AUKUS : US, UK and Australia forge military alliance to counter China

The 3 SSN Virginia are a bridging sub. It also provides docking, repair facilities and manpower for the USN subs. It is in the US interests, so they can forward deploy. It is not really in Australia's interest to run two types of subs. It only increases costs.

I don't have an issue if this is an outcome. It will save Australia a bunch of money.
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The virginia doesn't affect how many SSN-AUKUS. We were always going to build 8 USN AUKUS. We get the USN AUKUS 2040s

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Basically Australians paid French to develop a world beating SSK meeting their requirements. Then kicked them.

Then they are paying US and UK to sustain their SSN fleet with no insight on how the Collins will be replaced till 2040?

UK and USA taking Australian taxpayer for a ride.
We paid for an early concept design. We bailed early, when it came to detailed design. It had the potential to be a good sub. However Naval Group made it difficult. Google has the story.
Just for a start

SSN-AUKUS is the Collins replacement. The Collins are having a major refit to last till then.

You clearly don't know what AUKUS pillar 1 and 2 is
 
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We paid for an early concept design. We bailed early, when it came to detailed design. It had the potential to be a good sub. However Naval Group made it difficult. Google has the story.
Just for a start

SSN-AUKUS is the Collins replacement. The Collins are having a major refit to last till then.

You clearly don't know what AUKUS pillar 1 and 2 is
But pops that's exactly what we've been saying from the very beginning that le Francais wanted to take you for a ride ( I mean why blame them when you're such easy pickings ) & when your Anglo cousins saw how the figure of your submarine procurement escalated before they could bat their eyelids to the extent it did , they decided why should NG have all the fun & came out with a con of their own which as we all know the Aussies are much more comfortable with given your past history.

End result with a conflict looming in the Pacific which US administration is idiotic enough ( & I'd include Trump in it assuming he wins the election which I very much doubt though the Aussies would definitely identify more with him given similarities in the intellect ) to afford to go in for mfg submarines for you when they're facing an existential crisis themselves or even transfer a few to you ?

Best case scenario you get hand me downs post war depending on how the USN emerges from the conflict for which you pay top dollar plus costs of refurbishment , of course. And if I were to use my powers of prediction which is much better than RST's I'd say come 2040s you're looking at another refit of the Collins class assuming they've some life left in them which is a more likely scenario .

You've a better chance of building up an automotive industry given the Lithium deposits in Oz than you would of building submarines. Honest advice . Take it for what it's worth. Though if you don't manage to do both it wouldn't come as a surprise at all.
 
Ideally, Japan and should have been part of this alliance. However, with the efforts Biden administration done to interfere in India's internal matter, India is unlikely to be part of this alliance, but Japan is a natural contender. They should include Japan to make this alliance stronger.
 
I was referring to the first variation. The SSN-AUKUS is a new class meant to replace Astute.

It makes more sense for the USN to keep their subs; better personnel, better training, more experienced, better overall efficiency versus the same technologies used by allies. They can aim to build 8 SSN-AUKUS instead of 5.
yeah, i was joking about the availability of the Astute, but it is still worrying.

If the SSN-AUKUS are available in the 2040s, at best, i doubt the Collins will hold out until then despite the LOTE.

Then what happens if the Los Angeles are not there to fill the gap?
 
yeah, i was joking about the availability of the Astute, but it is still worrying.

If the SSN-AUKUS are available in the 2040s, at best, i doubt the Collins will hold out until then despite the LOTE.

Then what happens if the Los Angeles are not there to fill the gap?

I guess the plan now is to forward deploy newly built Virginias under the US flag until the AUKUS ones are inducted. That could be a 25-year process. So these redeployed Virginias could end their lives in Australian waters, replaced by AUKUS subs.

I don't think the LA class has much to do here, all of them are to be decommissioned by 2030-31, and Collins are gonna stay around until 2040 anyway. But it would mean Australia will not have a sufficiently large sub fleet of 3-4 SSNs until the mid-2050s.
 
AUKUS risks are piling up. Australia must prepare to build French SSNs instead
Australia should start planning for acquisition of at least 12 submarines of the French Suffren design. The current AUKUS plan for eight nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) has always been flawed, and now its risks are piling up.

We should go ahead with naval-operational aspects of the AUKUS SSN plan, such as supporting US and British submarines when they come to Australia. But for the acquisition effort, we should be ready to drop the plan to buy eight SSNs under AUKUS—three from the US that Washington is increasingly unlikely to supply, and five that are supposed to be built to an oversized British design and probably can’t arrive on time.

Instead, we would commence a joint Franco-Australian construction program for a greater number of submarines of the Suffren class, a design that is already in service with the French navy.

To ensure deliveries could begin as early as 2038, the Australian government that’s elected next year should commit to deciding in 2026 whether to switch to the French design.

