Status
Not open for further replies.
The LOC Air Battle on February 27th

Three matters are clear from this air battle - 1). Pakistan came to equalize the Balkote score but failed, 2). F-16s were used, but these stayed on their sides and used long range AMRAAM missiles to blast down a SU-30mk1 but failed again, 3). The Pakistani fighters a whole cluster of them could shoot only a lonely MIG-21, which strayed on their side of the LOC. In the process lost a F-16.

Pakistan should be screaming that they could not achieve any of the objectives in this air action. They did shoot their Denel built glide bombs, but from too far, hence the bomb did hit its intended location, but accuracy was so horrendous that it fell a thousand meters away. That is the danger in shooting glide bombs from that far away that the accuracy goes to hell. Moreover, atmospheric conditions do impact the flight of the bomb. A small change would make a huge difference and the bomb may not reach the intended target. That is what happened in the case of hitting the Nowshera brigade headquarters.

A clever trick was played by the PAF to snare the Su-30Mk1 into the fight. The latter had to remain out of range of 100 km beyond visual range US made AMRAAM missiles loaded on F-16 planes. To goad the Indian SU-30s into action, they fired a few AMRAAM missiles at them, which the clever Indian pilots avoided with Chaffe and blocking them completely. The missiles ran out of fuel and fell to the earth, which the Indian Army picked them up and made an issue with the Americans. This was an expensive trial for PAF as each missile costs $3 million. Their denials were of no avail, as India had the evidence to show it.

There were 24 Pakistani fighters which came for a combat. This is a large armada and I would understand that they came for a big score but failed. They relied on too much on technology to do the job without crossing the LOC. They let the bombs from too far and these fell inaccurately. Had they come a bit closer, the results would be different. Besides, they let their AMRAAM missiles a bit early, without a clear radar lock on the target hence these were ineffective. In the process another Indian MIG-21 gave a chase and had a lock on F-16 and fired. In the target chase, he lost his bearing and crossed the LOC. Now he lost all his communications and became an easy target for a Pakistani fighter. The Russian short range Russian missile brought the F-16 down, but he himself became the hunted. He was quickly shot down.

In those five minutes of melee, three parachutes opened, although the Pakistanis deny it but is their usual habit. Two parachutes were Pakistanis and one was Indian. By all accounts you can infer that the F-16 was a trainer. The fate of the one Pakistani pilot was sealed by the villagers in the area. He died at their hands. The Indian pilot pilot was about to suffer the same fate, but his action to ward off the villagers in commendable.

This battle lowered the Pakistani morale and they were prepared to de-escalate very quickly.
 
2703spice.jpg

Ever since the stunning US success in the 1991 Gulf War, we have increasingly come to take precision bombing for granted. While militaries may sometimes misidentify a target, we assume that they can precisely hit what they are aiming at. ‘Precision strike’ is supposedly a proliferating, off-the-shelf commodity.

But India’s recent air strike on a purported Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorist camp in Balakot in Pakistan on 26 February suggests that precision strike is still an art and science that requires both practice and enabling systems to achieve the intended effect. Simply buying precision munitions off the shelf is not enough.

Indian news media outlets have cited unnamed ‘senior military officers’ as saying that the Indian Air Force used the Israeli SPICE 2000 weapon to target four buildings at a terrorist camp in Balakot. The SPICE 2000 is the Israeli analogue of the US JDAM (joint direct attack munition), the weapon that has become the mainstay of coalition airstrikes in the Middle East. The SPICE 2000 is essentially a strap-on guidance kit that can transform a 2,000-pound ‘dumb’ bomb into a very precise way to deliver more than 400 kilograms of high explosives at a range of up to 60 kilometres. The weapon can be both GPS- and electro-optically guided. A 2,000-pound bomb causes substantial damage to structures.

Controversy has raged over whether India hit its intended targets. The Indian narrative has insisted that the strikes did hit their targets, ‘killing a large number of terrorists’. Indian Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa remarked, ‘If we plan to hit the target, we hit the target.’

The Indian narrative has also suggested that the strike used a SPICE 2000 variant with a reduced amount of explosive and the ability to penetrate through several floors of a building and even underground before detonating. This argument claims that such a weapon would only create a small entry hole and, while it would kill all occupants, it wouldn’t destroy the target building.

However, publicly available imagery acquired by European Space Imaging the day after the strike suggests that buildings at the camp were not visibly damaged or destroyed (see image below). This imagery, which is of a higher resolution than that available previously, shows conspicuously undamaged roofs that are not consistent with either a SPICE 2000 strike or a strike with other munitions. We believe that even a weapon with reduced explosive fill would cause damage to buildings that would be identifiable in the satellite imagery.

2703SiteOverview4.jpg

Satellite imagery © 2019 DigitalGlobe, a Maxar Technologies company—provided by European Space Imaging.

