Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning and F-22 'Raptor' : News & Discussion

Yes we can assume just like you assumed/lied the F-35 "supercruised" 150 miles in "slight decline." Since Duhssault doesn't even give an estimation of range like the US does for F-35 and F-22 it leads me to suspect the Rafail supercruise is for such a short period of time that they don't dare to even give an estimation. If the Rafail can go over mach1+ for 20-30 miles without afterburner than yeah it technically supercruised and Duhssault can claim the plane can SP. That simple.

F-35's F135 was not built to supercruise it has a time-at-temperature limitation on its turbine that restricts it from continuous supercruise operation. I can tell you this F-35 SP goes much farther than Rafail and its what... 13-14k pounds of fuel which includes the1250 liter center tank...unless you got any sources from French air force or Dassault saying otherwise?

Seems you're sorta in a catch 22, eh? Rafail with a 1250 liter center tank carries waay less fuel than F-35 and the F-35 can "SP" for 150 miles which means Rafail.... Get where I'm going? :sneaky:
From a french forum :

The super-cruise configuration is Mach 1.4 with 6 missiles or 4 missiles and a 1200L tank (source Dassault Le Bourget 2011 : http://rafalefan.e-monsite.com/medias/files/fiche-rafale-le-bourget-2011.jpg see my picture below taken on Le Bourget Dassault stand).

We can take the data from the F404 engine, older than M88 but in the same class. At Mach 1.2 and 30,000 feet : Full throttle dry: 5,480 pounds or 2,485kgf
Consumption: 5.650 lbs / hour or 2.560kg / hour
Specific consumption ~ 1.03 ( https://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/pdf/88166main_H-1556.pdf )

The M88 pushes a little more (+ 5%?) but has a slightly better specific consumption (-5%?), So the full dry gas consumption must be very close. Either for the Rafale 2x 2,560kg / hr. Let say 5,100kg / hour.

It's for 30,000 feet. At optimum altitude (~ 37,000-40,000 feet), the Rafale’s full dry gas consumption will be reduced by around 15-20%, or ~ 4,100-4,300kg / hr.

The fuel internal capacity of Rafale is 4700kg. Add 1000kg for the centerline tank.

The bird need to reach this altitude. Let's say it uses the 1000kg of the external tank. This gives M1.2-1.4 more than 1 hour of autonomy or more than 700-800 nautical miles in supercruise.
 
From a french forum :

The super-cruise configuration is Mach 1.4 with 6 missiles or 4 missiles and a 1200L tank (source Dassault Le Bourget 2011 : http://rafalefan.e-monsite.com/medias/files/fiche-rafale-le-bourget-2011.jpg see my picture below taken on Le Bourget Dassault stand).

We can take the data from the F404 engine, older than M88 but in the same class. At Mach 1.2 and 30,000 feet : Full throttle dry: 5,480 pounds or 2,485kgf
Consumption: 5.650 lbs / hour or 2.560kg / hour
Specific consumption ~ 1.03 ( https://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/pdf/88166main_H-1556.pdf )

The M88 pushes a little more (+ 5%?) but has a slightly better specific consumption (-5%?), So the full dry gas consumption must be very close. Either for the Rafale 2x 2,560kg / hr. Let say 5,100kg / hour.

It's for 30,000 feet. At optimum altitude (~ 37,000-40,000 feet), the Rafale’s full dry gas consumption will be reduced by around 15-20%, or ~ 4,100-4,300kg / hr.

The fuel internal capacity of Rafale is 4700kg. Add 1000kg for the centerline tank.

The bird need to reach this altitude. Let's say it uses the 1000kg of the external tank. This gives M1.2-1.4 more than 1 hour of autonomy or more than 700-800 nautical miles in supercruise.
Man you're so funny... I guess the Rafail is some superduper fighter because what you just posted says the Rafail SC range is much farther than the F-22, which carries 18000lb of fuel. Like I said Rafail fanboys are very delusional and will believe whatever claim as long as it's positive due to F-35 pretty much owning it every time it tries to compete with it.

I just love your links which says nothing about Rafails SC estimated range. Little advice... Don't take the word of a bunch Rafail fanboys in a forum they will make you look foolish like you currently look. Btw why didn't you post the link of this forum? I'd love to dissect their debate.
 
Man you're so funny... I guess the Rafail is some superduper fighter because what you just posted says the Rafail SC range is much farther than the F-22, which carries 18000lb of fuel. Like I said Rafail fanboys are very delusional and will believe whatever claim as long as it's positive due to F-35 pretty much owning it every time it tries to compete with it.

