After reading this article, I lost all the little positive opinion I had about HAL. I don't know how many defects/errors they had in LCA Tejas.
After reading this article, I lost all the little positive opinion I had about HAL. I don't know how many defects/errors they had in LCA Tejas.
Why do you think LCA was delayed so much.
Only competition can bring in efficiency and quality.
this statement:
"only competition can brinf in efficeincy and quality" needs to be embossed into every govt run sector including power, railways, telecom - everything.
the lethargy is because there is no positiv impact of good performance or negative impact of bad performance.
true fact: the loans passed by nationalised banks went bad/stale - tell me who is held accountable at all? it was only passing the buck. if your higher up forces you to do something, why did you do it? because the job itself was based on that higher up's recommendation.
will someone from a pvt bank go scot free if he passes a bad loan systematically?
ALH vs NUH Debate – Clarifying & Moving Forward with Positive EnergyThe Truth Hurts, Says Indian Navy’s 1st Dhruv Flight Commander
By Commander YASHODHAN MARATHE (Retd.)
I’m a second generation helicopter pilot and have been flying rotary wing machines since 1989. Of course, the primary amount of flying has been on HAL built aircraft, the Chetak and the ALH and of course, the Kiran.
I’m quite saddened by the slew of remarks against a former CNS, himself a decorated pilot. HAL has often taken one or two points in which there may be a slip-up, and highlighted only these points, thereby glossing over the crux of the matter. In this case, the crux of the matter is blade folding, not the “automatic” part that inadvertently came up. I have been in the field at the helm of affairs when the Naval ALH were taken on board the aircraft carrier for the first time. The idea was to test out the helicopter in the role that it was destined for. Sadly, the maiden embarkation on board the carrier was a challenge that the helicopter could not live up to.
Blade folding is a major sticking point that is currently being discussed. The navy had specified to HAL the requirement of a 3.5 m blade-folded width right from the very start. This was based on the shipborne requirements because, after all, the helicopter would have to land on a ship and be stowed in the hangar after folding the blades. At sea the requirement is also for a quick and easy way of folding the blades. Just like the Chetak or the Kamov, or the Sea King. Logically then, HAL should have thought about this as a major design shortcoming before even offering a helicopter with any width greater than 3.5 m. The navy had contributed a fair amount of money towards the development of the indigenous helicopter, yet it is quite clear that the blade folding requirement was not given its importance even during basic design at HAL. The navy as usual was forced to accept the initial lot of helicopters under concession.
It is always the crew that are pressurised to support ‘indigenous effort’ and were as usual told to at least start flying the helicopter and gain some experience. This was for the first 8 helicopters. Today, this very acceptance of a concession is being turned around to twist the Navy’s tail by making statements like the navy and HAL should sit together to discuss these points and engage HAL to let them know what the navy wants.
As a solution about fifteen years back, HAL had made the suggestion that the Navy should accept the method where one blade remains forward and other three go back. For this, HAL actually suggested that the Navy should cut holes in the helicopter hangar for the front facing blade – classic case of making the hand fit the glove. The thing is, these suggestions are often made at the MoD level, and the impression given is that the Navy is adamant in not taking this option. Similarly, the concession given to HAL was to achieve a 5.4 m folded width to begin with, instead of 3.5 m. They could not meet even this 5.4 m, and the constant complaint in any forum was that navy cannot accept even 0.2 m more than the required width – conveniently forgetting that the 0.2 m was from the 5.4 m, not the original requirement of 3.5m.
The problem in all this is that the person on the top does not have the background and the time to understand the nuances and gets convinced that the navy is putting unreasonable demands. The segmented blade folding option was discussed way back in 2005-06, so there is no reason that HAL should not already have done this over the last fifteen years if they were serious. At that time HAL had wanted the Navy to sponsor the study and trials. There is nothing new in segmented blade folding. The Chetak has got a two-piece blade from 1960 onward. Retrofitting the ALH for segmented blade folding will not only increase weight, but should also involve hundreds of hours of testing. And I’m not sure whether to trust the results of these flight tests, given the efficacy of the rigorous testing that HAL does.
To give everyone a clear viewpoint of the blade folding procedure, there were a total of 64 loose items that had to be removed, used, fitted back at the time the kit was offered in 2005. This took over half an hour, though a timing of 22 minutes or so was demonstrated using five HAL personnel and safely on ground with no wind and no rolling and pitching of the deck. I can’t imagine five personnel being employed for folding the blade in a procedure that takes over 20 minutes. During folding on board the carrier the first helicopter became unserviceable because the lining on the blade came off as soon as we folded and put back the blades. On the second aircraft, the bolt broke. HAL will claim that they have rectified this, by putting the lining on the bolt and using a better material of the bolt. They also would have reduced the number of items. But the procedure still takes too long, and at sea, this becomes a danger from submarines to the ship which has to maintain a steady course.
To come back to the point, the biggest problem again here is that the customer which is the Indian Navy, was given a product that did not fit the bill. Once again fault is being found with the Indian Navy for not supporting indigenous development. And the crux of the matter is being diverted by focusing the attention on the term ‘automatic blade folding’ that wasn’t asked for, only a convenient and quick blade folding.
Let us go to the testing philosophy of HAL, that many of crew felt was suspect. The (in) famous crash of the first civilian Dhruv after takeoff from Hyderabad was completely avoidable. For those of you who may not remember, the Government of Jharkhand ALH while on ferry from Hyderabad to Ranchi, lost the tail rotor at cruising altitude, and had to force-land. The aircraft was a writeoff, but the crew survived.
Before emphasising the survivability of the ALH, I’d like to point out that this failure occurred in cruise, at normal forward speed, and there was more than enough time for emergency actions, by the experienced test pilot that was flying the helicopter. If this had happened at hover, it was certain death. Now, a few months before this while ferrying a naval ALH to Visakhapatnam, the tail rotor gearbox had sheared off, and was hanging on just two supports. We could see the entire rotor disc shaking vigorously at hover, and it was quite scary. After landing, it was with horror that the crew found a nearly 8-inch portion of the tail rotor blade leading edge had flown off. This imbalance caused excessive vibrations and damage to the tail gear box. Another few minutes and this tail rotor would have flown off too.
This was a serious matter, and taken up with HAL. They provided the simplistic solution of changing the tail rotor blades and the tail gear box on board the ship, and expected the crew to fly the helicopter as if nothing had happened. When questioned about the analysis and the steps taken to prevent recurrence, the HAL staff were surprised why we were questioning their superior method of addressing the problem. To them the defective item had been replaced with another one, and voila! Good to go.