We suggest a possible alternative explanation.

One of us (Nathan Ruser) has previously published imagery identifying likely impact sites and comparing their locations with the locations of likely targets. The locations of the weapons’ impacts can be independently verified through three separate sources. First, photos taken by local journalists of impact craters have been geolocated by matching features visible in the images to features visible in satellite imagery.

Second, our previously published analysis of infrared satellite imagery indicates three circular areas—each roughly 30 metres in diameter—in which vegetation disappeared in the two days either side of the strike and which are consistent with explosive impact sites.

Finally, the images taken the day following the airstrikes and published by European Space Imaging allow for a higher resolution optical analysis, which indicates disturbances and craters in the areas previously identified as the likely impact locations.

There are two striking aspects to the images. The first is that all three weapons missed by similar (but not identical) distances, and certainly by much more than the 3 metre ‘circular error probable’ attributed to the SPICE 2000. The second is that all three weapons missed in virtually the same direction. These two factors suggest that the misses were caused by a systematic targeting error.

The strike could have relied on the SPICE 2000’s electro-optical guidance capabilities, but that would have required significant targeting support, including the development of topographically and architecturally precise modelling to program and guide the weapon. It is not a simple process and is dependent on considerable pre-strike imagery-collection and targeting infrastructure. It is likely that the Indian Air Force opted instead to rely solely on the weapon’s ‘set and forget’ GPS capabilities.

It is important to note two characteristics of GPS-guided weapons. The first is that GPS coordinates have three dimensions: elevation, latitude and longitude—something we tend to overlook in everyday life when we navigate using a mobile phone’s GPS function. Second, a glide weapon like the SPICE 2000 doesn’t fall vertically to its target; it follows an inclined trajectory. Therefore, an incorrect vertical coordinate will result in the weapon missing as surely as an error in latitude or longitude.

Such errors can occur for various reasons, including by neglecting to convert coordinates from one coordinate system, or datum, to another (a datum shift). One potential candidate in this case is the difference between GPS ellipsoidal height and orthometric height based on mean sea level (see here for an explanation). In northeastern Pakistan, the difference is around 33 metres, although in many areas the difference is not precisely mapped so it may be larger or smaller at a point such as Balakot.

One explanation for the miss is that the SPICE 2000 bombs were incorrectly programmed to fly precisely into GPS points that were, say, 33 metres above their intended targets (the buildings on top of the ridge line). They performed as programmed and then continued on their trajectories until they struck the valley beneath.

The image below correlates the identified impact sites, the buildings that were the likely targets and a discrepancy between ellipsoidal and orthometric height which we have assumed to equate to 33 metres above the target buildings. Presented in 3D, this correlation results in consistent, parallel trajectories indicating a consistent targeting error. The differences in the impact distances from the intended targets are accounted for by the steep terrain and the differences in elevation between the impact sites. While this diagram does not necessarily represent the actual trajectories of the missiles, it does suggest a systematic targeting error caused by the use of different vertical datums.

2703TargetMiss8.jpg

Satellite imagery © 2019 DigitalGlobe, a Maxar Technologies company—provided by European Space Imaging.

This explanation is lent further credibility by the fact that the resultant trajectories point back towards where India has claimed the weapons were launched from, just on the Indian side of the border.

This may not be the actual explanation. In a strike system that consists of French jets, Israeli weapons, US GPS and a targeting system that potentially used maps based on an older local Indian datum, there are other ways in which incorrect information could have been introduced or data shifts could have been omitted.

Despite the proliferation of precision weapons, actually completing the strike ‘kill chain’ is still difficult. Some militaries, such as those of the US and Australia, have spent years developing the technologies and systems that enable precision strike and employing the skills required in actual operations. But proficiency should not be taken for granted. It takes more than the weapon itself to launch a successful precision stike.

India’s strike on Balakot: a very precise miss? | The Strategist
 
Were India’s airstrikes in Pakistan a strategy for public approval?

1 Mar 2019|Nathan RuserStrategist special report

SHARE
Print This Post

0103kashmirhill.jpg

After 12 days of heightened tension between India and Pakistan following the 14 February Pulwama attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, considerable hostilities broke out between the two countries. In the early morning of 26 February, Indian fighter jets reportedly bombed a target in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan after crossing over the line of control and Pakistani-administered Kashmir.

While the Indian and Pakistani military have regularly conducted firing across the line of control in recent years, including airstrikes in September 2016, this incident marks the first time that Indian forces have released munitions into Pakistan’s undisputed territory since the 1971 India–Pakistan War.

Indian media has reported that the target of the strike was a concentration of militants—members of Jaish-e-Mohammad, a Pakistan-based organisation that has conducted significant terrorist attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir—who had evacuated disputed Kashmir out of fears of Indian retaliation for the Pulwama attack. India claimed that the facility, roughly 10 kilometres into undisputed Pakistani territory and near the town of Jaba, was largely destroyed, resulting in the death of hundreds of militants.