I just love your links which says nothing about Rafails SC estimated range. Little advice... Don't take the word of a bunch Rafail fanboys in a forum they will make you look foolish like you currently look. Btw why didn't you post the link of this forum? I'd love to dissect their debate.
you write, write, write. To say nothing.
Not a single technical argument. Only bull shit.
come on : [Rafale]
an occasion to see your french. Because no english there. just an advice : use "Rafail" and you will be fired, not like on this forum.
 
you write, write, write. To say nothing.
Not a single technical argument. Only bull shit.
come on : [Rafale]
an occasion to see your french. Because no english there. just an advice : use "Rafail" and you will be fired, not like on this forum.
I've been posting sources from USAF, F-35 pilots, LM and DOD, you know people in the know, but you've purposely have put your head up your..... where the sun don't shine every time I post these sources because the truth goes against your delusion. I don't need to get technical since people in the know do the talking for me. Besides what good is technical argument when yours are BS argument with no facts to back them up... and it wasn't even your argument but somebody else's who is as delusional as you. :LOL:
 
I've been posting sources from USAF, F-35 pilots, LM and DOD, you know people in the know, but you've purposely have put your head up your..... where the sun don't shine every time I post these sources because the truth goes against your delusion. I don't need to get technical since people in the know do the talking for me. Besides what good is technical argument when yours are BS argument with no facts to back them up... and it wasn't even your argument but somebody else's who is as delusional as you. :LOL:
To be surprised of the shorter range of a F22 in SC is surprising : it is not know to have a great range & it supercruises at higher speed, so higher fuel greedy.
Even an average US people must know that.
 
To be surprised of the shorter range of a F22 in SC is surprising : it is not know to have a great range & it supercruises at higher speed, so higher fuel greedy.
Even an average US people must know that.
Doesn't say at what speed only that it SC for an estimated range. Just admit you shouldn't have used technical numbers from a fanboy in a forum that was using an old US engine for comparison. Lol.

You need to use that brain of your and ponder this, if Rafail had that kind of range in SC Duhssault would be boasting and making sure everyone knows it. They would be telling potential customers that Rafail has a much longer range in SC than F-22 but Duhssault doesn't do that, eh? Take a guess why?

This is why I STRONGLY believe, and I'm not the only one, Rafail fanboys are the most delusional people when it comes to their plane. They will believe any lie that makes their plane sound superior than it really is. Notice how Indians in here are quiet and stay far away from your claim? They want nothing to do with you and your claim that it can SC at such distance because they know it's not true. You gotta think babe.
 
Just admit you shouldn't have used technical numbers from a fanboy in a forum that was using an old US engine for comparison. Lol.
You are a Flyingturkey-35 fan boy yourself.
Using a old engine give our calculation more strengh, because it's quite easy to make better with newer and hotter core engine.
 
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You are a Flyingturkey-35 fan boy yourself.
Using a old engine give our calculation more strengh, because it's quite easy to make better with newer and hotter core engine.
You're still not using that brain of yours. Duhssault loves to overhype Rafails capabilities but the one thing it doesn't hype for obvious reason is its SC endurance. If it had anywhere the endurance that you foolishly posted Duhssault would be promoting the hell out of that capability like its supposed EW superiority which the Swiss found out was false when compared to F-35.

SC capability was hardly if ever mentioned during Swiss evaluation and it's not being mentioned in Finnish evaluation... wonder why?

Rafail + fanboys = delusional. :unsure:
 
This is probably true. Some hillbilly.

Look at the language and arrogance on display.
US hillbillies have a much better quality of life than you Indians always remember that before you knock hillbillies.

Arrogance? And what about the language? Don't like the facts is that what the problem is? Rafail fanboys are delusional especially when it comes to the F-35 because the F-35 has clobbered the Rafail totally contradicting their mental narrative these fanboys had about the F-35. Just look how shocked frenchies and non frenchy Rafail fanboys became when Swiss released info that the F-35 was less expensive and superior to their plane... they went into denial and now their only hope is that the Swiss people are dumb enough to vote against the F-35 and vote for a more expensive inferior fighter. Lol!

When Finland selects the F-35 BonPlan and his friends will need therapy... or they'll do what they always do and just go into denial.
 
US hillbillies have a much better quality of life than you Indians always remember that before you knock hillbillies.
And the french members here could have an even better quality of life with medical insurance and quality education. Their kids could even spot India on a map and do not feel prejudiced.

But how do all those matter here? This is an internet forum. Maybe we can aspire to be cordial to communicate ideas. Is that too much to ask?
 
And the french members here could have an even better quality of life with medical insurance and quality education. Their kids could even spot India on a map and do not feel prejudiced.

But how do all those matter here? This is an internet forum. Maybe we can aspire to be cordial to communicate ideas. Is that too much to ask?
You an Indian living in India knock US hillbillies in negative way so I pointed out that hillbillies here in the US have a better quality of life than you Indians.

How about getting back to the topic of, why the F-35 is vastly superior, on this F-35 thread? Rafail fanboys just love to go off topic when the facts don't back up their claims.
 
And the french members here could have an even better quality of life with medical insurance and quality education. Their kids could even spot India on a map and do not feel prejudiced.

But how do all those matter here? This is an internet forum. Maybe we can aspire to be cordial to communicate ideas. Is that too much to ask?
Just report that less educated newbie.
 
Most people who like Trump are on that hooka delusional reality.