Even if the AUKUS acquisition plan succeeds, it will deliver a questionable capability. The submarines’ designs would be a mix of two blocks of Virginia-class submarines, more than 14 years apart in design, and yet-to-be-designed SSN-AUKUS using Britain’s yet-to-be-tested PWR3 reactor. Moreover, SSN-AUKUS would be partly built by the underperforming British submarine enterprise that’s under great pressure to deliver the Royal Navy’s next class of ballistic missile submarines.

Displacing more than 10,000 tonnes, SSN-AUKUS submarines will be too big for Australia’s needs. Their size will increase their detectability, cost and crews. (The large size appears to be driven by the dimensions of the reactor.)

The Royal Australian Navy is already unable to crew its ships and grow to meet future demands. It will have great difficulty in crewing Virginias, which need 132 people each, and SSN-AUKUS boats, too, if their crews equal the 100-odd needed for the current British Astute class.

We have yet to see a schedule for the British design process, nor does a joint design team seem to have been established. In the absence of news that milestones have been achieved or even set, it is highly likely that the SSN-AUKUS program, like the Astute program, will run late and deliver a first-of-class boat with many problems. Knowing that Britain’s Strategic Defence Review is grappling with serious funding shortfalls hardly instils confidence.

Also, eight SSNs will be enough to maintain deployment of only one or two at any time, not enough for an effective deterrent. The difficulty in training crews and building up experience in three designs of submarines would add to the obvious supply chain challenges in achieving an operational force.

Achieving even this inadequate capability is growing less likely. Reports at the recent US Navy Submarine League Symposium reveal continuing US failure to increase submarine building rates. By now an additional submarine should have been ordered to cover the transfer of an existing Block IV Virginia to Australia in eight years, but no contract has been placed. Worse, Virginia production at both US submarine shipbuilders is actually slowing due to supply chain delays. The US’s top priority shipbuilding program, for Columbia class ballistic-missile submarines, continues to suffer delays. In late November, the White House requested emergency funding from Congress for the Virginia and Columbia programs.

This situation flags an increasing likelihood that, despite its best efforts, the US Navy will be unable to spare any Virginias for sale to Australia. The president of the day probably will be unable, as legislation requires, to certify 270 days before the transfer it will not degrade US undersea capabilities.

Meanwhile, Britain’s submarine support establishment is having difficulties in getting SSNs to sea. A recent fire affecting the delivery of the final Astute class SSN can only add to these woes.

The French Suffren SSN class was the reference design for the diesel Attack class that Australia intended to buy before switching to SSNs. It offers the solution to our AUKUS problems. It is in production by Naval Group, with three of the planned six submarines commissioned in the French navy.

At 5300 tonnes and with a 70-day endurance, capacity for 24 torpedoes or missiles, four torpedo tubes and a crew of 60, it would be cheaper to build, own and crew than the AUKUS boats. The design is flexible—optimised for anti-submarine warfare but with a good anti-surface ship capability from dual-purpose torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. It can also carry land-attack cruise missiles, mines and special forces.

The Suffren class uses low-enriched uranium fuel and needs refuelling every 10 years, whereas the US and British designs, with highly enriched uranium, are intended never to be refuelled. But the Suffren reactor is designed to simplify refuelling, which could be completed during a scheduled refit in Australia. Used fuel can be reprocessed, simplifying decommissioning at the end of life.

True, the Suffren design does not have the weapon load, vertical launch missile tubes or 90-day endurance of the Virginia and, presumably, SSN-AUKUS. However, as a nuclear-powered relative of the Attack class it is much closer to the original Australian requirement for a replacement for the Collins class than SSN-AUKUS is shaping up to be. The design offers adequate capability for Australia’s needs in a package we can afford to own. We could operate 12 Suffrens and still need fewer crew members than we would under the AUKUS plan.

If we shifted to the Suffren design, we should nonetheless stick with the SSN training programs we’ve arranged with the US Navy and Royal Navy. We should also go ahead with establishing an intermediate repair facility that would support their SSNs as well as ours and with rotating them through Western Australia.

As for the AUKUS acquisition plan, we need to begin preparations now for jointly building Suffrens with France. Australia cannot wait for the US to finally say Virginias will be unavailable.

To the extent that design needs changing, we can go back to the work done for the Attack class, particularly incorporation of a US combat system and Australian standards.

Difficult, challenging and politically courageous? Surely. But not nearly as improbable getting SSNs under AUKUS on time.

Author
Peter Briggs is a retired submarine specialist and a past president of the Submarine Institute of Australia.
 

Will Donald Trump kill US-UK-Aussie sub defense deal?

The landmark defense agreement between the U.S, U.K. and Australia could be in jeopardy with the maverick Republican back in the White House.

