Upgrade? For where?
Are you aware of why Mirage and Mig-29 Upgrade is delayed for so many years?
Import tradition? Why is it there? Take a wild guess!
India - Pakistan Standoff 2019
- Thread starter nair
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Upgrade? For where?
Are you aware of why Mirage and Mig-29 Upgrade is delayed for so many years?
Import tradition? Why is it there? Take a wild guess!
Given the cryptic acronyms he uses, I wouldn't be surprised if its Falcon moonlighting on Twitter.
Oi hoi hoi hoi...............
Bangladesh ups ante on Pakistan; demands UN recognition for 1971 genocide
Bangladesh ups ante on Pakistan; demands UN recognition for 1971 genocide
@Nilgiri I believe this is what you were talking about.
--“It is time for India to use its economic strength to deter such things happening in the future,” government sources said.
Swedish Awacs in focus again after PAF used it against India
--“It is time for India to use its economic strength to deter such things happening in the future,” government sources said.
Swedish Awacs in focus again after PAF used it against India
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From the Russians of course. And the upgrades can come in during overhauls from 2015 onwards. Too late now, we have to stick with the current MKI upgrade plan. But I hope they do something about future platforms.
You can blame HAL as much as you want. But you need to start the process first and then HAL can be blamed later for delays.
I don't mind the imports, in fact I support them. What I'm complaining about is the IAF's inability to bring in upgrades quickly for their existing platforms.
Do you remember an old conversation we had, with regards to Ajai Shukla's article and the upgrade of the P-8I? The article pointed out that P-8As bought by other export customers also bought the upgrades as they came in. You said it was a lack of proper decision making. I pointed out that since we are going to keep ordering more P8s, we will be buying the upgrades along with the new orders. So, the IN is keeping abreast with new technologies and are now upgrading their older P-8s along with 4 new upgraded P-8s. So IN received their first P-8 in 2012 and are now upgrading it just a few years later. But look at the IAF, they got the Phalcon in 2009, but there's still be no talk about upgrading the first 3 along with the purchase of the following 2. If the IN can upgrade quickly, why can't the IAF? So it's not a problem from the MoD's end.
I find it very weird that the IAF does not follow through with extensive upgrades for their existing platforms frequently. Especially for aircraft like the MKIs which are bought in the hundreds. The French buy their Rafales in tranches, and each tranche comes with extensive upgrades.
Latest pravachan by Baba
Real game is starting now...It may take few days, few weeks or few months to conclude...But not more than 6 month.. And yes...When it will be on extreme... I would not be here.. When crop would be ready....I will have to go for safer collection of grains.
Real game is starting now...It may take few days, few weeks or few months to conclude...But not more than 6 month.. And yes...When it will be on extreme... I would not be here.. When crop would be ready....I will have to go for safer collection of grains.
Try and match it with timelines I gave about the best time to strike Pakistan. It seems we have fully operationalised the BMD for our major cities and also networked all our missile defences in one single network.
If we have to go by what was posted by Gokhale, the 27th PAF strike was handled from ground and not from AWACS. This means that even AWACS were being used as a sensor and feeding info to our highly secure and networked ADCC-Air Defence Control Center coupled with ADDC-Air Defence Direction Center,
When it will be on extreme... I would not be here.. When crop would be ready....I will have to go for safer collection of grains.
Extreme - when the seperation is over and establishment of new states formation begins - Balochistan, Sindhu Desh, KPK and absorption of POK in India
Crop ready - the WMDs have been identified, located and secured
Safer collection of grains - Collection and disposal of the WMDs
A good rebuttal of sekhar gupta's article.
An article with an agenda
by KaranM
Post the successful Balakot operation, F-16 shoot down by IAF MIg21 and subsequent safe return of Wing Co Abhinandan Varthaman, the Modi Government has definitely been on a high as far as its scores on national security are concerned. During any other time this increase in acceptance for the Govt would have been left to pass by the opposition however, with the elections round the corner, it certainly looks like those who dislike the current Govt have decided to portray the events at Balakot and thereafter in a jaundiced light by deliberately downplaying the capabilities of the Indian Air Force.
We need to see the following article by the author in this light. In my opinion, the article at best is written out of ignorance and at worst is playing to a particular political gallery, by twisting all the facts. The first part of this article debunks all the claimed, deep insights made by Gupta while the second part looks into all the half truths that appear to further an agenda, so as to water down the Modi Government's Rafale purchase by linking it to claimed missteps done by a prior NDA Govt.
Furthermore, the author's claims are fundamentally at odds with actual details of how air operations proceed and his whimsical or otherwise, claims do grave discredit to the air warriors of the IAF, who pulled off an understated, yet incredible achievement against the PAF's counter-strike attempt. Hence, they merit a reply.
Following information is gleaned across all available articles which includes articles by AVM A. Subramaniam (Retd) and also from leaked MoD accounts to the other members of the lay press, who unlike Gupta (who has neither a science degree nor a clue about aeronautics, he graduated from school of communication studies Punjab as mentioned in wiki) are far more credible. Now to the assessment of the article and what most likely happened
The author says the PAF had created superiority and surprise, while IAF AWAC crews were switching duties; we can only marvel at the oversimplification and the regurgitation of the Israel attack on Egypt modus operandi. The fact is we were expecting an attack and given the terrain there were blind spots which the PAF took advantage of and came closer which is when they were detected by the Netras and Phalcons, and likely even other Ground Based radars sited by the IAF to take care of the terrain blind spots. Going by the IAF response the PAF was neither able to create any technological superiority nor achieve any creative surprise, it just took cover of the mountains to reach as close possible to the LOC and then exploit any momentary tactical weakness on the part of the IAF, which to their credit, the IAF did not display. The PAF was however, able to create numerical superiority but was unable to exploit it which only goes to show their tactics, technology or skill were lacking, or even all three. While that is about the PAF, judging by this article, I am certain the author lacks all three.
