 20,000 websites, including YouTube, for displaying material considered critical of Islam. In addition the pro-Islamic parties organized dozens of demonstrations to protest, often violently, an American film accused of being anti-Islam. These demonstrations were part of an effort by the Islamic parties to establish themselves as censors for all Pakistanis. The 2012 crackdown began earlier in the year when the government blocked national access to Twitter for most of the day, apparently because of blasphemous (to some Moslems) activity on Twitter. Every day, if not every hour, there is something on Twitter that Islamic conservatives would consider blasphemous. What the Pakistani government particularly disliked about Twitter was that it was a speedy conduit of reports on bad behavior by the Pakistani officials. Shutting Twitter down for a sustained period would be enormously unpopular inside Pakistan and that’s why the threat evaporated. Yet the Islamic politicians kept at it and in July 2017 a senior Facebook executive met with the Pakistani Interior Ministry to discuss Pakistan demands that Facebook monitor and censor Facebook posts that Pakistani law considers blasphemous against Islam, especially if the message was posted by one of the 33 million Pakistani Facebook users. A Pakistani Facebook user had recently been sentenced to death for such a post and that prompted Facebook to meet with Pakistani officials and help sustain the illusion that the Internet could be censored. That served the goals of the Pakistani military, who were after individual critics not everyone who uses Facebook and Twitter. After all the Pakistani officers make enough to be comfortably middle class and the younger members of these families are big fans of the Internet. But individuals who criticize the Pakistani military via the Internet do not have a lot of fans among military families
India-Pakistan: Power Without Responsibility
Yet there are sometimes unpleasant things that must be done, no matter how senior your rank. For example the head of the Pakistani military (army general Qamar Bajwa) recently spoke before parliament to brief the legislators on the state of Pakistani military security and the military efforts against Islamic terrorism and other enemies of Pakistan. The Pakistani military, especially its senior general, rarely reports to parliament. The last time this happened was after the 2011 American raid that killed Osama bin Laden in his Pakistani hideout and left with the bin Laden corpse and massive amounts of documents, many of them detailing how the Pakistani military had lied to the world about secret support for al Qaeda and many other Islamic terror groups.
After 2011 the military made a few changes involved things like going to war with Islamic terror groups that carried out unauthorized (by the military) attacks inside Pakistan. This included shutting down sanctuaries these groups (particularly the Pakistani Taliban) had long used. The army literally invaded the main sanctuary (North Waziristan) in mid-2014 and is still fighting there and nearby areas. This greatly reduced Islamic terror related deaths inside Pakistan. There was still such violence inside Pakistan but most of it was done without permission from the military. What Islamic terrorism the military still used inside Pakistan had a specific purpose. Case in point is the growing use of blasphemy charges by Islamic religious parties against those who threaten military power. Most of these parties are either allies of the military or literally on the army payroll. This program includes the new Islamic political parties formed by Islamic terror groups that have long worked for the military to carry out attacks inside India. The Pakistani military wants to protect these Islamic terror groups and turning them into political parties is the latest ploy. The covert violence against foreign (Afghan and Indian targets) is against Pakistani and international law and the Pakistani military continues to claim that it is not involved.
To obtain the cooperation of Pakistani politicians the military uses a slightly different form of Islamic terrorism. This was in full view during late 2017 when the army refused government orders to help restore free access to the capital. General Bajwa was appearing before parliament, in part, to explain what was going on with that. It was a masterful performance. First he admitted that the military is, according to Pakistani law, subordinate to the elected government. General Bajwa then pointed out that as a good Moslem he was obliged take religious considerations into account. That was how he justified the recent refusal to provide troops to assist in removing thousands of civilians who were blocking the main roads into the capital.
This blockade was part of an effort to force a senior government official to resign for his involvement in a new law (not passed) that made a minor (to the rest of the world and most Pakistanis) change to the oath new officials take. For Islamic political parties deciding what is blasphemy and acting on it is why such parties exist. The Islamic political parties represent less than ten percent of the voters and want to impose Islamic (Sharia) law on all Pakistanis. Most Pakistanis, and especially the military, don’t agree with that but cannot express those views openly. The military has turned this threat to their advantage by controlling enough of these Islamic political parties to terrorize those who oppose the military. That includes most of the people in parliament. General Bajwa even took some questions, which men in his position rarely do. He said he wanted to make peace with India but when asked about army support for Islamic terror groups like Lashkar i Taiba to turn themselves into political parties he said it was legal and the army would not interfere. He also added that while the army did not support Islamic terror attacks on India men like Hafiz Saeed, the leader of Lashkar i Taiba, do and the army has no control over that. General Bajwa was indirectly telling parliament to not interfere. And it wasn’t just about reusing to help clear the roads.