When we asked them about a similar thing happening on the new tail rotor, the answer was, “We have tested this and it is okay”. Well, the one that broke also was tested, right? In all this, we found that one more helicopter tail gearbox had a crack in a similar place (two down out of only three on board the ship). HAL remained unfazed, and claimed that the two cracks were unrelated, and other helicopter gearbox had cracked due to “over-shimming” so we were not to bother. They would replace the other gearbox too. Nice solution. Over-shimming -This had obviously been done at manufacturer facility. Why was not the person responsible for this over-shimming brought to task? If it were found that a Naval technician had missed out something important, there would be some disciplinary action if it was negligence, and a method of addressing the issue if it was procedural. Not sure if the person who signed off on the paper clearing that helicopter for flight was taken to task or not.
At this point, HAL should have done a proper analysis of the cause and taken corrective actions of the tail rotor blade debonding. If they had done the study, then possibly the crash of the ill-fated civilian ALH on ferry from Hyderabad to Ranchi in November that year, would have been avoided. This is a clear case of, well, so many things. There were many other findings that came as a result of this accident. A peculiar one was that the CVR/FDR stopped recording after both engines were shut down. The simple fact of ensuring that the vital black box is connected to the battery when both engines were shut down had been missed out during design. So, when the generators stopped working, so did the crucial recording device. We all keep wondering what other crucial things had been missed out by design.
I’m not sure of the actual effect any disciplinary action taken after the crash of the first civilian ALH because there were many problems found in the processes being followed in manufacture of the blades. Among them, the process of manufacture of the composite tail rotor blades. The entire fleet was grounded for six to eight months until we got replacement blades. Again, these blades started showing signs of cracking up of the resin coating. HAL said it was not a problem. Photographs are scary.
There have been a few crashes on the ALH in the recent past. Two Army aviators lost their lives and in the latest one, the Army Commander was on board, when a critical component in the control chain failed. This kind of failure is unheard of in any modern helicopter, and puts a cloud on the whether the testing of any modifications is really exhaustive or just that there is some aspect missed out either by ignorance of act of omission. I do not want to elaborate further, because the cause is not yet finalised, but so many crashes in such a short time do bring about a very big trust deficit.
After this embarkation on board the aircraft carrier, there was a detailed analysis carried out internally and it was fairly well concluded that this helicopter would not meet the exacting requirements of Naval flying from ships, and the problem areas were highlighted to HAL.
Well before we embarked the carrier, we had to contend with many other issues. The strangest one was that whenever it rained, it poured inside the cockpit. Water would come through the overhead CB panel, and pour on the collective pitch where the engine control was located. Water would drip on the instrument panel. Water would drip on the passenger seats. I remember the AME of the civilian Dhruv telling me that the ONGC Chairman when flying on board the civilian ALH once had to use a newspaper to shield himself from rain. HAL will again claim that this point has been addressed. But the main issue again begs question, why was this not checked out in design and before delivery?
As far as the Indian Navy went, we were the most problematic customers for HAL. We would demand that the helicopter be fully free from any rain water leakage, we would insist that all the documentation had to be in order, and that all instruments had to be fully functional before we left the facility. We would make sure that there was no defect on the helicopter before leaving for the unit. The crew were very sure that once we took off from the helipad to take the helicopter back, we would get no support from HAL. The advantage of the Navy was that our sailors and officers had worked with Western technologies for a very long time with the Sea King, the Sea Harrier etc. The procedures laid out from so many years of following internationally laid down standards in acceptance procedures made the Navy a very painful customer for HAL. HAL may state that they have addressed many of these problems in the Mark 3, but why should the problem been there in the first place? Would you accept a car from the dealer that leaks rain water? HAL designers and others at the plant would often claim that this was the first time they were making a helicopter, so there would be some ups and downs. This excuse even then was completely untenable, because HAL as an organisation manufactured everything from spacecraft components and supersonic fighters to propeller trainers. this is not because HAL is the best, but because nobody else has been permitted to do this. There is no bigger tragedy for the nation than not allowing any competition. Ask any Services pilot and you will hear the truth – the finished aircraft lack quality, HAL lacks commitment and most of all an unwillingness to face the truth. I’ve rarely if at all heard anything good being said about the HAL. If this is indeed the case, why is it that the opinion of the real customer never taken, the pilot in the field?
The real question to ask is that if HAL is indeed so capable and the ALH is really a world-class helicopter why is it that there are no sales in the civil market and for Military Export? The issue seems to be that HAL has set its standards very low by any yardstick, and it reminds me of the saying that goes “ the real problem is not that I will set my standards too high and fail, but that I will set the standards too low and succeed”. Successive HAL products have been pushed down the throats of the reluctant Armed Forces, and they are in no position to refuse – unwilling customers that cannot say no, for various reasons. The correct thing to do for HAL would be to challenge the globally established players; prove that the helicopter and the Company is right up there along with the best. This in itself will ensure that the Services come willingly to the table to buy the ALH for their own use.
Following the 2007 crash of IAF’s helicopter display team’s Dhruv, a Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report from 2010 highlighted the fractured relationship between HAL and the IAF. The report blamed HAL of compromising with professionalism to protect its business interests, which in turn could have serious implications on safety of the people flying and operating the machine. The report also highlighted the problem of “cyclic saturation” with the helicopters, which caused two of the crashes (including the one in 2007). This technical oversight had also reportedly cost HAL a contract with Chile for the sale of the helicopters.
I also perceived a lack of professionalism at HAL. To list out some:
During acceptances at HAL, we would find that individual components would have been switched from other helicopters. In other words, the log card would state that for eg, the fuel pump serial no 12345 was installed, but the actual item on the aircraft would be serial no 98765. Once we realised this, then it became de-rigueur to physically inspect each and every component to check that the component is correct. HAL were concerned about this, and would say, why are you so fussy? Why is this so important, you may ask. It’s important because each component has certain flying hours and a defect history that is recorded in the log card, and ensures that nothing which is defective or with more flying hours on it than recorded is installed. Would you ever think of doing something like this from any foreign vendor? One expects a certain level of integrity and honesty from any vendor, especially a PSU that is supposed to be trustworthy.
