The abrupt cancellation of the Barracuda class submarine agreement with France and the signing of the AUKUS agreement have undeniably caused diplomatic tensions, particularly with France, which has significant territories and strategic interests in the Pacific.
France has a significant presence in the Pacific, with territories such as New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna. This gives it significant strategic and economic interests in the region, as well as security responsibilities. Because of its presence, France plays an active role in regional security, the management of maritime resources, and cooperation with other Pacific nations.
The lack of consultation with France prior to the announcement of the AUKUS agreement was seen as a lack of respect and transparency, leading to diplomatic tensions. This was seen as a "betrayal" by some French officials, affecting bilateral relations.
This breakdown has highlighted potential gaps in diplomatic and strategic coordination between Western allies, which could weaken cohesion in the face of common challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.
By working with France, Australia could have benefited from France's nuclear submarine experience, while strengthening ties with an ally with a significant presence in the Pacific.
Enhanced cooperation with France could have created beneficial synergies for regional security, integrating French capabilities and presence in the Pacific with AUKUS security initiatives.
The lack of coordination and communication with France on such a crucial issue could be perceived as diplomatic incompetence, affecting credibility and trust between allies. This situation could have long-term repercussions on France's willingness to cooperate in other strategic areas and on its perception of its Anglo-Saxon allies.
The cancellation of the Barracuda class submarine deal with France and the announcement of the AUKUS deal without prior consultation with Paris have certainly had significant diplomatic and strategic consequences. The lack of consultation with France, which has substantial interests and presence in the Pacific, has created tensions that could weaken future cooperation and relations between these allies. This illustrates the need for better diplomatic coordination and communication to maintain cohesion between strategic partners, particularly in such sensitive areas as defence and regional security.
Better diplomacy vis-à-vis France could have facilitated the transition to the AUKUS class in terms of time and cost
Given the bottleneck in the production of Virginia-class submarines in the US and their likely late availability to the Australians, an approach based on delivery of Suffren-class submarines in the short term, followed by AUKUS-class submarines when they become available, could be considered.
Combining the Suffren class submarines with the future AUKUS class offers a balanced approach, enabling an advanced nuclear submarine capability to be available much earlier and at lower cost, while establishing a solid foundation for the integration of the more advanced and interoperable AUKUS class capabilities in the longer term. This would enable Australia to respond quickly to threats and strengthen its defence while progressively developing its capabilities for strategic co-operation with its allies.
Virginia Class and AUKUS Class
The availability of the Virginia class is estimated to be between 2036 and 2042, while that of the AUKUS class is estimated to be between 2038 and 2045. The costs of the combined programme of Virginia-class provisioning followed by AUKUS-class delivery are very high, with total costs for the programme estimated at between AUD 268 billion and AUD 368 billion.
The supposed advantages are strategic alignment with the US and access to advanced technologies and increased interoperability with US forces. The disadvantages are long lead times, very high costs and the complexity of integrating the American and Australian systems.
Suffren class and AUKUS class
The availability of the Suffren class for the first submarine is possible as early as 2031, with subsequent deliveries in 2033, 2035... while that of the AUKUS class is estimated between 2038 and 2045. The costs of the combined programme of Suffren-class provisioning followed by AUKUS-class delivery are estimated at around AUD 1.6 billion per Suffren submarine, potentially much less expensive than the previous programme for a transitional solution.
The assumed benefits are reduced lead times: Suffren class submarines would be available much earlier, providing Australia with advanced nuclear capabilities sooner, potentially lower costs per submarine, providing a more cost effective solution in the short term. In addition, Suffren class submarines are technologically advanced and offer high stealth, endurance and operational capabilities, and this solution presents less of a technological breakthrough, facilitating the transition to AUKUS class capabilities. The disadvantages are less immediate interoperability with US forces, although this can be offset by progressive integration with future AUKUS-class systems.
Conclusion
The Suffren class would provide Australia with nuclear submarines quickly while developing the infrastructure and capabilities needed for AUKUS-class submarines in the longer term. This approach mitigates the risks associated with delays and high costs by providing a solid intermediate capability. Combining the Suffren as an interim solution with the longer-term AUKUS submarines allows greater flexibility in adapting defence capabilities to evolving needs. Less costly in the short term, allowing financial resources to be channelled into the development of the AUKUS class and other defence priorities.
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