India-US Relations

American opinion of India:


MAIN ARGUMENT​

The U.S.-India relationship is founded on common interests, including a deepening strategic convergence with respect to China. U.S. policymakers also cite a shared commitment to liberal democratic governance as a central reason for closer alignment with India. Yet India’s prevailing political culture is not best defined as “liberal,” and under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India’s commitment to democracy is increasingly in doubt. Erosion is most obvious in the areas of tightened media controls, limits on civil society organizations, and reduced protections for minorities. The evolving character of India’s domestic politics is likely to influence India’s foreign policy aims and decision-making processes, hard-power capabilities, and the way India relates to other states, including the U.S.​

POLICY IMPLICATIONS​

  • The U.S.-India strategic partnership is strong and likely to remain durable because of shared concerns about China’s power and influence. Yet because India’s domestic political culture and international worldview reflect unique historical, ideological, and cultural wellsprings, U.S. policymakers should not assume U.S.-India convergence on liberal aims, including India’s commitment to the defense of the liberal international order.
  • Rhetorically, the Biden administration has attached great significance to liberal democracy and thus risks politically costly criticism if it appears to ignore undemocratic trends in India. To avoid hypocrisy and, most importantly, to set realistic expectations for U.S.-India partnership, U.S. officials should convey their concerns about India’s political trajectory forthrightly but bearing in mind that the U.S. has little influence over India’s internal politics.
  • Further erosion of democratic institutions and practices would, on balance, make India a less powerful and predictable international actor, and would reduce its capacity for reassurance and building partnerships with other states, including the U.S.
  • The U.S. government should monitor political developments in India. If democratic erosion worsens, managing U.S. relations with India will demand a tricky balancing act that preserves and even strengthens partnership in areas deemed critical to geopolitical competition with China without extending U.S.-India cooperation into areas that would mistake India for an entirely like-minded U.S. treaty ally.

Daniel Markey is a Senior Advisor on South Asia at the United States Institute of Peace. His most recent book is China’s Western Horizon (2020).​
Note: The author wishes to thank Jacob Larsen and Zaara Wakeel for their research assistance and two anonymous Asia Policy reviewers for their insightful feedback.​

The above is just the summary; there's a 30-page PDF you have to download if you want to read the whole article.
American opinion of India:


MAIN ARGUMENT​

The U.S.-India relationship is founded on common interests, including a deepening strategic convergence with respect to China. U.S. policymakers also cite a shared commitment to liberal democratic governance as a central reason for closer alignment with India. Yet India’s prevailing political culture is not best defined as “liberal,” and under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India’s commitment to democracy is increasingly in doubt. Erosion is most obvious in the areas of tightened media controls, limits on civil society organizations, and reduced protections for minorities. The evolving character of India’s domestic politics is likely to influence India’s foreign policy aims and decision-making processes, hard-power capabilities, and the way India relates to other states, including the U.S.​

POLICY IMPLICATIONS​

  • The U.S.-India strategic partnership is strong and likely to remain durable because of shared concerns about China’s power and influence. Yet because India’s domestic political culture and international worldview reflect unique historical, ideological, and cultural wellsprings, U.S. policymakers should not assume U.S.-India convergence on liberal aims, including India’s commitment to the defense of the liberal international order.
  • Rhetorically, the Biden administration has attached great significance to liberal democracy and thus risks politically costly criticism if it appears to ignore undemocratic trends in India. To avoid hypocrisy and, most importantly, to set realistic expectations for U.S.-India partnership, U.S. officials should convey their concerns about India’s political trajectory forthrightly but bearing in mind that the U.S. has little influence over India’s internal politics.
  • Further erosion of democratic institutions and practices would, on balance, make India a less powerful and predictable international actor, and would reduce its capacity for reassurance and building partnerships with other states, including the U.S.
  • The U.S. government should monitor political developments in India. If democratic erosion worsens, managing U.S. relations with India will demand a tricky balancing act that preserves and even strengthens partnership in areas deemed critical to geopolitical competition with China without extending U.S.-India cooperation into areas that would mistake India for an entirely like-minded U.S. treaty ally.