It was army influence and pressure that, by November, got Islamic terrorist leader Hafiz Saeed freed from house arrest. This was a very unpopular decision inside Pakistan and around the world. Saeed is a known and quite notorious Islamic terrorist but since he works for the Pakistani military he is protected. Up to a point. In 2012 the U.S. announced a $10 million bounty for the arrest or conviction of Hafiz Saeed, who is accused of organizing the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks as well as 2001 attack on the Indian parliament. India and the United States have presented compelling evidence to implicate Saeed, but the Pakistani government refuses to prosecute. Inside Pakistan, many politicians and media outlets admit that Saeed is a major Islamic terrorist leader and the man behind the Mumbai attack and numerous other atrocities. Saeed has dared the U.S. to come and get him, which the current American government might actually do. Saeed has long headed the Islamic terror group Lashkar i Taiba, which in turn was organized and long supported by the Pakistani military, mainly to organize and carry out terrorist attacks in India. Note that the reward offer is only good if Saeed is delivered alive. That is a useful condition and justifies the plan to turn its favorite Islamic terror groups (mainly the ones that attack India and do so because of Kashmir) into political parties to give these groups and their leaders even more protection from domestic or foreign interference. The major fear the Pakistani generals have is that the Americans will, as they did with bin Laden, apply “dead or alive” conditions to the reward. So far the Pakistani military has been able to protect Saeed although he has not been an international criminal for as long as bin Laden was before he was taken down.
One of the ironies of this situation is that what was used to protect bin Laden and, even more so, guys like Saeed are blasphemy laws. Like many Moslem majority nations Pakistan has laws that actually encourage religious violence and the military has regarded that as a useful tool. The most damaging instance of this are the blasphemy laws enacted in the 1970s. These allow for prosecution of anyone accused of speaking or acting against Islam. While no one had ever been officially executed because of these laws, many are accused and jailed each year, and often condemned to death (and later reprieved). But a growing number of those accused have been murdered by Islamic fanatics, who are a large, and violent, minority of the population. Accusations of blasphemy are mostly used by Moslems against innocent non-Moslems (usually Christians) but also against each other. For example the Pakistani Taliban is a Sunni group that encourage attacks on “blasphemers”. This usually means Shia but there are other non-Sunni Moslem groups that will do, as well as Christians and Jews. Hindus are considered pagans and require no encouragement for a devout Moslem to go after. The Taliban also considers any Sunni who does not support them a heretic and deserving of punishment.
Efforts to repeal these laws, or at least limit their misuse, are violently resisted by Islamic political parties and the military. It was the military that created these laws back when it decided to turn Islamic terrorism into a secret weapon for use against its enemies. The military still uses false blasphemy charges as an excuse to silence (often by death) media and political opponents. This sort of thing has gotten worse as the Pakistani military is put under more pressure to cease supporting Islamic terrorism.