LONDON — There are few issues on which we do not know Donald Trump’s opinion.

After thousands of hours of interviews and speeches over the past eight years, the president-elect has enlightened us on what he thinks on almost any topic which enters his brain at any given moment.

But in the key area of defense, there are some gaps — and that's leading global military chiefs to pore over the statements of the president's allies and appointees to attempt to glean some clues, specifically over the $369 billion trilateral submarine program known as AUKUS he will inherit from Joe Biden.

Trump does not appear to have publicly commented on the AUKUS pact — named for its contingent parts Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States — which would see the U.S. share technology with its partners to allow both countries to build state-of-the-art nuclear submarines by the 2040s.

This uncertainty has left ministers and government officials in London and Canberra scrambling to discover how the Republican is likely to view the Biden-era deal when he returns to the White House in January.

Two defense industry figures told POLITICO there were serious concerns in the British government that Trump might seek to renegotiate the deal or alter the timelines.

This is because the pact likely requires the U.S. to temporarily downsize its own naval fleet as a part of the agreement — something Trump may interpret as an affront to his “America First” ideology.

Looking east​

There is hope in Westminster that Trump would be in favor of a military project which is an obvious, if unspoken, challenge to China.

The deal would see American-designed nuclear submarines right on China's doorstep and would form a part of Australia's attempts to bolster its military might in the Indo-Pacific.

When former U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson said in September 2021 that the deal was not "intended to be adversarial toward China," President Xi Jinping simply did not believe him.

The Chinese leader said AUKUS would "undermine peace" and accused the Western nations of stoking a Cold War mentality.

Mary Kissel, a former senior adviser to Trump's ex-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, said "you can assume Trump two will look a lot like Trump one" when it comes to building alliances with other Western countries against China.

"We revivified the Quad [Australia, India, Japan and the U.S.], got our allies to bolster NATO funding and worked to prevent China from dominating international institutions," she said.

However, the deal also forces the U.S. government to sell Australia three to five active Virginia attack submarines, the best in the U.S. Navy's fleet, by the early 2030s as a stopgap until the new AUKUS subs are built.

Is America first?​

This coincides with a time where there is a widely recognized crunch on America's industrial defense capacity.

In layman's terms, the U.S. is currently struggling to build enough submarines or military equipment for its own needs.

One U.K. defense industry figure, granted anonymity to speak freely, said there was “a lot of queasiness” in the U.K. government and a “huge amount of queasiness in Australia” about whether Trump would allow this to happen.

“There is a world in which the Americans can't scale up their domestic submarine capacity for their own needs and don't have spare to meet Australia's needs,” they said.

“If you started pulling on one thread of the deal, then the rest could easily fall away.”

One U.K. government official played down how much London and Canberra are worried about the future of the deal, however.

They said the U.K. government was confident Trump is positive about the deal and that the U.S. was “well equipped with the number of submarines for their fleet.”

Glimmers of hope​

In Washington too, defense experts are seeking clues to the attitude of the incoming administration.

While close observers agree it is too soon to predict what Trump would do about AUKUS, there has been some reason for optimism in the president-elect’s selection of two China hawks for top national security posts: Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), as secretary of state, and Rep. Mike Waltz (R-Fla.) as national security adviser.

Both served on the congressional foreign affairs committees that handled legislation to authorize AUKUS and will be well aware that it has broad bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress, giving AUKUS advocates on Capitol Hill two well-placed former colleagues with whom they can make their case to Trump world.

But the brightest glimmer of hope may be an Economist essay Waltz co-authored last month that slams Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris for a rash of global crises, but reserves a some praise for AUKUS.

“Mr. Biden and Ms. Harris have taken some positive steps on China, such as strengthening export controls and establishing AUKUS, a trilateral security partnership with Britain and Australia, but these have been more than outweighed by the distraction caused by failed policies in Europe and the Middle East,” Waltz wrote with Matthew Kroenig, a former Pentagon strategist.

Meanwhile, a U.K. review into the entire AUKUS project is being led by Stephen Lovegrove, former national security adviser to Boris Johnson, after being commissioned by Defence Secretary John Healey in August.

Lovegrove was supposed to release the report in October, but it has still not been published.

Feeling queasy​

However, Alexander Gray, a national security-focused White House aide in Trump's first term, told POLITICO that there was good reason for the aforementioned queasiness.

The former chief of staff to Trump's National Security Council said “we need to have a serious discussion given the demands on U.S. Navy attack submarine fleet,” adding that “we’re not on track to reach the minimum requirements for our own needs.”

“If you take America first literally, and people should, then you should not be surprised if a serious American defense official comes and says ‘we have to prioritize construction or repair needs for our own purposes,’” Gray added.

“That doesn't question the validity of AUKUS, or mean it’s not a priority, but we need to start looking at these commitments in an American-centric way that may not meet up with the priorities of Canberra and London.”