Daniel Markey is a Senior Advisor on South Asia at the United States Institute of Peace. His most recent book is China’s Western Horizon (2020).​
Note: The author wishes to thank Jacob Larsen and Zaara Wakeel for their research assistance and two anonymous Asia Policy reviewers for their insightful feedback.​

The above is just the summary; there's a 30-page PDF you have to download if you want to read the whole article.
 
American opinion of India:


MAIN ARGUMENT​

The U.S.-India relationship is founded on common interests, including a deepening strategic convergence with respect to China. U.S. policymakers also cite a shared commitment to liberal democratic governance as a central reason for closer alignment with India. Yet India’s prevailing political culture is not best defined as “liberal,” and under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India’s commitment to democracy is increasingly in doubt. Erosion is most obvious in the areas of tightened media controls, limits on civil society organizations, and reduced protections for minorities. The evolving character of India’s domestic politics is likely to influence India’s foreign policy aims and decision-making processes, hard-power capabilities, and the way India relates to other states, including the U.S.​

POLICY IMPLICATIONS​

  • The U.S.-India strategic partnership is strong and likely to remain durable because of shared concerns about China’s power and influence. Yet because India’s domestic political culture and international worldview reflect unique historical, ideological, and cultural wellsprings, U.S. policymakers should not assume U.S.-India convergence on liberal aims, including India’s commitment to the defense of the liberal international order.
  • Rhetorically, the Biden administration has attached great significance to liberal democracy and thus risks politically costly criticism if it appears to ignore undemocratic trends in India. To avoid hypocrisy and, most importantly, to set realistic expectations for U.S.-India partnership, U.S. officials should convey their concerns about India’s political trajectory forthrightly but bearing in mind that the U.S. has little influence over India’s internal politics.
  • Further erosion of democratic institutions and practices would, on balance, make India a less powerful and predictable international actor, and would reduce its capacity for reassurance and building partnerships with other states, including the U.S.
  • The U.S. government should monitor political developments in India. If democratic erosion worsens, managing U.S. relations with India will demand a tricky balancing act that preserves and even strengthens partnership in areas deemed critical to geopolitical competition with China without extending U.S.-India cooperation into areas that would mistake India for an entirely like-minded U.S. treaty ally.

Daniel Markey is a Senior Advisor on South Asia at the United States Institute of Peace. His most recent book is China’s Western Horizon (2020).​
Note: The author wishes to thank Jacob Larsen and Zaara Wakeel for their research assistance and two anonymous Asia Policy reviewers for their insightful feedback.​

The above is just the summary; there's a 30-page PDF you have to download if you want to read the whole article.
American opinion of India:


MAIN ARGUMENT​

The U.S.-India relationship is founded on common interests, including a deepening strategic convergence with respect to China. U.S. policymakers also cite a shared commitment to liberal democratic governance as a central reason for closer alignment with India. Yet India’s prevailing political culture is not best defined as “liberal,” and under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India’s commitment to democracy is increasingly in doubt. Erosion is most obvious in the areas of tightened media controls, limits on civil society organizations, and reduced protections for minorities. The evolving character of India’s domestic politics is likely to influence India’s foreign policy aims and decision-making processes, hard-power capabilities, and the way India relates to other states, including the U.S.​

