Japan’s Kono Says He Supports Building Nuclear Submarines
The leading candidate to succeed Prime Minister Suga announced his support for building nuclear-powered subs, but acknowledged the challenges.
Japan’s Kono Says He Supports Building Nuclear Submarines
The leading candidate to succeed Prime Minister Suga announced his support for building nuclear-powered subs, but acknowledged the challenges.
thediplomat.com
From the submarine to the ridiculous
The old plan was to build a conventionally powered version of a nuclear-powered French submarine. It was crazy. The new plan – to buy a nuclear-powered submarine instead – is worse. It will make the replacement of the Royal Australian Navy’s fleet of Collins-class boats riskier, costlier and...
From submarine to ridiculous (Hugh White)
“The old plan was to build a conventionally powered version of a French nuclear powered submarine. It was madness. The new plan, to buy a nuclear powered submarine, is worse. It will make the replacement of the Royal Australian Navy Collins Class fleet riskier, more expensive and slower. This means an even greater drop in our submarine capacity over the next several decades. And it reinforces our engagement in the United States' military confrontation with China, which is unlikely to succeed and carries terrifying risks.
There is a reason why only six countries, all nuclear-weaponized, operate nuclear-powered submarines. For everyone else, their benefits, including greater range and speed, do not outweigh their much higher costs. Nuclear propulsion makes perfect sense for submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles and for "hunter-killer" submarines that are designed to track and destroy them. But for other tasks, including operating against enemy ships, conventionally powered diesel-electric submarines are more cost effective.
If the Australian submarines were primarily intended to defend Australia and our closest neighbors, then there is no way we would consider nuclear propulsion. But the navy decided many years ago that the primary role of our new ships should be to operate off the coast of China in cooperation with the US navy, and the government was quick to follow suit. This required a larger and more complex submarine than any conventional submarine in the world, with attributes only found in nuclear powered ships. It was the attempt to meet these demands that led us to the very problematic French deal, which has now imploded so dramatically.
Under the new AUKUS deal, announced on Thursday, Australia will have access to highly sensitive nuclear propulsion technology that will allow us to become nuclear ourselves. Eight ships are planned to be built in South Australia, based on the American Virginia class or British Astute class models. Scott Morrison said the decision will be made after an 18-month process to explore and assess all the issues and options at stake.
If the United States, by miscalculation, finds itself at war with China, we absolutely cannot assume that it will win. It must certainly be part of our calculations as to whether we will commit to fighting alongside America.
In a way, the switch to nuclear power does make some sense - but only if we really need the very ambitious capabilities that have driven us to this stage, and which are now pushing us more and more into larger ships. large and more complex. It is enough to be convinced of it to look at the size of the submarines of which we speak. The Collins class weighs 3,000 tonnes. The French-designed Attack class, now discontinued, was to weigh 4,500 tonnes. The American and British submarines we are considering now weigh over 7,000 tonnes.
That's a lot of boats, and they're very efficient. But these abilities come with huge penalties. Starting with the cost. The prime minister acknowledged that the new plan will cost even more than the old one, and that the number of ships will drop from 12 to 8. With an estimated cost of $ 80 billion for 12 ships, the French program was already incredibly expensive. International comparisons clearly show that we could build large modern, conventionally powered submarines for half that price. We could have twice as many submarines in service for the same amount if we scrapped the French program, but stayed in the realm of conventional power and didn't go nuclear. Now we will only have eight boats. This is a significant operational loss, because the numbers really matter in the battle.
Then there is the timing. The Prime Minister has acknowledged that the first of the new nuclear-powered submarines will not be in service until 2040. While all is well, that means we will not have replaced the six Collins-class ships until 2050, and that we will not have 12 ships in service before the mid-2020s. It is far too slow when our strategic situation is changing so rapidly. We need much more submarine capacity, much sooner.
And this schedule could well be changed too. All submarines are complex, but nuclear submarines are doubly so, and Australia has no expertise in this form of propulsion, and very little nuclear engineering expertise to draw upon. No decision has been made as to which design we will purchase, whether we will purchase an existing UK or US model "off the shelf" or whether we will develop a modified model of our own design. Even a standard model would be risky, and any modification would make it even riskier. Second, the challenge of building these boats in Australia, as the government has pledged to do, is daunting. Long delays are very likely, so we should cautiously expect to wait until the mid-2040s for the new submarines to enter service.