Gray also savaged Keir Starmer for his decision to meet with President Xi just days after Trump's reelection, labeling the British prime minister's attempts to improve Sino-British relations as “regrettable.”

“One of the successes of Trump’s term, and the Biden-Harris administration, was a significant amount of mutual understanding of partners in London and Europe writ large about the danger China poses globally,” he said.

“I hate to see backsliding like this at the very start of a `Trump administration.”

Everyone's a winner​

This attempted U.K.-China reset will likely be high on the list of talking points when Healey meets with his Australian counterpart Richard Marles next month in London for an “AUKMIN” summit.

The Australian Labor government, after all, has conducted a similar reset with the Chinese government since coming to power in 2022 after relations hit a nadir during COVID.

Also at the top of the agenda will be how to sell the incoming president on the AUKUS deal in a positive way.

A second defense industry insider said the British and Australian governments should try to badge the deal in terms that make it look like Trump has personally won from the deal.

“Everybody is worried about America's lack of industrial capacity and how it affects AUKUS,” they said.

“He is also instinctively against the idea of America being the world’s police and so he may not see the value in AUKUS at all, but they need to let him own it and make him think he’s won by doing it.”

Sophia Gaston, the London-based U.K. foreign policy lead at Canberra's ASPI think tank, said most people in Trump's orbit “can find some element of the project which chimes with their interests.”

“Britain and Australia need to work in complete lockstep on AUKUS in Washington, and recognize that they must embrace more tactical and strategic language grounded in American self-interest,” she said.

“There will also be a need to demonstrate how AUKUS can deliver short-term wins, which ensure the project’s deterrence effect is credible.”

Pillar II​

While the core nuclear submarine deal will get most of the headlines in the coming months, progress on the lesser-known Pillar II of AUKUS also remains somewhat elusive.

Launched alongside the submarine pact, Pillar II was designed to codevelop a range of military technologies, such as quantum-enabled navigation, artificial intelligence-enhanced artillery, and electronic warfare capabilities.

One Pillar II technology-sharing deal was struck on hypersonic missiles just last month, but expected progress on a range of other areas has not transpired.

Ambitions to admit Japan to the Pillar II partnership this year have also gone unfulfilled.

Meanwhile, there seemed to be a step forward when the Biden administration introduced legislation to ease the trade of sensitive technology between the three nations earlier this summer.

But while it was dubbed “a historic breakthrough” by the U.K., pro-Trump Sen. Jim Risch, the most senior Republican on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, complained it was “overly restrictive” and limited progress on AUKUS Pillar II.

“I couldn't be more dissatisfied with the pace of implementation,” he said. “It is not moving at the speed of relevance.”

However, some U.S. policy wonks are somewhat more optimistic about the future of the program.

Bryan Clark, director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at the Hudson Institute, said Trump might channel some funds from Pillar I into Pillar II.

He said: “Can we siphon some of that money off to support Pillar II, because it gives us a faster benefit?

“The tech startup community is going to be entering the administration in official and unofficial positions, so I think we’ll find their influence will protect some of these investments.”

There surely won't be long to wait until the president-elect comes down from on high to give his opinion on AUKUS.

All interested parties will no doubt be watching X and Truth Social for when that moment arrives.
 
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L’Australie fait du maintien en service de ses six sous-marins Collins un « sujet de préoccupation »

Translated with DeepL.com (free version)

Australia makes keeping its six Collins submarines in service a ‘matter of concern

by Laurent Lagneau - 14 December 2024

At the beginning of November, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation [ABC] revealed that only one of the six Collins submarines owned by the Royal Australian Navy [RAN] was seaworthy. It had previously been reported that corrosion had been discovered in the torpedo tubes of two other units, HMAS Farncombe and HMAS Sheean.

For the RAN, it is imperative that these six ‘Collins’ remain in service until the delivery of the nuclear attack submarines [NAS] it is due to receive under the AUKUS pact, signed by Australia with the United States and the United Kingdom in September 2021.

As a reminder, this led Canberra to cancel the acquisition of twelve Shortfin Barracuda [or ‘Attack’] submarines from France's Naval Group. Some people seem to regret this, as shown by an article recently published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute [ASPI], a think tank funded by... the Australian Department of Defence.

The ASPI felt that ‘we should probably go back to the work done for the Attack class’, given the difficulties encountered in the AUKUS pact. In fact, the delivery by the United States of three Virginia-type SNAs to the Australian Navy seems risky insofar as the US Navy is already struggling to obtain its own, as the American naval industry has not yet managed to increase its production rate.