However, that does not apply to people who like the F-35.
 
F-35 : quelle suprématie aérienne future de l'OTAN en cas de conflit de haute intensité ?

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

F-35: What future NATO air supremacy in high-intensity conflict?


According to the Mars think-tank, "the F-35 has been a formidable war machine for subjugating European defence to American interests. It risks being tomorrow the tool of NATO's defeat in the face of its strategic competitors". The F-35 is above all a stealth fighter-bomber whose payload capacity (otherwise it is no longer stealthy) does not allow it to strike both far and hard; it is one or the other. The F-35A's range is no more than 1,000 km, and its range is limited to a few minutes at that distance. By the Mars Think Tank.

After the 'revolution in military affairs' (RAM) characterised by the digitalisation of the battlespace (NEB), collaborative combat is the future of high-intensity warfare. Paradoxically, advances in real-time and connected combat have not empowered combat units, but rather 'caporalised' them despite clear desires for subsidiarity. Henceforth, the tactical model of the infantry combat group was generalised to all environments, with a sergeant who analysed the situation and gave conduct orders to his corporals and grenadier-voltigeurs according to the mission received.

In "fluid" environments (endo and exo-atmospheric spaces, marine and submarine) where the "combat pawn" (ship, aircraft) has until now been characterised by its autonomy, collaborative combat has the consequence, via "networking", of making each "unitary pawn" dependent on the others, to the benefit of the circulation of information in real time and, thus, of a better control of the overall situation.

A complicated implementation

This is the ambition of the Scorpion system for land combat, based on vetronics, software-defined radio and data transfer, but the other environments are not left out, as illustrated by the demonstration of collaborative naval and air combat connected in the eastern Mediterranean during Operation Hamilton (with cruise missile firing). The principle is simple: information from all deployed sensors is analysed by the system's "brain", which instantly assigns the target to the best available effector (shooter).

Implementation is more complicated: sensors and effectors must be (hyper)connected in a network hardened to electronic warfare and the cyber-threat, a sort of "nervous system" controlled by a "brain" that must analyse and sort all the information that comes back to it in real time.

F-35, an architecture that prohibits any interoperability

The JSF (Joint Strike Fighter) programme launched by the United States in the 1990s was intended to provide NATO forces with air superiority through connected combat from a platform that was discrete in terms of both detection of opposing radars and their communication systems. This new weapon system is based on a fighter aircraft ultimately called the F-35. It is a stealth aircraft that is advertised as multi-role (fighter-bomber), but above all it is the "quarterback" of a "battle group" made up of all the sensors and effectors with which it can communicate directly (without passing through a ground station) in real time via extremely secure tactical data links (gateways to tactical data link 16, then link 22).

The F-35 system actually poses many problems. Firstly, it is intentionally built on a closed architecture that prohibits any interoperability with allied combat systems, which is absolutely contrary to NATO principles. As the F-35 system is interoperable only with itself, allied militaries must acquire the aircraft in order to be able to interact directly with it, unless they agree to degraded-mode interoperability based on relays. As the Minister of the Army jokingly reminded us on 18 March 2019, "the Alliance should be unconditional, otherwise it is not an alliance. NATO's solidarity clause is called article V, not article F35.

Technological setbacks

Secondly, the development of the JSF programme was conceived from the outset as a leonine cooperation in which the member countries of the 'club' were asked to contribute to its financing in exchange for a certain industrial return in proportion to their financial commitment. In other words, the programme drained the R&D budgets of several allies without any guarantee of the finished product, unlike the export of a weapon system that had already been developed and de-risked. The 14 foreign users of the F-35 thus fall into two categories: seven partners (Turkey was excluded for having acquired the Russian S400 air defence system) who contributed financially to the development of the programme in exchange for a certain industrial return, and now seven customers (along with Switzerland) through the FMS transfer process.

Finally, and this follows from this, the realisation of the F-35 looks like a long series of technological setbacks, to the point that the Pentagon, which has never spared its criticism of a programme that seemed incapable of meeting its deadlines and costs, is tempted to drastically reduce its orders in favour of older generation aircraft (the modernised F15), but whose real performance is likely to still guarantee the air superiority of American forces. And nothing can be said about the logistical information system that sends all the data back to the manufacturer, making each mission absolutely transparent for Lockheed Martin and indirectly for the US Department of Defense, except for the Israeli version, as the Tsahal requires an autonomous logistical system.

The programme is so problematic that the GAO (the US Court of Auditors) publishes several public reports each year noting the progress made and making recommendations to limit the financial disaster. The latest report highlights a $6 billion shortfall in the overall cost of the programme, which is staggering: a total life-cycle cost estimated at $1.7 trillion, including $400 billion for acquisition and $1.3 trillion for implementation and maintenance of the aircraft, a $150 billion slippage compared to the 2012 estimate. The actual cost per flight hour of the 400 F-35s in service with the US military in 2019 was over $38,000 in constant 2012 dollars. The target cost is set at $25,000 per flight hour in 2025. This is the aircraft that Armasuisse claims won the competition by being the cheapest in terms of operating costs!