Satellite imagery, acquired by Planet Labs Inc. on the morning of 27 February and accessed by ASPI, calls this claim into question. No evidence of damage to the facility or nearby areas is visible on the images. Local media have visited the site and published photographsof multiple small craters in the vicinity, but they haven’t been granted access to the facility that was reportedly targeted. Satellite imagery, presented and analysed below, provides no apparent evidence of more extensive damage and on the face of it does not validate Indian claims regarding the effect of the strikes.

0103kashmirstrikes3.jpg

Image courtesy of Planet Labs, Google Earth and Digital Globe.

By analysing areas of healthy vegetation from the imagery, I’ve been able to identify three clear impact areas between 150 and 200 metres from the edge of the facility. These correspond to photos shared by local journalists and confirm the location of strikes.

gif_Small_2_planetlogo.gif

The recent tension between India and Pakistan has been marked by disinformation from both sides. Local media’s reporting of unsubstantiated facts and rumours, together with online trolls, have made it difficult to discern the reality of the situation. The satellite imagery suggests that the claims made by India’s Ministry of External Affairs of ‘a very large number’ of militants being killed in the strike are likely false.

An interesting aspect of the incident is the speculation about what might have caused the munitions to land so far from structures in the targeted facility. The official spokesman of the Pakistan Armed Forces, Major General Asif Ghafoor, claimed on Twitter that a prompt Pakistani response forced the Indian pilots to ditch their payload and retreat. Later that day, unnamed Indian defence sources were reported to have leaked to the media the precise munitions that were used in the strike: Israeli-made SPICE-2000 precision-guided bombs. The reporting made it clear that these munitions operate largely through pre-programmed coordinates, and also feature optical recognition sensors to guide the missile to the target. Indeed, the payload dictated the model of fighter jet used, as India’s newer Su-30 fighters are not compatible with the SPICE-2000.

These reported leaks signalled that the mission was designed so that the payloads would not miss their intended targets. The munitions that guided the mission’s planning and were used in it have a ‘circular error probable’ of 3 metres—which means that 50% of all strikes are designed to hit their coordinates to within 3 metres, and statistically fewer than 0.2% hit further than 10 metres from the designated strike area.

This reportedly leaked information could be read as refuting Pakistani claims of an inaccurate strike to an Indian audience while signalling to Pakistani decision-makers that the intended effect of these strikes was to not cause material damage. In a statementissued the following day, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that its strikes in Indian-administered Kashmir were against non-military targets and likewise did not cause any significant damage.

It’s possible that the overall strategy behind the Indian mission was to demonstrate military capability while managing escalation. One of the undisputed facts is that Indian jets crossed not only Kashmir’s line of control, but also the international border into undisputed Pakistani territory and were able to release their payloads. India’s military claims that the strikes lasted for a total of 20 minutes.

It’s also possible that an error in the targeting process caused these strikes to fail. Confirmed reports of airstrikes were first released by Ghafoor, the representative of a military that explicitly denied previous airstrikes conducted by India. Meanwhile, sources within the Indian Armed Forces claimed that they struck three locations in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Although no evidence or substantiated reports have emerged of additional Indian strikes, it’s possible that Pakistan would only acknowledge a failed strike from among a larger wave of successful ones.

However, based on the available evidence—satellite imagery, official statements, and reported leaks to the media—it appears plausible that India’s strikes in Pakistan were designed primarily to placate a domestic audience while simultaneously limiting escalation by not targeting built-up areas and causing substantial casualties. India’s upcoming election placed significant pressure on Prime Minister Narendra Modi to act in retaliation for the Pulwama attack. There was a requirement to balance the domestic desire for a strong response with the risk of a broader military conflict that would be costly for both countries.

By issuing strong statements while offering Pakistan implicit assurances that these strikes were limited—but only by choice—India would be able to achieve that balance. The impending release of an Indian pilot who was captured by the Pakistani military highlights that while risks of unintended escalation are real, throughout this period of tension, both parties seem to have been seeking off-ramps from further conflict.

Correction: An earlier version of this piece said, in the third paragraph, that the Indian airstrike occurred ‘roughly 10 kilometres into Pakistani-administered Kashmir’ instead of ‘10 kilometres into undisputed Pakistani territory’. The error occurred at the editorial stage.

Were India’s airstrikes in Pakistan a strategy for public approval? | The Strategist
 
Please do not try to invent things like Mr Farooq Abdullah who said he doubts that 40 CRPF wer ever killed. I doubt 40 CRPF soldiers were killed in Pulwama attack: Farooq Abdullah There are two facts 1. Strike was carried out at Balakot. 2. Two aircrafts were shot down besides Mi 17 helicopter. One aircraft was of India MiG 21 other a F -16 of Pakistan Air Force. No nation ever gives out intimiate details. Hence, balance is logical conjectures.
One thing for definite targets were hit and there is no ambiguity about it. Lots of images can be collected as per your leanings. But casualties have taken place and facility destroyed. Or else why was Pakistan shy to allow local media to visit the area.
 
