Air India Ahmedabad-London flight crash

Look its a clear case of malfunction of Fadec due to some kink. I had FAC-1 & FAC-2 failure after taking off from Srinagar in 2007. FBW system collapsed. The aircraft reverted to alternate law followed by direct law whn the gear was downed. My F/O went cold and in shock, I just told him not to worry as the most sophisticated aircraft has just become a Cessna-152 which he flew to get his CPL. I landed back, switched off everything including battery. Went out for a smoke, Came back and restarted the aircaft. The A-320 went into BITE, self corrected itself, I flew back to Delhi without any problem.

Many people have suspected FADEC fault but some are also suspecting other reasons like Electrical, Fuel, maintenance, pilot error, sabotage, etc. So these have to be explored to clean misinformation & propaganda.

It is good when you share your experience. But please don't abuse, discourage others, not expected from matured professionals, it affects reputation of Indians.
Aeronautics is combo of multi-disciplines. Investigation teams also don't have all-rounders but multi-domain members.

> Dual FAC failure is different from dual engine failure.
> A320's FAC (Flight Augmentation Computer) seems to be related to some control surfaces & some auto functions, while FADEC is related to engines.

> Boeing & Airbus cockpit controls are slightly different.
> B787 differes from previous Boeing jets also.
> The screenshots of other jets were given only bcoz B787 videos or pic couldn't be found & some fundamentals are conceptually same or identical in all jets.
> Since 2007 it has been 18 years, some upgrades would have happened.

> You spoke about A320's FAC 1, 2 failure -
- which doesn't result in loss of engines or all flight controls bcoz they're divided among ELAC 1,2 & SEC 1,2 also.
- It affects things like yaw, rudder trim, auto-pilot, auto-thrust, etc.
- ECAM messages tell to reset them 1 by 1 in flight. If worked then good otherwise keep off.
- I wonder what was the cause of FAC failure from PFR (Post Flight Report) out of FIDS (Flight Info Display System)?
- Was any S/w patch upgrade done or part changed?

> B787 hydraullic system is redundant for flight controls. Beyond that we've to look into the flight controls videos & articles.
> B787 also has toggle switch in overhead panel to disconnect primary flight computer from flight control system, put them in direct mode, or keep it in AUTO to try restoring to normal or secondary mode + other alternate control switches.

As per search,
> In A320 the FADEC can be reset by circuit breakers, perhaps in flight.
> In B787 there are EEC modes but it seems the FADEC cannot be reset, at least not in flight, may be on ground by power cycling.
 
Just today a LATAM B787 had Rat deployment while coming in to land. It happened on its own vdout pilot input. this is 3rd such case on this aircraft
 
Again, this should have been shared long back.
Some selected points from 787 CBT videos - Engines chapters -



> Overhead engine start switch START/NORM
- open fuel spar valve
- energize ignitors
- FMC moves knob back to NORM after start completion & ignitors de-energized.

> Fuel switch CUTOFF/RUN behind throttle -
- opens/closes spar fuel valve.
- arms/closes engine fuel valve (EEC opens the valve when needed)
- arms/switch-offs ignitors (EEC turns on ignitors when needed)
- Cutoff unlocks fire handle.

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> For initial power the EEC uses plane's electrical system then switches to PMA. If PMA is INOP then AC bus will be used again.

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> EEC modes -
- Normal - TPR is used as reference, based on thrust lever position.
Max TPR = Max rated thrust as per temperature & pressure at any altitude.
The buttons will show NORM only.
- Alternate - N1 is used as reference
Auto-switch to Alternate mode if required signals not avaiable in Normal mode.
No Thrust protection in this mode.
-- Soft Alternate - if the start mode nob is in NORM position. Last known ambient data is taken to calculate max N1 data. The buttons will show both NORM & ALTN.
-- Hard Alternate - if EECbuttons pushed. EEC sets thrust using N1 & pre-programmed thrust shedule. The buttons will show ALTN only.
If auto-throttle is on the 2 thrust levers could be staggered as per ambient situation. If ony 1 engine is in ALT mode then selecting other in ALT mode by pushing button will eliminate throttle lever stagger & assymetrical thrust.
Since thrust protection absent, the max rated thrust will be reached before max thrust lever position which can cause over-boost if put to full position, this should be used in emergency only like approaching terrain, etc.

> Overspeed protection is provided on N1 & N2 spools, indirectly for N3 also.
> N1 & N2 red line protection still available in ALT mode. If N1 or N2 RPM approaches red line limit then EEC reduces fuel flow. If RPM limting fails & red line crossed & overspeed condition persists then EEC shuts off fuel valves & ENG FAIL message is displayed with aural alarm.

