NEWS: Three @HALHQBLR DHRUV Advanced Light Helicopters Mark-III were inducted earlier today, 07 June 2021 at INS Dega, Eastern Naval Command by Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief East, Vice Adm AB Singh.
— Delhi Defence Review (@delhidefence) June 7, 2021
This is the second induction ceremony of ALH Mk III into the Indian Navy pic.twitter.com/42fiZcCO0A
Indian Navy crew has started training on two MH-60R helicopters which will be delivered next month.
Indian Navy crew has started training on two MH-60R helicopters which will be delivered next month.
First pic of an @indiannavy's MH-60R with the AN/AAS-44C(V) Multi-Spectral Targeting System installed on the nose (30 of which were contracted in the deal). Pic via @strategic_front. pic.twitter.com/Qy0SAnpxPv
— Parthu Potluri (@Parthu_Potluri) June 18, 2021
INS Shikra, Home to INAS 330 (ASW Helicopter squadron), INAS 321 (Fleet Support Squadron), Marine Commando, and Shikra 321 Flights and Coast Guard Chetak Squadron. pic.twitter.com/CB3QttM1Xw
— Strategic Frontier (@strategicfront) August 7, 2021
Got any pics of the inside (not the cockpit, but the navigators station and cargo hold) of an Indian Sea King? I'm curious as to what modifications, either electronics or structural might have been made or what indigenous gear is used versus international or OEM models.
Something like these if you can. These are from my personal collection.
I've been on Sea Kings a lot as my unit flew them near daily for SAR missions.
Is there any possibility of US giving out stocked old Apache for Army or Sirkosky for Navy?
Both are needed. . Apache until atleast LCH is inducted and Sirkosky until further orders?
Doubtful.
Yes. Especially the MH-60Rs. The Navy's Sea Kings are too old. For the 1 billion we insist on wasting on the NASAMS-II we could have had 11-12 MH-60Rs. That would take the number of MH-60R with the IN to 35-36.
The Navy had purchased 41-42 Sea Kings from 1969-87. Not sure how many remain operational today. Given the increase in the Navy's fleet size since the 80s & the ever growing need of ASW platforms/helos we need more than 42 units of MH-60Rs.
Could have been possible had we actually gone to war after Galwan. The better option is to buy new ones.
Apache is needed regardless of LCH's success. It has twice the payload and is naturally far more advanced and mature. HAL is gonna work on a medium weight attack chopper after IMRH.
This is the actual requirement.
India to float $5bn tender for 234 naval choppers: Here is all you need to know
The Indian Navy wants to buy 234 helicopters to replace its ageing fleet of Sea Kings and Chetaks.
Anyway, with our main LHDs significantly delayed, I suppose this will give HAL the decade they need to make a naval helicopter for the NMRH requirement.
The combined need for Utility & Multirole helo is 234. I was only talking about replacing the Sea King , so the multirole helo. The article says the Navy wants 123 of those.This is the actual requirement.
India to float $5bn tender for 234 naval choppers: Here is all you need to know
The Indian Navy wants to buy 234 helicopters to replace its ageing fleet of Sea Kings and Chetaks.www.hindustantimes.com
The Navy just told HAL that the HAL's IMRH for the navy must use the same engine as the MH-60R. At least someone is thinking of logistics. It would be safe to assume the IN's NMRH needs would be met by MH-60R & HAL IMRH. How many of which will broadly depend on HAL's timeline for developing the IMRH. The sooner it is ready the more the orders it stands a chance of getting.
If the current delivery timelines of 2028 stands, I can see the navy ordering another 24 MH-60R. The recently seen wind tunnel photos were of the Naval version of the IMRH. Maybe HAL is pushing the Naval version ahead of the other versions.
HAL has also developed the automatic tail & blade folding. The front blade is still sticking out though. They are about to do flight trials on that very soon. Assuming they succeed that opens up the door for HAL in the naval utility helo space.
That's true. Although I was hoping the LHDs would get heavier helos like Chinooks.
2028 is for IMRH, meant for the IA and IAF. The IN's INMRH will take longer than that.
Anyway, the IMRH and INMRH will be designed for 2 different foreign engines, and both will be drop fit, in case of sanctions. One of those is bound to be the same as the Romeo's.
The LHDs will need heavy, medium and attack helicopters. I'd like to see the new King Stallion in IN colours some day.
Attachments
Can't keep calm because 3rd Romeo is coming soon 🚁#RomeoForIndia pic.twitter.com/mHRYUZ1Dky
— Lockheed Martin India (@LMIndiaNews) October 1, 2021
Government Set To Roll Back Key Defence Procurement Reform, Seeks Industry Feedback
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) on December 13 sought inputs from Industry bodies on proposals which suggest that the ambitious Strategic Partner (SP) concept is set to be diluted in order to co-opt Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) into the model.