In the meantime, the government is counting on the old Collins-class ships to fill the void. He's planning a major upgrade to extend the operational life of the Collinses, but this project is also complex and risky, and it's only just getting started. There is no way to avoid a significant drop in capacity in the 2030s, and there is a real risk that the failures of the Collins modernization and delays in new nuclear ships will wipe out our sub-force. navy for a while.
Then there is the challenge of operating and maintaining nuclear powered submarines safely. This is an immensely complex and demanding responsibility that would place enormous responsibilities on the navy, which has struggled in recent years to operate much simpler systems. There is no doubt that the government and navy intend to rely heavily on help from Britain and the United States, but this is where the problem lies. In addition to the costs and delays, the choice of nuclear submarines reinforces our dependence on the United States and Great Britain, which carries real strategic risks in the context of tense and growing power politics. rapid development of our region. So much for the government's vaunted sovereign submarine capability.
It is a big step for the United States to agree to share, and allow Britain to share, its nuclear propulsion technology with Australia. They've never done it before with anyone. Their reason has nothing to do with the catch-all discourse on shared values and mutual commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. It has everything to do with the ruthless strategic interest of the United States to tie us more closely to their military strategy against China.
Washington wants Australia to be able to do more - much more - to support them in a war against China. So it is in the interests of the United States that we invest in forces designed for this purpose, and nuclear-powered submarines meet their needs perfectly. The government maintains that it is in our best interests as well, as we must rely on the United States to resist China's threatening ambitions, and therefore we must do everything in our power to help them.
But putting all our eggs in America's basket is only a good strategy if the United States is sure to win the competition with China over which of the two will dominate Asia in the decades to come, and if their interests in the region will always be aligned with ours. This is far from certain. Scott Morrison may call our alliance an "everlasting relationship," but nothing is everlasting when it comes to power politics. The United States faces an immense challenge to confront and contain China in its own backyard. He is the most formidable rival the country has ever faced, and its defeat will require enormous sacrifices.
It has been a decade now since Washington has made a strong speech about its determination to confront China. But so far we haven't seen any signs that America's voters or their leaders are actually prepared to shoulder the burdens and pay the costs that come with it. On the contrary, Joe Biden and Donald Trump, each in their own way, made it clear that they were reluctant to take on the obligations of global leadership. In Australia, we simply cannot plan for our future by assuming that the United States will always be there for us, no matter how many nuclear submarines we buy.
And if the United States, by miscalculation, finds itself at war with China, we absolutely cannot assume that it will win. It certainly has to be part of our calculations as to whether we will commit to fighting alongside America. And yet this is what we do more and more
What should we do instead? First, we should recognize, as our neighbors in Southeast Asia do, that confronting and containing China will not work. Whether we like it or not, we're going to have to live with China's growing power and influence. That doesn't mean doing everything China says, but moving away from Washington's policy of trying to push China back by threatening it with war.
Second, we should build forces to defend ourselves without relying on the United States, rather than increasing our dependence on an ally who, despite his tough rhetoric, is less and less credible. It means buying submarines and other systems that work profitably to defend us, not to serve our allies - which means buying conventional submarines rather than nuclear ones.
And third, we should take a step back and think about our long-term future as a country. Thirty years ago, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating said Australia had no choice but to stop looking for its security in Asia and start looking for it in Asia. This remains true, and it is quite the opposite to go back to the time of Robert Menzies and his two "great and powerful friends" Anglo-Saxon.
But that's exactly what Morrison did this week. He's tied Australia to a deal that undermines our sovereign capabilities, spends too much on equipment we can barely be sure will work, and brings us closer to the front line of a war we may not have. no interest to lead.
From the submarine to the ridiculous
The old plan was to build a conventionally powered version of a nuclear-powered French submarine. It was crazy. The new plan – to buy a nuclear-powered submarine instead – is worse. It will make the replacement of the Royal Australian Navy’s fleet of Collins-class boats riskier, costlier and...www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au
From submarine to ridiculous (Hugh White)
“The old plan was to build a conventionally powered version of a French nuclear powered submarine. It was madness. The new plan, to buy a nuclear powered submarine, is worse. It will make the replacement of the Royal Australian Navy Collins Class fleet riskier, more expensive and slower. This means an even greater drop in our submarine capacity over the next several decades. And it reinforces our engagement in the United States' military confrontation with China, which is unlikely to succeed and carries terrifying risks.