Coming to the next gem in his article, he states that PAF F-16s creatively surprised the IAF fleet and fired AMRAAMs on the Su-30MKIs. This apparently was some sort of victory for the PAF which we should all be collectively worried about.
Basic 101 tactics in fighter school, available via 100's of accounts over the years, clearly teaches pilots to not be an Arnold in Terminator (spraying belts of ammo) but fire only when the enemy is in your definite kill zone, otherwise be prepared to waste your valuable missile rounds. The author makes a virtue of the PAF pilots lack of skill or fire discipline in having launched multiple AMRAAM rounds without merit. Now reverting back to the author's insightful assertion that the SU-30MKIs were outgunned and outranged I want to paraphrase what AVM A. Subramaniam (Retd) wrote in his detailed account, which of course he cannot openly credit as that of the IAF's but subsequent accounts all bear out how closely the actual events mimicked the details mentioned in the article.
As AVM Subramaniam (Retd) notes, out of 4 available Su-30s, two Su-30s were at the limits of their endurance. So in effect, the remaining 2 Su-30s stayed on in the fight, and took on several times their number. We are told by Gupta that the radar/weapons control/missile were outmatched. Lets look at this entire set in more detail, to understand how ludicrous his claims really are.
The first fact, is that the Su-30s radar is far more powerful than the APG-68 V(9) on the F-16s, quite easily compensating for the size difference between the two fighters in terms of radar cross section, and in Red Flag and several other multinational exercises, and in-house IAF exercises all with jammers, the Bars radar has held up well, in training mode itself. (Reference circa 2008 https://www.livefistdefence.com/2008/11 ... -hand.html). Considering the fact that the central sensor of the Sukhoi, its radar … held up just fine in training mode …despite the barrage of electronic jamming augurs well for the Indian Air Force. Note that a decade back itself, the then version of the Bars radar which was subsequently upgraded in 2012, acquitted itself well against some of the most sophisticated electronic warfare units available at Nellis AFB during the famed Red Flag exercises.
Subsequently, the Su-30s have matched up in Beyond Visual Range fights against F-16s, F-15s, Rafales, Mirage 2000s, Eurofighters, Tornado F.3 ADVs and have acquitted themselves credibly, in several cases coming out ahead. Never mind, the IAF has heavily evaluated the fighter against what it itself possesses. So here we have the foundation of the Su-30 weapons system as being well established. Clearly, the radar and its weapons control system work well.
Also, the Su-30 pilots have RVV-AE missiles which match the AMRAAMs in range. Unlike the Pakistani pilots though, they didn't fire their missiles "blind" and waited for a proper, high probability of kill shot, while maneuvering to dodge the PAF AMRAAMs.
Now in which idiotic world, does this series of events, translate to the Su-30s being "outranged and outgunned". At this point, we must pity the author's lack of knowledge when it comes to how BVR combat works.
BVR combat is quite complex, but can be summarized as being about denying the enemy's weaponry any chance of a kill while maneuvering to land a decisive shot. If anything, the IAF pilots played the BVR game perfectly. They out maneuvered, decoyed the AMRAAMs, & kept the air defence F-16s engaged, allowing time for Bisons to bounce the strike F-16s, even as they (the Su-30s) prevented the air defence F-16s from shooting down the Bisons in BVR. The Su-30s played to their strengths, their endurance for instance.
If Abhinandan's MiG-21 was lost, it was when he was firmly out of coverage of his wingmen and the Su-30 fleet, and there are high chances that even his aircraft was not lost to an AMRAAM shot but may have suffered an engine failure due to debris ingestion from the exploding F-16. A good reason for this to happen, is if his separation from the F-16 he was chasing was not substantial, even as it "ate" his R-73E missile. Do we all remember the manner in which Flt Lt Kambampati Nachiketa Rao was lost at Kargil in 1999 and how the Pakistani lay press were quick to claim him as one of their victories? Subsequently, it turned out it was the exhaust gas from his rockets firing (the MiG-27 carried rocket pods for strike), which disturbed his engine's airflow causing it to cut out.
Furthermore, active missiles like AMRAAM are hounds which go after the target/s in the vicinity once un-caged, they would not differentiate between a F-16 or a Bison, as the role of the Identification Friend or Foe in the fire control radar was over once the missile was generally launched at the Bison. But with the F-16 nearby, the chances of a friendly fire incident would be very high. Again, would the PAF pilots be so blase? Only detailed post mission analysis by the IAF can provide more information.
Now, lets get back to the Su-30 MKIs weapon control system, the WCS computes when a reasonable shot is possible based on available weaponry. Clarifying the topic further, active missiles work in 2 modes. Lock on before launch, lock on after launch. The latter is what competent fighter pilots would prefer. The on-board radars guide the missiles in via datalink, the seeker turns on at the last moment, to give jammers minimum time to work or countermeasures to be triggered. However, you can also launch the missile in the general direction of the target, with location cues from your radar & then *hope* it picks up the target. Especially if you are manouevering and can't guide the missile in. This is what the PAF pilots likely did. Either that, or their fire control radar/datalink combination just couldn't guide the missiles in towards the IAF Sukhois.
