Thank you. Everything we post on twitter is open source.Well why not. After all I got this from a PSU's annual report in public domain.
Ladakh temperature drops to sub-zero, focus shifts to countering Chinese Navy
Indian military planners have decided to give top priority to Eastern Naval Command and island territories of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and Lakshadweep to counter any threat from Chinese PLA Navy
One more Amphibious Brigade Coming up
Ladakh temperature drops to sub-zero, focus shifts to countering Chinese Navy
Indian military planners have decided to give top priority to Eastern Naval Command and island territories of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and Lakshadweep to counter any threat from Chinese PLA Navym.hindustantimes.com
One more Amphibious Brigade Coming up
We will eventually need a full corps, but this is a good start.
Indian Navy: Time To Expand The Geographical Scope Of Mission Based Deployments – Analysis
By Dr. Vijay Sakhuja*The Indian Navy has added a new acronym—TIDE—to its lexicon, which stands for Trust; Interoperability; Domain Awareness; and Enhanced Engagements. In his online address, titled “SAGAR – Charting India’s Maritime Security,” to the National Defence College, India’s Navy Chief, Adm Karambir Singh, emphasised that TIDE is closely linked with Indian Prime Minister Narendera Modi’s vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), an initiate that was announced five years ago in Mauritius.
Adm Singh also alluded to the Indian Navy’s three ‘Lines of Effort’: (a) collaboration and cooperation; (b) enhancing positive influence in the region; and (c) enhancing reach and sustenance in the farthest corners of India’s areas of interest, which resonate with “like-minded maritime nations, and are focused towards pursuance of our overall national and regional maritime objectives.” However, in the same breath, ostensibly referring to China, he was unequivocal that the ‘global commons’ could emerge as ‘contested seas’ threatening free flow of commerce and trade. Addressing this, he argued, necessitates a “pragmatic and outcome based strategy, rather than a purely conceptual.”
Although it is fashionable for militaries to coin acronyms for long or complex formulations for use in their day-to-day operational and administrative functioning, Adm Singh’s acronym, TIDE, embeds three important security discourses—cooperative, convergent, and competitive. These are also echoed in India’s politico-diplomatic thinking and strategic decision-making.
The ‘cooperative’ discourse is led by SAGAR, which motivates states to “conserve and sustainably use the maritime domain, and to make meaningful efforts to create a safe, secure and stable maritime domain.” Its primary focus is on the Indian Ocean, in which India is an important player and has been labelled as the ‘net security provider’. Its contribution to regional grouping such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) etc is worth mentioning.
The ‘convergent’ security discourse is the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), flagged by Prime Minister Modi at the November 2019 East Asia Summit in Bangkok. It is an ‘open global initiative’ and draws on “existing regional cooperation architecture and mechanisms to focus on seven central pillars conceived around Maritime Security; Maritime Ecology; Maritime Resources; Capacity Building and Resource Sharing; Disaster Risk Reduction and Management; Science, Technology and Academic Cooperation; and Trade Connectivity and Maritime Transport.” These are to be achieved by creating partnerships with interested countries. Significantly, India’s vision of the IPOI resonates with Japan’s Free and Open Indo Pacific,which envisages combining two continents (Asia and Africa) and two oceans (Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean); and the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific, which seeks cooperation in a broad range of areas of maritime collaboration, connectivity, UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030, economy etc.
TIDE’s ‘competitive’ discourse is reflected in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) that is associated with the Malabar series of naval exercises, involving India, Japan and the US (which now includes Australia). These fit into New Delhi’s broad understanding of the Indo-Pacific that is centered on China albeit with varying interpretations. Undeniably, the Indo-Pacific is an arena of a power shift (relative and real) and has a bearing on the global security order.
There is ample evidence of competitive security at play in the Indo-Pacific. In particular, the western Pacific Ocean has emerged as the centre of gravity of naval presence, aggressive posturing and maritime/naval infrastructure development. The US has announced the Pacific Deterrence Initiative; has conducted unprecedented multi-carrier operations; and has relentlessly undertaken Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea. China’s navy has responded in equal measure such as by carrier operations; simultaneous naval-air drills in different sea areas; launching DF series ballistic missiles (carrier killers) in the South China Sea; and military intimidation of Taiwan. The Australian and Japanese navies have conducted high end naval exercises. The French navy too is proactively engaged in multilateral naval exercises; the Canadian navy is making its presence in the region; the British Royal Navy has plans for long deployment in the region by its new carrier; and it would not be surprising to see the German navy in the region in the coming future.