Switzerland: the very surprising choice of the F-35

From an operational point of view, one can only wonder about the contribution of the F-35 to the Swiss army. As Israel regularly shows, the F-35 is above all a stealthy joint strike fighter whose payload capacity (otherwise it is no longer stealthy) does not allow it to strike both far and hard; it is one or the other. The F-35A's range does not exceed 1,000 km, and its range is limited to a few minutes at that distance. The F-35 is also too heavy to be very manoeuvrable in aerial combat and its stealthy skin makes it unsuitable for supersonic flight. This is a pity, because Switzerland needs an air defence aircraft, not a medium-range fighter-bomber.

Moreover, the F-35 programme has not yet reached the stage of series production (milestone C), as more than 800 defects remain to be corrected, some of them involving flight safety, while new problems are emerging, including those with the Pratt & Whitney F-135 engine, as those already detected are resolved. The Pentagon is now faced with a real capability impasse. Given the obvious impossibility of containing the costs of the F-35 programme, despite Lockheed Martin's promises until 2019, the three endowed "services" (Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps) are seriously considering reducing their fleets by replacing some of the planned F-35s either with modernised 4th generation aircraft or by accelerating the development of a 6th generation fighter.

The aim is to be able to count on a reliable and efficient fleet in the face of strategic rivals who, for their part, are improving the quantity and quality of their respective fleets of weapons aircraft. Even an ally as reliable as Japan is reviewing its plans after the loss (as yet unresolved) of an F-35 damaged on the high seas and in the face of the aircraft's poor tactical performance and air defence warning difficulties against Chinese provocations.

The F-35 is not up to NATO's needs

This will eventually result in a lack of outlets for Lockheed Martin, which explains the pressure put by the State Department (responsible for the FMS procedure) on export prospects, if only to compensate for the abandonment of the Turkish market. We hope that the Swiss authorities will be able to justify their choice in the event of a vote, a prospect that seems more and more likely. The Rafale may still have a future under Swiss colours.

Beyond the case of Switzerland, a neutral state as everyone knows, the question of NATO's future air supremacy in the event of a high-intensity conflict arises. In addition to the United States, eight member nations of the Alliance are or will be equipped with an aircraft whose performance is clearly not up to the task. The Alliance's entire security is thus in danger of being jeopardised by an uncontrolled programme that has siphoned off a significant portion of European R&D budgets. The F-35 has been a formidable "war machine" for submitting European defence to American interests. Tomorrow, it risks being the tool of NATO's defeat by its strategic competitors. The latter do not play recklessly with the military capabilities of their own forces and their allies.

Faced with this capability impasse, NATO will be led in the short term to encourage a return to modernised 4th generation aircraft (such as the Rafale F3R, pending the F4 standard, but also the F-15 EX, F-16 Viper, F-18 Super Hornet, with the Eurofighter's ability to evolve still to be proven) to guarantee its posture and fulfil its missions. This will perhaps clarify the future of the SCAF and Tempest programmes.
 
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Reactions: Bon Plan
F-35 : quelle suprématie aérienne future de l'OTAN en cas de conflit de haute intensité ?

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

F-35: What future NATO air supremacy in high-intensity conflict?


According to the Mars think-tank, "the F-35 has been a formidable war machine for subjugating European defence to American interests. It risks being tomorrow the tool of NATO's defeat in the face of its strategic competitors". The F-35 is above all a stealth fighter-bomber whose payload capacity (otherwise it is no longer stealthy) does not allow it to strike both far and hard; it is one or the other. The F-35A's range is no more than 1,000 km, and its range is limited to a few minutes at that distance. By the Mars Think Tank.

After the 'revolution in military affairs' (RAM) characterised by the digitalisation of the battlespace (NEB), collaborative combat is the future of high-intensity warfare. Paradoxically, advances in real-time and connected combat have not empowered combat units, but rather 'caporalised' them despite clear desires for subsidiarity. Henceforth, the tactical model of the infantry combat group was generalised to all environments, with a sergeant who analysed the situation and gave conduct orders to his corporals and grenadier-voltigeurs according to the mission received.

In "fluid" environments (endo and exo-atmospheric spaces, marine and submarine) where the "combat pawn" (ship, aircraft) has until now been characterised by its autonomy, collaborative combat has the consequence, via "networking", of making each "unitary pawn" dependent on the others, to the benefit of the circulation of information in real time and, thus, of a better control of the overall situation.

A complicated implementation

This is the ambition of the Scorpion system for land combat, based on vetronics, software-defined radio and data transfer, but the other environments are not left out, as illustrated by the demonstration of collaborative naval and air combat connected in the eastern Mediterranean during Operation Hamilton (with cruise missile firing). The principle is simple: information from all deployed sensors is analysed by the system's "brain", which instantly assigns the target to the best available effector (shooter).