The Final assembly line of the helicopter used to be very bad. There was no proper hygiene maintained. For eg, all the metal filings from the drilled holes would fall to the aircraft floor, never to be cleared. There was no template being used for the drilling of holes, so each panel had to be hand-crafted because there was nothing standardised. I have personally seen people working on the open Main Gearbox / IDS with tools and pens sticking out of pockets. Anything could fall out of the pocket into the gearbox, causing dents and leakages. We have removed ballpoint pens and nuts / bolts under the floor board, in the area of the floatation gear bottles after hours of flying. A very dangerous incident was when we had sparking and melting of the alternator cables. Never heard of. The HAL solution was to replace the cables. All was well, and the team that had come with the cable, told our engineer, that the cable was too long, and they wanted to use tiewraps (or tie-wire) to secure it. Fortunately for us, the designer also came by that day to find out what was wrong. He was horrified to find that the persons installing the new cable did not have a wiring diagram, and had routed the cables incorrectly. This was the reason there was ‘extra’ cable. We were saved a repeat of this. There were so many places all over the aircraft where cable bundles were secured with a tiewrap due to which the cables got cut. This was because of the vibrations on the aircraft, and the cables likely not being routed correctly. It is likely that many of these are corrected, so I will not dwell too long on these points, but such lack of basic engineering hygiene and procedures invariably led to many failures. This is completely unacceptable from any standpoint in a manufacturing company that specialises in Aerospace components and aircraft.
One day we came back from a sortie during which we noticed the GPS position not showing. On return, we found that both the GPS antennae had flown off. When I called HAL, I was horrified when I was told that we were not the only ones – so why didn’t they tell us in time? This meant that they knew this was happening. It was a faulty design of the antenna mounting bracket and we found cracks on all of them on other helicopters.
While I can go on about individual incidents, the crucial point is the way that HAL handles any defect reported by the customer.
- There seems to be very little accountability. When the customer reports a problem especially grave problems, the manufacturer must find out the deeper reason for the defect or failure. In Mathematics, it is called ‘deriving from first principles’. The manufacturing process has to be vetted. There could be a flaw in the assembly line, or there could be a problem with the particular tooling used to put together the component. Or there could be just plain carelessness. Like in the case of the alternator wire. While punitive action may not be always necessary, some amount of disciplining is required. As customers, the Service pilots never get to know whether the root cause has been addressed – all that we used to receive was a defect summary that did not tell us what exactly has been done.
- The way HAL handles most defects is replacement, without really going into the root of the problem. The tail rotor issue on the ALH is one example, that I have written about. I was not satisfied with the resolution of the problem, and refused to fly the helicopter from the Carrier at the time.
The other point is about the way that the design bureau looks at designing a helicopter. A couple of examples are in order. The engine cowlings on any helicopter are designed to open upwards, sometimes they open downwards so that people can stand on the cowlings and work on the engines. Not for ALH. The initial design required two technicians to climb on a huge platform and open about a dozen and half fasteners, and then the entire cowling had to be taken down like an egg-shell and laid on the ground. It was only after many meetings with the Navy, that HAL agreed to cowlings with hinged clamshells that would open downwards providing a platform for the worker to stand on. The quality of these clamshells was so bad, that they would bend and break at times. This point will also possibly be refuted by HAL as having been addressed, but the issue is that this should not have happened in the first place at the time.
I actually casually asked some of the designers whether they had ever worked on, or closely studied any other existing type of helicopter, to see the crucial design issues and other small modifications or attention to detail they had done. “No” was the answer. They seemed genuinely surprised about my asking and proudly said all of them were PGs, with some either holding or pursuing Doctorates, (so why would anyone want them to look at other helicopters). My point was also important because it is only when you have physically worked on any helicopter in the field, will you understand the day to day problems with regard to accessibility, Human-Machine Interface (HMI) issues and the like. They will would also see how other manufacturers have addressed issues that they may have faced. Many of these are simple solutions, may not be patented and can easily be adopted. One simple example is of the hand holds provided to climb on the engine deck. The HAL has provided handles made like similar to commercial cupboard door handles, sticking out into the airflow. Other manufacturers have provided spring-loaded flaps, so that the flap goes in when you put your hand or foot, and the flap provides a smooth finish to reduce drag in flight. Even these door type handles were so badly made, that one of them broke when a sailor was climbing on top, and broke his hand. We are fortunate he was alive. What happens if he falls overboard? I’m sure HAL would have then provided a heavier hand hold, and come up with some theory that the person should be more careful when climbing up or something like that, rather than addressing the core issue. Other manufacturers have provided spring-loaded flaps, so that the flap goes in when you put your hand or foot, and the flap provides a smooth finish to reduce drag in flight. It must be understood that all most of the other manufacturers worldwide have adequate staff on the design and production that who have a lot of experience in the field, and therefore know and understand the problems faced by the man in the heat of the battle when tasked to service and to fly the helicopter.
Another point is that there is no independent thought or foresight. A simple example – I also asked one of those on the LUH design team in the Design Bureau, whether they had considered commonality of parts between the ALH and the LUH. Again, they were surprised, and asked me why is this relevant? Now, if I need to answer that question here in this article, then evidently, the reader has no authority to comment on anything written here.
Coming back to the issue of customer base, the LUH could have been developed and matured in the civil market, and then offered to the Services, if HAL were so confident that the product was good. It must be realised that the civil world has no time to waste in down time of aircraft. Time is money, and they cannot afford the luxury of down time like the Services have to. Penalties are extremely harsh, and could even be up to a lakh of rupees per half hour of delay in positioning of the helicopter. ONGC and all Oil Companies impose such penalties on the helicopter companies. I myself was working on a contract where the only down time permitted for the single helicopter was 48 hours in a month, non-cumulative. Can anyone be confident of providing such a commitment were he to operate the ALH?
All pilots will have personal instances of an lackadaisical indifferent attitude or a deliberate wrong being done at the factory, just to get the aircraft off their backs. Our unit once took three months to accept a helicopter from HAL. This delay was because of recurrent problems with vibrations, rain water leakage, components not matching, the list is endless- but we didn’t budge. Can you think of any other manufacturer that will take so long to deliver a helicopter that has only just come out of servicing?
Before we go too deep into the how and whether HAL should be considered to provide the Navy with the 111 helicopters needed to replace the Chetak, we should first consider the current state of our Military-Industrial-Complex. A large part of the income from exports of any major industrialised nations comes from weapons / systems sales. India has practically none that really matter.
