Whilst Trappier refers to the 114 Indian Rafales as a contract due to be signed before the end of 2026, and goes on to say that he is still hoping for further contracts in India, this suggests that he no longer views India as merely an export customer, but as the Rafale’s second sustainable industrial pillar after France. India had already entered into high-level aerospace cooperation with France, whilst the UAE has ordered 80 Rafales; they are therefore the two most natural foreign partners for the economic expansion of the Rafale ecosystem.
Rafale F5 under French control
France retains control of the overall architecture, sovereign functions, sensitive electronic warfare systems, the nuclear component and the management of future upgrades. However, India and the UAE could finance or co-develop certain exportable components:
- engines and power upgrades;
- sensors and optronics;
- sovereign data links;
- tactical artificial intelligence;
- new weaponry;
- escort drones;
- simulation and collaborative combat infrastructure.
This fits perfectly with the doctrine set out by Trappier: cooperation is possible, but with a single architect, responsibilities based on expertise, and no paralysing co-governance.
Formation of a ‘Rafale F5 club’
India would simultaneously contribute:
- significant volume;
- a production line;
- engineering capabilities;
- demanding operational requirements in the face of China and Pakistan;
- the prospect of a significant volume of aircraft in the long term.
The UAE, on the other hand, would contribute:
- funding;
- a modern fleet of 80 aircraft;
- high operational demands;
- experience with American and French systems;
- potentially investments in drones, AI and weaponry.
The roles would therefore not be identical. India would be the potential industrial partner; the UAE would be more of a financial partner, a partner specialising in specific technologies and a launch customer.
Then, a gateway to the future French aircraft
Participating in the F5 programme would be a way for these countries to build credibility before seeking a place in the future French NGF programme.
But Trappier would likely set a very clear boundary. They could become partners in the programme, without becoming co-designers of the aircraft. In other words:
French prime contractor + international funding + allocated technology packages + guaranteed contracts
India would be much more than just a financial backer
India has an advantage that potential European partners do not necessarily have: it can guarantee a large domestic market.
If the 114 are added to the IAF’s 36 Rafales and the 26 Rafale Marines, India would already have 176 Rafales, even before the subsequent orders mentioned by Trappier. It could then, in the long term, become the leading operator of the Rafale alongside France, depending on the pace of deliveries and future French orders.
And the additional contracts could cover:
- a second batch for the Air Force;
- more Rafale Marine aircraft;
- the gradual replacement of other Indian fleets;
- the combat drone associated with the F5;
- and an export version of the future French aircraft.
Under these circumstances, it makes sense to offer India a stake in the development, because it would not merely be funding the design studies: it would provide the production volumes needed to recoup the programme’s costs
A major challenge: India’s demands for self-reliance
The sticking point will be the sharing of technology and design authority. India will probably want to:
- carry out a large proportion of production on its own territory;
- integrate certain indigenous weapons systems;
- have autonomy over maintenance and upgrades;
- gain access to more technical data;
- employ its own design offices.
Dassault may accept a very extensive localisation of the industrial system, but certainly not relinquish control over the aerodynamic configuration and overall architecture. The compromise could be the one Trappier describes for the nEUROn: an undisputed prime contractor and partners responsible for complete sub-assemblies corresponding to their actual areas of expertise.
As regards Ukraine, as of 1 July 2026, the Gripen is no longer merely a proposal: on 30 June 2026, Saab signed a contract for 16 Gripen E aircraft, worth approximately 24.6 billion Swedish kronor, with deliveries scheduled for 2029–2030. Gripen C/D aircraft are also due to arrive earlier.
As for the Rafale, the matter is still at an earlier stage legally, but is far more serious than a mere rumour. In November 2025, France and Ukraine signed a declaration paving the way for the acquisition of up to 100 Rafale F4s by 2035, complete with armaments, radars and the possibility of local manufacturing in Ukraine. In March 2026, Zelensky announced that advance payments were being prepared for both the Gripen and the Rafale.
The previous Gripen deal illustrates precisely the possible sequence:
- letter of intent → European financing solution → deposit → firm contract
The Rafale could follow the same path, albeit with a delay due to its cost, the industrial burden on Dassault and the need to put together a more substantial financing package.
Ukraine could become not only an additional Rafale customer, but a major European partner in the Rafale F5 programme, with:
- a potential requirement of up to 100 aircraft;
- exceptional combat experience against Russian air defences;
- a genuine aerospace and missile industry;
- advanced expertise in drones, electronic warfare, communications and the rapid adaptation of weaponry;
- strong justification for receiving European defence funding.
Ukraine could contribute very substantial technological expertise, particularly in escort drones, long-range effectors, resilient tactical links and operational feedback.