Implementation is more complicated: sensors and effectors must be (hyper)connected in a network hardened to electronic warfare and the cyber-threat, a sort of "nervous system" controlled by a "brain" that must analyse and sort all the information that comes back to it in real time.

F-35, an architecture that prohibits any interoperability

The JSF (Joint Strike Fighter) programme launched by the United States in the 1990s was intended to provide NATO forces with air superiority through connected combat from a platform that was discrete in terms of both detection of opposing radars and their communication systems. This new weapon system is based on a fighter aircraft ultimately called the F-35. It is a stealth aircraft that is advertised as multi-role (fighter-bomber), but above all it is the "quarterback" of a "battle group" made up of all the sensors and effectors with which it can communicate directly (without passing through a ground station) in real time via extremely secure tactical data links (gateways to tactical data link 16, then link 22).

The F-35 system actually poses many problems. Firstly, it is intentionally built on a closed architecture that prohibits any interoperability with allied combat systems, which is absolutely contrary to NATO principles. As the F-35 system is interoperable only with itself, allied militaries must acquire the aircraft in order to be able to interact directly with it, unless they agree to degraded-mode interoperability based on relays. As the Minister of the Army jokingly reminded us on 18 March 2019, "the Alliance should be unconditional, otherwise it is not an alliance. NATO's solidarity clause is called article V, not article F35.

Technological setbacks

Secondly, the development of the JSF programme was conceived from the outset as a leonine cooperation in which the member countries of the 'club' were asked to contribute to its financing in exchange for a certain industrial return in proportion to their financial commitment. In other words, the programme drained the R&D budgets of several allies without any guarantee of the finished product, unlike the export of a weapon system that had already been developed and de-risked. The 14 foreign users of the F-35 thus fall into two categories: seven partners (Turkey was excluded for having acquired the Russian S400 air defence system) who contributed financially to the development of the programme in exchange for a certain industrial return, and now seven customers (along with Switzerland) through the FMS transfer process.

Finally, and this follows from this, the realisation of the F-35 looks like a long series of technological setbacks, to the point that the Pentagon, which has never spared its criticism of a programme that seemed incapable of meeting its deadlines and costs, is tempted to drastically reduce its orders in favour of older generation aircraft (the modernised F15), but whose real performance is likely to still guarantee the air superiority of American forces. And nothing can be said about the logistical information system that sends all the data back to the manufacturer, making each mission absolutely transparent for Lockheed Martin and indirectly for the US Department of Defense, except for the Israeli version, as the Tsahal requires an autonomous logistical system.

The programme is so problematic that the GAO (the US Court of Auditors) publishes several public reports each year noting the progress made and making recommendations to limit the financial disaster. The latest report highlights a $6 billion shortfall in the overall cost of the programme, which is staggering: a total life-cycle cost estimated at $1.7 trillion, including $400 billion for acquisition and $1.3 trillion for implementation and maintenance of the aircraft, a $150 billion slippage compared to the 2012 estimate. The actual cost per flight hour of the 400 F-35s in service with the US military in 2019 was over $38,000 in constant 2012 dollars. The target cost is set at $25,000 per flight hour in 2025. This is the aircraft that Armasuisse claims won the competition by being the cheapest in terms of operating costs!

Switzerland: the very surprising choice of the F-35

From an operational point of view, one can only wonder about the contribution of the F-35 to the Swiss army. As Israel regularly shows, the F-35 is above all a stealthy joint strike fighter whose payload capacity (otherwise it is no longer stealthy) does not allow it to strike both far and hard; it is one or the other. The F-35A's range does not exceed 1,000 km, and its range is limited to a few minutes at that distance. The F-35 is also too heavy to be very manoeuvrable in aerial combat and its stealthy skin makes it unsuitable for supersonic flight. This is a pity, because Switzerland needs an air defence aircraft, not a medium-range fighter-bomber.

Moreover, the F-35 programme has not yet reached the stage of series production (milestone C), as more than 800 defects remain to be corrected, some of them involving flight safety, while new problems are emerging, including those with the Pratt & Whitney F-135 engine, as those already detected are resolved. The Pentagon is now faced with a real capability impasse. Given the obvious impossibility of containing the costs of the F-35 programme, despite Lockheed Martin's promises until 2019, the three endowed "services" (Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps) are seriously considering reducing their fleets by replacing some of the planned F-35s either with modernised 4th generation aircraft or by accelerating the development of a 6th generation fighter.

The aim is to be able to count on a reliable and efficient fleet in the face of strategic rivals who, for their part, are improving the quantity and quality of their respective fleets of weapons aircraft. Even an ally as reliable as Japan is reviewing its plans after the loss (as yet unresolved) of an F-35 damaged on the high seas and in the face of the aircraft's poor tactical performance and air defence warning difficulties against Chinese provocations.

The F-35 is not up to NATO's needs

This will eventually result in a lack of outlets for Lockheed Martin, which explains the pressure put by the State Department (responsible for the FMS procedure) on export prospects, if only to compensate for the abandonment of the Turkish market. We hope that the Swiss authorities will be able to justify their choice in the event of a vote, a prospect that seems more and more likely. The Rafale may still have a future under Swiss colours.