There is a reason why only six countries, all nuclear-weaponized, operate nuclear-powered submarines. For everyone else, their benefits, including greater range and speed, do not outweigh their much higher costs. Nuclear propulsion makes perfect sense for submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles and for "hunter-killer" submarines that are designed to track and destroy them. But for other tasks, including operating against enemy ships, conventionally powered diesel-electric submarines are more cost effective.
If the Australian submarines were primarily intended to defend Australia and our closest neighbors, then there is no way we would consider nuclear propulsion. But the navy decided many years ago that the primary role of our new ships should be to operate off the coast of China in cooperation with the US navy, and the government was quick to follow suit. This required a larger and more complex submarine than any conventional submarine in the world, with attributes only found in nuclear powered ships. It was the attempt to meet these demands that led us to the very problematic French deal, which has now imploded so dramatically.
Under the new AUKUS deal, announced on Thursday, Australia will have access to highly sensitive nuclear propulsion technology that will allow us to become nuclear ourselves. Eight ships are planned to be built in South Australia, based on the American Virginia class or British Astute class models. Scott Morrison said the decision will be made after an 18-month process to explore and assess all the issues and options at stake.
If the United States, by miscalculation, finds itself at war with China, we absolutely cannot assume that it will win. It must certainly be part of our calculations as to whether we will commit to fighting alongside America.
In a way, the switch to nuclear power does make some sense - but only if we really need the very ambitious capabilities that have driven us to this stage, and which are now pushing us more and more into larger ships. large and more complex. It is enough to be convinced of it to look at the size of the submarines of which we speak. The Collins class weighs 3,000 tonnes. The French-designed Attack class, now discontinued, was to weigh 4,500 tonnes. The American and British submarines we are considering now weigh over 7,000 tonnes.
That's a lot of boats, and they're very efficient. But these abilities come with huge penalties. Starting with the cost. The prime minister acknowledged that the new plan will cost even more than the old one, and that the number of ships will drop from 12 to 8. With an estimated cost of $ 80 billion for 12 ships, the French program was already incredibly expensive. International comparisons clearly show that we could build large modern, conventionally powered submarines for half that price. We could have twice as many submarines in service for the same amount if we scrapped the French program, but stayed in the realm of conventional power and didn't go nuclear. Now we will only have eight boats. This is a significant operational loss, because the numbers really matter in the battle.
Then there is the timing. The Prime Minister has acknowledged that the first of the new nuclear-powered submarines will not be in service until 2040. While all is well, that means we will not have replaced the six Collins-class ships until 2050, and that we will not have 12 ships in service before the mid-2020s. It is far too slow when our strategic situation is changing so rapidly. We need much more submarine capacity, much sooner.
And this schedule could well be changed too. All submarines are complex, but nuclear submarines are doubly so, and Australia has no expertise in this form of propulsion, and very little nuclear engineering expertise to draw upon. No decision has been made as to which design we will purchase, whether we will purchase an existing UK or US model "off the shelf" or whether we will develop a modified model of our own design. Even a standard model would be risky, and any modification would make it even riskier. Second, the challenge of building these boats in Australia, as the government has pledged to do, is daunting. Long delays are very likely, so we should cautiously expect to wait until the mid-2040s for the new submarines to enter service.
In the meantime, the government is counting on the old Collins-class ships to fill the void. He's planning a major upgrade to extend the operational life of the Collinses, but this project is also complex and risky, and it's only just getting started. There is no way to avoid a significant drop in capacity in the 2030s, and there is a real risk that the failures of the Collins modernization and delays in new nuclear ships will wipe out our sub-force. navy for a while.
Then there is the challenge of operating and maintaining nuclear powered submarines safely. This is an immensely complex and demanding responsibility that would place enormous responsibilities on the navy, which has struggled in recent years to operate much simpler systems. There is no doubt that the government and navy intend to rely heavily on help from Britain and the United States, but this is where the problem lies. In addition to the costs and delays, the choice of nuclear submarines reinforces our dependence on the United States and Great Britain, which carries real strategic risks in the context of tense and growing power politics. rapid development of our region. So much for the government's vaunted sovereign submarine capability.