Since June 2017, the Indian Navy has engaged in Mission Based Deployments (MBD) for enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness, and its warships, submarines and aircraft have been deployed in the Indian Ocean on near continuous basis for Presence and Surveillance Missions off critical choke points/sea lanes. It is fair to argue that the future of Indo-Pacific security will be determined in the western Pacific. The Indian navy is not new to the western Pacific, given that it has conducted the Malabar naval exercises in the region (off Guam and the Sea of Japan). The MBDs must avoid being labelled as the proverbial ‘frog in the well’ and expand into the western Pacific.
Indian Navy: Time To Expand The Geographical Scope Of Mission Based Deployments – Analysis
By Dr. Vijay Sakhuja* The Indian Navy has added a new acronym—TIDE—to its lexicon, which stands for Trust; Interoperability; Domain Awareness; and Enhanced Engagements. In his online address, titled “SAGAR - Charting India’s Maritime Security,” to the National Defence College, India’s Navy...
www.eurasiareview.com
Sea and Space Power
www.indiandefencereview.com
Sea and Space Power
Alfred Thayer Mahan, eventually an Admiral in the US Navy, is often quoted for saying in 1897, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia. This ocean will be the key to the seven seas in the 21st Century. The destiny of the world will be decided on its waters”. The term ‘Indo-Pacific’...
Indian Navy has to finalize the deal for its Project 75I class submarines and Minesweepers before it focuses on any other platforms. NUH and MH60R will be the next key purchases.
From humble beginnings
The Indian Navy adapted the policy of gradualism in developing autonomous naval design capability. A cadre of three civilian officers and eighteen uniformed naval architects mainly to maintain warships acquired from the Royal Navy was conceived in 1957. Small groups at Naval Headquarters and shipyards monitored and oversaw the construction of small vessels built under license in Indian Shipyards. Design work began with small vessels, mostly yard craft such as tugs, water boats, Landing Crafts (Utility) etc. in the sixties. It was very a modest beginning.
The Navy’s first involvement in major warships was in the construction of Giri Class frigates (RN Leander Class) in collaboration with the British Government and Vickers/Yarrow Shipyards. Officers, supervisors and workmen from Mazagon Docks were trained in Vickers and Yarrow which were building RN Leanders. The RN offered to train one naval architect on Leander hull systems at Director General Ships, Foxhill Bath.
I was fortunate to be nominated for a year’s attachment to the Leander Section at DGS Bath from March 1967 to February 1968. I had to leave my young wife Vijaya and baby daughter behind and stay alone in UK for nearly twelve months. I was reluctant to go but Vijaya persuaded me to accept the assignment, as it was good for my career.
I left for UK in March 1967 and reported at the offices of Admiralty Design Offices, Bath on 27th March. My first encounter was with the chief of security of the establishment, a Mr. Walton.
A suave and handsome James Bond-like character, Walton was manifestly unhappy to see an Indian at DGS Bath. “Particularly since the Indian Navy has ties with the Soviets,” he told me frankly.
“The decision to allow me to work at Bath had been taken at a higher level and the concerned authorities must have considered the implications, “I pointed out politely and gently.
“Just stick strictly to your brief, don’t be unnecessarily inquisitive, and never let me find you in any place where you are not supposed to be” he growled.
“I will fully respect the security regulations, “I assured him.
”I don’t want to see you again the rest of the time in Bath,” was his parting shot.
I made good use of my stay at the Admiralty Design Offices and learned a lot, without treading in any way on security’s toes. The head of the Leander section was a Lieutenant Commander Del Roushorn, a very pleasant and open Canadian. He gave me full freedom to work in the department and free access to all Leander frigate files and drawings. In fact, when a Royal Navy frigate needed to accommodate a new and heavier helicopter, I was given the task of designing the landing platform. I also devised a simple and logical method for saving weight on helicopter deck structures, taking into account the wheel configuration and probable zones where the wheel could touch down on the deck. By just going through the departmental files, I got valuable insights on the criteria for choosing complex equipment and systems like steering gear, fin stabilizers, air conditioning systems etc.
Much of the unclassified but useful information was squirreled away by senior and leading draftsmen who would not share the same with their colleagues. I befriended them by taking pains to discuss with them the subjects of their interest.
One was a cricket buff, who maintained that Surrey was the best county team in all England. The best batsmen, of course, were Jack Hobbs before the war and Peter May after the war, both belonging of course to his beloved Surrey. My interest in the game brought us close. He gave me a lot of useful tips that he would not share with his own countrymen! Another draftsman loved classical music. I would discuss Schubert’s lieder and Verdi’s great arias with him. Soon, they shared a lot of unclassified but useful data with me, that they would not even dream of showing to their own colleagues. In any case, I was not a threat to them. The chief draftsman Arthur Pankhurst wryly commented that Lt. Mohan Ram was literally sucking in information and could photograph data with his eyes!