Beyond the case of Switzerland, a neutral state as everyone knows, the question of NATO's future air supremacy in the event of a high-intensity conflict arises. In addition to the United States, eight member nations of the Alliance are or will be equipped with an aircraft whose performance is clearly not up to the task. The Alliance's entire security is thus in danger of being jeopardised by an uncontrolled programme that has siphoned off a significant portion of European R&D budgets. The F-35 has been a formidable "war machine" for submitting European defence to American interests. Tomorrow, it risks being the tool of NATO's defeat by its strategic competitors. The latter do not play recklessly with the military capabilities of their own forces and their allies.

Faced with this capability impasse, NATO will be led in the short term to encourage a return to modernised 4th generation aircraft (such as the Rafale F3R, pending the F4 standard, but also the F-15 EX, F-16 Viper, F-18 Super Hornet, with the Eurofighter's ability to evolve still to be proven) to guarantee its posture and fulfil its missions. This will perhaps clarify the future of the SCAF and Tempest programmes.
A french site using some opinion "think tank" that calls themselves Mars? :ROFLMAO:

Why do you purposely make a fool of yourself? The desperation of Rafail fanboys who just can't accept the Swiss decision that the F-35 is cheaper and superior than Rafail has cause them much mental anguish.

The Swiss must feel insulted that french Rafail fanboys would think they'd be dumb enough to reject a SUPERIOR and LESS EXPENSIVE fighter over an inferior and more expensive fighter just because the F-35 is American. Lol! I just love the logic of Rafail fanboys. It's going to be fun watching and reading the reaction of Rafail fanboys when Finland selects the F-35. There's going to be a lot of Rafail fanboys on Prozac very soon.
 

A US F-22 Raptor pilot describes the challenge of going up against F-35 red air aggressors​

  • F-35s flown by dedicated red air pilots joined the Air Force's top air combat exercise this month for the first time.
  • Capt. Patrick Bowlds, an F-22 pilot, was one of the blue air pilots who flew against them.
  • "It definitely adds a level of complexity," Bowlds said of the red air F-35s.

The US Air Force turned up the pressure this month at its premier air-to-air combat training exercise, adding F-35 stealth fighters flown by dedicated red air aggressor pilots — who emulate the tactics of an enemy force — into the mix of threats that blue air pilots face for the first time.

Red Flag, which takes place at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, started as an air combat exercise but has evolved to include not just increasingly advanced aerial aggressor threats but also surface-to-air, space, and information threats.

"My job is not to give blue an easy day," Col. Scott Mills, the 57th Operations Group commander and an F-35 aggressor pilot, said in a recent statement. "My job is to give blue the absolute toughest day that I can. And the way for me to do that is to bring the F-35 into the fight."

Capt. Patrick "Smokah" Bowlds, an F-22 instructor pilot at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia and one of the blue air pilots at Red Flag, told Insider the addition of the F-35 aggressors definitely made the training more challenging.

1630366393717.png


"Having them on red air adds a level of complexity" to an already "complex scenario" involving multiple threats, he said.

"When you have a stealth platform on red air, it makes our job a lot more difficult in terms of knowing where they are, how we are going to protect allied forces or protect points on the ground or whatever the mission set is at that point in time," Bowlds said.

"It is challenging, even flying the Raptor, to have good [situational awareness] on where the F-35s are," he said.

The F-22 is a fifth-generation fighter built for air superiority, giving it certain advantages in air-to-air combat, while the F-35 is a newer fifth-generation multi-mission fighter with a wider range of capabilities.

Bowlds said that inserting F-35 aggressors into Red Flag makes things "more challenging because there is a little bit of an unknown in terms of what they are going to be able to do."

Additionally, "red air detects are happening at further ranges," Bowlds explained. "It inherently poses more of a threat to allied blue air forces than older aggressors," such as the fourth-generation F-16s.

The F-35s "have better detection capabilities kind of against everybody just because of their new radar and the avionics they have," he said. "It definitely adds a level of complexity."

The combat training pilots do at Red Flag helps US pilots maintain their edge against emerging higher-end threats. For instance, both China and Russia are developing their own fifth-generation stealth fighters, the J-20 and Su-57, respectively.

"I've seen adversary aircraft or surface-to-air threats becoming more and more advanced. It is a significant challenge," Bowlds told Insider. "Things continue to evolve, and so we need to be constantly aware of that and ready to evolve with them so we can be that leading edge."

During Red Flag, blue air pilots are assigned a mission, which could be anything from an offensive strike on an adversary target to defending a critical position. Red air pilots are tasked with stopping blue air pilots from achieving mission success.

"What aggressors are able to present to them is a more challenging problem for blue air assault," Lt. Col. Chris Finkenstadt, the 64th Aggressor Squadron commander, said in a recent statement.