The five other SNAs promised to the RAN are to be built in cooperation with the UK. However, as the ASPI article points out, the PWR3 reactor that is to equip them ‘has not yet been tested’ and the UK's priority is the commissioning of the future Dreadnought nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). What's more, British industry seems to be struggling to maintain the Royal Navy's Astute submarines in operational condition. Last August, none of them were on mission...

Be that as it may, extending the six Collins-type submarines beyond their operational life, i.e. until the 2030s, remains the Australian Navy's priority. To this end, it has launched the LOTE [Life Of Type Extension] programme, costing around €3 billion. However, it has had to scale back its ambitions, notably by abandoning its plans to equip the navy with the capacity to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles, as this operation was not deemed economically viable.

The LOTE programme will not be enough to extend these submarines. In July, the RAN awarded a €1.3 billion contract to the ASC Pty Ltd shipyard to maintain them in operational condition for four years.

However, these efforts may not be enough to guarantee the Collins' availability. And a temporary breakdown in capacity is looming on the horizon. At least, that's what the Australian Department of Defence fears, having just announced its decision to classify the MCO of these submarines as a programme of ‘concern’. In plain English, this means that the programme will be placed under ‘enhanced scrutiny’.

‘As the submarines are expected to operate beyond their design life, it is essential to meet increased sustainment requirements to ensure that the Collins class remains an effective and formidable capability until it is withdrawn from service’, he explained. He will also present an action plan to address the highest risk vulnerabilities.

‘The Government is committed to investing in priority capability improvements... to ensure that the Collins Class submarine fleet remains a powerful and credible capability to conduct operations to protect Australia's maritime approaches and sea lines of communication,’ he added.

In the meantime, this decision suggests that extending the operational life of the Collins submarines will be more complicated than anticipated, which, depending on the evolution of their condition, could force the RAN to impose operational restrictions on them.
 
AUKUS risks are piling up. Australia must prepare to build French SSNs instead
Australia should start planning for acquisition of at least 12 submarines of the French Suffren design. The current AUKUS plan for eight nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) has always been flawed, and now its risks are piling up.

We should go ahead with naval-operational aspects of the AUKUS SSN plan, such as supporting US and British submarines when they come to Australia. But for the acquisition effort, we should be ready to drop the plan to buy eight SSNs under AUKUS—three from the US that Washington is increasingly unlikely to supply, and five that are supposed to be built to an oversized British design and probably can’t arrive on time.

Instead, we would commence a joint Franco-Australian construction program for a greater number of submarines of the Suffren class, a design that is already in service with the French navy.

To ensure deliveries could begin as early as 2038, the Australian government that’s elected next year should commit to deciding in 2026 whether to switch to the French design.

Even if the AUKUS acquisition plan succeeds, it will deliver a questionable capability. The submarines’ designs would be a mix of two blocks of Virginia-class submarines, more than 14 years apart in design, and yet-to-be-designed SSN-AUKUS using Britain’s yet-to-be-tested PWR3 reactor. Moreover, SSN-AUKUS would be partly built by the underperforming British submarine enterprise that’s under great pressure to deliver the Royal Navy’s next class of ballistic missile submarines.

Displacing more than 10,000 tonnes, SSN-AUKUS submarines will be too big for Australia’s needs. Their size will increase their detectability, cost and crews. (The large size appears to be driven by the dimensions of the reactor.)

The Royal Australian Navy is already unable to crew its ships and grow to meet future demands. It will have great difficulty in crewing Virginias, which need 132 people each, and SSN-AUKUS boats, too, if their crews equal the 100-odd needed for the current British Astute class.

We have yet to see a schedule for the British design process, nor does a joint design team seem to have been established. In the absence of news that milestones have been achieved or even set, it is highly likely that the SSN-AUKUS program, like the Astute program, will run late and deliver a first-of-class boat with many problems. Knowing that Britain’s Strategic Defence Review is grappling with serious funding shortfalls hardly instils confidence.

Also, eight SSNs will be enough to maintain deployment of only one or two at any time, not enough for an effective deterrent. The difficulty in training crews and building up experience in three designs of submarines would add to the obvious supply chain challenges in achieving an operational force.

Achieving even this inadequate capability is growing less likely. Reports at the recent US Navy Submarine League Symposium reveal continuing US failure to increase submarine building rates. By now an additional submarine should have been ordered to cover the transfer of an existing Block IV Virginia to Australia in eight years, but no contract has been placed. Worse, Virginia production at both US submarine shipbuilders is actually slowing due to supply chain delays. The US’s top priority shipbuilding program, for Columbia class ballistic-missile submarines, continues to suffer delays. In late November, the White House requested emergency funding from Congress for the Virginia and Columbia programs.

This situation flags an increasing likelihood that, despite its best efforts, the US Navy will be unable to spare any Virginias for sale to Australia. The president of the day probably will be unable, as legislation requires, to certify 270 days before the transfer it will not degrade US undersea capabilities.