I wanted to spend some time in the specialist sections, which were the repository of specialized and detailed information. I formally wrote to the authorities seeking their permission and was cleared to spend a week at each section. I made my way through the galleys and laundries section, followed by section dealing with air conditioning and ventilation etc. and finally landed in the sensitive section dealing with shock, vibration and damage calculations.
I scrupulously stuck to data on Leander class frigates but found that people in the adjacent tables were doing studies on the effect of torpedo attacks on Soviet Kynda and Kashin class warships. They were actually doing damage and flooding calculations using Russian blueprints of layouts of latest Soviet warships! Some spook must have risked his neck to smuggle the drawings out of the Soviet Union!.
I was intrigued but made no comment, it was none of my business! One day, Mr. Smithers, the chief constructor in charge of the section who had been on leave, strode into the office. He was apoplectic to see a strange brown man in his section and inquired how I came to be there. When he found that I had come there only after formal clearance, he asked me to take the day off.
As I came to work next day, Mr. Walton summoned me to his office and gave me a fierce dressing down. He reminded me of his express directive to be careful and his desire not to see me before the end of my attachment. And here I was guilty of a security violation. I protested that I had done nothing wrong and had gone to the specialist sections only after formal written clearance. Even if the authorities had made a mistake, I should not have taken advantage of their laxity, he thundered. After that, I was not permitted to go to any other department except the Leander drawing offices and the canteen. I traveled to Glasgow and Southampton to attend or inspection and trials of Leander class ships built in the shipyards. Mercifully, I never met Walton again. No Indian constructor was ever allowed in Bath again. I wonder if Mr. Walton had a role to play in the decision.
More than the big ticket items, the detailed practical information I gathered from experts and poring through files on galleys, laundries, HVAC and equipment cooling systems, steering gear, tests and trials etc. turned out to be extremely useful (real gold) for future ship designs in India, as we had no data base. The data I had painfully copied in my illegible hand in a big fat tome (which I called my Doomsday book) came in very handy during the design of INS Godavari and future ships by my successors. It is rightly said that the devil is in the details.
The fledgling organization I had the privilege of being one of the pioneers, now has over three hundred officers (men and women) and is involved in the design of stealth frigates, aircraft carriers, corvettes and nuclear submarines. It has come a long way from its humble beginnings.
The Indian Navy adapted the policy of gradualism in developing autonomous naval design capability. A cadre of three civilian officers and eighteen uniformed naval architects mainly to maintain warships acquired from the Royal Navy was conceived in 1957. Small groups at Naval Headquarters and shipyards monitored and oversaw the construction of small vessels built under license in Indian Shipyards. Design work began with small vessels, mostly yard craft such as tugs, water boats, Landing Crafts (Utility) etc. in the sixties. It was very a modest beginning.
The Navy’s first involvement in major warships was in the construction of Giri Class frigates (RN Leander Class) in collaboration with the British Government and Vickers/Yarrow Shipyards. Officers, supervisors and workmen from Mazagon Docks were trained in Vickers and Yarrow which were building RN Leanders. The RN offered to train one naval architect on Leander hull systems at Director General Ships, Foxhill Bath.
I was fortunate to be nominated for a year’s attachment to the Leander Section at DGS Bath from March 1967 to February 1968. I had to leave my young wife Vijaya and baby daughter behind and stay alone in UK for nearly twelve months. I was reluctant to go but Vijaya persuaded me to accept the assignment, as it was good for my career.
I left for UK in March 1967 and reported at the offices of Admiralty Design Offices, Bath on 27th March. My first encounter was with the chief of security of the establishment, a Mr. Walton.
A suave and handsome James Bond-like character, Walton was manifestly unhappy to see an Indian at DGS Bath. “Particularly since the Indian Navy has ties with the Soviets,” he told me frankly.
“The decision to allow me to work at Bath had been taken at a higher level and the concerned authorities must have considered the implications, “I pointed out politely and gently.
“Just stick strictly to your brief, don’t be unnecessarily inquisitive, and never let me find you in any place where you are not supposed to be” he growled.
“I will fully respect the security regulations, “I assured him.
”I don’t want to see you again the rest of the time in Bath,” was his parting shot.
I made good use of my stay at the Admiralty Design Offices and learned a lot, without treading in any way on security’s toes. The head of the Leander section was a Lieutenant Commander Del Roushorn, a very pleasant and open Canadian. He gave me full freedom to work in the department and free access to all Leander frigate files and drawings. In fact, when a Royal Navy frigate needed to accommodate a new and heavier helicopter, I was given the task of designing the landing platform. I also devised a simple and logical method for saving weight on helicopter deck structures, taking into account the wheel configuration and probable zones where the wheel could touch down on the deck. By just going through the departmental files, I got valuable insights on the criteria for choosing complex equipment and systems like steering gear, fin stabilizers, air conditioning systems etc.
