Sir who is RST? You frequently mention him I've been seeing for years, still don't know who he is.
I'd urge you to go through the current thread to understand the reason I'm claiming our war against the Chinese will precede the one against Taiwan. I can't possibly encapsulate 3 years worth of posts in one single post .Sir what makes you think China will come for us in 2030 and not later, like 2035.
There're 2 posts #496 & #497 which capture to a great extent what I've been trying to put out.
In addition to the above I forgot the link the below linked podcast . Here's what I've posted in the other forum.
Buxom babe & Clutterji's latest squeeze Swasti Rao interviewing Brig ( Rtd) Narang & Jaydev Ranade ( ex Addl Secretary R&AW) on China's strategy to destabilize India.
Understanding China's strategy vis a vis India is a full time job . I've linked the earlier two podcasts on the same topic pretty much covering similar grounds with a twist .
Unlike the episode featuring Lt Gen Shukla & the one featuring Ambassador Shukla ( no relationship ) which focused on the inner workings of the CCP & it's relationship to the PLA , this one features Chinese strategy to handle India.
Apparently the Chinese were on to what Fauji Foundation was upto in Pahalgam & supported the latter with ISR for preparations in the form of satellite imagery as per Brig Narang. This is a huge development if true.
Both Mr Ranade & Brig Narang seem convinced that China wouldn't initiate anything with India but encourage Paxtan to fight their war equipping them with the arms required & the finances.
I'm not too sure I agree with the entire analysis for Paxtan is much too fragile to undertake what the Chinese desire which could well be a full fledged war . Besides as long as the US is around they'd definitely seek to prevent the outbreak of such a war by hook or by crook.
However if the internal security situation breaks down in Paxtan which is where we seem headed then Munira would be tempted to itch the scratch called India once again.
Chinese policy on India thereafter would be dictated by what happens in case of a decisive Indo Pak encounter. If whatever the action we undertake permanently destabilizes Paxtan to the extent of triggering its downfall then China will have us in their cross hair.
The IA has already openly accused China of colluding with Paxtan something they've neither denied nor acknowledged. Our MEA has maintained a studious silence.
Having bared their fangs ( prematurely in Doklam , Galwan & in Operation Sindoor ) there's no way they'd back off IMO.
Hence I very much see them calling on us before Taiwan to safeguard their western borders. More so since if they don't , we will definitely attempt something to pay back for what they've done in Pahalgam & later during Operation Sindoor apart from older issues bedeviling our relations.
The Blurb from the podcast. You may be interested : @Rajput Lion ; @Speedster1 ; @Jaymax ; @redpanda ; @ et al .
Eight years after Indian and Chinese troops faced off in Doklam, ThePrint’s #WorldViewWithSwasti revisits the tri-junction that once held the world’s attention and still silently shapes the region’s geopolitics.
In this deep-dive discussion, Dr Swasti Rao is joined by Brigadier (Retd) Anshuman Narang, a seasoned expert in artillery and defence strategy, and Jayadev Ranade, former Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, Member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), and President of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy. Together, they unpack why Doklam remains a high-stakes flashpoint and how China is steadily reshaping the balance of power through infrastructure, diplomacy, and political influence in Bhutan, Nepal, and Bangladesh.
The episode explores how China’s six-step strategy in Bhutan mirrors its tactics in the South China Sea, how PLA rocket artillery and 5G surveillance tech are being deployed in the Chumbi Valley, and why the Siliguri Corridor remains India’s most vulnerable link. With Bhutan still resisting China’s Belt and Road Initiative and a possible "package deal" on the table, the conversation unpacks how the choices made in Thimphu can directly affect Indian national security. The discussion also takes a broader view, examining how China’s political and military moves post-Galwan, including space-based surveillance and pressure on India’s eastern borders, fit into a long-term plan that looks toward Taiwan in 2027.