Incidentally, ALH helicopters were sent to Nepal, Israel and Equador. The HAL crew really put in a lot of efforts for preparing the first of the civil helicopters to be sent abroad to Israel, in 2005 or 2006. A lot of efforts meant they did a very good paint job. I’m not sure if the rainwater leakage was fixed or not, but the difference in the quality of paint job between that helicopter and the one they had prepared for the Navy was enormous. Just like the “Export Quality” goods that used to be advertised in India. The HAL had a marketing contract with an Israeli firm, which nobody is talking about. If the ALH was indeed manna from heaven, then why did this marketing contract not produce the desired results? Israel promptly returned the civil registration helicopter and this is never mentioned anywhere by HAL. I’m not sure if Nepal is still flying their ALH. Ecuador has grounded all their remaining helicopters after some of them crashed, one quite spectacularly during a parade and cancelled the contract. HAL claims this is pilot error, and the customer thinks otherwise. In any case there was a trust deficit and Ecuador cancelled the contract, mainly, because they were at liberty to do so, unlike the Indian Armed Forces. HAL had exported one ALH on contract to Israel which they returned to HAL because they didn’t find it good enough. This and the aircraft sold to Equador most of which crashed is not even a drop in the ocean of defence sales. The ALH with Nepal and Maldives were gifted by the Government of India, not purchased by them out of choice.
The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) in many ways tries to address this shortcoming of the Military-Industrial-Complex. It is clearly stated in the preamble that “A need has also been felt for identifying strategic partners for promoting defence production in the private sector.” To start with, this one definitive push is in the right direction. A private sector player is interested primarily in the bottom-lines. This statement should not be quoted out of context. This is because even the PSUs are required to adhere to budgets, time lines, and finally, generate profits. The approach to this is different for both of these. Private industry will not compromise on quality of intake, or have to go through detailed procedures and governmental approvals to achieve the desired results. To quote some examples from the non-aviation commercial space, an excellent example is what happened to Maruti, after collaboration with Suzuki, and what was the status of Maruti Motors before that. Prior to this, India was ‘atmanirbhar’ for cars like the Ambassador Mark 4, the Premier Padmini and the Standard Herald. The fact that these were copies is a different matter. The common man had to be happy with the paddle shift gears in cars. The electricals were so bad that batteries had to be disconnected when going out of station. Cars needed petrol to be poured over the carburettor on a winter morning to start. I myself have driven a Premier Padmini and the change from this to a Wagon R was like moving on to a completely different level. Remember how all of us had to tilt our Bajaj Chetak scooters before starting? Do we do this with any of our modern bikes, whether an indigenous bike like the Pulsar or a foreign one like a Honda Activa?
Why I bring these examples to an aviation discussion is that the basic principles are the same – India had a practically non-existent industrial capability and never seen or used modern manufacturing techniques, better standards of equipment and the highest safety standards. Do any one of you think for a moment, that if the Government of that time had not brought in Suzuki, we would have been driving anything other than the Ambassador or Padmini? There is a dynamic difference in the machining, finishing, quality of workmanship and performance of the modern generation cars. Perhaps India would have had a much larger share of global manufacturing of cars, had the Government gone all the way, and allowed more numbers of car manufacturers to set up base here. However if other manufacturers had been allowed a free run like Maruti was, then Maruti may not have had the lion’s share of the market today. A similar mindset we’re seeing now about the HAL’s entry into the NUH market, existed in 1982 when Suzuki was brought in. In the case of the NUH debate, seems to be a feeling that if another manufacturer comes into India and proves its mettle, then the unchallenged position of HAL will be in danger. If we do not grab this opportunity of tying up with a foreign manufacturer, to set up shop in India, with a Private entity, then we will definitely miss the bus to building a strong Military-Industrial-Complex.
I’m a commercial helicopter pilot now, and wish to touch upon the issue of speed. Why is speed so crucial you may ask? Well, to cover a distance of 100 NM (Nautical Miles) a helicopter flying at 150 kts will take 40 minutes, and the ALH zipping along at 110 kts will take about 15 minutes extra. So what’s the big deal? Imagine YOU are the person drowning in the water, fighting to stay afloat, and have to wait for 15 minutes more. Or, you need to reach the point where the enemy submarine is so that you can speedily drop the torpedo before the submarine disappears. Additionally, since the fuel consumption figures of the S76 and ALH are comparable, the same amount of fuel will just take us that of a much lesser distance in an ALH.
The fact that the Naval version of the ALH is about 400 kg heavier than the IAF/Army version is another point to be kept in mind. This difference is as good as 5 passengers and is a crucial point. Weight increase has also been caused by the imported Vibration damping equipment strapped on at a later stage, which should not have been needed to start with, but that is a different line of discussion altogether.
If HAL was truly serious about providing a naval helicopter, the moment design bureau realised that 3.5m width wasn’t possible, a possible decision could have been taken at the time that the basic airframe could be the same, but the rotor head and blades for the Navy would be optimised for sea level operations and shipborne use. The current ALH is more optimised for high altitude use and survive battle damage, and hence separating the two designs could have yielded the required results. The Sea King is excellent for sea level use, but cannot cross the Banihal pass. Similarly, the ALH performs admirably at high altitudes, but the same performance could be a drag at sea level (pun intended). This option is just one of the possible scenarios I’m suggesting, in hindsight of course. If this was not considered possible, HAL should have at the onset accepted that that they will not design a helicopter for the more exacting Naval requirements. HAL claiming (as per information on a different website) that the cost of an imported helicopter would cost 10-15 crores more without actually knowing the figures is incorrect. We don’t even know the exact cost of an ALH.
Coming back to the ALH, the moot question is – how much of the ALH is actually Indian? The engines are ‘manufactured’ at the HAL Engine Division, a euphemism for assembled. The Avionics are Israeli. Crew seats are imported, as are passenger seats for VIP. The material used to make the airframe and blade comes from various sources abroad. There is enough literature about the weapons that are going to be imported. Floation gear is imported. The Rotor brake was made in India with quality control by HAL. These brakes used to suddenly get jammed while flying, and so HAL said to us, fly without the brakes. Sadly with this aircraft, the Sum is less than the Total of the parts.
Coming to the oft-repeated term of indigenisation. When we speak of an Indigenous product, what exactly is indigenous? Something produced by a PSU (with parts from all over the globe) or something that is produced in India, even if it is by a foreign manufacturer with imported and locally produced parts. By different yardsticks, a Hyundai car made in India will be indigenous or will be imported. It is the same for home use items like Surf Excel or Colgate. Should we stop using any of these products? There are enough clarifications in the news from the Government that an item manufactured by a multi-national company in India will still be considered Indian / indigenous. So we have to understand that if a foreign vendor with years of experience comes into India to set up shop to manufacture a helicopter, he is bound to bring with him the expertise, the precision manufacturing practices, industrial safety and everything that has made that company successful. You are automatically creating a value chain, supply chain that will increase the standards of manufacturing and design in India. This will also spawn its own network of MSMEs and design experts. This will further spur indigenous R & D and design as well as spinoff manufacturing. This is just like the previously described automobile revolution.