Meanwhile, Britain’s submarine support establishment is having difficulties in getting SSNs to sea. A recent fire affecting the delivery of the final Astute class SSN can only add to these woes.

The French Suffren SSN class was the reference design for the diesel Attack class that Australia intended to buy before switching to SSNs. It offers the solution to our AUKUS problems. It is in production by Naval Group, with three of the planned six submarines commissioned in the French navy.

At 5300 tonnes and with a 70-day endurance, capacity for 24 torpedoes or missiles, four torpedo tubes and a crew of 60, it would be cheaper to build, own and crew than the AUKUS boats. The design is flexible—optimised for anti-submarine warfare but with a good anti-surface ship capability from dual-purpose torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. It can also carry land-attack cruise missiles, mines and special forces.

The Suffren class uses low-enriched uranium fuel and needs refuelling every 10 years, whereas the US and British designs, with highly enriched uranium, are intended never to be refuelled. But the Suffren reactor is designed to simplify refuelling, which could be completed during a scheduled refit in Australia. Used fuel can be reprocessed, simplifying decommissioning at the end of life.

True, the Suffren design does not have the weapon load, vertical launch missile tubes or 90-day endurance of the Virginia and, presumably, SSN-AUKUS. However, as a nuclear-powered relative of the Attack class it is much closer to the original Australian requirement for a replacement for the Collins class than SSN-AUKUS is shaping up to be. The design offers adequate capability for Australia’s needs in a package we can afford to own. We could operate 12 Suffrens and still need fewer crew members than we would under the AUKUS plan.

If we shifted to the Suffren design, we should nonetheless stick with the SSN training programs we’ve arranged with the US Navy and Royal Navy. We should also go ahead with establishing an intermediate repair facility that would support their SSNs as well as ours and with rotating them through Western Australia.

As for the AUKUS acquisition plan, we need to begin preparations now for jointly building Suffrens with France. Australia cannot wait for the US to finally say Virginias will be unavailable.

To the extent that design needs changing, we can go back to the work done for the Attack class, particularly incorporation of a US combat system and Australian standards.

Difficult, challenging and politically courageous? Surely. But not nearly as improbable getting SSNs under AUKUS on time.

Author
Peter Briggs is a retired submarine specialist and a past president of the Submarine Institute of Australia.

Instead of 8 SSNs, do you think a mix of 6 simpler SSKs like the Okra class and 4 AUKUS-SSNs suffice?
 
Instead of 8 SSNs, do you think a mix of 6 simpler SSKs like the Okra class and 4 AUKUS-SSNs suffice?
8 SSNs are not even enough:

- To ensure a deterrent presence you need 12 SSNs because the theatre is large and you have to think about downtime due to maintenance.

- The problem is that it is highly unlikely that Australia will have SSNs in time, i.e. before the Colins are withdrawn, because the latter are in a sorry state and both the US and the UK are struggling to meet their own needs.

To solve these problems, and so that the Australians don't lose face, they could strengthen the AUKUS alliance by admitting France, which would be responsible for filling the gap with Suffren (not Barracuda, since Australia now accepts SSNs and the Suffren is cheaper than the Barracuda because there are no modifications), each costing only about a billion dollars.

And if Trump ever cancels the contract, that makes a decent plan B.
 
In view of the challenges facing Australia in the context of the AUKUS pact, it would seem necessary to rethink this alliance in order to guarantee its credibility and effectiveness. The current situation cannot continue without the risk of a breakdown in submarine capabilities for our Australian partner.

This is why I believe it is time to breathe new life into this trilateral cooperation by including France. Such a development would not just be a symbolic addition: it would refocus this alliance on its essential strategic objectives and strengthen its operational coherence.

In short, it would transform the current AUKUS, still weakened by uncertainties, into a truly forward-looking pact: a ‘FOCUS’ - France, UK, US, and Australia. A partnership built around a clear vision: the sustainable protection of maritime and strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

The French contribution could be based on our Suffren class submarines, which offer a credible and immediately available operational solution to fill the Australian gap. Built in partnership or deployed temporarily, they would meet the pressing needs of the Royal Australian Navy, while laying the foundations for long-term strategic cooperation.
 
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8 SSNs are not even enough:

- To ensure a deterrent presence you need 12 SSNs because the theatre is large and you have to think about downtime due to maintenance.

- The problem is that it is highly unlikely that Australia will have SSNs in time, i.e. before the Colins are withdrawn, because the latter are in a sorry state and both the US and the UK are struggling to meet their own needs.

To solve these problems, and so that the Australians don't lose face, they could strengthen the AUKUS alliance by admitting France, which would be responsible for filling the gap with Suffren (not Barracuda, since Australia now accepts SSNs and the Suffren is cheaper than the Barracuda because there are no modifications), each costing only about a billion dollars.