Now piecing together the sequence of events. The Su-30 pilots learnt that the PAF pilots were firing their missiles at them, were likely out of effective range , i.e. the missiles no-escape zone, and without proper guidance, unable to guide but the missiles remained a threat because of the fact they can lock on after launch. They too could have retaliated. The Su-30s radar+ computer + missile combination would give an effective firing solution only when their missiles would be effective or the pilots could choose to launch outside optimal parameters! Unlike the PAF pilots, the Su-30 pilots did not waste their missiles by salvo-ing their ARH missiles in turn as the F-16 pilots did. Instead, they focused on defeating the PAF missile threat and constantly looking for an optimal firing solution on the F-16s in turn, which was the correct thing to do. They kept aware of the tactical situation via either via own radar, own data links or warned by IAF controllers.
The IAF press release notes that "the Su-30s took correct tactical measures to defeat the AMRAAM threat". A terse, and succinct way of explaining what happened without getting bogged down in classified details. We also know what happened thereafter, as what AVM Subramaniam notes. None of the LGB strikes by the strike F-16s worked. They hightailed it back, without guiding their munitions in. Remember, unlike the movies, these fancy LGBs, etc require a steady platform, and careful designation by either onboard or off board laser guidance pods. Yet, these careful launch parameters were not met.
Why did that happen if not for the fact, that with Bisons headed their way, the strike F-16s just had to break off. Their allocated protectors, the air defence F-16s remained engaged with the Su-30s who remained in the fight. The Su-30s had their radars active, were still in the game and the air defence F-16 pilots knew the clear and potent danger the Sukhoi's represented.
Heavy fighters like the Su-30 are apex predators, and with their large radar, missile, range combination can afford to wait for their chance, a chance the F-16 pilots decided not to risk and left the area as fast as they could, once the strike F-16s returned from the incursion.
We know that all AMRAAMs fired at Su-30s missed which leaves us with the following conclusions:
1. The F-16 radars could not guide the missiles after launch, because they were either jammed or the fighters were maneuvering to avoid the Su-30 radars. In conclusion, Su-30s held off a larger force of F-16s in BVR mode.
2. AMRAAM missiles could not get a lock-on to the Su-30s. So either their initial cues were hopelessly wrong (see the above point), or they were jammed/defeated by Su-30 countermeasures/maneuvering. Either way, the Su-30s defeated the AMRAAMs.
In short, let alone being outranged and outgunned. The Su-30s held off a much larger number of F-16s and defeated their prized silver bullets, the AMRAAMs. Even as of this moment, suffice to say, there would be much angst in the PAF about how & why their tactics failed, how a small force of Su-30s held off their F-16s, how their carefully husbanded stocks of AMRAAMs didn't work the way they were meant to, and why the F-16s could not land any decisive win against the Su-30s. The DG (ISPR)'s crowing is for the public consumption of their "awaam" who see the PAF as some mythical crusaders against the infidel. Reality though bites, and it would be biting the PAF AHQ planners as they consider the bleak outcome of their mass deployment of AMRAAMs against what was thought to be an unprepared and outnumbered foe.
They will also be keenly aware that the Astra, a missile which is superior to the RVV-AE in specifications set by the IAF, and which it has reportedly met, is on the verge of induction in the Su-30 MKI fleet. Unlike the Pakistanis with their US supplied C-5 model AMRAAMs, India can fine tune and program its Astra missiles to the latest ECCM standards and continue to develop it further.
Next, the author also claims that the surprised and outnumbered IAF scrambled 6 MiG21s from Srinagar and Awantipur. What a phrase. "Surprised and outnumbered", as if the IAF were suddenly caught off guard and panicked. The IAF didn't scramble MiG-21s because it was "surprised and outnumbered". It did so, because that's what the Standard Operating Procedure(SOP) dictates when any OpFor has to be countered. The number of assets surged into the fight depend on the OpFor. MiG-21s have time on station for anywhere from 30 mins to 45 mins. They are short radius, point defense interceptors. They are kept on "hot readiness" and not long endurance CAP. Six decades of the MiG-21 in service or thereabouts, and yet the celebrated reporter doesn't even know how the IAF uses them.
Then, we then have the author implying the Mica is equivalent to the AMRAAM. And this was the magic behind the Mirages becoming superior or equivalent to the F-16s. Sure, the Mica has its pros and cons and even comes in the IIR (Imaging Infra red) flavor allowing for some real sneaky tactics, but that's not his claim. His claim is about range. A Mica hit a non maneuvering target in Taiwanese AF exercises several years back at around 60km. It's well recognized, that the Mica missile is outranged by the RVV-AE which the Su-30s carry and the AMRAAM the F-16s carry in terms of raw range. The longer range usually translates into longer engagement ranges overall, considering rough parity in terms of other aspects such as seeker performance (which is usually classified but all 3 countries US, France, Russia field robust electronics teams).
So, bottom line, the Su-30s have a longer stick than the Mirage 2000. When it comes to Mirage against the F-16, the range advantage in AMRAAM capability would remain with the F-16, with EW capability remaining the decider in whether a proper fire control solution would be found or not or AMRAAMs would be fired blind as in the above case. The Mica is certainly capable, but unlike what the author claims, it is not some magic answer which would scare the PAF F-16s away. Make them wary, certainly. But much the same as the mix of the missiles on the Su-30.
The final ludicrous claim is "Mirage 2000's locked on to some of the PAF planes". Mirage 2000's don't need to lock on for Mica. They fire from Track While Scan mode. Same as the Sukhois with their RVV-AE missiles. Lock-on (i.e. constant illumination of the target leading to a RWR alert, is only required for Super530D and AA-10 missile attacks or AIM-7 Sparrow missiles). In reality, the moment, the PAF pilots got an indication on their RWR that a Mirage 2000 or a Su-30 radar had "repeatedly swept" them, they would have been wary (and engaging countermeasures as necessary), knowing that it could well be sufficient for a missile attack which they'd keep an eye out for. The point though which the AVM makes of the Mirages superiority vis a vis the JF-17 needs to be understood. Its that despite engaging countermeasures, the JF-17/Mirage fleet still felt at threat. They continued to get "painted" by radar. Mark that as a plus for the superb equipment on the upgraded Mirages.