Today there are Indian companies producing world class components for foreign manufacturers. I was told at the Sikorsky factory that the entire cabin structure of the S92 is manufactured in India and sent across. This is the norm everywhere. An American helicopter can have French engines, or Canadian engines, European manufacturers will use engines from Pratt and Whitney, components from all over the globe, so in that sense, any helicopter is a fusion of material from around the globe. What then is different if HAL does the same thing? Sadly with the ALH, the sum is less than the total of the parts.
What can HAL however, bring to the table? If we allow a foreign vendor to bring in a helicopter that is suited for the Naval requirements, then ultimately, the Nation will benefit. If we were to insist on HAL’s (unsuitable) helicopter being inducted into the Navy to replace the Chetak, then we are doing a great disservice to the Service and to the Nation. I do not understand why there are so many demands that only a PSU should make helicopters and that the design effort of HAL should not be allowed to go waste. If as I’ve said earlier, the product is really so good, there will automatically be a queue to purchase the helicopter. HAL has its order books full not with willing customers, but with those that had no choice. The navy today has a choice and there seems to be a determined move to scuttle this choice. If the ALH were to be imposed onto the navy as the NUH, HAL may have won the NUH battle, but we India will surely lose the war. We in addition would have lost an opportunity to break free of the clutches of the Soviet era mentality that believed anything made or done by the government is good, and anything done by private enterprise is evil. We would have forever killed any opportunity of nurturing real talent, as well as allowing knowledge and skills to grow and flourish, all for short term gains of a PSU that really, has nothing to gain or lose from the contract, other than a sense of prestige and balancing of the account books.
When we look back many years later, we will then know exactly on whose door to pin our failure as a nation to seize the moment.
The author is a 55 year old helicopter pilot, Qualified Flight Instructor and has about 5800 hours of flying. He was the Flight Commander of the first Naval ALH flight and has adequate experience in taking the ALH through all the paces required for Naval requirements. After retiring from the Navy in 2008, he has flown commercial offshore and ashore flights. His views are personal.
The Truth Hurts, Says Indian Navy’s 1st Dhruv Flight Commander
Wonderful writeup by the commander. Settles most of the questions.
Recently, a war of words erupted between former naval aviators and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). An open forum Livefist Defence turned into a stage for angry exchange of words between veterans from Indian Navy and HAL. It is unfortunate and shifts focus from real enemies that threaten us today.
The bone of contention is the Naval Utility Helicopter (NUH). This paper aeroplane has occupied centrestage in many intersecting schools of thought. It is the first experiment in Strategic Partnership (SP) program rolled out by PM Narendra Modi government for creating private sector capacity in major aerospace and defence (A&D) manufacturing in addition to capabilities of Defence Public Sector Undertakings (PSU).
Many angry words were spoken; often leading the discourse towards “us versus them”; creating straw men anybody with a Twitter handle or WhatsApp account could attack.
Where does the pain come from
To make sense of the latest round of sparring between navy and HAL, one must understand where the pain comes from. Adm Arun Prakash, former Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) and one of navy’s venerated aviators, has done more for indigenisation than many commentators on either side of this debate. He is a 1971-war hero who had more than two decades of service in whites when ALH first took to the skies. He was already occupying high office when the initial parleys on ALH took place. If he is miffed, one must understand why.
Adm Arun Prakash has worked through all key positions in naval aviation and given more than a fair share of rope to HAL during his stellar service career. He is an alumnus of Air Force Test Pilots School (AFTPS); a Production Test Pilot (PTP) and former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The HAL spokesperson who dismissed Adm AP’s remarks with “easy for retired persons to talk and give endless commentary” is an unfortunate example of corporate communication. It added more fat into the fire, drew sharp responses and diverted attention from real issues.
One of the most astute observations on where the HAL spokesperson’s pain possibly came from was summarised by author KS Nair (@TheBrownBeagle) on Twitter below!
This was soon followed by headline jargon such as “Angry HAL replies“, “Navy throws it back“, etc. Many people feasted on the spectacle as the silent service watched on. This was followed up by another post on the same channel (Livefistdefence) from HAL’s senior test pilot in his “personal capacity”. The shadow-boxing marks a new low in customer-service relations from an industry otherwise known for the opposite, at least in public forum.
Delaminating the latest imbroglio
A humble admission. I have known and worked, if not flown, with each and every person in this round of ‘ALH versus NUH’ debate. I will attempt to clarify some issues rising from the latest opinion piece before we move on.
The senior test pilot who authored the piece is a brilliant TP and colleague whom I have known for over 20 years. We toiled through the flight test course (FTC) together and have shared cockpit in many sorties. He makes a fair point at the outset that “problems do occur but they are not because the men behind the machines did not do their jobs; there are limits to knowledge and one learns from experience“. I fully agree with this observation and politely request him to extend the same generosity to the customers too.
He further states: “none of the naval pilots have flown or assessed the current generation ALH. It’s sad that with 16 ALH in the pipeline, the Naval Project Team at HAL does not have a Test Pilot or a Test Engineer on its strength. The last Test Crew was posted to the project team some 6-8 years back and that too with no mandate to participate in the ongoing ALH flight trials“.
The last test pilot at NPO incidentally was me! I have some amazing experiences from those days!
HAL test crew and me undertook the maiden afloat trials of ALH Mk-3 DW151 in 2014 with a “clear mandate” for spot checks of Mk-3 systems and dynamic interface prior shipping it to Maldives. I have flown all marks of the ALH in my capacity as project test pilot appointed to Naval Project Office (NPO) at HAL. Naval pilots have been flying the ALH Mk-3 for over six years now; and continue to do so to this day. An ALH Mk-3 is still with Maldives, flown by naval pilots. What generation-change or quantum jump took place in six years, I am keen to know. The latest Mk-3 on offer to navy reportedly comes with additional sensors and customisation. I will be keen to report on this bird, given an opportunity.
If navy did miss something, it is the inability to field test crew to NPO at HAL since 2014. Instead, the navy has raised a centre of excellence for naval flight testing – the Naval Flight Test Squadron (NFTS) at Goa. HAL has regularly been in touch with NFTS. I am also informed that there is significant synergy between HAL and NFTS. Test crew from both sides are in regular touch.
The navy is a small service with limited means. Test crew are premium even in the IAF and anywhere else in the world. Given the present low-throughput of indigenous aerospace manufacturing, the nation or industry may hardly value or require test crew. But from my experience, test crew contribution is valued not by numbers but by effect.