For example, in late 2012 Islamic political parties in Pakistan forced the government to block over 20,000 websites, including YouTube, for displaying material considered critical of Islam. In addition the pro-Islamic parties organized dozens of demonstrations to protest, often violently, an American film accused of being anti-Islam. These demonstrations were part of an effort by the Islamic parties to establish themselves as censors for all Pakistanis. The 2012 crackdown began earlier in the year when the government blocked national access to Twitter for most of the day, apparently because of blasphemous (to some Moslems) activity on Twitter. Every day, if not every hour, there is something on Twitter that Islamic conservatives would consider blasphemous. What the Pakistani government particularly disliked about Twitter was that it was a speedy conduit of reports on bad behavior by the Pakistani officials. Shutting Twitter down for a sustained period would be enormously unpopular inside Pakistan and that’s why the threat evaporated. Yet the Islamic politicians kept at it and in July 2017 a senior Facebook executive met with the Pakistani Interior Ministry to discuss Pakistan demands that Facebook monitor and censor Facebook posts that Pakistani law considers blasphemous against Islam, especially if the message was posted by one of the 33 million Pakistani Facebook users. A Pakistani Facebook user had recently been sentenced to death for such a post and that prompted Facebook to meet with Pakistani officials and help sustain the illusion that the Internet could be censored. That served the goals of the Pakistani military, who were after individual critics not everyone who uses Facebook and Twitter. After all the Pakistani officers make enough to be comfortably middle class and the younger members of these families are big fans of the Internet. But individuals who criticize the Pakistani military via the Internet do not have a lot of fans among military families
India-Pakistan: Power Without Responsibility
PLAN IS KEYMONDAY, JANUARY 01, 2018 BY INDIANDEFENSE NEWS
by Syed Ata Hasnain
The Indian Army needs, as part of a transformation of conflict with Pakistan, greater pro-activity and freedom to operate optimally to place its adversary under intense pressure
In 1983, I was deployed at a forward defended locality (FDL) in the Poonch sector as a company commander. It was a remote post surrounded on all sides by Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, where the Pakistan Army had an upper hand due to their deployment at a higher ground, and yet we kept them subdued due to intense engagement from well-concealed positions.
We kept the morale high through some sub-tactical-level psychological actions. Across the Betar Nala, I had a grandstand view of both Indian and Pakistani positions, rising up to the Raja Rani, which features the highest peaks on that part of the offshoot of the Pir Panjal; the area had seen intense fighting in both the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan. The Line of Control (LOC) ran between two trees standing like twins and visible from far away; they were called “Bhai Bhai” in typical cryptic army humour. Close to Raja Rani was a forested feature where a Pakistani helipad existed, obviously the battalion headquarters of the Pakistani unit; it was called Rakh Chikri (“Rakh” means forest). The entire area had a thick forest cover.
On 25 December 2017, I was forced to mentally recall the lay of the ground again as this was the exact area of the 59 Baluch against whom an Indian unit of the famous Poonch Brigade carried out a local tactical action across the LOC, killing an officer and three Jawans of the Pakistan Army. It was an act of retribution for the action carried out by the Pakistan Army at Keri against our troops, in which an officer and three bravehearts of 2 Sikh (Royal) were martyred.
The Indian action at Rakh Chikri was a tactical trans-LoC operation and not a surgical strike. The difference is essentially in the realm of objectives. In a surgical strike, specific objectives are chosen relating to the adversary’s infrastructure and locations, including terror camps, launch pads and training facilities, and the focus remains there; the distance could be deeper into the adversary’s ground. Any other operations conducted in adversary-held territory are incidental to the main operations.
In a local tactical operation, the penetration is comparatively shallow, but the number of troops could be comparable, operating as a number of small teams. They could be a mix of Special Forces and ghataks (commandos of the infantry units who are trained to a much higher degree of proficiency). The nature of operation is more akin to ambush, as routes of adversary patrols and logistics elements are well-known over the years. The Indian Army units are quite adept at these operations and can execute them without hiccups.
Pakistan chose to launch its operation against an Indian Army unit, 2 Sikh (Royal), in the Keri-defended area of the Rajouri sector, on 22 December 2017. A strike on the Kashmir LOC would have been much more difficult with the heavy snow conditions and missing foliage, which makes movement easier to discover. The Rajouri and Mendhar sectors are comparatively lower in altitude and in winter have the cover still reasonably intact. There are hundreds of such locations along the lower areas of the LOC south of the Pir Panjal, where there is enough broken ground through which infiltration is possible, and the LOC anti-infiltration fence runs close to the LOC. All these locations are patrolled by our troops for domination. The inevitable question should be why the strength of such patrols is small, making them vulnerable. The answer is that with the hundreds of responsibilities of troops at the LOC and the large number of such locations, there can only be a certain strength of troops available for patrolling the many gaps.
It also needs to be remembered that it is the Pakistan Army which has the initiative because it aids and abets in the infiltration of terrorists across the LOC. It also assists and in fact organises and leads Border Action Team (BAT) actions against our troops. The Indian Army has greater deployment, but it is more in responsive mode so as to counter infiltration and ensure the security of its posts. Much of the troop strength at our posts goes into these arduous tasks. Yet it cannot be denied that faster response systems and drills can assist in ensuring that the BAT cannot get away after having executed a task.