Much of the unclassified but useful information was squirreled away by senior and leading draftsmen who would not share the same with their colleagues. I befriended them by taking pains to discuss with them the subjects of their interest.
One was a cricket buff, who maintained that Surrey was the best county team in all England. The best batsmen, of course, were Jack Hobbs before the war and Peter May after the war, both belonging of course to his beloved Surrey. My interest in the game brought us close. He gave me a lot of useful tips that he would not share with his own countrymen! Another draftsman loved classical music. I would discuss Schubert’s lieder and Verdi’s great arias with him. Soon, they shared a lot of unclassified but useful data with me, that they would not even dream of showing to their own colleagues. In any case, I was not a threat to them. The chief draftsman Arthur Pankhurst wryly commented that Lt. Mohan Ram was literally sucking in information and could photograph data with his eyes!
I wanted to spend some time in the specialist sections, which were the repository of specialized and detailed information. I formally wrote to the authorities seeking their permission and was cleared to spend a week at each section. I made my way through the galleys and laundries section, followed by section dealing with air conditioning and ventilation etc. and finally landed in the sensitive section dealing with shock, vibration and damage calculations.
I scrupulously stuck to data on Leander class frigates but found that people in the adjacent tables were doing studies on the effect of torpedo attacks on Soviet Kynda and Kashin class warships. They were actually doing damage and flooding calculations using Russian blueprints of layouts of latest Soviet warships! Some spook must have risked his neck to smuggle the drawings out of the Soviet Union!.
I was intrigued but made no comment, it was none of my business! One day, Mr. Smithers, the chief constructor in charge of the section who had been on leave, strode into the office. He was apoplectic to see a strange brown man in his section and inquired how I came to be there. When he found that I had come there only after formal clearance, he asked me to take the day off.
As I came to work next day, Mr. Walton summoned me to his office and gave me a fierce dressing down. He reminded me of his express directive to be careful and his desire not to see me before the end of my attachment. And here I was guilty of a security violation. I protested that I had done nothing wrong and had gone to the specialist sections only after formal written clearance. Even if the authorities had made a mistake, I should not have taken advantage of their laxity, he thundered. After that, I was not permitted to go to any other department except the Leander drawing offices and the canteen. I traveled to Glasgow and Southampton to attend or inspection and trials of Leander class ships built in the shipyards. Mercifully, I never met Walton again. No Indian constructor was ever allowed in Bath again. I wonder if Mr. Walton had a role to play in the decision.
More than the big ticket items, the detailed practical information I gathered from experts and poring through files on galleys, laundries, HVAC and equipment cooling systems, steering gear, tests and trials etc. turned out to be extremely useful (real gold) for future ship designs in India, as we had no data base. The data I had painfully copied in my illegible hand in a big fat tome (which I called my Doomsday book) came in very handy during the design of INS Godavari and future ships by my successors. It is rightly said that the devil is in the details.
The fledgling organization I had the privilege of being one of the pioneers, now has over three hundred officers (men and women) and is involved in the design of stealth frigates, aircraft carriers, corvettes and nuclear submarines. It has come a long way from its humble beginnings.
The author posted this on a fb group im in probably a small piece from his book.So always credit him if u share this somewhere else.
Authors bio: "I am a new member of this group. I am Captain NS Mohan Ram, VSM, Indian Navy (retired). I worked as a naval designer in the Indian Navy for 20 years from 1959 and for five years as head of design of Mazagon Docks Limited for the next five. I graduated from IIT Kharagpur in Naval Architecture in 1958 and did a four year course with the Royal Navy in warship design."
I will share a few more here if u guys like this so do comment
Authors bio: "I am a new member of this group. I am Captain NS Mohan Ram, VSM, Indian Navy (retired). I worked as a naval designer in the Indian Navy for 20 years from 1959 and for five years as head of design of Mazagon Docks Limited for the next five. I graduated from IIT Kharagpur in Naval Architecture in 1958 and did a four year course with the Royal Navy in warship design."
I will share a few more here if u guys like this so do comment
COVER STORY : Building INS Godavari to designing TVS Scooty
This is a forty five year old story of how the Indian Navy went about designing a missile frigate for the first time with meagre manpower and very little data. The information is in the public domain, mostly in the excellent official history of the Indian Navy written by late Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani. I was privileged to play a part in the adventure.)