And if Trump ever cancels the contract, that makes a decent plan B.

Australia with SSNs is not in India's interests. And I thought Suffren costs $2B?

Shouldn't American and British subs suffer lesser downtime due to life-of-ship reactors?

Anyway, I doubt what you said will work out. The US and your EU chums want France to dismantle its military industry in favor of a pan-European system. The last thing they need is more France in a US-allied state. Hasn't Dassault already seen that in SoKo and Switzerland? They have already roped France in for tanks and fighters. Now only the navy's left. Politics will definitely keep France out, no matter how much sense it makes.
 
Australia with SSNs is not in India's interests. And I thought Suffren costs $2B?

Shouldn't American and British subs suffer lesser downtime due to life-of-ship reactors?

Anyway, I doubt what you said will work out. The US and your EU chums want France to dismantle its military industry in favor of a pan-European system. The last thing they need is more France in a US-allied state. Hasn't Dassault already seen that in SoKo and Switzerland? They have already roped France in for tanks and fighters. Now only the navy's left. Politics will definitely keep France out, no matter how much sense it makes.
Sous-marins Barracuda : 9 milliards d'euros sous les mers
Barracuda submarines: €9 billion under the sea

The attack submarine programme, the first of which will be officially launched by the French President in Cherbourg on Friday, will cost €9 billion. This is the price we have to pay to keep France in the select club of major nuclear and naval powers, alongside the United States, Russia and China.

‘The Marseillaise and superlatives will be the order of the day this Friday, in the Cherbourg arsenal basin, for the launch of the Navy's first Barracuda attack submarine, in the presence of the President of the Republic. Weighing in at 4,700 tonnes of steel and measuring 99 metres in length, the ‘Suffren’ (pronounced ‘Suffrin’) is not only one of the largest and most complex submarines ever built in France, it is also one of the most costly weapons programmes: over €9 billion in total for the six submarines planned for the Navy between now and 2029, which will remain in service until 2060.

This is the price we have to pay to enable France to maintain an autonomous nuclear deterrent, but also to intervene far from its borders with a minimum of risk. Designed to protect nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier from other submarines, the Barracuda is the first French submersible capable of firing cruise missiles at land targets more than 1,000 km away. With the ‘Suffren’, France will join the very select club of countries capable of building nuclear-powered submarines equipped with cruise missiles, alongside the United States, Russia and China.

Twenty years of effort

This is the result of 20 years' work by the French Defence Procurement Agency, Naval Group, the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), TechnicAtome and more than a hundred subcontractors. Launched in 1998 by Jacques Chirac to replace the ‘Rubis’ designed under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, the Barracuda took eight years to develop and a further 12 years to build. Almost three years behind schedule.

And the adventure is not over. Once launched at the end of July, the Suffren will begin a long series of sea trials, off Cherbourg in early 2020, then Brest for the first dives and finally Toulon, its future base, for armament tests. The date of its entry into active service has not been given.

From the 2CV to Formula 1


That's not too much for such a complex programme,’ says Vincent Martinot-Lagarde, one of the architects of the Barracuda at Naval Group. The Barracuda represents almost a million parts and over 70 million hours of work since the programme was launched. Compared to the Rubis, we've gone from the 2CV to Formula 1. The same goes for the weapons.

Compared with its predecessors, the Barracuda will not only be ten times quieter - the main advantage of a submarine - thanks in particular to its cork-lined hull and its new propulsion system, but it will also have much greater firepower, with the possibility of firing SCALP missiles, new heavy torpedoes costing 2.3 million euros each, capable of sinking anything within a 50 km radius, laying mines, etc. It will also be able to carry below deck an advanced base for combat swimmers, with their own mini submarine. All this will be supported by electronic equipment capable of detecting a door slamming from miles away.

Screens instead of periscopes
To be able to operate with a reduced crew of 65 men, the Barracuda also makes extensive use of digital technology. The traditional periscope has been replaced by an ‘electronic surveillance and attack mast’. ‘The periscope, which required a hole to be drilled in the hull, has been replaced by a cable connected to screens placed throughout the control centre, enabling several people to see images from outside,’ explains Emmanuelle Gaudez from the DGA. Digital tablets have replaced the manual valves.

Incidentally, the Suffren is also the first submersible to be fitted out for mixed crews, with cabins for 4 and 6 men, even though the first crew will be entirely male. The first female submariners joined the French Navy a year and a half ago and have yet to accumulate the 3,000 hours of diving required for sea trial crews.