"The aggressors know the threat replication a little bit better, and they have studied the adversary and the way that the adversary would actually react to a specific situation," he said. "Based on our focus toward great power competition, we need to make sure that those guys are ready."

During the training, there is a lot going on, which is one reason the addition of F-35 aggressors really makes things tough for blue air pilots.

"I've flown against red F-35s locally," Bowlds said, telling Insider that "it's always challenging." That challenge is amplified in a large exercise like Red Flag. "There's a lot of different things out there that want to hurt you, and that's where you can start to lose track of the stealth adversaries," he said.

That challenge, though, is welcomed by blue air pilots like Bowlds, who told Insider that "if you're complacent for very long, that's when bad stuff starts to happen."
F-22 Pilot Describes Going up Against F-35 Aggressors (businessinsider.com)

So the US has two of the most advanced fighters in the world, actually three with the F-15EX, but now these fighter pilots get to train against advanced 5th gen stealth fighters giving them a whole new level of experience unlike other nations fighter pilots that don't have 5th gen stealth fighters like the French. This is just going to make US fighter pilots which are Tier-1 in the ranking realm to Tier-1 plus.
 
F-35 : quelle suprématie aérienne future de l'OTAN en cas de conflit de haute intensité ?

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

F-35: What future NATO air supremacy in high-intensity conflict?


According to the Mars think-tank, "the F-35 has been a formidable war machine for subjugating European defence to American interests. It risks being tomorrow the tool of NATO's defeat in the face of its strategic competitors". The F-35 is above all a stealth fighter-bomber whose payload capacity (otherwise it is no longer stealthy) does not allow it to strike both far and hard; it is one or the other. The F-35A's range is no more than 1,000 km, and its range is limited to a few minutes at that distance. By the Mars Think Tank.

After the 'revolution in military affairs' (RAM) characterised by the digitalisation of the battlespace (NEB), collaborative combat is the future of high-intensity warfare. Paradoxically, advances in real-time and connected combat have not empowered combat units, but rather 'caporalised' them despite clear desires for subsidiarity. Henceforth, the tactical model of the infantry combat group was generalised to all environments, with a sergeant who analysed the situation and gave conduct orders to his corporals and grenadier-voltigeurs according to the mission received.

In "fluid" environments (endo and exo-atmospheric spaces, marine and submarine) where the "combat pawn" (ship, aircraft) has until now been characterised by its autonomy, collaborative combat has the consequence, via "networking", of making each "unitary pawn" dependent on the others, to the benefit of the circulation of information in real time and, thus, of a better control of the overall situation.

A complicated implementation

This is the ambition of the Scorpion system for land combat, based on vetronics, software-defined radio and data transfer, but the other environments are not left out, as illustrated by the demonstration of collaborative naval and air combat connected in the eastern Mediterranean during Operation Hamilton (with cruise missile firing). The principle is simple: information from all deployed sensors is analysed by the system's "brain", which instantly assigns the target to the best available effector (shooter).

Implementation is more complicated: sensors and effectors must be (hyper)connected in a network hardened to electronic warfare and the cyber-threat, a sort of "nervous system" controlled by a "brain" that must analyse and sort all the information that comes back to it in real time.

F-35, an architecture that prohibits any interoperability

The JSF (Joint Strike Fighter) programme launched by the United States in the 1990s was intended to provide NATO forces with air superiority through connected combat from a platform that was discrete in terms of both detection of opposing radars and their communication systems. This new weapon system is based on a fighter aircraft ultimately called the F-35. It is a stealth aircraft that is advertised as multi-role (fighter-bomber), but above all it is the "quarterback" of a "battle group" made up of all the sensors and effectors with which it can communicate directly (without passing through a ground station) in real time via extremely secure tactical data links (gateways to tactical data link 16, then link 22).

The F-35 system actually poses many problems. Firstly, it is intentionally built on a closed architecture that prohibits any interoperability with allied combat systems, which is absolutely contrary to NATO principles. As the F-35 system is interoperable only with itself, allied militaries must acquire the aircraft in order to be able to interact directly with it, unless they agree to degraded-mode interoperability based on relays. As the Minister of the Army jokingly reminded us on 18 March 2019, "the Alliance should be unconditional, otherwise it is not an alliance. NATO's solidarity clause is called article V, not article F35.

Technological setbacks

Secondly, the development of the JSF programme was conceived from the outset as a leonine cooperation in which the member countries of the 'club' were asked to contribute to its financing in exchange for a certain industrial return in proportion to their financial commitment. In other words, the programme drained the R&D budgets of several allies without any guarantee of the finished product, unlike the export of a weapon system that had already been developed and de-risked. The 14 foreign users of the F-35 thus fall into two categories: seven partners (Turkey was excluded for having acquired the Russian S400 air defence system) who contributed financially to the development of the programme in exchange for a certain industrial return, and now seven customers (along with Switzerland) through the FMS transfer process.