It is a big step for the United States to agree to share, and allow Britain to share, its nuclear propulsion technology with Australia. They've never done it before with anyone. Their reason has nothing to do with the catch-all discourse on shared values and mutual commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. It has everything to do with the ruthless strategic interest of the United States to tie us more closely to their military strategy against China.
Washington wants Australia to be able to do more - much more - to support them in a war against China. So it is in the interests of the United States that we invest in forces designed for this purpose, and nuclear-powered submarines meet their needs perfectly. The government maintains that it is in our best interests as well, as we must rely on the United States to resist China's threatening ambitions, and therefore we must do everything in our power to help them.
But putting all our eggs in America's basket is only a good strategy if the United States is sure to win the competition with China over which of the two will dominate Asia in the decades to come, and if their interests in the region will always be aligned with ours. This is far from certain. Scott Morrison may call our alliance an "everlasting relationship," but nothing is everlasting when it comes to power politics. The United States faces an immense challenge to confront and contain China in its own backyard. He is the most formidable rival the country has ever faced, and its defeat will require enormous sacrifices.
It has been a decade now since Washington has made a strong speech about its determination to confront China. But so far we haven't seen any signs that America's voters or their leaders are actually prepared to shoulder the burdens and pay the costs that come with it. On the contrary, Joe Biden and Donald Trump, each in their own way, made it clear that they were reluctant to take on the obligations of global leadership. In Australia, we simply cannot plan for our future by assuming that the United States will always be there for us, no matter how many nuclear submarines we buy.
And if the United States, by miscalculation, finds itself at war with China, we absolutely cannot assume that it will win. It certainly has to be part of our calculations as to whether we will commit to fighting alongside America. And yet this is what we do more and more
What should we do instead? First, we should recognize, as our neighbors in Southeast Asia do, that confronting and containing China will not work. Whether we like it or not, we're going to have to live with China's growing power and influence. That doesn't mean doing everything China says, but moving away from Washington's policy of trying to push China back by threatening it with war.
Second, we should build forces to defend ourselves without relying on the United States, rather than increasing our dependence on an ally who, despite his tough rhetoric, is less and less credible. It means buying submarines and other systems that work profitably to defend us, not to serve our allies - which means buying conventional submarines rather than nuclear ones.
And third, we should take a step back and think about our long-term future as a country. Thirty years ago, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating said Australia had no choice but to stop looking for its security in Asia and start looking for it in Asia. This remains true, and it is quite the opposite to go back to the time of Robert Menzies and his two "great and powerful friends" Anglo-Saxon.
But that's exactly what Morrison did this week. He's tied Australia to a deal that undermines our sovereign capabilities, spends too much on equipment we can barely be sure will work, and brings us closer to the front line of a war we may not have. no interest to lead.
This basically assumes the worst case scenario.
what is this guy smoking?????
Our diplomatic task is daunting, but the mission is clear
Australia’s strategic direction seems changed utterly.A future Australian Defence Force of nuclear-powered submarines and advanced conventional missiles, an AUKUS technology partnership with London and Washington, and far-reaching plans to advance the global good with America, Japan and India under the mantle of the Quad: the past few weeks have been a firehose of national security news.
So great is the torrent that momentous developments – notably the nuclear submarines announcement – have drowned out the merely major ones.
For instance, on 16 September the AUSMIN joint statement by our foreign and defence ministers and their American counterparts signalled we will see more US forces in Australian air and naval bases. This is part of a wider distribution of American military presence in the Indo-Pacific to deter conflict with China.
That statement also declared “intent to strengthen ties with Taiwan” as a “leading democracy” and a “critical partner” – lines that once would have induced their very own gasps in the business community and foreign affairs establishment.
It’s no surprise that much commentary has fixated on this as a transformational moment in Australia’s security posture and global geopolitics.
The Morrison government has decisively chosen the United States over China. Canberra’s defiance of Beijing is here to stay. The Biden Administration is committing to stop Chinese coercion in the Indo-Pacific.
Britain, in its way, is now openly resisting China and pivoting to this region. The Quad will provide core strength for global groupings to balance China’s power. But European seriousness about joining such coalitions is suddenly strained by Australia’s abandonment of the French submarine deal.
All this may be so, even if all such propositions come with caveats.