The Indian naval staff wanted to incorporate surface to surface and surface to air missiles, two Sea King helicopters and greater fire power, and higher speed of 29 knots in the follow on frigates to the Giri class in 1974. The Navy decided to import the missile systems and guns from the Soviet Union and incorporate Western underwater weapons in the ship. Such an exercise of marrying weapons of Soviet and western origin in the same ship had never been tried before. Many doubting Thomases felt that the Indian designers were not capable of designing such a ship.
My boss, Mr. Paramanandhan, Director of Naval Design, a man of extraordinary vision and courage, ventured to take up the task. I was appointed as the project officer for developing the design in late 1974. Quick studies revealed that the ship had to be a good 12 meters longer and displace 600 tons more than the Giri class ships.
Our team consisted of just six officers, two each from construction, engineering and electrical and weapons disciplines. We had a few civilian designers who had come up from the ranks. Our draftsmen were inexperienced and were mostly apprentices trained by us in-house. Never had any navy in the world embarked on a project of that magnitude with such meager resources, inexperienced personnel and a non-existent data base. It was a leap of faith.
As the project in charge, I was assigned the task of coordinating the different disciplines in the design. As the hull specialist, I was also responsible for the lines of the vessel; layout, structural design, propellers, and major systems like air conditioning. We decided to use metric units in the project from the beginning, in line with all other ships designed by the directorate unlike the UK imported ships and Giri class.
When we started we had no data on Soviet weapons and systems. It would take a while before the Navy could finalize an agreement with the Soviets and obtain the data. We started the deck layout, scaling up dimensions from the small photographs of Soviet frigates and missile ships from “Jane’s Fighting Ships”! From a photo of about six inches or so length, we scaled up the locations and clearances for sophisticated missiles, guns and fire control radars and systems. Necessity is the mother of invention was, never truer than the way Indian navy went about this project. It worked well finally!
The Giri class displaced about 3000 tons and had a top speed of about 28 knots. The Naval staff demanded a minimum one knot extra from the ships estimated to displace about 3600 tons and 12.3 meters (40 feet) longer. The Giris were propelled by two steam turbines of 15000 shaft horsepower each. Conventional wisdom would indicate that a bigger and longer ship, designed to go faster, would obviously need more power. Initial idea was that the ship would need about 40000 horsepower and major changes in the power plant. The Navy’s marine engineers wanted to fit gas turbines, an exercise we had never done before. The search was on for a larger power plant. I prepared a number of layouts including a COSAD layout with two steam turbines of 15000 and a central diesel engine driving a CPP, a very messy arrangement. The changes required introduction of major new equipment and total redesign of the machinery spaces, foundations, transmissions and shaft systems.
As the project in charge, I was keen to keep changes from known aggregates to the minimum and to resort to fresh design effort only where essential. In short, we had to design the ship to house new weapons and fire control systems. The hull had to be larger – which meant that we had to have totally new hull systems. Any change in the power plant would entail a total redesign of the ship.
I was doodling on a piece of paper at home on a wet Saturday afternoon, idly wondering what would happen if we powered the new ship with the same power plant- two turbines of fifteen thousand horsepower each. How much would the speed drop? Was there any chance of convincing the naval staff that a small sacrifice in top speed would make the ship more economical and easier to construct?
I did a quick back-of-the envelope calculation to estimate the speed loss. To my utter surprise, the ship did not seem to lose speed at all. On the contrary it would go a full knot faster, at 29 knots – the speed that the naval staff wanted! I checked the numbers again and again and could not find any mistakes in the calculation. I tried other methods for estimating the power required and found that the answer came out the same. I was so excited about my discovery that I could hardly sleep the whole weekend.
I rushed to the office on Monday and announced my discovery. At first, no one believed me. I was greeted with a stony silence and my colleagues thought that I had gone off my head. I could not blame them, as my findings were totally counter-intuitive. I then asked my assistant LCdr Subbiah, a brilliant designer, to check the power requirements and speed independently. He also arrived at the same answer. Mr. Paramanandhan also did not believe me at first. He insisted that a third officer checked the numbers. Lo and behold, the answer was the same. We then realized that we could preserve the power plant of Leander class frigates and meet the naval staff’s requirement for higher speed. That would save design effort and construction time and huge costs.
We could not rest content with our discovery but had to find the reason for the windfall. A detailed analysis showed that below twenty-two knots speed, the larger ship required more power for the same speed as the Leander. At around twenty-two knots, both ships required the same power but above 22 knots, the bigger ship required less power. Again above 31 knots, the bigger vessel again as at a disadvantage compared to the Leander class ships. But happily, at 29 knots plus, the larger ship needed only the same power as the Leander’s s 30000 HP due to crest formation at the stern due to bow and stern wave interference. A happy combination of the laws of hydrodynamics was working to our advantage.