Pakistan's count down has started. Wait for details in next 4-5 days. Rawalpindi Corps commander lost Akhnoor Dagger to India and tried to hide his cowardice behind lack of solid response. Pak Army is a divided house now. There may be rebellion within the Pak Army now. Akhnoor is directly under Tenth Corps based in Rawalpindi and Lt. Gen Bilal Akber has turned out to be the biggest coward of them all.


Now IAF must be Given a Free Hand

Attack all along the Border
 
On an unrelated but relevant note, Shyam Saran our ex FS had once in an interview declared that China had gradually nibbled some 650 sweet kms of territory westwards in Aksai Chin / Ladakh post 1962, which he retracted immediately afterwards.

I've posed this query to PKS a couple of times who instead of answering, counter questioned me, asking for proof and posing a rhetotical question - Will local district administration officials keep quiet about it for so long?

What's the truth?
/USER]


Short answer - True. Size may be slightly lesser. Odd square kilometer here and there along quite a bit of stretch. Recall the Chinese Border Guards and ITBP stoning stand off? That was in area technically on our side of LAC, but Chinese managed to crawl about 5 odd kilometers westward in that area with Governments of India simply deciding to 'talk things out'.

Only in Dokalam, for the first time, we showed our intent in a long time, to not allow even an inch of change to occur.
 
lol..
If you think we returned Abhinandan out of fear of India, you are wrong. We are not scared of India or we had not launched attack on 27th in the first place...


You need to re-check your facts with PM Niazi and COAS Gen Bajwa. Truth may be funny.

You are right, you did not release him out of fear of India. Because India never said a word to you. Instead, you released him when the US CENTCOM Commander rang up your Chief and told him to release the pilot as goodwill gesture which shall allow US to work out things to avert an Indian strike, which was coming shortly and which US will support as a legitimate act against terror infrastructure within Pakistan.

Oh, there was no threat against any of your military targets, merely couple of missiles into Pakistani heartland targeting terror infrastructure. Yes sir, you did not release him out of fear of India, you released him because no one was supporting you internationally other than China, who, in any case, refuses to take sides in any hostility (read rules out military intervention).
 
Bigger story Was off second israeli pilot


Don't push it. They might just task their minions to catch hold of some poor hapless foreigner visiting Pakistan or Afghanistan to put forward as the captured Israeli Air Force Pilot and ask the Israelis to prove that he is not Israeli!!!
 
Short answer - True. Size may be slightly lesser. Odd square kilometer here and there along quite a bit of stretch. Recall the Chinese Border Guards and ITBP stoning stand off? That was in area technically on our side of LAC, but Chinese managed to crawl about 5 odd kilometers westward in that area with Governments of India simply deciding to 'talk things out'.

Only in Dokalam, for the first time, we showed our intent in a long time, to not allow even an inch of change to occur.

Even if they come in , they go back

There is No permanent change in Territory
Being held

Post Doklam , there has been no news of intrusions

Our troops also do agressive patrolling and cross over
 
  • Like
Reactions: TrueSpirit
Even if they come in , they go back

There is No permanent change in Territory
Being held

Post Doklam , there has been no news of intrusions

Our troops also do agressive patrolling and cross over


Please read carefully, what has been written with respect to what.

Man, learn to respond, not react. Both are vastly different.
 
  • Agree
Reactions: TrueSpirit
lol..
If you think we returned Abhinandan out of fear of India, you are wrong. We are not scared of India or we had not launched attack on 27th in the first place...
Actually you people should not have returned wing co Abhinandan. We were obliged to stop our naval surgical strike which would have been the most ruthless as quid pro (btw why was Karachi on black out that night). Say thanks to our brave wing co Abhinandan for saving your *censored*..
 
Even if they come in , they go back

There is No permanent change in Territory
Being held

Post Doklam , there has been no news of intrusions

Our troops also do agressive patrolling and cross over

I remember during the foolish Maunmohan Singh the Chinese could brave the IA to pull down their camera at Demchok.

Now the Chinese have not dared after Doklam and after the Pangong lake stone pelting brawl
 
Actually you people should not have returned wing co Abhinandan. We were obliged to stop our naval surgical strike which would have been the most ruthless as quid pro (btw why was Karachi on black out that night). Say thanks to our brave wing co Abhinandan for saving your *censored*..

On 27 th Doval Himself warned ISI chief
That If Abhinandan was hurt , we will hit very badly
 
  • Agree
Reactions: TrueSpirit
Status
Not open for further replies.