The answer lies in ensuring that the Indian Army sheds all qualms about conducting trans-LoC operations and any hesitation about the choice of objectives. If gloves have to be off, the ethics of LOC conflict may need to change. Already the Indian Army is dominating the exchanges of fire assault across the LOC. It only has to move up a few notches to shed inhibitions and prove that it can do one better than the Pakistan Army, a fact that it has proven in battle many a time.
I have conducted trans-LoC operations in my time when we were absolutely pressed to respond and can vouch that one strike would put the Pakistan Army into a shell and force it to become completely defensive. I have seen Pakistani FDLs lighting fires all night to illuminate areas around them because of the scare we imposed and psychological domination we achieved. To that extent, the swift decision of the government to give the Army’s Northern Command the green light to proceed and carry out retaliation for the criminal act that the Pakistan Army indulged in at Keri was most appropriate.
The choice of Rakh Chikri for the retribution did not surprise me. It is far removed from Keri (almost 120 km away), in a higher part of an offshoot of the Pir Panjal range where the separation is reasonably large, offering scope for movement. The adversary would least have expected a response in an area higher up in the mountains due to snow conditions (December was usually a month during which Rakh Chikri was white-shod; not known whether the same is true today).
It is well-known that the LOC has become for Pakistan a convenient location for strategic messaging. When it is unable to achieve anything substantial in other domains, such as operations in the Valley or Jammu, it resorts to an odd BAT action. Due to infrequency in execution, the predictability factor remains low while surprise is high. Maintaining a high level of vigil 24 x 7 x 365 is virtually impossible for the best of forces; there will be chinks in the armour and human failings at some point. What the Indian Army needs as part of a transformation of conflict with Pakistan is greater pro-activity and freedom to operate optimally to place its adversary under intense pressure.
The government does not appear to have placed shackles in the Army’s way, so it is up to its hierarchy to draw up a more offensive game plan. Ethics and qualms do not work here. There have been times the Indian Army has actually deliberately held back its offensive designs to allow the Pakistan Army to continue its counter-insurgency operations, for which troops from the LOC had also been withdrawn. We need to do the reverse so that a larger strength of the Pakistan Army is forced to return to the LOC and be on 24 x 7 vigil, awaiting Indian Army Ghataks and Special Forces who could be behind it or on its flanks.
Lastly, Pakistan is adept at choreographing events and executing its tactical actions in sync with them. The visit of Kulbhushan Jadhav’s family and their humiliation comes in close coordination with the trans-LoC operation at Keri. It is this which needs to be defeated more substantially with greater predictability and better war-gaming.
In Trans-LOC Operations, An Offensive Game Plan Is Key
by Syed Ata Hasnain
The Indian Army needs, as part of a transformation of conflict with Pakistan, greater pro-activity and freedom to operate optimally to place its adversary under intense pressure
In 1983, I was deployed at a forward defended locality (FDL) in the Poonch sector as a company commander. It was a remote post surrounded on all sides by Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, where the Pakistan Army had an upper hand due to their deployment at a higher ground, and yet we kept them subdued due to intense engagement from well-concealed positions.
We kept the morale high through some sub-tactical-level psychological actions. Across the Betar Nala, I had a grandstand view of both Indian and Pakistani positions, rising up to the Raja Rani, which features the highest peaks on that part of the offshoot of the Pir Panjal; the area had seen intense fighting in both the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan. The Line of Control (LOC) ran between two trees standing like twins and visible from far away; they were called “Bhai Bhai” in typical cryptic army humour. Close to Raja Rani was a forested feature where a Pakistani helipad existed, obviously the battalion headquarters of the Pakistani unit; it was called Rakh Chikri (“Rakh” means forest). The entire area had a thick forest cover.
On 25 December 2017, I was forced to mentally recall the lay of the ground again as this was the exact area of the 59 Baluch against whom an Indian unit of the famous Poonch Brigade carried out a local tactical action across the LOC, killing an officer and three Jawans of the Pakistan Army. It was an act of retribution for the action carried out by the Pakistan Army at Keri against our troops, in which an officer and three bravehearts of 2 Sikh (Royal) were martyred.
The Indian action at Rakh Chikri was a tactical trans-LoC operation and not a surgical strike. The difference is essentially in the realm of objectives. In a surgical strike, specific objectives are chosen relating to the adversary’s infrastructure and locations, including terror camps, launch pads and training facilities, and the focus remains there; the distance could be deeper into the adversary’s ground. Any other operations conducted in adversary-held territory are incidental to the main operations.