POLICY IMPLICATIONS​

  • The U.S.-India strategic partnership is strong and likely to remain durable because of shared concerns about China’s power and influence. Yet because India’s domestic political culture and international worldview reflect unique historical, ideological, and cultural wellsprings, U.S. policymakers should not assume U.S.-India convergence on liberal aims, including India’s commitment to the defense of the liberal international order.
  • Rhetorically, the Biden administration has attached great significance to liberal democracy and thus risks politically costly criticism if it appears to ignore undemocratic trends in India. To avoid hypocrisy and, most importantly, to set realistic expectations for U.S.-India partnership, U.S. officials should convey their concerns about India’s political trajectory forthrightly but bearing in mind that the U.S. has little influence over India’s internal politics.
  • Further erosion of democratic institutions and practices would, on balance, make India a less powerful and predictable international actor, and would reduce its capacity for reassurance and building partnerships with other states, including the U.S.
  • The U.S. government should monitor political developments in India. If democratic erosion worsens, managing U.S. relations with India will demand a tricky balancing act that preserves and even strengthens partnership in areas deemed critical to geopolitical competition with China without extending U.S.-India cooperation into areas that would mistake India for an entirely like-minded U.S. treaty ally.

Daniel Markey is a Senior Advisor on South Asia at the United States Institute of Peace. His most recent book is China’s Western Horizon (2020).​
Note: The author wishes to thank Jacob Larsen and Zaara Wakeel for their research assistance and two anonymous Asia Policy reviewers for their insightful feedback.​

The above is just the summary; there's a 30-page PDF you have to download if you want to read the whole article.
Post in thread 'Indo - Chinese Diplomatic & Economic Relations : News, Updates, Discussions & Analysis.' Indo - Chinese Diplomatic & Economic Relations : News, Updates, Discussions & Analysis.

If liberal democracies are a pre requisite for greater ties & strategic co operation , I wonder how does Malarkey view the US's relationship with the Gulf Sheikdoms , the erstwhile bonhomie with China or even Pakistan - his chief patron.

Incidentally Moeed Yousuf the current NSA of Pakistan was a fellow of this institute apart from holding dual citizenship of the US & Pakistan.

I recall Prof C Christine Fair on Twitter jumping up & down since years yelling at whoever cared to listen that Moeed Yusuf was an ISI plant. When he was appointed the NSA a couple of years ago she had her - I told you so moment gloating on her prediction for months later .
 
Post in thread 'Indo - Chinese Diplomatic & Economic Relations : News, Updates, Discussions & Analysis.' Indo - Chinese Diplomatic & Economic Relations : News, Updates, Discussions & Analysis.

If liberal democracies are a pre requisite for greater ties & strategic co operation , I wonder how does Malarkey view the US's relationship with the Gulf Sheikdoms , the erstwhile bonhomie with China or even Pakistan - his chief patron.

Incidentally Moeed Yousuf the current NSA of Pakistan was a fellow of this institute apart from holding dual citizenship of the US & Pakistan.

I recall Prof C Christine Fair on Twitter jumping up & down since years yelling at whoever cared to listen that Moeed Yusuf was an ISI plant. When he was appointed the NSA a couple of years ago she had her - I told you so moment gloating on her prediction for months later .

If there was No Chinese threat these Evil Democrats would have imposed Sanctions on India , by Now , for CAA and Article 370 removal

Instead they are now forced to throw away their own laws like CAATSA 🤣🤣

We must send a thank You Note to
Eleven Jinping
 
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Reactions: _Anonymous_
This crazy guy Saurav Jha lives in a world of his own

He's right though. In about 5 years, most of our defence import contracts will be over, finished in favour of indigenisation.

But our gas needs are very high and will take a few decades to peak, so we are looking at non-OPEC suppliers. The same with coal.

So this will keep our relationship going for many decades, particularly with Russia.
 
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He's right though. In about 5 years, most of our defence import contracts will be over, finished in favour of indigenisation.

But our gas needs are very high and will take a few decades to peak, so we are looking at non-OPEC suppliers. The same with coal.