Overall conclusion: authors claims don't stand up to any data re: air warfare or even common sense.
Debunking the political overtones
Lets now explore a possible, reason behind this hare brained article. If the author is engaged in so much speculation, we might as well. The author's thesis in this case is that had the Vajpayee Govt agreed for Mirage2000 upgrade in 2001 this situation wouldn't have arisen. The technical argument towards this agenda has anyways been debunked above, now lets check the timing. This article curiously appears after Modi says that had the congress not taken 10 long years to decide on MMRCA and had we had Rafale this situation wouldn't have happened and the IAF continues to openly support the Rafale acquisition. So in effect, the author tries to pin the blame for the situation on a NDA predecessor, i.e. Shri Vajpayee and not on the lame and inept UPA Govt that ruled for 10 long years (it decided on the Rafale and in 2014 publicly stated that they didn't have the money to buy it). The whole thesis has nothing to do with the Su-30s and the technology that we have because the story here is of selling the Mirage 2000 as the IAF savior which the BJP i.e. Vajapyee scuttled and this story emerges, the moment Modi alludes to the Rafale missing in the IAF force structure. The author is entitled to his views, as we are to our view on him mixing fact and fiction to push a flawed thesis!
The same Su-30s which held up against one NATO AF after another, are suddenly useless because they don't fit the narrative, that only the Mirage will do, never mind its Mica's are even further outranged by the AMRAAMs and its radar is a fraction of the Su-30's in power aperture and in IAF exercises against the French AF, the French praised the performance of the Su-30 MKI, plus the serious and calm demeanour of the IAF pilots. Net, each aircraft has its pros and cons, and the Mirage is still a very dangerous and potent aircraft. It has arguably the most versatile mix of weaponry in the fleet matched only by the Su-30 MKI. Yet, to push a story, its just lousy behavior to decry the capabilities of one platform whilst selectively playing up another. IAF deterrence is built on a sum of all its parts.
To appear balanced the author cruelly strings AK Anthony out to dry. His personal mistakes apart, he was part of a system and why didn't the system correct the claimed NDA mistake and purchase the Mirage 2000-V post haste, by cancelling the MMRCA contest? No answer there either.
Weirdly, the author also makes an assertion that the current Govt realizing the danger went ahead and bought a few MICA missiles (like Sivakasi Diwali rockets are available in the market) and slung them onto the Mirage2000 and also foolishly flew close to the border for Pakistan to flaunt their new "biceps". Nothing can be farther from the truth in this case. 450 MICAs were bought as part of the Mirage2000 deal by the UPA itself to upgrade it to Mirage2000I standards in 2012, weren't bought overnight and there is no rocket science here that the 2000I upgrade has been slow and has been progressing with HAL as the lead partner. There was also a press release in 2016 where IAF had mentioned that they had tested this missile from the upgraded Mirage2000, and it hardly undertook any unprofessional stunt of flying close to the border with Mica's under slung hoping for a PAF F-16 to come by with binoculars, detect it had Micas and then fly back to report this earth shattering information to PAF AHQ.
Coming to how many Mirage2000s were upgraded, we are told this too is secret. The author knows this, but he is reluctant to tell us. Well, we know from news reports that 6 in number had been upgraded by 2019, as versus 21 planned, apart from the ones delivered by France itself. HAL blames the tardy receipt of upgrade kits from France. Leaving aside the finger pointing, the fact remains this is widely known news. Again, the authors, wink-nod-nudge claim of possessing some secret awareness of the state of the Mirage upgrade is anything but factual.
That apart the author willfully forgets that the MICA missiles had been ordered in 2012 during the UPA regime and delivered in 2015. So, again, where is the secrecy here?
Now coming to the towering insight that the author provides about jamming, that is Wing Co Varthaman couldn't hear what the controller told him because of jamming. According to available accounts, Wing Co Varthaman's last message to IAF GCI was "I have visual and locked".
Oh wait, these are magical PAF jammers. They are kind enough to allow Wing Co Varthaman to talk to the IAF. They just don't want him to hear anything in turn. And this only happens once he crosses the LOC. Till then, the radios work fine, vectoring him right to the ingressing PAF strike package.
Truly, as the author suggests, the IAF is no longer fighting human beings prone to mistakes as our analysis suggests. They are fighting aliens from Mars, who come with such advanced technology that allows the IAF fighter pilot to convey his points lucidly to ground control, but blocks him from hearing anything in turn. Further, the radio jamming only comes into play once the Bisons hunt of the F-16 begins. One would have otherwise thought that the entire Bison package would be jammed, but wait, they could hear ground control fine and took evasive measures first, because unlike the Wing Co. they were not (yet) engaged in a fight with the F-16s. However, the question remains, how could they hear anything if truly, the PAF was so effective in jamming all the Indian combatants in play?
Further, would the lack of ground control radio input, for even a fraction of a period, suddenly turn WingCo Varthaman into a victim? Consider this, he is trained, he knows he is up against F-16s (he is about to shoot one down), there is every chance the F-16s wingman would try to target him & his RWR would surely be buzzing with the tone of the F-16s APG-68 V(9). So he would have surely anticipated an AMRAAM or even AIM-9 shot & knew the terrific threat he was under, even as he, with single-minded and ruthless determination, went in for his kill. He knew the risks, and as a trained and superbly calm professional, judged them, filed them in his brain and went for that F-16. And got it.
