Under actual combat conditions, the thrust of the RD-33 engine far exceeds that of the 404, 414, and M88;
in fact, the MiG-35 likely boasts the highest thrust-to-weight ratio among active-duty fighter jets—surpassing even the Su-57 or F-22.
PAK-FA / Sukhoi Su-57 - Updates and Discussions
- Thread starter Ashwin
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in fact, the MiG-35 likely boasts the highest thrust-to-weight ratio among active-duty fighter jets—surpassing even the Su-57 or F-22.
But Mig 35 doesn't have a true super cruise capability, may be at high altitude but not overall. High TWR means good acceleration but sustaining high dry TWR is a complete different subject. Dry TWR greater than 1.0 at trans-sonic speeds immediately shows a wave drag spike (increase in wave drag) on graph.
But we can't tell if AMCA with it's aeroprofile can supercruise on two RD33 engines, it will be interesting to test it. Rafale can supercruise on two M88 which means here some different parameters apart from TWR are involved.
AMCA Mk1 is not gonna have supersonic capability with the GE 414 engine anyway, might as well go with a reliable supplier if things don't go well as planned with America.
listen man. The Su57 isnt going to happen until and unless russia agrees to a ceasefire in ukraine, the economic issues of working with russia while the majority of our economy does trade with the west is too hard. The only way we get the su57 is if the PAF gets the J35. Then we have a credible case. Its not like we can do jackshit vs China anyway for the next 20 or so years.
Isn't Pak already getting J35?
I think we Su57 can be a good opportunity for Indian aircraft companies. But only if we can structure deal right. My ambition is that we structure the deal as deep MKIzed version, so that instead of buying any flyway units, we ask for progressive indigenisation of subsystems of Su57, based on the Super Sukhoi upgrade.
Something like using the Russian airframe and engines, but replacing some parts such as Radar with Virupaksha, weapons with Astra series, use HAL mission computer, DRDO ECM package, etc. Any other component such as IRST which isn't ready should be Russian, as we don't want to delay procurement.
As more and more components are developed, the future aircraft will see increased indian content.
I know a deal like this is only fantasy, but if MoD can pull it off, it will really give a huge push to indian aircraft industry.
I have repeatedly made post regarding the selection of engine. The AMCA need to have supercruise capability if they are serious about developing a 5th gen stealth fighter. Mk1 and Mk2 both must have this capability.
I am now more satisfied that you need atleast 45 Su57s now.
Unless until some heavy losses during war occurs the Indians don't wake up. 600 causalities in Kargil could have been avoided as well. In the name of bhai chara and contacts and reference useless and incapable fellows are sitting on our head and pissing from there.
Why? Even for America, the F22 is the only US fighter which can supercruise and it's already outdated for modern combat, none of our enemies possess jets which can supercruise, so why the fixation for it? Sure it would be good to have and we will likely get it for the mk2 where newer platforms will be released globally.
I love the Su57, it would be our equivalent to the F22 but a generation ahead in tech and is also multi role which is a huge bonus. It's the only relevant 5th gen right now which can supercruise.
India disappoints both optimists and pessimists at the same time, a strange wonder.
We do not have access to intelligence report that Chinese do not have any aircraft or can't procure one or develop one with super cruise capability. But it is known that J20 has the supercruise capability. And looking at the US Iran and Russia Ukraine skirmish, plus having two enemies in the vicinity you have to be one step ahead.
The J20 can't sustain supercruise with their interim engine I believe, not to mention the tons of other issues on the jet. Maybe they would be able to crack it with the WS15 engine.
Ideally I would wish for a lot things in the AMCA like 6 IWB capacity, supercruise, thrust vectoring but none of this are an absolute need for 5th gen needs.
Supercruise isn't an absolute must according to americans because the F35 can't do it either or they dropped the ball with it's design.
There is no damn Fxxk WS-15 engine on the J-20.
