« Un ralentissement des opérations en Ukraine est probable »
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"A slowdown of operations in Ukraine is likely"
The specialist in the history of conflicts, Michel Goya, considers that the war in Ukraine is likely to get bogged down, despite the contribution of Western artillery, which is now preventing the Russians from advancing. The Ukrainian counter-offensive is facing the thorny problem of crossing the Dnieper.
The front lines have hardly moved for three weeks in Ukraine. Is this deceptive calm?
Yes and no. Military activity remains intense, with an effort of wear and tear on both sides and in particular many second-echelon strikes on depots and logistics, but there is also a pause in large-scale attacks. The latter now seem very difficult, as they involve the gathering of large units, easy to spot and hit by air and artillery. Moreover, the defensive positions on both sides have had time to strengthen over the months.
Not to mention the logistical strain, as ammunition had to be procured, transported to exposed terrain, etc., at a rate greater than that of production. Since taking Severodonetsk and Lysychansk at the beginning of July, Russia has paused, reconstituted its forces and redistributed them to the south of the Donbass front, as well as in the region between the Dnieper and Crimea, no doubt to face the Ukrainian offensive towards Kherson that Kiev has been trumpeting for weeks without showing much on the ground.
Why would a Ukrainian offensive towards Kherson be urgent, and is it feasible?
It is urgent because Russia has declared its intention to annex it, and thus to make the sovereignty of this territory secure, following a referendum that is obviously anything but sincere (it remains to be seen whether it could be organised despite Ukrainian military pressure). Kiev must also show its allies and its population that it can take the initiative and not just resist. But Kiev's recapture of this region will be very difficult, as it is a flat area, where the enemy can be seen coming from a distance, rich in villages constituting strong points, where the Ukrainian forces, about nine manoeuvre brigades and several territorial brigades, do not currently have a clear numerical superiority, and remain inferior in firepower, even if the Western artillery constitutes an important qualitative contribution.
Moreover, Ukrainian forces cannot apply the Russian method of ravaging a village to take it over. Reaching the Dnieper by September would be quite a feat for the Ukrainian army. Crossing the river, which is at least 500 metres wide, would then be very difficult. The few bridges in the area will probably have been destroyed and crossing a river in force with floating bridges installed by engineers is a difficult exercise. The Russians suffered a disaster trying to cross the Donets River in the Donbass in this way, so caution is advised. And even if an amphibious assault succeeded in establishing a bridgehead, the crossing routes would then have to be protected from Russian strikes.
In fact, the most likely scenario is a slowing down of operations with increasingly reduced fighting, until one of the two protagonists unblocks the situation after having reconstituted its forces better than the opponent, innovated in its equipment, organisation and methods. It may then be possible to mount major attacks that will shake the opponent's defensive system.
What about the shifts in the balance of power brought about by the heavy weapons delivered to Kiev or those that may be delivered? And shouldn't Moscow soon run out of missiles?
Multiple and mobile rocket launchers like the American Himars and long-range precision guns like the French Caesars have changed the situation by making it possible to strike with precision at the rear of the front, destroying in particular numerous ammunition depots, but they are not enough to upset the balance of power. More broadly, the West has supplied almost all the types of ground weapons in its catalogues and has used up a large part of its often reduced stocks. Assault helicopters and combat aircraft, especially ground attack aircraft, could be provided, but this requires a very long investment in training Ukrainian pilots.
On the Russian side, it is surprising that they are still able to fire cruise ballistic missiles, as their stockpile should have been exhausted weeks ago, but they are succeeding, even if they are now resorting to old-fashioned weapons, such as Ka22 anti-ship missiles from the 1960s, and even, strangely enough, S-300 anti-aircraft missiles used against ground targets. The ability of Russian artillery to maintain a high level of activity over the long term will undoubtedly be one of the keys to the conflict.
indianexpress.com