These are IAF pilots we are talking about. Ground Control input offers them cues, additional situational awareness above and beyond their eyeball Mk1 and their onboard radar. It does not turn them into zombies who must and should need this input to make any and every decision.
The IAF indeed plans to field an Operational Data Link, piggybacking on what are called as Software Defined Radios, but this is a work in progress, quite clearly stalled not merely by a perfidious Babu, but as much as by interoperability concerns and the challenge of the task ahead. Even so, 470 odd radios are being procured, half for ground stations, half for fighters in the first phase. There is no guarantee these sets will be fitted to the ageing MiG-21 Bisons which are due to be phased out in the next few years and replaced by the indigenous and potent LCA Tejas, which has achieved FOC. Even after the encrypted SDRs are inducted, it would take some time for a data link to be operational.
So, unfortunately, this claim about radio deployment, data links, the loss of WingCo Abhinandan because he crossed the LOC and a dastardly villain preventing the IAF from acquiring capabilities it so desperately needs, seems to have rather large holes in it.
But then again, nothing in this entire article makes the least amount of sense. And it clearly wasn't meant to. It was just to push an obvious agenda that the IAF is weak, under-equipped, and hence ends up perpetuating more myths.
An article with an agenda
by KaranM
Post the successful Balakot operation, F-16 shoot down by IAF MIg21 and subsequent safe return of Wing Co Abhinandan Varthaman, the Modi Government has definitely been on a high as far as its scores on national security are concerned. During any other time this increase in acceptance for the Govt would have been left to pass by the opposition however, with the elections round the corner, it certainly looks like those who dislike the current Govt have decided to portray the events at Balakot and thereafter in a jaundiced light by deliberately downplaying the capabilities of the Indian Air Force.
We need to see the following article by the author in this light. In my opinion, the article at best is written out of ignorance and at worst is playing to a particular political gallery, by twisting all the facts. The first part of this article debunks all the claimed, deep insights made by Gupta while the second part looks into all the half truths that appear to further an agenda, so as to water down the Modi Government's Rafale purchase by linking it to claimed missteps done by a prior NDA Govt.
Furthermore, the author's claims are fundamentally at odds with actual details of how air operations proceed and his whimsical or otherwise, claims do grave discredit to the air warriors of the IAF, who pulled off an understated, yet incredible achievement against the PAF's counter-strike attempt. Hence, they merit a reply.
Following information is gleaned across all available articles which includes articles by AVM A. Subramaniam (Retd) and also from leaked MoD accounts to the other members of the lay press, who unlike Gupta (who has neither a science degree nor a clue about aeronautics, he graduated from school of communication studies Punjab as mentioned in wiki) are far more credible. Now to the assessment of the article and what most likely happened
The author says the PAF had created superiority and surprise, while IAF AWAC crews were switching duties; we can only marvel at the oversimplification and the regurgitation of the Israel attack on Egypt modus operandi. The fact is we were expecting an attack and given the terrain there were blind spots which the PAF took advantage of and came closer which is when they were detected by the Netras and Phalcons, and likely even other Ground Based radars sited by the IAF to take care of the terrain blind spots. Going by the IAF response the PAF was neither able to create any technological superiority nor achieve any creative surprise, it just took cover of the mountains to reach as close possible to the LOC and then exploit any momentary tactical weakness on the part of the IAF, which to their credit, the IAF did not display. The PAF was however, able to create numerical superiority but was unable to exploit it which only goes to show their tactics, technology or skill were lacking, or even all three. While that is about the PAF, judging by this article, I am certain the author lacks all three.
Coming to the next gem in his article, he states that PAF F-16s creatively surprised the IAF fleet and fired AMRAAMs on the Su-30MKIs. This apparently was some sort of victory for the PAF which we should all be collectively worried about.
Basic 101 tactics in fighter school, available via 100's of accounts over the years, clearly teaches pilots to not be an Arnold in Terminator (spraying belts of ammo) but fire only when the enemy is in your definite kill zone, otherwise be prepared to waste your valuable missile rounds. The author makes a virtue of the PAF pilots lack of skill or fire discipline in having launched multiple AMRAAM rounds without merit. Now reverting back to the author's insightful assertion that the SU-30MKIs were outgunned and outranged I want to paraphrase what AVM A. Subramaniam (Retd) wrote in his detailed account, which of course he cannot openly credit as that of the IAF's but subsequent accounts all bear out how closely the actual events mimicked the details mentioned in the article.
As AVM Subramaniam (Retd) notes, out of 4 available Su-30s, two Su-30s were at the limits of their endurance. So in effect, the remaining 2 Su-30s stayed on in the fight, and took on several times their number. We are told by Gupta that the radar/weapons control/missile were outmatched. Lets look at this entire set in more detail, to understand how ludicrous his claims really are.
The first fact, is that the Su-30s radar is far more powerful than the APG-68 V(9) on the F-16s, quite easily compensating for the size difference between the two fighters in terms of radar cross section, and in Red Flag and several other multinational exercises, and in-house IAF exercises all with jammers, the Bars radar has held up well, in training mode itself. (Reference circa 2008 https://www.livefistdefence.com/2008/11 ... -hand.html). Considering the fact that the central sensor of the Sukhoi, its radar … held up just fine in training mode …despite the barrage of electronic jamming augurs well for the Indian Air Force. Note that a decade back itself, the then version of the Bars radar which was subsequently upgraded in 2012, acquitted itself well against some of the most sophisticated electronic warfare units available at Nellis AFB during the famed Red Flag exercises.