To that end, whenever any crucial naval ALH trial is conducted, services of naval test crew are always enlisted. NPO (ALH) sits across the road inside the Rotary Wing Research and Design Centre (RWRDC). Moving that office into the flight operations complex of HAL is simply an organisational or real estate problem. It can be fixed if both sides give or take a little.
Keeping an eye on future naval projects, HAL could easily consider offering few retiring naval test crew a second career in their organisation. Every country with such capability does. There’s nothing many self-respecting test crew would love doing more than flight testing. The latest discourse creates an imaginary shortage where none exists. Test pilots who have aced hundreds of prototype sorties face uncertain careers in airline industry today. That’s a pot of gold industry and services can tap into for bridging voids in customer requirements and product development.
Another point the senior TP makes runs contrary to the very purpose of navy setting up the NPO back in late 80s:
“On the naval side, the role of the project team is reduced only to following up on the aircraft that come here for maintenance. There is no one to advise NHQ on what exactly HAL’s current capability is and how it has improved over the years. So, most of what you get is hearsay”.
While I understand where this complaint comes from, the role of NPO is not “following up on aircraft that come here (Bengaluru) for maintenance“. That is the role and charter of Naval Liaison Cell (NLC), Bengaluru – a completely separate entity. If today, NPO lacks a naval test pilot, so does HAL. If indeed the NPO has turned insignificant, navy needs to worry.
I took up duties at IHQ MoD (Navy) / DNAS at a point where the file for returning all eight naval ALH back to HAL was in process. I take some credit – along with many naviators who wished well for this bird – for having played a role in reversing this decision. An increasingly frustrated navy, left holding ALH that couldn’t sustain even a fair-weather embarkation, did a Williamson’s Turn to order 16 more ALH, albeit for a shore-based role.
I have not flown the ALH in operational roles. My first brush with ALH was at NPO which was also my last assignment before taking premature retirement from navy. I did not belong to any exclusive “members-only” club when I took office in NPO. My experience was thus not coloured by cognitive or selection bias. It came from a purely flight test background, having already flown about 18 types in India and abroad; with NHQ experience to boot. My paper on ‘Improving the Operational Utility of Naval ALH’ penned sometime in 2010-11 can be found in the dusty cupboards of NHQ or Western Naval Command.
Slowly, a momentum was generated. Maldives was the first beneficiary – not because ALH out-performed any competitition, but because it was an indigenous product that met a strategic purpose. That’s the signalling power of indigenisation. Today, HAL has orders for 16-each ALH Mk-3 from IN and Indian Coast Guard. See how far we have come!
Rest of the commentary by the senior TP highlights poor experience of IN with LSP aircraft and the inability to meet NSQRs. He writes emphatically “the Navy continues to hold only the Mk I (LSP) variants, hence the poor experience.”
While I do understand the difference between Limited Series Production (LSP) and Series Production (SP), fact remains that Indian Navy today has eight ALH – of which two are LSP and balance six are from SP. I am sure the 16 ALH Mk-3 will provide both sides an opportunity to fly and evaluate the improvements and updates. In fact, I see a golden opportunity for HAL to develop the 2-segmented blade and demonstrate a workable blade folding solution on one of the 16 Mk-3s.
This line from his post sums it up nicely and aligns with recent comments from other high-ranking officials of HAL: “ALH was specifically designed for high altitude and some intensive manoeuvring which are exactly opposite to what the Indian Navy needed.” If true, one wonders why HAL should persist with offering ALH back to the navy with no major change. Maybe I am missing something.
A question posed towards the end makes for interesting reading: “What is HAL asking? I suppose a level playing field. Allow ALH to compete and allow HAL the same margins that are given for development and integration of systems to foreign vendors. Don’t make a QR which keeps ALH out. Allow it to compete on its own merit rather than forcing it out by making a skewed qualitative requirement.” A Defence PSU asking for ‘level playing field’ is like Sachin Tendulkar asking for one while playing street cricket with the local boys!
“Foreign vendors only care about the gains that they will make, they do not want a self-reliant India. They want an India which they can continue to milk for years“, he writes. Fair point; but maybe the same holds true for DPSUs too. Strategic Partnership has approval of Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). If the very premise of SP is being challenged, it is for the CCS to decide.
I completely endorse his closing remarks that “the Indian Navy and HAL can work together and resolve their differences. Both institutions owe this to the nation.” YES we can, and we SHOULD! It’s been 35 years since ALH NSQRs were released. During this period, Sub Lieutenants became Admirals and retired. In services, where “you have to move if you want to go places”, it is impossible, in my opinion, to foment or sustain any perceived “anti-indigenisation” agenda. The Indian Navy has always been “pro-indigenisation”. But they are admittedly a tough customer. There’s a goldmine waiting to be tapped here for OEMs. Go ahead and satisfy your best critic. The best brand ambassador for any product is a satisfied customer.
Your sharpest critic is not your enemy; just as a sycophant is not your best friend
Let’s do this together!
Somewhere down the line, this “us versus them” should be turned into “us and them together”. Rhetoric must make way for a deeper understanding of customer requirements. Together, everyone achieves more.
India is oozing with talent. But the entry barriers for people wanting to work with PSUs are huge. Having seen both sides of the fence, I feel, private sector can leapfrog processes that take years in state-owned entities if there is serious business to be transacted. All around me, I see bright sparks so well read; straining at the leash to work towards ‘atma nirbharta‘ (self-reliance). Some of them amaze me with their knowledge and energy. Some I had the good fortune to mentor left this country for foreign shores just because nobody around here gave them a chance to contribute.
Much talent and resources can be found within five miles from the hub of aviation design and development here in Bangalore if only we turn this debate away from “individuals” to “issues”, turn negative discourse to “positive engagement”, develop healthy professional attitude & eschew parochialism.
May the user have the final word on this debate. No world-class product can be developed in an atmosphere of mistrust. The last mile is often the hardest! Let us put the past behind and move forward with positive energy. I leave you with one of the best lines i heard from a commentator on Twitter in this discussion:
ALH vs NUH Debate – Clarifying & Moving Forward with Positive Energy
Recently, a war of words erupted between former naval aviators and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). An open forum Livefist Defence turned into a stage for angry exchange of words between vetera…
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Navy-Dhruv Spat Escalates, Key Officers Throw It Back To HAL
A war of words over HAL’s Dhruv helicopter for the Indian Navy, sparked by an interview on Livefist this week, has escalated further. After an angry HAL took issue with a former Chief of Naval Staff calling them ‘lethargic, deadbeat’ for their lack of initiative in delivering a ship-worthy Dhruv helicopter, several veterans — both from HAL and the Indian Navy — have reacted.