A unique nuclear reactor

However, the Barracuda's main asset remains its nuclear reactor, developed by CEA and Areva, which is more compact, quieter and more reliable than anything previously fitted to French submarines. Its power is equivalent to 1% of that of a civilian reactor. Enough to power a small town. ‘France is one of the few nations to have mastered nuclear propulsion, and our reactors are the only ones to operate with uranium enriched to civilian standards,’ stresses Pascal Lucas, director of the programme at the CEA. This is an additional guarantee of safety for the crew, whose quarters are ten metres from the reactor, but it also means that maintenance costs can be halved. ‘The Barracuda reactor will only require one maintenance operation per year, instead of two, and will have to operate without a major overhaul for ten years’, he explains.
 
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Sous-marins Barracuda : 9 milliards d'euros sous les mers
Barracuda submarines: €9 billion under the sea

The attack submarine programme, the first of which will be officially launched by the French President in Cherbourg on Friday, will cost €9 billion. This is the price we have to pay to keep France in the select club of major nuclear and naval powers, alongside the United States, Russia and China.

‘The Marseillaise and superlatives will be the order of the day this Friday, in the Cherbourg arsenal basin, for the launch of the Navy's first Barracuda attack submarine, in the presence of the President of the Republic. Weighing in at 4,700 tonnes of steel and measuring 99 metres in length, the ‘Suffren’ (pronounced ‘Suffrin’) is not only one of the largest and most complex submarines ever built in France, it is also one of the most costly weapons programmes: over €9 billion in total for the six submarines planned for the Navy between now and 2029, which will remain in service until 2060.

This is the price we have to pay to enable France to maintain an autonomous nuclear deterrent, but also to intervene far from its borders with a minimum of risk. Designed to protect nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier from other submarines, the Barracuda is the first French submersible capable of firing cruise missiles at land targets more than 1,000 km away. With the ‘Suffren’, France will join the very select club of countries capable of building nuclear-powered submarines equipped with cruise missiles, alongside the United States, Russia and China.

Twenty years of effort

This is the result of 20 years' work by the French Defence Procurement Agency, Naval Group, the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), TechnicAtome and more than a hundred subcontractors. Launched in 1998 by Jacques Chirac to replace the ‘Rubis’ designed under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, the Barracuda took eight years to develop and a further 12 years to build. Almost three years behind schedule.

And the adventure is not over. Once launched at the end of July, the Suffren will begin a long series of sea trials, off Cherbourg in early 2020, then Brest for the first dives and finally Toulon, its future base, for armament tests. The date of its entry into active service has not been given.

From the 2CV to Formula 1

That's not too much for such a complex programme,’ says Vincent Martinot-Lagarde, one of the architects of the Barracuda at Naval Group. The Barracuda represents almost a million parts and over 70 million hours of work since the programme was launched. Compared to the Rubis, we've gone from the 2CV to Formula 1. The same goes for the weapons.

Compared with its predecessors, the Barracuda will not only be ten times quieter - the main advantage of a submarine - thanks in particular to its cork-lined hull and its new propulsion system, but it will also have much greater firepower, with the possibility of firing SCALP missiles, new heavy torpedoes costing 2.3 million euros each, capable of sinking anything within a 50 km radius, laying mines, etc. It will also be able to carry below deck an advanced base for combat swimmers, with their own mini submarine. All this will be supported by electronic equipment capable of detecting a door slamming from miles away.

Screens instead of periscopes
To be able to operate with a reduced crew of 65 men, the Barracuda also makes extensive use of digital technology. The traditional periscope has been replaced by an ‘electronic surveillance and attack mast’. ‘The periscope, which required a hole to be drilled in the hull, has been replaced by a cable connected to screens placed throughout the control centre, enabling several people to see images from outside,’ explains Emmanuelle Gaudez from the DGA. Digital tablets have replaced the manual valves.

Incidentally, the Suffren is also the first submersible to be fitted out for mixed crews, with cabins for 4 and 6 men, even though the first crew will be entirely male. The first female submariners joined the French Navy a year and a half ago and have yet to accumulate the 3,000 hours of diving required for sea trial crews.

A unique nuclear reactor

However, the Barracuda's main asset remains its nuclear reactor, developed by CEA and Areva, which is more compact, quieter and more reliable than anything previously fitted to French submarines. Its power is equivalent to 1% of that of a civilian reactor. Enough to power a small town. ‘France is one of the few nations to have mastered nuclear propulsion, and our reactors are the only ones to operate with uranium enriched to civilian standards,’ stresses Pascal Lucas, director of the programme at the CEA. This is an additional guarantee of safety for the crew, whose quarters are ten metres from the reactor, but it also means that maintenance costs can be halved. ‘The Barracuda reactor will only require one maintenance operation per year, instead of two, and will have to operate without a major overhaul for ten years’, he explains.

That's certainly cheap. Hopefully you don't sell a future rival to India cheap SSNs. Pretty much no neighbor in Asia has relished the thought of the Australians operating SSNs. Hence the Orka.