Subsequently, the Su-30s have matched up in Beyond Visual Range fights against F-16s, F-15s, Rafales, Mirage 2000s, Eurofighters, Tornado F.3 ADVs and have acquitted themselves credibly, in several cases coming out ahead. Never mind, the IAF has heavily evaluated the fighter against what it itself possesses. So here we have the foundation of the Su-30 weapons system as being well established. Clearly, the radar and its weapons control system work well.
Also, the Su-30 pilots have RVV-AE missiles which match the AMRAAMs in range. Unlike the Pakistani pilots though, they didn't fire their missiles "blind" and waited for a proper, high probability of kill shot, while maneuvering to dodge the PAF AMRAAMs.
Now in which idiotic world, does this series of events, translate to the Su-30s being "outranged and outgunned". At this point, we must pity the author's lack of knowledge when it comes to how BVR combat works.
BVR combat is quite complex, but can be summarized as being about denying the enemy's weaponry any chance of a kill while maneuvering to land a decisive shot. If anything, the IAF pilots played the BVR game perfectly. They out maneuvered, decoyed the AMRAAMs, & kept the air defence F-16s engaged, allowing time for Bisons to bounce the strike F-16s, even as they (the Su-30s) prevented the air defence F-16s from shooting down the Bisons in BVR. The Su-30s played to their strengths, their endurance for instance.
If Abhinandan's MiG-21 was lost, it was when he was firmly out of coverage of his wingmen and the Su-30 fleet, and there are high chances that even his aircraft was not lost to an AMRAAM shot but may have suffered an engine failure due to debris ingestion from the exploding F-16. A good reason for this to happen, is if his separation from the F-16 he was chasing was not substantial, even as it "ate" his R-73E missile. Do we all remember the manner in which Flt Lt Kambampati Nachiketa Rao was lost at Kargil in 1999 and how the Pakistani lay press were quick to claim him as one of their victories? Subsequently, it turned out it was the exhaust gas from his rockets firing (the MiG-27 carried rocket pods for strike), which disturbed his engine's airflow causing it to cut out.
Furthermore, active missiles like AMRAAM are hounds which go after the target/s in the vicinity once un-caged, they would not differentiate between a F-16 or a Bison, as the role of the Identification Friend or Foe in the fire control radar was over once the missile was generally launched at the Bison. But with the F-16 nearby, the chances of a friendly fire incident would be very high. Again, would the PAF pilots be so blase? Only detailed post mission analysis by the IAF can provide more information.
Now, lets get back to the Su-30 MKIs weapon control system, the WCS computes when a reasonable shot is possible based on available weaponry. Clarifying the topic further, active missiles work in 2 modes. Lock on before launch, lock on after launch. The latter is what competent fighter pilots would prefer. The on-board radars guide the missiles in via datalink, the seeker turns on at the last moment, to give jammers minimum time to work or countermeasures to be triggered. However, you can also launch the missile in the general direction of the target, with location cues from your radar & then *hope* it picks up the target. Especially if you are manouevering and can't guide the missile in. This is what the PAF pilots likely did. Either that, or their fire control radar/datalink combination just couldn't guide the missiles in towards the IAF Sukhois.
Now piecing together the sequence of events. The Su-30 pilots learnt that the PAF pilots were firing their missiles at them, were likely out of effective range , i.e. the missiles no-escape zone, and without proper guidance, unable to guide but the missiles remained a threat because of the fact they can lock on after launch. They too could have retaliated. The Su-30s radar+ computer + missile combination would give an effective firing solution only when their missiles would be effective or the pilots could choose to launch outside optimal parameters! Unlike the PAF pilots, the Su-30 pilots did not waste their missiles by salvo-ing their ARH missiles in turn as the F-16 pilots did. Instead, they focused on defeating the PAF missile threat and constantly looking for an optimal firing solution on the F-16s in turn, which was the correct thing to do. They kept aware of the tactical situation via either via own radar, own data links or warned by IAF controllers.
The IAF press release notes that "the Su-30s took correct tactical measures to defeat the AMRAAM threat". A terse, and succinct way of explaining what happened without getting bogged down in classified details. We also know what happened thereafter, as what AVM Subramaniam notes. None of the LGB strikes by the strike F-16s worked. They hightailed it back, without guiding their munitions in. Remember, unlike the movies, these fancy LGBs, etc require a steady platform, and careful designation by either onboard or off board laser guidance pods. Yet, these careful launch parameters were not met.
Why did that happen if not for the fact, that with Bisons headed their way, the strike F-16s just had to break off. Their allocated protectors, the air defence F-16s remained engaged with the Su-30s who remained in the fight. The Su-30s had their radars active, were still in the game and the air defence F-16 pilots knew the clear and potent danger the Sukhoi's represented.
Heavy fighters like the Su-30 are apex predators, and with their large radar, missile, range combination can afford to wait for their chance, a chance the F-16 pilots decided not to risk and left the area as fast as they could, once the strike F-16s returned from the incursion.
We know that all AMRAAMs fired at Su-30s missed which leaves us with the following conclusions:
1. The F-16 radars could not guide the missiles after launch, because they were either jammed or the fighters were maneuvering to avoid the Su-30 radars. In conclusion, Su-30s held off a larger force of F-16s in BVR mode.
2. AMRAAM missiles could not get a lock-on to the Su-30s. So either their initial cues were hopelessly wrong (see the above point), or they were jammed/defeated by Su-30 countermeasures/maneuvering. Either way, the Su-30s defeated the AMRAAMs.