One could therefore envisage a credible core:
- France: architecture and project management
- Greece: nEUROn structures and experience
- Ukraine: drones, electronic warfare, weapon systems and combat feedback
Then, outside the European framework:
- India and the UAE: production volumes, funding and targeted industrial cooperation
Ukraine is even potentially significant in this arrangement for securing European funding, as its involvement would undermine the argument that the programme is being artificially ‘Europeanised’. With France, Greece and Ukraine, this would genuinely be a European programme bringing together a lead designer, a former industrial partner of the nEUROn, and the country with the most up-to-date operational experience of high-intensity air warfare.
From an industrial perspective, the available information indicates that around 90 to 96 of the 114 aircraft would be manufactured or assembled in India, depending on the formula ultimately adopted, with the remainder being delivered directly from France. An Indian final assembly line is being considered, with a gradual increase in local subcontracting; Safran has also declared itself ready to set up an M88 engine assembly line in India.
Above all, the industrial infrastructure is already being established independently of the 114-aircraft contract:
- Tata is set to manufacture complete sections of the Rafale fuselage in India, including for global markets, with an announced capacity of up to two fuselages per month;
- DRAL in Nagpur is already developing a fully-fledged Dassault supply chain centred on the Falcon;
- the proposed Indian Rafale production line is sometimes estimated to have a potential capacity of around 24 aircraft per year.
India would therefore likely be keen to produce beyond its own requirements. It is specifically seeking to become an aerospace export hub, not merely a workshop tasked with fulfilling a domestic order.
Two complementary production lines
An arrangement of this type could be achieved:
- France → French aircraft, highly sensitive aircraft, first export models, F5s and development
- India → Indian orders, certain export orders, fuselages and sub-assemblies for the entire fleet
This would free up the French production line for French, Emirati, Ukrainian or European orders, whilst allowing India to take on other customers with Dassault’s agreement.
The Indian production line would therefore not merely be a means of fulfilling the ‘Make in India’ initiative. It would become a second industrial source for the Rafale.
The real constraints would be political and contractual
India would not be able to freely sell Rafales in the same way it would sell a domestically produced aircraft. Dassault and the French government would likely retain control over:
- the configuration;
- sensitive software;
- sovereign equipment;
- export licences;
- and final certification.
However, there is nothing to prevent a Rafale intended for a third country from being assembled in India, using French engines, radars and equipment, or those produced under French supervision.
This is already implicitly included in the Dassault–Tata agreement: Indian production of fuselages is intended for India and other global markets.
Implications for Ukraine
This makes the prospect of a large Ukrainian order much less of an obstacle. The first aircraft could come from France or be drawn from a priority production line, whilst subsequent batches could be partly produced in India.
One could even envisage, in the long term:
- France: development and final integration
- India: large-scale production
- Ukraine: heavy maintenance, operational adaptations and drones
In this scenario, the 114 Indian Rafales would not necessarily tie up Dassault’s capacity: on the contrary, they would justify the creation of additional industrial capacity that would enable the company to serve other markets.
This is also why Trappier can hope for further Indian contracts beyond the 114. Once a production line capable of handling around twenty aircraft per year is in place, it becomes economically sensible to maintain it with:
- additional Indian batches;
- the Indian Navy’s requirements;
- modernisation programmes;
- and possibly aircraft intended for export.
India could then become for the Rafale what Italy or Japan are expected to become for the GCAP: not merely a customer, but a major industrial production hub — with Dassault, however, retaining control over the product’s architecture and development.
Russia is gradually ceasing to be a credible aerospace supplier for the region. Sanctions, support difficulties, the priority given to Russian requirements and the loss of equipment in Ukraine are causing lasting damage to the Russian offering. A recent analysis even estimates that the war has virtually eliminated Russia as a viable arms supplier in South-East Asia.
This opens up opportunities for France and India.
Indonesia has already joined the Rafale ecosystem with 42 aircraft and began taking delivery of its first planes in 2026. It could further increase its order.
Malaysia and the Philippines present greater challenges, as their budgets are smaller and they are also considering lighter solutions such as the FA-50. But their need for fleet renewal is very real, and regional military modernisation is accelerating rapidly. The Philippines, in particular, has embarked on a particularly significant multi-year modernisation programme.
But precisely because of this, the Rafale fits well with this culture of non-alignment. It allows countries to purchase a high-performance Western aircraft without becoming entirely dependent on the United States. This is probably its major commercial advantage in the region: replacing the Russian offering without imposing the political and IT dependence associated with the F-35.
Thus, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines could gradually become a second Asian ‘Rafale arc’, complementing India, even if Indonesia is currently the only truly established pillar.