I also discovered that similar phenomena occurred in ‘jumboized’ super tankers lengthened by adding a new mid-section. The elongated tankers carried more crude and sometimes achieved higher speeds! However, as in nature, as in life, there is no free lunch. While we could reach the top speed comfortably with the same engines at the normal cruising speeds, the ship consumed twenty percent more fuel than the Leander. We had to increase the fuel tank capacity of the ship.
My serendipitous discovery enabled us to use the same power plant, gearing, transmission and even propeller as the Leander in the new ships, saving immense design effort and costs. Moreover, Mazagon Docks had experience of construction of six Leander class ships with the same power plant and the learning would help in making engine related erection a lot easier.
We announced our findings to the naval staff. The marine engineering fraternity was up in arms and angrily questioned the validity of my calculations. I stuck to my guns and staked my professional reputation on the accuracy of my calculations. Many meetings ensued, some of them pretty raucous, but we prevailed. The top brass supported me. The Godavari class frigates were designed round existing steam turbine layouts. Full credit goes to the Chief of Naval staff and senior colleagues for reposing faith in a junior officer.
A peculiar problem arose due to the mixture of Soviet and western weapon systems in one ship. The soviet ships use a 380V-3 phase-50 cycle main power supply while the western ships use 440V-3 phase-60 cycles power supply. This demanded that the ship operate two distinct electrical systems. For Soviet weapons and systems, we decided to install two motor alternators of 350 kW each, converting the supplies to 380 V and 50 cycles. This solution of having two distinct power supplies in one warship was unprecedented and highly unorthodox. But we had no choice while combining two differing philosophies of design. This was just one of the many departures from convention in the ship.
An additional 500kW Diesel alternator was added to meet the demand for extra electric power. We installed 3 air conditioning plants of 110 ton capacity instead of two plants of 90-ton capacity, providing a much-needed standby capacity. We also added an extra pair of fin stabilizers over the existing two to reduce rolling motions in the bigger ship. The steering system had to be totally designed anew.
Our lack of experience and non-availability of data turned out to be major assets. We were not constrained by past practice, which often worked against innovations.
The Godavari design group had a great time designing the ship. Each day threw up fresh challenges and problems with exciting solutions. The team worked as an inspired group. When the situation demanded we worked sixteen-hours, days on end continuously. Our designers were young and inexperienced but incredibly committed. The group was working in a fever pitch of self-actualization. The mood was similar to a duet of Ravi Shankar and Ali Akbar khan or a Miles Davis jam session.
Model tests for propulsion and sea keeping of the hull form at National Physical Laboratory in the UK confirmed the estimates. They vindicated my assertion that we could achieve over 29 knots speed in the larger ship with the same power plant. The sea-keeping qualities of the ship were excellent, providing a very stable platform even under rough sea conditions.
Some years later, I spent some exciting, nerve-racking and ultimately satisfying moments on the actual ship during sea trials. Godavari met and exceeded staff requirements.
(I totally left my profession of naval architecture in 1984 when I moved to senior positions in private industry. I have had nothing to do with ships from that date! Two of the Godavari class have been decommissioned! I published the memoirs of my naval career 'My ships sailed the seas but I stayed ashore three years ago. I am happy to see that the fledgling organization I worked far has now become a capable and well-equipped design outfit working on cutting edge design.)
The Indian naval staff wanted to incorporate surface to surface and surface to air missiles, two Sea King helicopters and greater fire power, and higher speed of 29 knots in the follow on frigates to the Giri class in 1974. The Navy decided to import the missile systems and guns from the Soviet Union and incorporate Western underwater weapons in the ship. Such an exercise of marrying weapons of Soviet and western origin in the same ship had never been tried before. Many doubting Thomases felt that the Indian designers were not capable of designing such a ship.
My boss, Mr. Paramanandhan, Director of Naval Design, a man of extraordinary vision and courage, ventured to take up the task. I was appointed as the project officer for developing the design in late 1974. Quick studies revealed that the ship had to be a good 12 meters longer and displace 600 tons more than the Giri class ships.
Our team consisted of just six officers, two each from construction, engineering and electrical and weapons disciplines. We had a few civilian designers who had come up from the ranks. Our draftsmen were inexperienced and were mostly apprentices trained by us in-house. Never had any navy in the world embarked on a project of that magnitude with such meager resources, inexperienced personnel and a non-existent data base. It was a leap of faith.