In short, let alone being outranged and outgunned. The Su-30s held off a much larger number of F-16s and defeated their prized silver bullets, the AMRAAMs. Even as of this moment, suffice to say, there would be much angst in the PAF about how & why their tactics failed, how a small force of Su-30s held off their F-16s, how their carefully husbanded stocks of AMRAAMs didn't work the way they were meant to, and why the F-16s could not land any decisive win against the Su-30s. The DG (ISPR)'s crowing is for the public consumption of their "awaam" who see the PAF as some mythical crusaders against the infidel. Reality though bites, and it would be biting the PAF AHQ planners as they consider the bleak outcome of their mass deployment of AMRAAMs against what was thought to be an unprepared and outnumbered foe.
They will also be keenly aware that the Astra, a missile which is superior to the RVV-AE in specifications set by the IAF, and which it has reportedly met, is on the verge of induction in the Su-30 MKI fleet. Unlike the Pakistanis with their US supplied C-5 model AMRAAMs, India can fine tune and program its Astra missiles to the latest ECCM standards and continue to develop it further.
Next, the author also claims that the surprised and outnumbered IAF scrambled 6 MiG21s from Srinagar and Awantipur. What a phrase. "Surprised and outnumbered", as if the IAF were suddenly caught off guard and panicked. The IAF didn't scramble MiG-21s because it was "surprised and outnumbered". It did so, because that's what the Standard Operating Procedure(SOP) dictates when any OpFor has to be countered. The number of assets surged into the fight depend on the OpFor. MiG-21s have time on station for anywhere from 30 mins to 45 mins. They are short radius, point defense interceptors. They are kept on "hot readiness" and not long endurance CAP. Six decades of the MiG-21 in service or thereabouts, and yet the celebrated reporter doesn't even know how the IAF uses them.
Then, we then have the author implying the Mica is equivalent to the AMRAAM. And this was the magic behind the Mirages becoming superior or equivalent to the F-16s. Sure, the Mica has its pros and cons and even comes in the IIR (Imaging Infra red) flavor allowing for some real sneaky tactics, but that's not his claim. His claim is about range. A Mica hit a non maneuvering target in Taiwanese AF exercises several years back at around 60km. It's well recognized, that the Mica missile is outranged by the RVV-AE which the Su-30s carry and the AMRAAM the F-16s carry in terms of raw range. The longer range usually translates into longer engagement ranges overall, considering rough parity in terms of other aspects such as seeker performance (which is usually classified but all 3 countries US, France, Russia field robust electronics teams).
So, bottom line, the Su-30s have a longer stick than the Mirage 2000. When it comes to Mirage against the F-16, the range advantage in AMRAAM capability would remain with the F-16, with EW capability remaining the decider in whether a proper fire control solution would be found or not or AMRAAMs would be fired blind as in the above case. The Mica is certainly capable, but unlike what the author claims, it is not some magic answer which would scare the PAF F-16s away. Make them wary, certainly. But much the same as the mix of the missiles on the Su-30.
The final ludicrous claim is "Mirage 2000's locked on to some of the PAF planes". Mirage 2000's don't need to lock on for Mica. They fire from Track While Scan mode. Same as the Sukhois with their RVV-AE missiles. Lock-on (i.e. constant illumination of the target leading to a RWR alert, is only required for Super530D and AA-10 missile attacks or AIM-7 Sparrow missiles). In reality, the moment, the PAF pilots got an indication on their RWR that a Mirage 2000 or a Su-30 radar had "repeatedly swept" them, they would have been wary (and engaging countermeasures as necessary), knowing that it could well be sufficient for a missile attack which they'd keep an eye out for. The point though which the AVM makes of the Mirages superiority vis a vis the JF-17 needs to be understood. Its that despite engaging countermeasures, the JF-17/Mirage fleet still felt at threat. They continued to get "painted" by radar. Mark that as a plus for the superb equipment on the upgraded Mirages.
Overall conclusion: authors claims don't stand up to any data re: air warfare or even common sense.
Debunking the political overtones
Lets now explore a possible, reason behind this hare brained article. If the author is engaged in so much speculation, we might as well. The author's thesis in this case is that had the Vajpayee Govt agreed for Mirage2000 upgrade in 2001 this situation wouldn't have arisen. The technical argument towards this agenda has anyways been debunked above, now lets check the timing. This article curiously appears after Modi says that had the congress not taken 10 long years to decide on MMRCA and had we had Rafale this situation wouldn't have happened and the IAF continues to openly support the Rafale acquisition. So in effect, the author tries to pin the blame for the situation on a NDA predecessor, i.e. Shri Vajpayee and not on the lame and inept UPA Govt that ruled for 10 long years (it decided on the Rafale and in 2014 publicly stated that they didn't have the money to buy it). The whole thesis has nothing to do with the Su-30s and the technology that we have because the story here is of selling the Mirage 2000 as the IAF savior which the BJP i.e. Vajapyee scuttled and this story emerges, the moment Modi alludes to the Rafale missing in the IAF force structure. The author is entitled to his views, as we are to our view on him mixing fact and fiction to push a flawed thesis!
The same Su-30s which held up against one NATO AF after another, are suddenly useless because they don't fit the narrative, that only the Mirage will do, never mind its Mica's are even further outranged by the AMRAAMs and its radar is a fraction of the Su-30's in power aperture and in IAF exercises against the French AF, the French praised the performance of the Su-30 MKI, plus the serious and calm demeanour of the IAF pilots. Net, each aircraft has its pros and cons, and the Mirage is still a very dangerous and potent aircraft. It has arguably the most versatile mix of weaponry in the fleet matched only by the Su-30 MKI. Yet, to push a story, its just lousy behavior to decry the capabilities of one platform whilst selectively playing up another. IAF deterrence is built on a sum of all its parts.