But another meaning of the past fortnight is precisely that it is not some dramatic departure. Rather, now is a culmination of years of change in our strategic settings to prepare Australia for at least a decade of hazard and disruption.
That is, Australia now has in place most of the elements of a genuine Indo-Pacific strategy.
Australia has shaped an influential new vision of global order, where the idea of a vast maritime region of connectivity and shared principles empowers many nations to work together to prevent China’s bid for dominance.
Former prime ministers can comment all they wish, but there are currents of continuity with their own policies, more than some may acknowledge.
Malcolm Turnbull’s government led a pushback against Chinese infringements on sovereignty and a rules-based regional order, including by criminalising foreign interference, strengthening cyber defences and challenging Beijing’s breaches of international law in the South China Sea. His choice of the French submarine option – whatever its merits or otherwise – was part of our wider build-up as a maritime power.
And Turnbull’s foreign policy emphasised new coalitions in the Indo-Pacific, enabling the revival of the Quad.
Much of the defence modernisation under Morrison and Turnbull actually began with Tony Abbott, who also personally drove strengthened ties with India and Japan. It is a testament to the Australia-Japan partnership he fostered that Tokyo so quickly moved ahead with our wider Indo-Pacific alignment even after it lost to France the submarine deal Abbott had wanted with Prime Minister Abe.
Julia Gillard’s government fell far short on defence spending, but the saving grace of her 2013 defence white paper was its pioneering role globally in affirming the Indo-Pacific as the world’s new strategic centre of gravity. She advanced relations with India, ending Labor’s ban on uranium exports.
Most substantially, in 2011 Gillard agreed to ‘force posture initiatives’ allowing the deployment of US Marines to Darwin and preparing for an air and naval presence.
With his 2009 defence white paper, Kevin Rudd envisioned Australia as a serious naval power – even if he failed to cost and commence the submarine ambitions he promised. He warned of China as a military danger long before most of us were willing to countenance this.
John Howard revitalised the US alliance, and not only in the war on terror. He advanced ties with Japan, India and democratic Indonesia – and the modern global partnership with Britain now influencing AUKUS.
And Paul Keating? His antiquated, anti-Quad rantings overlook the fact that Australia’s driving role in that fast-evolving institution – with an agenda spanning COVID-19 vaccines, environment, infrastructure, technology and, yes, security – is a practical manifestation of the activist middle-power diplomacy he once espoused.
Labor’s qualified support for AUKUS – and conversion to the Quad – confirm that government and opposition are now fairly much in the same boat in recognising our strategic problem and the chosen course. And most of the public is on board. Stunningly, opinion polling from Essential suggests that even most Greens voters disagree with their leader that a nuclear-propelled submarine fleet will make Australia less safe.
Relentlessly hard work lies ahead. The diplomatic task alone is daunting: salvaging relations with France, ensuring Britain stays the course, patiently working with the pragmatism of Asian partners, many of which deep down could benefit from a stronger Australia.
But the real odyssey will be at home. To succeed, the nuclear submarine ambition and the critical technology-sharing opportunities under AUKUS will require fundamental changes in the way our defence and science establishments do business. This will require grimly dedicated focus from political leadership now and across governments to come.
Our diplomatic task is daunting, but the mission is clear
AUKUS puts India on the backfoot
Even as India leases submarines from Russia and sub-leased one to Myanmar to counter Chinese naval power, AUKUS signals a growing lack of confidence in India’s ability to help contain China
www.nationalheraldindia.com
India Welcomes AUKUS Pact as China Deterrent
The agreement will help New Delhi with its quest for a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
foreignpolicy.com
National Herald is Congress Party Mouth Piece which is led by an Italian and his retard half bred son. FYI INC has signed MOU/Agreements with CPC of ChinaAUKUS puts India on the backfoot
Even as India leases submarines from Russia and sub-leased one to Myanmar to counter Chinese naval power, AUKUS signals a growing lack of confidence in India’s ability to help contain China
India Welcomes AUKUS Pact as China Deterrent
The agreement will help New Delhi with its quest for a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
INC?
Why is Congress hiding its MoU with China’s Communists?
While the Congress is facing yet another challenge from within with long-time party loyalists doubtful about its future, the news about the Memorandum of Unders
Indian National Congress.INC?
Why is Congress hiding its MoU with China’s Communists?