The SP Model - as enunciated in Chapter 7 of the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 and its predecessor, the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2016 - was meant to facilitate the emergence of private sector complexes for the design and manufacture of complex military platforms, including fighter aircraft, helicopters, submarines and battle tanks, as an alternate to the DPSUs. The methodology envisaged was to nominate some big procurements as SP programmes where only the Indian private sector would be considered as bidders in collaboration with Foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (FOEMs
But the DPSUs have hit back to force a re-think on the model which was poised to end public sector monopoly in India’s Defence Industry as systems integrators for military platforms. The very first SP Programme – the $3 Billion Naval Utility Helicopter (NUH) project – has been stalled for the last two years after the MoD asked the Indian Navy to consider including an insistent Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) on its Strategic Partner shortlist. HAL is India’s biggest DPSU and its sole aircraft manufacturer
Now, after a two-year impasse, the MoD wants Industry feedback on proposals to amend the SP Model. The thought process suggests that the Government is open not only to co-opt the public sector into the SP Model but even to ensure its continued primacy in Defence manufacturing
Inputs and “value additions” have been sought from Industry bodies, including SIDM, FICCI and ASSOCHAM on the following point
“1. Recommended strategy to ensure SP Model is distinct from existing ‘Licensed Production’ & Transfer of Technology (ToT) model being followed between FOEM & DPSU/Ordnance Factory. This to include overcoming issue of IPR for manufacturing additional quantities or for development of variants. Investing in System ToT rather than their production
2. ToT /IP for production of limited numbers only & subsequently improved models/ variants be developed by the Strategic Partner independently or jointly.
3. A Hybrid SP Model where only a part of the technology is sourced from FOEM & balance from DRDO / DPSU. This model would circumvent the need for 'Licensed Production'
Industry watchers infer that the immediate fallout of the “re-think” on the SP model could be the certain inclusion of HAL in the NUH programme. “This would defeat the original purpose of the SP Model, which was to develop private sector alternatives to a slothful public sector. How can the private sector be expected to raise new industrial complexes and yet compete on price with the public sector where manufacturing facilities exist for decades and whose costs have long been amortized?” asks an observer
The note seeking Industry inputs signals strong preference on DPUs to uphold Indian interests. “In certain cases, DPSUs have also been recommended to be included as a partner along with foreign OEM to further the cause of ‘Indigenisation’ & ‘Technological Atmanirbharta’ & ensure that we are not completely dependent on foreign OEM,” the note states
The second SP Programme for building six diesel-electric submarines under Project 75 (I) has already accommodated the public sector by default. Only one private Indian shipyard – L&T – qualified for the SP shortlist, and the public sector Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) was thus co-opted to avoid a single-vendor situation. BW Businessworld recently reported reservations about the SP model by some FOEMs, which threaten to derail or delay Project 75 (I)
. . . .” . s:. . ).ay Project 75 (I).
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) on December 13 sought inputs from Industry bodies on proposals which suggest that the ambitious Strategic Partner (SP) concept is set to be diluted in order to co-opt Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) into the model.
The SP Model - as enunciated in Chapter 7 of the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 and its predecessor, the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2016 - was meant to facilitate the emergence of private sector complexes for the design and manufacture of complex military platforms, including fighter aircraft, helicopters, submarines and battle tanks, as an alternate to the DPSUs. The methodology envisaged was to nominate some big procurements as SP programmes where only the Indian private sector would be considered as bidders in collaboration with Foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (FOEMs
But the DPSUs have hit back to force a re-think on the model which was poised to end public sector monopoly in India’s Defence Industry as systems integrators for military platforms. The very first SP Programme – the $3 Billion Naval Utility Helicopter (NUH) project – has been stalled for the last two years after the MoD asked the Indian Navy to consider including an insistent Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) on its Strategic Partner shortlist. HAL is India’s biggest DPSU and its sole aircraft manufacturer
Now, after a two-year impasse, the MoD wants Industry feedback on proposals to amend the SP Model. The thought process suggests that the Government is open not only to co-opt the public sector into the SP Model but even to ensure its continued primacy in Defence manufacturing
Inputs and “value additions” have been sought from Industry bodies, including SIDM, FICCI and ASSOCHAM on the following point
“1. Recommended strategy to ensure SP Model is distinct from existing ‘Licensed Production’ & Transfer of Technology (ToT) model being followed between FOEM & DPSU/Ordnance Factory. This to include overcoming issue of IPR for manufacturing additional quantities or for development of variants. Investing in System ToT rather than their production
2. ToT /IP for production of limited numbers only & subsequently improved models/ variants be developed by the Strategic Partner independently or jointly.
3. A Hybrid SP Model where only a part of the technology is sourced from FOEM & balance from DRDO / DPSU. This model would circumvent the need for 'Licensed Production'
Industry watchers infer that the immediate fallout of the “re-think” on the SP model could be the certain inclusion of HAL in the NUH programme. “This would defeat the original purpose of the SP Model, which was to develop private sector alternatives to a slothful public sector. How can the private sector be expected to raise new industrial complexes and yet compete on price with the public sector where manufacturing facilities exist for decades and whose costs have long been amortized?” asks an observer
The note seeking Industry inputs signals strong preference on DPUs to uphold Indian interests. “In certain cases, DPSUs have also been recommended to be included as a partner along with foreign OEM to further the cause of ‘Indigenisation’ & ‘Technological Atmanirbharta’ & ensure that we are not completely dependent on foreign OEM,” the note states
The second SP Programme for building six diesel-electric submarines under Project 75 (I) has already accommodated the public sector by default. Only one private Indian shipyard – L&T – qualified for the SP shortlist, and the public sector Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) was thus co-opted to avoid a single-vendor situation. BW Businessworld recently reported reservations about the SP model by some FOEMs, which threaten to derail or delay Project 75 (I)
. . . .” . s:. . ).ay Project 75 (I).