In a local tactical operation, the penetration is comparatively shallow, but the number of troops could be comparable, operating as a number of small teams. They could be a mix of Special Forces and ghataks (commandos of the infantry units who are trained to a much higher degree of proficiency). The nature of operation is more akin to ambush, as routes of adversary patrols and logistics elements are well-known over the years. The Indian Army units are quite adept at these operations and can execute them without hiccups.
Pakistan chose to launch its operation against an Indian Army unit, 2 Sikh (Royal), in the Keri-defended area of the Rajouri sector, on 22 December 2017. A strike on the Kashmir LOC would have been much more difficult with the heavy snow conditions and missing foliage, which makes movement easier to discover. The Rajouri and Mendhar sectors are comparatively lower in altitude and in winter have the cover still reasonably intact. There are hundreds of such locations along the lower areas of the LOC south of the Pir Panjal, where there is enough broken ground through which infiltration is possible, and the LOC anti-infiltration fence runs close to the LOC. All these locations are patrolled by our troops for domination. The inevitable question should be why the strength of such patrols is small, making them vulnerable. The answer is that with the hundreds of responsibilities of troops at the LOC and the large number of such locations, there can only be a certain strength of troops available for patrolling the many gaps.
It also needs to be remembered that it is the Pakistan Army which has the initiative because it aids and abets in the infiltration of terrorists across the LOC. It also assists and in fact organises and leads Border Action Team (BAT) actions against our troops. The Indian Army has greater deployment, but it is more in responsive mode so as to counter infiltration and ensure the security of its posts. Much of the troop strength at our posts goes into these arduous tasks. Yet it cannot be denied that faster response systems and drills can assist in ensuring that the BAT cannot get away after having executed a task.
The answer lies in ensuring that the Indian Army sheds all qualms about conducting trans-LoC operations and any hesitation about the choice of objectives. If gloves have to be off, the ethics of LOC conflict may need to change. Already the Indian Army is dominating the exchanges of fire assault across the LOC. It only has to move up a few notches to shed inhibitions and prove that it can do one better than the Pakistan Army, a fact that it has proven in battle many a time.
I have conducted trans-LoC operations in my time when we were absolutely pressed to respond and can vouch that one strike would put the Pakistan Army into a shell and force it to become completely defensive. I have seen Pakistani FDLs lighting fires all night to illuminate areas around them because of the scare we imposed and psychological domination we achieved. To that extent, the swift decision of the government to give the Army’s Northern Command the green light to proceed and carry out retaliation for the criminal act that the Pakistan Army indulged in at Keri was most appropriate.
The choice of Rakh Chikri for the retribution did not surprise me. It is far removed from Keri (almost 120 km away), in a higher part of an offshoot of the Pir Panjal range where the separation is reasonably large, offering scope for movement. The adversary would least have expected a response in an area higher up in the mountains due to snow conditions (December was usually a month during which Rakh Chikri was white-shod; not known whether the same is true today).
It is well-known that the LOC has become for Pakistan a convenient location for strategic messaging. When it is unable to achieve anything substantial in other domains, such as operations in the Valley or Jammu, it resorts to an odd BAT action. Due to infrequency in execution, the predictability factor remains low while surprise is high. Maintaining a high level of vigil 24 x 7 x 365 is virtually impossible for the best of forces; there will be chinks in the armour and human failings at some point. What the Indian Army needs as part of a transformation of conflict with Pakistan is greater pro-activity and freedom to operate optimally to place its adversary under intense pressure.
The government does not appear to have placed shackles in the Army’s way, so it is up to its hierarchy to draw up a more offensive game plan. Ethics and qualms do not work here. There have been times the Indian Army has actually deliberately held back its offensive designs to allow the Pakistan Army to continue its counter-insurgency operations, for which troops from the LOC had also been withdrawn. We need to do the reverse so that a larger strength of the Pakistan Army is forced to return to the LOC and be on 24 x 7 vigil, awaiting Indian Army Ghataks and Special Forces who could be behind it or on its flanks.
Lastly, Pakistan is adept at choreographing events and executing its tactical actions in sync with them. The visit of Kulbhushan Jadhav’s family and their humiliation comes in close coordination with the trans-LoC operation at Keri. It is this which needs to be defeated more substantially with greater predictability and better war-gaming.