Finally, and this follows from this, the realisation of the F-35 looks like a long series of technological setbacks, to the point that the Pentagon, which has never spared its criticism of a programme that seemed incapable of meeting its deadlines and costs, is tempted to drastically reduce its orders in favour of older generation aircraft (the modernised F15), but whose real performance is likely to still guarantee the air superiority of American forces. And nothing can be said about the logistical information system that sends all the data back to the manufacturer, making each mission absolutely transparent for Lockheed Martin and indirectly for the US Department of Defense, except for the Israeli version, as the Tsahal requires an autonomous logistical system.

The programme is so problematic that the GAO (the US Court of Auditors) publishes several public reports each year noting the progress made and making recommendations to limit the financial disaster. The latest report highlights a $6 billion shortfall in the overall cost of the programme, which is staggering: a total life-cycle cost estimated at $1.7 trillion, including $400 billion for acquisition and $1.3 trillion for implementation and maintenance of the aircraft, a $150 billion slippage compared to the 2012 estimate. The actual cost per flight hour of the 400 F-35s in service with the US military in 2019 was over $38,000 in constant 2012 dollars. The target cost is set at $25,000 per flight hour in 2025. This is the aircraft that Armasuisse claims won the competition by being the cheapest in terms of operating costs!

Switzerland: the very surprising choice of the F-35

From an operational point of view, one can only wonder about the contribution of the F-35 to the Swiss army. As Israel regularly shows, the F-35 is above all a stealthy joint strike fighter whose payload capacity (otherwise it is no longer stealthy) does not allow it to strike both far and hard; it is one or the other. The F-35A's range does not exceed 1,000 km, and its range is limited to a few minutes at that distance. The F-35 is also too heavy to be very manoeuvrable in aerial combat and its stealthy skin makes it unsuitable for supersonic flight. This is a pity, because Switzerland needs an air defence aircraft, not a medium-range fighter-bomber.

Moreover, the F-35 programme has not yet reached the stage of series production (milestone C), as more than 800 defects remain to be corrected, some of them involving flight safety, while new problems are emerging, including those with the Pratt & Whitney F-135 engine, as those already detected are resolved. The Pentagon is now faced with a real capability impasse. Given the obvious impossibility of containing the costs of the F-35 programme, despite Lockheed Martin's promises until 2019, the three endowed "services" (Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps) are seriously considering reducing their fleets by replacing some of the planned F-35s either with modernised 4th generation aircraft or by accelerating the development of a 6th generation fighter.

The aim is to be able to count on a reliable and efficient fleet in the face of strategic rivals who, for their part, are improving the quantity and quality of their respective fleets of weapons aircraft. Even an ally as reliable as Japan is reviewing its plans after the loss (as yet unresolved) of an F-35 damaged on the high seas and in the face of the aircraft's poor tactical performance and air defence warning difficulties against Chinese provocations.

The F-35 is not up to NATO's needs

This will eventually result in a lack of outlets for Lockheed Martin, which explains the pressure put by the State Department (responsible for the FMS procedure) on export prospects, if only to compensate for the abandonment of the Turkish market. We hope that the Swiss authorities will be able to justify their choice in the event of a vote, a prospect that seems more and more likely. The Rafale may still have a future under Swiss colours.

Beyond the case of Switzerland, a neutral state as everyone knows, the question of NATO's future air supremacy in the event of a high-intensity conflict arises. In addition to the United States, eight member nations of the Alliance are or will be equipped with an aircraft whose performance is clearly not up to the task. The Alliance's entire security is thus in danger of being jeopardised by an uncontrolled programme that has siphoned off a significant portion of European R&D budgets. The F-35 has been a formidable "war machine" for submitting European defence to American interests. Tomorrow, it risks being the tool of NATO's defeat by its strategic competitors. The latter do not play recklessly with the military capabilities of their own forces and their allies.

Faced with this capability impasse, NATO will be led in the short term to encourage a return to modernised 4th generation aircraft (such as the Rafale F3R, pending the F4 standard, but also the F-15 EX, F-16 Viper, F-18 Super Hornet, with the Eurofighter's ability to evolve still to be proven) to guarantee its posture and fulfil its missions. This will perhaps clarify the future of the SCAF and Tempest programmes.

Some of those arguments don't make sense. Especially the one about interoperability within NATO, when even the Swiss have mentioned they are impressed by its ability to network. Particularly its integration with the Patriot for CEC.
 
Some of those arguments don't make sense. Especially the one about interoperability within NATO, when even the Swiss have mentioned they are impressed by its ability to network. Particularly its integration with the Patriot for CEC.
The F-35 can receive L16 but cannot transmit on this network to preserve its stealth. It can only transmit on MADL, which is a short-range system and requires a line of sight between the transmitter and receiver. Moreover, MADL is not a NATO system and no other aircraft has it except the E-2D which can be used as a relay to other types of aircraft or ground systems by converting MADL <=> L-16. So it is fair to say that the F-35 is not very good at interoperability, and this is deliberate, otherwise it would be enough to make MADL a NATO standard.