As the project in charge, I was assigned the task of coordinating the different disciplines in the design. As the hull specialist, I was also responsible for the lines of the vessel; layout, structural design, propellers, and major systems like air conditioning. We decided to use metric units in the project from the beginning, in line with all other ships designed by the directorate unlike the UK imported ships and Giri class.
When we started we had no data on Soviet weapons and systems. It would take a while before the Navy could finalize an agreement with the Soviets and obtain the data. We started the deck layout, scaling up dimensions from the small photographs of Soviet frigates and missile ships from “Jane’s Fighting Ships”! From a photo of about six inches or so length, we scaled up the locations and clearances for sophisticated missiles, guns and fire control radars and systems. Necessity is the mother of invention was, never truer than the way Indian navy went about this project. It worked well finally!
The Giri class displaced about 3000 tons and had a top speed of about 28 knots. The Naval staff demanded a minimum one knot extra from the ships estimated to displace about 3600 tons and 12.3 meters (40 feet) longer. The Giris were propelled by two steam turbines of 15000 shaft horsepower each. Conventional wisdom would indicate that a bigger and longer ship, designed to go faster, would obviously need more power. Initial idea was that the ship would need about 40000 horsepower and major changes in the power plant. The Navy’s marine engineers wanted to fit gas turbines, an exercise we had never done before. The search was on for a larger power plant. I prepared a number of layouts including a COSAD layout with two steam turbines of 15000 and a central diesel engine driving a CPP, a very messy arrangement. The changes required introduction of major new equipment and total redesign of the machinery spaces, foundations, transmissions and shaft systems.
As the project in charge, I was keen to keep changes from known aggregates to the minimum and to resort to fresh design effort only where essential. In short, we had to design the ship to house new weapons and fire control systems. The hull had to be larger – which meant that we had to have totally new hull systems. Any change in the power plant would entail a total redesign of the ship.
I was doodling on a piece of paper at home on a wet Saturday afternoon, idly wondering what would happen if we powered the new ship with the same power plant- two turbines of fifteen thousand horsepower each. How much would the speed drop? Was there any chance of convincing the naval staff that a small sacrifice in top speed would make the ship more economical and easier to construct?
I did a quick back-of-the envelope calculation to estimate the speed loss. To my utter surprise, the ship did not seem to lose speed at all. On the contrary it would go a full knot faster, at 29 knots – the speed that the naval staff wanted! I checked the numbers again and again and could not find any mistakes in the calculation. I tried other methods for estimating the power required and found that the answer came out the same. I was so excited about my discovery that I could hardly sleep the whole weekend.
I rushed to the office on Monday and announced my discovery. At first, no one believed me. I was greeted with a stony silence and my colleagues thought that I had gone off my head. I could not blame them, as my findings were totally counter-intuitive. I then asked my assistant LCdr Subbiah, a brilliant designer, to check the power requirements and speed independently. He also arrived at the same answer. Mr. Paramanandhan also did not believe me at first. He insisted that a third officer checked the numbers. Lo and behold, the answer was the same. We then realized that we could preserve the power plant of Leander class frigates and meet the naval staff’s requirement for higher speed. That would save design effort and construction time and huge costs.
We could not rest content with our discovery but had to find the reason for the windfall. A detailed analysis showed that below twenty-two knots speed, the larger ship required more power for the same speed as the Leander. At around twenty-two knots, both ships required the same power but above 22 knots, the bigger ship required less power. Again above 31 knots, the bigger vessel again as at a disadvantage compared to the Leander class ships. But happily, at 29 knots plus, the larger ship needed only the same power as the Leander’s s 30000 HP due to crest formation at the stern due to bow and stern wave interference. A happy combination of the laws of hydrodynamics was working to our advantage.
I also discovered that similar phenomena occurred in ‘jumboized’ super tankers lengthened by adding a new mid-section. The elongated tankers carried more crude and sometimes achieved higher speeds! However, as in nature, as in life, there is no free lunch. While we could reach the top speed comfortably with the same engines at the normal cruising speeds, the ship consumed twenty percent more fuel than the Leander. We had to increase the fuel tank capacity of the ship.
My serendipitous discovery enabled us to use the same power plant, gearing, transmission and even propeller as the Leander in the new ships, saving immense design effort and costs. Moreover, Mazagon Docks had experience of construction of six Leander class ships with the same power plant and the learning would help in making engine related erection a lot easier.
We announced our findings to the naval staff. The marine engineering fraternity was up in arms and angrily questioned the validity of my calculations. I stuck to my guns and staked my professional reputation on the accuracy of my calculations. Many meetings ensued, some of them pretty raucous, but we prevailed. The top brass supported me. The Godavari class frigates were designed round existing steam turbine layouts. Full credit goes to the Chief of Naval staff and senior colleagues for reposing faith in a junior officer.