While the Congress is facing yet another challenge from within with long-time party loyalists doubtful about its future, the news about the Memorandum of Underswww.newindianexpress.com
US and UK begin jostling to supply Australia with nuclear submarine fleet
Just before the outbreak of World War I, the fledgling Royal Australian Navy turned to the "mother country" for its first submarine and more than a century later, Britain is again likely to play a pivotal role.The British built AE1 was commissioned at Portsmouth in February 1914 and accompanied by her sister AE2, departed England for Sydney the following month.
In September that year, AE1 disappeared and no trace was found of the submarine's 35 crew — 14 Royal Australian Navy members and 21 members of the Royal Navy.
The last known image of Australia's first submarine AE1 before it was lost at sea, taken on September 9, 1914.(
Supplied: Sea Power Centre
)
In 2021, the Australian Defence Force is again considering what role the Royal Navy could play in developing its next submarines, or whether like many modern acquisitions, it will focus on interoperability with American technology.
Under the AUKUS partnership struck in September, the leaders of the United Kingdom and the United States have agreed to work with Australia on how to build a new class of nuclear-powered submarines.
Over the next 18 months, the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Task Force inside the Department of Defence will lead a study into the numerous regulatory issues involved in the ownership and operation of nuclear-powered boats.
While the design is not yet known, or what the criteria will be, for many commentators the existing British Astute-class is emerging as an early favourite for Australia to replace the Collins-class fleet.
Others inside the defence industry believe any nuclear-powered Australian submarine will need to be an American boat, based on the Virginia-class so that it can be serviced at nearby US bases in Guam or Japan.
Both the British and US options have various advantages and disadvantages, which highlight the extraordinarily complex process the ADF faces to select a nuclear-powered submarine — which may never actually eventuate.
Australia's nuclear-powered submarine fleet is decades from being ready.
Already the regulatory challenges appear significant, as nothing is more complex and costly in the military world than nuclear-powered submarines, particularly for a country with no domestic nuclear industry.
In the United States, an eminent group of former officials and experts has written to President Joe Biden warning the AUKUS deal could threaten national security by encouraging hostile nations to obtain highly enriched uranium (HEU).
Australia insists it will uphold its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but the engineering sector warns it will be a steep learning curve for the Defence Department.
The now dumped Attack class submarine being designed by France's Naval Group was based on the Barracuda class, which lost three years in development because of less complex regulatory issues associated with low enriched uranium (LEU).
"This is a very long-term effort that'll be decades, I think, before a submarine goes in the water," US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Gilday predicted last month.
The Pentagon is yet to decide who will run the submarine process for the US under the new AUKUS agreement but Admiral Gilday warns, "I don't see this as a short-term timeline".
Despite Prime Minister Scott Morrison's boast of a "forever partnership" in which the United States is willing to share its secret nuclear technology in a "one-off" deal, some still doubt the Pentagon will be prepared to part with its "crown jewels".
On the British side, the experience of building the nuclear-powered Astute fleet has been far from easy, requiring assistance from US submarine builder Electric Boat, which also provided advice to Australia's Collins-class program.
Given the two-year delay now projected for Australia's British designed Hunter-class frigates, some inside Defence believe there may also be a reluctance to again rely too heavily on the "mother country" on a far more complex and bigger submarine project.
US and UK begin jostling to supply Australia with nuclear submarine fleet
The Australian Defence Force is again considering what role the Royal Navy could play in developing its next submarines, or whether it will focus on American technology, writes Andrew Greene.
www.abc.net.au
Britain reaffirms Asia 'tilt' as new warship makes Singapore stop
Britain's new aircraft carrier the HMS Queen Elizabeth made a stop in Singapore on Monday, part of a move to reassert itself globally and boost its military presence in Asia amid rising competition among major powers. The Queen Elizabeth led a British carrier strike group in exercises with...
The 5 Main Options For Australia’s AUKUS Nuclear Submarine Deal - Naval News
As Australia looks set to join the elite club of nuclear submarine operators, we explore the options. The U.S. Navy's Virginia Class? The Royal Navy's Astute Class? Or something new? We have identified the 5 most obvious candidates.
www.navalnews.com
Subs : The Australian govt decision more and more contested in USA and Australia
-The Naval Group deal price increase from 50 Md$ to 90 Md$ because the number of subs grow from 8 to 12 and because the AUstralian $ fall from 15% in the meantime. These informations were hiden to the australian people (that means that the Naval Group bill only increase by 10% from the early beginning...).