In Trans-LOC Operations, An Offensive Game Plan Is Key
How AI can help the Indian Armed Forces
Of all the purported uses of Artificial Intelligence (AI), it would be hard to find one more controversial than its possible use for military purposes. In popular consciousness, the idea of military AI immediately brings to mind the notion of autonomous weapon systems or “killer robots”, machines that can independently target and kill humans. The possible presence of such systems on battlefields has sparked a welcome international debate on the legality and morality of using these weapon systems. The controversies surrounding autonomous weapons, however, must not obscure the fact that like most technologies, AI has a number of non-lethal uses for militaries across the world, and especially for the Indian military. These are, on the whole, not as controversial as the use of AI for autonomous weapons, and, in fact, are far more practicable at the moment, with clear demonstrable benefits.
For the Indian military especially, these potential uses of AI could prove to be exploitable low-hanging fruit to quickly and effectively enhance its technological capabilities. Put together, there are three areas where AI can be readily deployed without much controversy or effort.
First, logistics and supply chain management. This is arguably the lowest of the low-hanging fruits available to the Indian military. Substantial work has already been done in deploying AI for logistics and supply chain management in the civilian sector, with several Indian companies also having built considerable expertise in this area. It would, therefore, not require much effort to transfer the technology, knowledge and expertise already present in the civilian space to meet the military’s needs. An efficient logistics system lies at the heart of any well-functioning military, and this is especially complicated for the Indian Armed Forces given the diverse environments and conditions they operate in. AI-backed systems could go a long way in increasing efficiencies, reducing wastage and overall costs in the military’s logistics management.
Second, cyber-operations. As cyber warfare becomes faster, more sophisticated and more dangerous, it becomes necessary to develop both offensive and defensive cyber-war capabilities both to protect the military’s own assets and communication links, and to attack similar assets of opposing militaries. Specifically trained AI systems could actually prove to be far more efficient and effective than humans for such tasks. The scale and speed of the responses necessary in evolving cyber-operation domains make it unlikely that humans will be able to tackle evolving threats in an effective manner by themselves. A number of cybersecurity experts and commentators believe that AI is the future of cyber-operations, with machine-on-machine engagements increasingly becoming the norm, especially to counter low-order or routine threats.
Third, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). This has already been put into practice by various countries, including the US, and, possibly, China. Using AI for ISR tasks can take two different forms. The first is the use of AI in unmanned vehicles and systems, whether on air, land, or on and under water. This includes increasingly ubiquitous drones but also unmanned ships and submersibles and ground vehicles. Such “intelligent” unmanned systems could be used for patrolling in harsh terrains and weather conditions, providing harbour protection, and allowing the deploying force to scout the battlefield or conflict zone with no danger to human soldiers. The second use is for data analysis and interpretation. An AI system could, for instance, be trained to pick out predetermined suspicious behaviour from the video footage of a surveillance drone, and thereby identify potential targets. Much of this work is currently done by humans, but the time taken and possible data under-analysed is immense. AI could do in a few hours what would have taken a human days to do, and in a significantly more efficient manner. This fact has led the US to develop and deploy an experimental system called Project Maven, which analyses video footage from drones to identify potential threats in the US’ fight against the Islamic State (IS).
The three specific use-cases discussed above are the very low-hanging fruit that can be exploited with the existing technical and manpower capabilities. The incorporation of these AI systems in the functioning of the Indian military could potentially lead to a long-term reduction in costs, while improving its technological capabilities. Further, the technology for each of these use cases is already present in some form principally in the civilian space.
To fully exploit their potential, however, the Indian military needs to build a close working relationship with the vibrant private technology sector in India, and especially with start-ups doing exciting work in the AI space. This will inevitably involve handing over potentially sensitive data to private firms so as to enable the building of AI systems that can meet the specific needs of the Indian Armed Forces. This is entirely uncharted territory in India, and to assuage the valid concerns that may arise with sensitive data being in private hands, a unique legal “trust model” needs to be built that accounts for the needs of the military and technological innovation. While the development of such a model may, in fact, prove to be a tougher task than the simple integration of AI technologies, it needs to be done if the Indian military is to prepare itself for warfare in the 21st century.