A peculiar problem arose due to the mixture of Soviet and western weapon systems in one ship. The soviet ships use a 380V-3 phase-50 cycle main power supply while the western ships use 440V-3 phase-60 cycles power supply. This demanded that the ship operate two distinct electrical systems. For Soviet weapons and systems, we decided to install two motor alternators of 350 kW each, converting the supplies to 380 V and 50 cycles. This solution of having two distinct power supplies in one warship was unprecedented and highly unorthodox. But we had no choice while combining two differing philosophies of design. This was just one of the many departures from convention in the ship.
An additional 500kW Diesel alternator was added to meet the demand for extra electric power. We installed 3 air conditioning plants of 110 ton capacity instead of two plants of 90-ton capacity, providing a much-needed standby capacity. We also added an extra pair of fin stabilizers over the existing two to reduce rolling motions in the bigger ship. The steering system had to be totally designed anew.
Our lack of experience and non-availability of data turned out to be major assets. We were not constrained by past practice, which often worked against innovations.
The Godavari design group had a great time designing the ship. Each day threw up fresh challenges and problems with exciting solutions. The team worked as an inspired group. When the situation demanded we worked sixteen-hours, days on end continuously. Our designers were young and inexperienced but incredibly committed. The group was working in a fever pitch of self-actualization. The mood was similar to a duet of Ravi Shankar and Ali Akbar khan or a Miles Davis jam session.
Model tests for propulsion and sea keeping of the hull form at National Physical Laboratory in the UK confirmed the estimates. They vindicated my assertion that we could achieve over 29 knots speed in the larger ship with the same power plant. The sea-keeping qualities of the ship were excellent, providing a very stable platform even under rough sea conditions.
Some years later, I spent some exciting, nerve-racking and ultimately satisfying moments on the actual ship during sea trials. Godavari met and exceeded staff requirements.
(I totally left my profession of naval architecture in 1984 when I moved to senior positions in private industry. I have had nothing to do with ships from that date! Two of the Godavari class have been decommissioned! I published the memoirs of my naval career 'My ships sailed the seas but I stayed ashore three years ago. I am happy to see that the fledgling organization I worked far has now become a capable and well-equipped design outfit working on cutting edge design.)
Malabar exercise reassures our commitment to a free, inclusive Indo-Pacific region: Top Naval officer MS Pawar
New Delhi: The ongoing Malabar exercise in the Indian Ocean region between Indian, US, Australian and Japanese warships shows the readiness for combat and interoperability of maritime forces, and also reassures the international community of the commitment of the countries for an inclusive Indo-Pacific, the deputy chief of Indian Navy said on Friday.“‘Malabar 2020’ helps us show our combat readiness, interoperability and ability to tackle challenges in the maritime domain. It also reassures the international community of our commitment to a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based Indo-Pacific,” Vice Adrimal MS Pawar said.
Phase 2 of the Malabar exercise commenced on Tuesday in the Northern Arabian Sea with the participation of Indian Navy aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, US aircraft carrier USS Nimitz along with other Indian, American, Australian and Japanese warships participating in the wargames.
On Friday, MiG-29Ks of the Indian Navy and F-18s of US Navy carried out simulated attacks on the surface targets during the multilateral naval exercise. The MiG-29s operated from the INS Vikramaditya.
The Phase-2 of the 24th edition of the multilateral Malabar Naval Exercise culminates today.
On Thursday, the Malabar exercise saw a high tempo of fighter jet operations from the decks of the two participating aircraft carriers – INS Vikramaditya and USS Nimitz.
“MiG 29K’s of the Indian Navy and the F-18 of the US Navy flew along with the Indian Navy’s maritime patrol aircraft P-8I and the USN AEW aircraft E2C Hawkeye in seamless coordination,” the Indian naval command said yesterday.
Malabar exercise reassures our commitment to a free, inclusive Indo-Pacific region: Top Naval officer MS Pawar
Phase 2 of the Malabar exercise commenced on Tuesday in the Northern Arabian Sea with the participation of Indian Navy aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and US aircraft carrier USS Nimitz.
At some point in the future, Indian Navy should pursue building 2 sets of 6-12 missile boats for the purposes of Land Attack and Anti Ship roles. From a tonnage perspective it need not be more than 1500 - 2000 tons. The Land attack ships should be loaded with 16 - 32 Nirbhay missiles and 16-32 VL-SRSAMs while the Anti Ship role boats should carry 16-32 Bhramos missiles and 16-32 VL-SRSAMs. Depending on the number of these missiles, we may end up having around 8 Barak 8 missiles as well.