Inputs from officers involved in key decisions around the naval Dhruv now add detail and texture to a program that has been described as a ‘sad story’ by Admiral Prakash in his interview to Livefist.
The most prominent among them is Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha, former chief of the Western Naval Command & of the Integrated Defence Staff. Speaking to Livefist, he said, “It is with utter dismay that I see HAL’s response to Admiral Arun Prakash’s comment. It is surprising that HAL has retorted in this manner. With conviction I can say that HAL dragged the issue of NUH (naval utility helicopter) for a number of years after it failed to meet NASQRs (naval air staff qualitative requirements) in 2003. HAL must also be reminded that in 2011 they gave in writing that they (HAL) cannot meet the NASQRs of NUH, since they cannot manufacture auto blade folding mechanism.“
Vice Admiral Sinha insists that it was HAL that signed off on MoD’s decision, therefore, to approve steps to identify an import option for the Indian Navy.
He says, “It was in the 2011 Services Capital Acquisition Procurement (SCAP) meeting I was part of that a decision was given on behalf of MoD that the Indian Navy can use the ‘Buy’ option for NUH. I was chief of the IDS during that period and part of deliberation. There was no choice but to ask the navy to go ahead with the ‘Buy’ option. The requirement at that time was lesser than what it is now because of delays and helicopters finishing with technical life. Many ships have been commissioned without helicopters since then. It is integral part of a warship. HAL may like to go through their files before making lose statements against a former Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee and CNS who has supported indigenisation to the hilt.“
The 2011 SCAP meeting that the officer refers to is significant, since it is basically the Indian Navy’s documented proof that HAL had green-lit plans to import helicopters, since HAL had assessed itself to be incapable of delivering a compliant helicopter. In the best traditions of Indian bureaucracy, the SCAP comprises two committees — the SCAPCC (categorisation committee) and SCAPCHC (higher committee), both of which consist of representatives of all departments of MoD. The SCAPCC is populated by Joint Secretary-level officers and chaired by the by Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Policy Planning and Force Development). The SCAPCHC was chaired at the time by Vice Admiral Sinha himself, and included the 3 service Vice Chiefs and Additional Secretary-level officers.
Only when a proposal of a service headquarters (in this case the Naval HQ) passes collective scrutiny of both committees is it put up to the apex Defence Acquisition Council ( DAC) chaired by the Defence Minister (AK Antony at the time) and includes all Secretary-level officers of the MoD , the Minister of State for Defence, service chiefs, DG Acquisition, DRDO chief and CISC (Vice Admiral Sinha at the time).
Livefist will update this story if we hear back officially from HAL or the company’s chairman at the time of these decisions in 2011, Ashok Nayak.
A senior HAL official, who asked not to be named, told Livefist, “Yes there have been some misgivings in this project regarding requirements for shipborne compatibility, but there is a view that such attacks will only alienate those working on such projects. We respect the views of the customer above all, and can understand the emotions that are involved, but the intention must be to fix what has gone wrong, however long it takes, and ensure we are on the same track.”
The top-level spat over the naval Dhruv has come into particular focus owing to the Indian Navy’s reputation as being traditionally more accepting and supportive of indigenous equipment than the other two services. In turn, that explains the intensity of the exchange.
Rear Admiral Sudhir Pillai, former Director Naval Air Staff at Naval Headquarters tweeted today in response to Livefist’s report, “The naval Dhruv development was requested in 2003/04 by Admiral Arun Prakash as CNS when he made a fervent plea for the development of an ALH Mk 2 to a high-powered team including HAL chairman (NR Mohanty at the time) after the ALH review revealed shortcomings. He offered Indian Navy support for funds. But was this ever pursued by HAL?“
Captain Dalip Kumar Sharma, former Indian Navy spokesperson and now a military affairs commentator, tells Livefist, “HAL needs to be reminded that the officer (Admiral Arun Prakash) making comments is not only a retired Chief of Naval Staff, but a revered naval aviator who has played an extremely important role in shaping the navy’s air arm.”
Capt. Sharma continues, “The first naval qualitative requirements for the ALH were provided to HAL in 1978, including dimensional requirements for fitment in ship hangars. These were found stringent, and on request from HAL were modified by the Indian Navy. However, these also could not be met. How can a navy procure helicopters that cannot be stowed onboard ships? Certainly, the navy will not procure helicopters for operations from ashore.”
While the Livefist interview has amplified a bone of contention that has festered over the Dhruv helicopter for long, several officers have also sought to dismiss the notion that the Indian Navy has been dismissive of HAL’s helicopter.
In a detailed blog post today on the helicopter blade-folding debate — one of the points of divergence between HAL and the navy on the Dhruv — veteran helicopter pilot Commander K.P. Sanjeev Kumar writes, “It may be fashionable to say ‘navy was never interested in ALH’ or ‘navy loves imports’. But it is patently unfair & completely untrue… The Indian Navy has remained engaged with ALH & continues to do so even today. From an initial order of over a 100+ ALH, navy almost closed the project, only to revive it with orders for 16 more Mk-3 ALH in shore-based role… A world-class manufacturer should target global customers. This is unlikely to happen if domestic customers are unhappy. Being dismissive doesn’t help either.”
Capt. Sharma, who retired from the Indian Navy last year, says, “120 helicopters were sought from HAL in 1994, signed by Admiral Arun Prakash who was then the ACNS (Air). This was again echoed to HAL in 1996 by Vice Admiral Sushil Kumar, the then VCNS. Despite not meeting QRs, the navy accepted 8 ALHs commencing 2003 with the hope of HAL undertaking modifications to meet original naval requirements. It has been 17 years since and 900 modifications later, as indicated by the navy to HAL, that ALH still does not meet the requirements. The design and development cost to make ALH compliant to naval requirements was sought from the navy. Funding by navy to meet its QRs is akin to a car manufacturer asking the buyer for R&D cost to install a brake system on the car.“
HAL’s Dhruv has been successfully inducted in significant numbers with the Indian Army, IAF and Indian Coast Guard, with units exported to countries that include Ecuador. The current tensions of the navy’s NUH stand in contrast to the creditable strides the helicopter itself has made in its standard and weaponised variants, though bureaucratic indecision has created significant hurdles there.
Livefist will have updates soon from HAL.
Navy-Dhruv Spat Escalates, Key Officers Throw It Back To HAL - Livefist
A war of words over HAL's Dhruv helicopter for the Indian Navy, sparked by an interview on Livefist this week, has escalated further. After an angry HAL took issue with a former Chief of Naval Staff calling them 'lethargic, deadbeat' for their lack of initiative in delivering a ship-worthy Dhruv...
www.livefistdefence.com
Indian Navy is acquiring the MH-60 platform for recon and anti-submarine operations. They could look into expanding to other variants for their fleet purposes...