R. Shashank Reddy is a research analyst with Carnegie India.
Comments are welcome at [email protected]
@Falcon Now ready to agree to what I was saying sometime back.
Of all the purported uses of Artificial Intelligence (AI), it would be hard to find one more controversial than its possible use for military purposes. In popular consciousness, the idea of military AI immediately brings to mind the notion of autonomous weapon systems or “killer robots”, machines that can independently target and kill humans. The possible presence of such systems on battlefields has sparked a welcome international debate on the legality and morality of using these weapon systems. The controversies surrounding autonomous weapons, however, must not obscure the fact that like most technologies, AI has a number of non-lethal uses for militaries across the world, and especially for the Indian military. These are, on the whole, not as controversial as the use of AI for autonomous weapons, and, in fact, are far more practicable at the moment, with clear demonstrable benefits.
For the Indian military especially, these potential uses of AI could prove to be exploitable low-hanging fruit to quickly and effectively enhance its technological capabilities. Put together, there are three areas where AI can be readily deployed without much controversy or effort.
First, logistics and supply chain management. This is arguably the lowest of the low-hanging fruits available to the Indian military. Substantial work has already been done in deploying AI for logistics and supply chain management in the civilian sector, with several Indian companies also having built considerable expertise in this area. It would, therefore, not require much effort to transfer the technology, knowledge and expertise already present in the civilian space to meet the military’s needs. An efficient logistics system lies at the heart of any well-functioning military, and this is especially complicated for the Indian Armed Forces given the diverse environments and conditions they operate in. AI-backed systems could go a long way in increasing efficiencies, reducing wastage and overall costs in the military’s logistics management.
Second, cyber-operations. As cyber warfare becomes faster, more sophisticated and more dangerous, it becomes necessary to develop both offensive and defensive cyber-war capabilities both to protect the military’s own assets and communication links, and to attack similar assets of opposing militaries. Specifically trained AI systems could actually prove to be far more efficient and effective than humans for such tasks. The scale and speed of the responses necessary in evolving cyber-operation domains make it unlikely that humans will be able to tackle evolving threats in an effective manner by themselves. A number of cybersecurity experts and commentators believe that AI is the future of cyber-operations, with machine-on-machine engagements increasingly becoming the norm, especially to counter low-order or routine threats.
Third, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). This has already been put into practice by various countries, including the US, and, possibly, China. Using AI for ISR tasks can take two different forms. The first is the use of AI in unmanned vehicles and systems, whether on air, land, or on and under water. This includes increasingly ubiquitous drones but also unmanned ships and submersibles and ground vehicles. Such “intelligent” unmanned systems could be used for patrolling in harsh terrains and weather conditions, providing harbour protection, and allowing the deploying force to scout the battlefield or conflict zone with no danger to human soldiers. The second use is for data analysis and interpretation. An AI system could, for instance, be trained to pick out predetermined suspicious behaviour from the video footage of a surveillance drone, and thereby identify potential targets. Much of this work is currently done by humans, but the time taken and possible data under-analysed is immense. AI could do in a few hours what would have taken a human days to do, and in a significantly more efficient manner. This fact has led the US to develop and deploy an experimental system called Project Maven, which analyses video footage from drones to identify potential threats in the US’ fight against the Islamic State (IS).
The three specific use-cases discussed above are the very low-hanging fruit that can be exploited with the existing technical and manpower capabilities. The incorporation of these AI systems in the functioning of the Indian military could potentially lead to a long-term reduction in costs, while improving its technological capabilities. Further, the technology for each of these use cases is already present in some form principally in the civilian space.
To fully exploit their potential, however, the Indian military needs to build a close working relationship with the vibrant private technology sector in India, and especially with start-ups doing exciting work in the AI space. This will inevitably involve handing over potentially sensitive data to private firms so as to enable the building of AI systems that can meet the specific needs of the Indian Armed Forces. This is entirely uncharted territory in India, and to assuage the valid concerns that may arise with sensitive data being in private hands, a unique legal “trust model” needs to be built that accounts for the needs of the military and technological innovation. While the development of such a model may, in fact, prove to be a tougher task than the simple integration of AI technologies, it needs to be done if the Indian military is to prepare itself for warfare in the 21st century.
R. Shashank Reddy is a research analyst with Carnegie India.
Comments are welcome at [email protected]
@Falcon Now ready to agree to what I was saying sometime back.