That trash is way behind schedule, lagging far behind the 117S also Izdeliye 30
It’s just a dumbass trashy magazine
NOELREPORTS (@noelreports.com)
InformNapalm claims a Ukrainian HUMINT-CYBINT operation manipulated Russia’s BARS Moscow air defenses into downing a Su-57 in Moscow region. It said intercepted training materials exposed vulnerabilities passed to Ukraine’s military and used in the operation. #Ukraine
bsky.app
Tom Cooper takes a scathing view of the Su-57.
While the core of his argument is sound, his article mixes excellent systemic insight with several technical exaggerations.
The truly damning point is this: the T-50 first flew in 2010, yet the engine intended to give the Su-57 its definitive configuration is still not operational. Rostec has only just announced the first flight tests of the "izdeliye 177," touted as the next-generation engine. Sixteen years after the maiden flight, the definitive propulsion system therefore remains under development.
Cooper is also right about several serious issues:
the first serial-production aircraft crashed in 2019 following a flight control system failure;
Russian deliveries are announced in "batches," with the size of these batches rarely disclosed;
its use in Ukraine remains essentially that of a standoff missile platform, avoiding regular exposure within heavily defended Ukrainian airspace.
This is enough to demonstrate a program that is severely delayed, lacks industrial maturity, and remains incomplete—one whose cautious operational use sits uneasily with the image of a revolutionary stealth fighter promoted by Moscow.
However, Cooper sometimes overstates his case to the point of undermining his own argument.
His claim that the Su-57 lacks any radar-absorbent coating is almost certainly incorrect. Rostec officially describes an absorbent treatment for the canopy, and UAC has even installed industrial equipment specifically for applying and curing the Su-57’s absorbent coatings. One can argue that its stealth characteristics are mediocre—particularly from the rear—without claiming that no absorbent materials are used at all. Similarly, his claim that all Western fifth-generation fighters use flat nozzles is incorrect: the F-35 specifically employs a low-signature axisymmetric nozzle featuring serrated edges, controlled seals, and high-temperature coatings.
His highly detailed accounts regarding software rewrites, Taiwanese processors, the inability to fuse radar data, and the potential replacement of Russian avionics with Indian radars rest on shakier ground. Cooper provides plenty of names and details but rarely offers the primary source documents needed to formally link each issue to the operational Su-57. Indeed, he himself acknowledges relying on "RUMINT" (rumor-based intelligence) for some recent developments.
Finally, the term "vaporware" is an overstatement. The Su-57 exists, flies, has been delivered in limited numbers, and has actually served as a platform for launching long-range missiles. It is not a fictional program. Rather, it is a prototype undergoing gradual industrialization—deployed in an incomplete configuration and falling far short of the ambitions originally proclaimed.
The Su-57 is not vaporware; it is a real aircraft surrounded by an exceptional amount of vaporware.
Cooper correctly identifies the fundamental problem: on paper, the Russians have amassed the attributes of a fifth-generation fighter—multi-band capability, data fusion, supercruise, stealth, an electronic co-pilot, and collaborative drone integration—without demonstrating mastery of how to integrate them into a coherent, industrially reproducible operational system. This is precisely the trap of substituting a catalog of features for true systems engineering.
Tom Cooper's article
While the core of his argument is sound, his article mixes excellent systemic insight with several technical exaggerations.
The truly damning point is this: the T-50 first flew in 2010, yet the engine intended to give the Su-57 its definitive configuration is still not operational. Rostec has only just announced the first flight tests of the "izdeliye 177," touted as the next-generation engine. Sixteen years after the maiden flight, the definitive propulsion system therefore remains under development.
Cooper is also right about several serious issues:
the first serial-production aircraft crashed in 2019 following a flight control system failure;
Russian deliveries are announced in "batches," with the size of these batches rarely disclosed;
its use in Ukraine remains essentially that of a standoff missile platform, avoiding regular exposure within heavily defended Ukrainian airspace.