To appear balanced the author cruelly strings AK Anthony out to dry. His personal mistakes apart, he was part of a system and why didn't the system correct the claimed NDA mistake and purchase the Mirage 2000-V post haste, by cancelling the MMRCA contest? No answer there either.
Weirdly, the author also makes an assertion that the current Govt realizing the danger went ahead and bought a few MICA missiles (like Sivakasi Diwali rockets are available in the market) and slung them onto the Mirage2000 and also foolishly flew close to the border for Pakistan to flaunt their new "biceps". Nothing can be farther from the truth in this case. 450 MICAs were bought as part of the Mirage2000 deal by the UPA itself to upgrade it to Mirage2000I standards in 2012, weren't bought overnight and there is no rocket science here that the 2000I upgrade has been slow and has been progressing with HAL as the lead partner. There was also a press release in 2016 where IAF had mentioned that they had tested this missile from the upgraded Mirage2000, and it hardly undertook any unprofessional stunt of flying close to the border with Mica's under slung hoping for a PAF F-16 to come by with binoculars, detect it had Micas and then fly back to report this earth shattering information to PAF AHQ.
Coming to how many Mirage2000s were upgraded, we are told this too is secret. The author knows this, but he is reluctant to tell us. Well, we know from news reports that 6 in number had been upgraded by 2019, as versus 21 planned, apart from the ones delivered by France itself. HAL blames the tardy receipt of upgrade kits from France. Leaving aside the finger pointing, the fact remains this is widely known news. Again, the authors, wink-nod-nudge claim of possessing some secret awareness of the state of the Mirage upgrade is anything but factual.
That apart the author willfully forgets that the MICA missiles had been ordered in 2012 during the UPA regime and delivered in 2015. So, again, where is the secrecy here?
Now coming to the towering insight that the author provides about jamming, that is Wing Co Varthaman couldn't hear what the controller told him because of jamming. According to available accounts, Wing Co Varthaman's last message to IAF GCI was "I have visual and locked".
Oh wait, these are magical PAF jammers. They are kind enough to allow Wing Co Varthaman to talk to the IAF. They just don't want him to hear anything in turn. And this only happens once he crosses the LOC. Till then, the radios work fine, vectoring him right to the ingressing PAF strike package.
Truly, as the author suggests, the IAF is no longer fighting human beings prone to mistakes as our analysis suggests. They are fighting aliens from Mars, who come with such advanced technology that allows the IAF fighter pilot to convey his points lucidly to ground control, but blocks him from hearing anything in turn. Further, the radio jamming only comes into play once the Bisons hunt of the F-16 begins. One would have otherwise thought that the entire Bison package would be jammed, but wait, they could hear ground control fine and took evasive measures first, because unlike the Wing Co. they were not (yet) engaged in a fight with the F-16s. However, the question remains, how could they hear anything if truly, the PAF was so effective in jamming all the Indian combatants in play?
Further, would the lack of ground control radio input, for even a fraction of a period, suddenly turn WingCo Varthaman into a victim? Consider this, he is trained, he knows he is up against F-16s (he is about to shoot one down), there is every chance the F-16s wingman would try to target him & his RWR would surely be buzzing with the tone of the F-16s APG-68 V(9). So he would have surely anticipated an AMRAAM or even AIM-9 shot & knew the terrific threat he was under, even as he, with single-minded and ruthless determination, went in for his kill. He knew the risks, and as a trained and superbly calm professional, judged them, filed them in his brain and went for that F-16. And got it.
These are IAF pilots we are talking about. Ground Control input offers them cues, additional situational awareness above and beyond their eyeball Mk1 and their onboard radar. It does not turn them into zombies who must and should need this input to make any and every decision.
The IAF indeed plans to field an Operational Data Link, piggybacking on what are called as Software Defined Radios, but this is a work in progress, quite clearly stalled not merely by a perfidious Babu, but as much as by interoperability concerns and the challenge of the task ahead. Even so, 470 odd radios are being procured, half for ground stations, half for fighters in the first phase. There is no guarantee these sets will be fitted to the ageing MiG-21 Bisons which are due to be phased out in the next few years and replaced by the indigenous and potent LCA Tejas, which has achieved FOC. Even after the encrypted SDRs are inducted, it would take some time for a data link to be operational.
So, unfortunately, this claim about radio deployment, data links, the loss of WingCo Abhinandan because he crossed the LOC and a dastardly villain preventing the IAF from acquiring capabilities it so desperately needs, seems to have rather large holes in it.
But then again, nothing in this entire article makes the least amount of sense. And it clearly wasn't meant to. It was just to push an obvious agenda that the IAF is weak, under-equipped, and hence ends up perpetuating more myths.
Both the articles have specific take aways .... too long to reply both on move .. so will reply on points at a later date.
Renewed proposal by US UK France to sanction Azhar again. China is getting isolated badly and earning some real bad reputation globally. Feels like US want to humiliate China again and again.
US sets up UN clash with China over bid to blacklist JeM chief Masood Azhar
US sets up UN clash with China over bid to blacklist JeM chief Masood Azhar
If this really go thru.... China being sidelined for supporting a terror outfit would look very bad on them..... Slowly start to learn the difficulties of befriending a cobra......
China not intrested in pakistan they are really irked by india..they cant still not forget 1962.nxt generation of gernals and soldiers will not be that hostile .chinese hate muslims in their state and love muslims outside.. irony
If the resolution goes to a vote we will win hands down. China wont be able to use its veto and we only need 10 votes I believe out of 15
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