-According to all the specialists, the deal for 8 SSN built in Australia will be higher than 100 Md$ !!!
-It is highly possible that Australia will never have the skill to build such complicated weapon. They probably will have to be made in USA or UK. The 100+ Md$ bill will not be partially compensated by social and fiscal revenues. The Naval Group deal agree for a 60% made in Australia workshare. It may be near zero for the new deal. => More costly, less job and no ToT. Good job Morisson.
-The US and UK SSN use a 97% enriched uranium, a nuke uranium grade, when France nuked Barracuda use 7.5% enriched u239. This first deal, if inked, may be the first of a class, making fear of an escalation in all the pacific.
- French SSN Barracuda costs slighly more than 1 Md€. UK Astute costs 1.7 Md£ (ie 1.45 Md€). US Virginia costs 3.5 Md$ (ie 3 Md€) but with a far greater cruise missile capacity.
-Australian parliament discovered AUKUS the same day than President Macron. They all are horrified, even in the same politic camp than Morrison.
France may offer officially and publicly a new deal for the supply of 8 SSN Barracuda on the shelf, the far less costly option, so as to put Morrison in the corner.
www.meta-defense.fr
-The Naval Group deal price increase from 50 Md$ to 90 Md$ because the number of subs grow from 8 to 12 and because the AUstralian $ fall from 15% in the meantime. These informations were hiden to the australian people (that means that the Naval Group bill only increase by 10% from the early beginning...).
-According to all the specialists, the deal for 8 SSN built in Australia will be higher than 100 Md$ !!!
-It is highly possible that Australia will never have the skill to build such complicated weapon. They probably will have to be made in USA or UK. The 100+ Md$ bill will not be partially compensated by social and fiscal revenues. The Naval Group deal agree for a 60% made in Australia workshare. It may be near zero for the new deal. => More costly, less job and no ToT. Good job Morisson.
-The US and UK SSN use a 97% enriched uranium, a nuke uranium grade, when France nuked Barracuda use 7.5% enriched u239. This first deal, if inked, may be the first of a class, making fear of an escalation in all the pacific.
- French SSN Barracuda costs slighly more than 1 Md€. UK Astute costs 1.7 Md£ (ie 1.45 Md€). US Virginia costs 3.5 Md$ (ie 3 Md€) but with a far greater cruise missile capacity.
-Australian parliament discovered AUKUS the same day than President Macron. They all are horrified, even in the same politic camp than Morrison.
France may offer officially and publicly a new deal for the supply of 8 SSN Barracuda on the shelf, the far less costly option, so as to put Morrison in the corner.
Sous-marins : la décision du gouvernement Australien de plus en plus contestée en Australie et aux Etats-Unis
Après une phase d'euphorie parfois malsaine suite à l'annonce de l'annulation de la commande de sous-marins Shortfin Barracuda au profit de sous-marins nucléaires américains ou britanniques et d'une alliance tripartite aux contours flous, de nombreuses voix s'élèvent désormais, en Australie...
www.meta-defense.fr
British defence chief reveals new AUKUS security pact could expand to include other allies
Japan, Canada and New Zealand are flagged by General Sir Nicholas Carter as potential additions to the AUKUS security pact, with the Chief of the Defence Staff saying the partnership was "not designed to be in any way exclusive".
www.abc.net.au
Money was paid and accepted for the Chagos islands and for relocation of the residents. So the ICJ can rule a cat a dog but a sale is still a sale. As regards Hawaii and Guam, I don't hear any residents complaining. Slightly different case in Taiwan.
And what about France ? If it's a wide open alliance, could it be proposed to France too ?
I think they won't dare (lol)
2 millions French people are living in the indo-pacific area though
I think they won't dare (lol)
2 millions French people are living in the indo-pacific area though
Well thats your view, chinese also say the same thing about SCS as well. No one gives a f*** about ICJ. Guess what in another 20 years chinese will do the same to guam or japanese islands.
As for as the money is concerned, yeah I will take your word for it.
Just £12,000 of £40m fund for displaced Chagos islanders has been spent
MP representing most of UK’s Chagossians says failure to use compensation money to help those facing hardship is outrageous