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> TCMA (Thrust Control Malfunction Accomodation) works at assymetrical idle power on ground. EEC shuts down higher RPM engine when plane is on ground, thrust lever at idle, engine is above idle RPM not decelerating normally.

> TAP (Thrust Assymetric protection) reduces thrust of operating engine on failure of other, to have proper yaw control. It reduces thrust when air speed decreases below V2 on T/o or below Vref on G/a. Once speed increase beyond V2/Vref then TAP increases thrust. It doesn't affect thrust on engine-out ops at or above V2/Vref, unless G/a at less than 152,273 Kgs then thrust is reduced at Vref.

> EEC idle modes -
- minimum idle - for ground ops & most phases of flight.
- approach idle - higher than min. idle. This decreases acceleration time for go-around.
It is selected when flaps are 25 degrees or more & gears are down.
After touch down EEC goes to min. idle.
- icing idle - selected when engine anti-ice is on.
- ice crystal idle - selected when ambient air temp. is b.w ISA & ISA+29 C, or altitude b/w 35k & 5K ft.

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View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qdnfqMOSndo


> There are 2 ignitors. The EEC selects appropriate one for ground start. Both are used for in-flight restarts.
> DC power is the normal power source, with backup also.
> 2x Starter motors per engine are connected to N2 spool via gear box. They're operated by overhead start knobs. APU or GPU can provide power to starters.
> Simultaneous engine start is only allowed when APU is running & both APU generators are operational.
if both engines are commanded to start via knobs, but adequate power not there, then 2nd engine start is ignored & delayed.

> Autostart sequences fuel & ignition with no i/p from pilot.
> On ground the overhead start knobs & fuel switches behind throttles are operated.
> For in-flight windmill restarts, the autostart is initiated by moving fuel switch to RUN.
> So EEC will operate Fuel valves instructed by start knobs &/or fuel switches based on ground or flight mode.
> There will be load-shedding during engine start.

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> For ground start, EEC monitors start & attempts to correct -
- compressor stall​
- hot start​
- hung start​
- loss of 1 starter​
- no EGT rise​
- start time exceeds starter duty cycle timer.​
> If any of above happens then EEC will -
- turn off fuel & ignition​
- motor for 20-30 seconds
- make 2nd start attempt using reduced fuel flow & both ignitors.​
> If 2nd attempt fails then -
- auto start is cancelled by EEC.​
- Fuel & ignition shut off.​
- engine is motored to clear residual fuel.
- starters de-energized.​
- start knobs return to NORM.​
- EICAS error message displayed.​
> Only 2 start attempts allowed on ground.

> In-flight envelope info is displayed on EICAS when -
- Engine is not running in flight (N2 below ilde RPM).
- Engine is shut down in flight but fire handle is not pulled.
- Envelope info shows flight level & airspeed range.
- If airspeed is below windmill start threshold then starter-assisted indication is displayed.

> Secondary indications are automatically displayed when -
- Engine is not running in flight (N2 below ilde RPM with fuel switch in RUN).
- or Fuel switch CUTOFF

> In-flight auto-start will continue re-attempts until -
- engine starts
- pilot aborts start by fuel switch CUTOFF (& start switch to NORM in case of starter-assisted)

> EEC monitors engine parameters during windmill start to provide best fuel schedule to ensure shortest start time.

1754069173162.png


> Auto-relight is activated for flameout or engine at/below idle RPM with fuel switch in RUN position.
EEC activates both ignitors.


> Spar valve is opened when -
- fire handle is down
- either start knob to START or fuel switch to RUN
> Engine fuel valve is opened when fire handle is down & fuel switch is set to RUN.
> Both valves are shut off when -
- fire handle is pulled.
- or fuel switch is CUTOFF


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DERIVATIONS (not colclusions) -
> FSOVs can be manually closed by fuel switches or fire handle, but the EEC is said to monitor engine parameters.
> Somewhere i read that fire handle is activated only when fuel switch is off, if true then this is safety feature.
> Thrust limit in FMC's CDU should be carefully set.
> In low altitude emergency, only 1 engine at a time might get supported to restart by RAT, as APU N/a.
> Lone survivor said that there was flickering of lights, so that's expected during power failure, switch-over, engine relight, etc.
> 20-30 seconds needed in auto mode to ventilate engine of residual fuel before relight.


QUESTIONS -
> Is there any S/w protection against inappropriate switch operation, short circuit, S/w bug, etc?


> Combined with sensor error, can there be a glitch in-

- N1/N2 RPM limiting?
- overspeed protection?


> Can problem with LP/HP pumps, filters, valves cause 1 engine shutdown & then TAP feature shutting other as well?
 
One year mark coming up soon.

Waiting for the official reason for both engine fuel control switches moving from RUN to CUTOFF seconds after liftoff.

In America the NTSB would be expected to release the final report at this time.