The Truth Hurts, Says Indian Navy's 1st Dhruv Flight Commander - Livefist
By Commander YASHODHAN MARATHE (Retd.) I’m a second generation helicopter pilot and have been flying rotary wing machines since 1989. Of course, the primary amount of flying has been on HAL built aircraft, the Chetak and the ALH and of course, the Kiran. I’m quite saddened by the slew of…
www.livefistdefence.com
@vstol Jockey No wonder you wanted make choppers too..
You're setting the cat among the pigeons here. There's a whole lobby out there & here which wants to exclude HAL & opt for a SP model with a foreign OEM. Besides variants of the Sea Hawk fall into a different category ( Medium to Heavy) , while the IN is looking for a light utility helo with an AUW of 4.5-5.0 tonnes.
I have no such intentions.
Merely an observation that there is a demand for replacing aging Seakings in Indian service and the Seahawk is a modern platform of an equal weight class that India is buying into anyway... having commonality between platforms will make logistics and training easier. Especially as India will be adding more ships, I think the requirement for medium lift will only increase.
The light utility category can and should be a domestic venture. There are kinks and issues with the ALH program that have recently been dragged into the limelight, but working through them should be the immediate priority.
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The requirements are for some 12 ton heavy lift choppers for transport/ use for vertical replenishment/ troop transport from assault ships, etc. We will likely need a H225M variant there.
Then 60+ 10 ton multi role ASW helicopters. Where the MH60R falls.
When the 123 NMRH wasn't there , the plan was to import 16 + 8 S70B ASW variant directly and then buy 44 more.
For use from lighter vessels in SAR missions, we need 5 ton helicopters. Thats were NUH comes in.
There's an on going project by HAL called IMRH which comes under the 10 tonne capacity. One doesn't know how far has it progressed if at all it has. But that's supposed to complement the Sea Hawks & replace all the mid weight category helos like the Sea Kings & the different variants of the Mi 17 among others in the Indian armed forces. At least that's the intention. Let's see how far HAL succeeds although you may be aware their past track record is nothing to write home about & inspire confidence.
The 24 MH60R should replace the ~20 Mk42B SeaKings. And maybe some Ka28PL. As imo only 9 out of 14 were to be repaired and refurbished.
The remaining 5 Mk42C and 6 USA SeaKings are troop transport variants. We will likely wait a few more years for their replacement. Either with HAL's IMRH or a H225M variant.
Yes. My design is coaxial rotor and a counter to AH-6I helicopter with much superior high altitude capabilities and far superior ability to withstand battle damage and it is a single engine, single pilot attack helicopter with MTOW of just 2.2 tons and flat rated engine for 4kms height. Max speed 200kts and battle area cruise of 150kts. Pencil shaped capable of operating from roads in high altitudes like Ladakh with 100% mobile infra consisting of one maintenence truck, one weapons truck and one small tanker to refuel them anywhere where you have clearance of just five meters. DIRCM and SPJ as standard fit and capable of shooting down enemy helicopters in aircombat. Basically a rotor fighter aircraft. 800kgs as OWE, 800kgs as weapon load and 400kgs as fuel load giving over 4.5 hrs endurance. Capable of detecting mortar, arty fire, GMTI and men using its mm wave radars to carrty out counter fire. It will cost half the price of a T-90 tank and be 17 times more effective than any tank in the world. Just like AH-6I, it will be able to ferry troops also on outboard platforms. six fully equipped commandos with a weight of 125kgs each. The weapon fit is going to be superior to LCH. BERP-4 rotor blades connected to a hubless main mast. Fixed gun with 40mm grenade launchers and the pilot will be able to tuer and aim faster than LCH/Cobra/Apache due to lack of tail rotor.The Truth Hurts, Says Indian Navy's 1st Dhruv Flight Commander - Livefist
By Commander YASHODHAN MARATHE (Retd.) I’m a second generation helicopter pilot and have been flying rotary wing machines since 1989. Of course, the primary amount of flying has been on HAL built aircraft, the Chetak and the ALH and of course, the Kiran. I’m quite saddened by the slew of…
@vstol Jockey No wonder you wanted make choppers too..
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Does it make sense to induct a Eurocopter variant instead of just sticking to a few common platforms though? The MH-60S is capable of all of the requirements you mentioned.
on the MH-60s
It's hilarious to read people saying navy is trying to exclude ALH. Infact original NUH requirement was capped at 4.5 ton AUW . The new RFI increased it to 5 ton. (In 2011, HAL gave in writing that they cannot meet the NASQRs of NUH)
Thus, In a year HAL came up with ALH poster and mockup (last aero india) with AUW of 5 ton.
If anything RFI changes helped HAL to make a case for ALH in the NUH category.
Also remember that all the old Dhruv trials were to qualify it for ASW operations not NUH. Where it would be competing with Seahawk class. It's a huge capability shortage, still Navy tried hard to qualify it. But they couldn't even get the rotor folding right. Thus abandoned.
Thus, In a year HAL came up with ALH poster and mockup (last aero india) with AUW of 5 ton.
If anything RFI changes helped HAL to make a case for ALH in the NUH category.
Also remember that all the old Dhruv trials were to qualify it for ASW operations not NUH. Where it would be competing with Seahawk class. It's a huge capability shortage, still Navy tried hard to qualify it. But they couldn't even get the rotor folding right. Thus abandoned.
Remember those who laugh last laugh the hardest & I suspect HAL will have the last laugh whatever your or anyone's or IN's misgivings about the chopper. It's a sub optimal platform even if they get the folding blades & tail rotor right. But you know what they say - tedha hain par mera hain.
Not correct, N-IMRH will be a 11-12 ton helicopter. And IAF/IA version ~12.5 ton.
N-IMRH will be closer to H225M than MH-60 in troop carrying capacity.
No its not . ALH outclasses Panther class(4 ton) any day for NUH role. Simply because it's bigger and more powerful with reduced weight.
The 12tons platform will come when we induct our LHDs. Two dozen fully equipped troops or 5 ton payload capacity. This will require a bigger helicopter.
I am not saying only Eurocopter H225M. With AW101 out of the table which would have been perfect replacement for Troop transport SeaKings , its Sirkosky S92 or H225M.
S92 will share some characteristics with MH60R platform.
2 LHDs will be cleared for construction, and the 2 meant for private industry will be put on hold. So there will be a sudden requirement for more NMRH.