This is enough to demonstrate a program that is severely delayed, lacks industrial maturity, and remains incomplete—one whose cautious operational use sits uneasily with the image of a revolutionary stealth fighter promoted by Moscow.
However, Cooper sometimes overstates his case to the point of undermining his own argument.
His claim that the Su-57 lacks any radar-absorbent coating is almost certainly incorrect. Rostec officially describes an absorbent treatment for the canopy, and UAC has even installed industrial equipment specifically for applying and curing the Su-57’s absorbent coatings. One can argue that its stealth characteristics are mediocre—particularly from the rear—without claiming that no absorbent materials are used at all. Similarly, his claim that all Western fifth-generation fighters use flat nozzles is incorrect: the F-35 specifically employs a low-signature axisymmetric nozzle featuring serrated edges, controlled seals, and high-temperature coatings.
His highly detailed accounts regarding software rewrites, Taiwanese processors, the inability to fuse radar data, and the potential replacement of Russian avionics with Indian radars rest on shakier ground. Cooper provides plenty of names and details but rarely offers the primary source documents needed to formally link each issue to the operational Su-57. Indeed, he himself acknowledges relying on "RUMINT" (rumor-based intelligence) for some recent developments.
Finally, the term "vaporware" is an overstatement. The Su-57 exists, flies, has been delivered in limited numbers, and has actually served as a platform for launching long-range missiles. It is not a fictional program. Rather, it is a prototype undergoing gradual industrialization—deployed in an incomplete configuration and falling far short of the ambitions originally proclaimed.
The Su-57 is not vaporware; it is a real aircraft surrounded by an exceptional amount of vaporware.
Cooper correctly identifies the fundamental problem: on paper, the Russians have amassed the attributes of a fifth-generation fighter—multi-band capability, data fusion, supercruise, stealth, an electronic co-pilot, and collaborative drone integration—without demonstrating mastery of how to integrate them into a coherent, industrially reproducible operational system. This is precisely the trap of substituting a catalog of features for true systems engineering.
Tom Cooper's article
There is no proper intelligence report. If China is developing this type of engine, sooner or later they will succeed. That's a know fact. Of course Russians are way ahead than China when it comes to jet engine technology. This is why I am very positive about Idz30 on Su57.
The WS-15 originated from the R-79-300, The prototype and technical drawings of the aircraft arrived in China in 1996.
Including its nozzles, it was exported to both the United States（F-135） and China.
with its bypass ratio reduced from 0.78 to a range of 0.2–0.3.
Within the Chinese military, there were strong calls arguing that the project was obsolete and should be restarted. (Production proceeded under the original designation.)
Actual development timeline:
For instance, the WS-10B (with a ground thrust of 13.2 tonnes) only completed its final certification in 2017—achieving a service life of 1,500 hours, which met the target threshold. The entire process, from project initiation to completion, spanned 27 years and saw three successive chief designers.
By the most conservative estimate, Initial Operational Capability (IOC) would be reached no earlier than 2030—assuming the R-79 core engine and basic design are retained.
If "Plan B"—starting development from scratch—is adopted, it would take until at least 2036.
In reality, its ultimate performance is highly likely to fall short of the AL-41F-1.
It is not in the same league as "Idz30"; by the time the WS-15 project was launched, the AL-41F-1 had not even been initiated. Furthermore, when the Su-35S—equipped with the AL-41F-1S—arrived in China in 2016, the WS-15 had not yet even undergone high-altitude bench testing. The gap in development speed is vast—
not to mention the "177" or "Idz30."
Based on current information:
117S: An engine scaled down to AL-31F dimensions using 41F (Izd. 20) technology
117: Izd. 20 scaled down to Su-57 dimensions
177S: An engine scaled down to AL-31F dimensions using 51F (Izd. 30) technology
177: 51F (Izd. 30) with the third bypass duct removed
Izd. 30: Features a fixed third bypass duct（Features the capability to switch between two fixed bypass ratios.）
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