So this will keep our relationship going for many decades, particularly with Russia.
I am not saying that he is wrong Per Se

I just said that it is crazy of talk of 5 years from now , At this moment , And at this point in time

Do you really think that in times such as these , with Pandemic AND World War , and Stock market meltdowns -- All happening together , Any Govt or Corporate leader is thinking of 5 YEARS into the future 🤣

EVERY country and company and even individuals are worried about Job cuts , Inflation ,Interest Rates , Supply Chain Disruptions , Gas prices and above all Inflation and Stagflation
 

The Biden administration is weighing whether to impose sanctions against India over its stockpile of and reliance on Russian military equipment as part of the wide-ranging consequences the West is seeking to impose on Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine.​
Donald Lu, the assistant secretary of State for South Asian affairs, on Thursday told lawmakers in a hearing that the administration is weighing how threatening India's historically close military relationship with Russia is to U.S. security.​
"It's a question we're looking at very closely, as the administration is looking at the broader question over whether to apply sanctions under CAATSA or to waive those sanctions," Lu said.​
The Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, passed in 2017 in the wake of the Kremlin's interference in U.S. elections, includes the authority to sanction transactions with Russian defense or intelligence sectors.​
The law includes waiver authority for the president that was used for Turkey, an ally in NATO, until December 2020 when the Trump administration imposed sanctions under the law for Ankara's purchase of the Russian S400 missile defense system.​
In 2016, India was named a "Major Defense Partner" with the U.S., a unique designation that serves to elevate defense trade and technology. Defense contracts between the U.S. and India are said to have amounted to $20 billion since 2008.​
India is also a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the U.S., Japan and Australia, a grouping that focuses on countering China's ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.​
President Biden held a video call with Quad leaders on Thursday, according to the White House, "to discuss the war against Ukraine and its implications for the Indo-Pacific."​
Lu told lawmakers that the administration is "in the process of trying to understand whether defense technology that we are sharing with India today can be adequately safeguarded given India's historical relationship with Russia and its defense sales."​


America... America never changes.
 

The Biden administration is weighing whether to impose sanctions against India over its stockpile of and reliance on Russian military equipment as part of the wide-ranging consequences the West is seeking to impose on Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine.​
Donald Lu, the assistant secretary of State for South Asian affairs, on Thursday told lawmakers in a hearing that the administration is weighing how threatening India's historically close military relationship with Russia is to U.S. security.​
"It's a question we're looking at very closely, as the administration is looking at the broader question over whether to apply sanctions under CAATSA or to waive those sanctions," Lu said.​
The Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, passed in 2017 in the wake of the Kremlin's interference in U.S. elections, includes the authority to sanction transactions with Russian defense or intelligence sectors.​
The law includes waiver authority for the president that was used for Turkey, an ally in NATO, until December 2020 when the Trump administration imposed sanctions under the law for Ankara's purchase of the Russian S400 missile defense system.​
In 2016, India was named a "Major Defense Partner" with the U.S., a unique designation that serves to elevate defense trade and technology. Defense contracts between the U.S. and India are said to have amounted to $20 billion since 2008.​
India is also a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the U.S., Japan and Australia, a grouping that focuses on countering China's ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.​
President Biden held a video call with Quad leaders on Thursday, according to the White House, "to discuss the war against Ukraine and its implications for the Indo-Pacific."​
Lu told lawmakers that the administration is "in the process of trying to understand whether defense technology that we are sharing with India today can be adequately safeguarded given India's historical relationship with Russia and its defense sales."​


America... America never changes.
If they invoke CAATSA which I very much doubt , it's good bye to Indo US ties . In turn this would put the present GoI under tremendous pressure vis a vis China.
 
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If they invoke CAATSA which I very much doubt , it's good bye to Indo US ties . In turn this would put the present GoI under tremendous pressure vis a vis China.

Just yesterday , Biden was talking about QUAD

Our simple question should be if Europe buys Russian Oil , then why India cannot buy Weapons

This has now become a political drama by US
 
Just yesterday , Biden was talking about QUAD

Our simple question should be if Europe buys Russian Oil , then why India cannot buy Weapons

This has now become a political drama by US
Pls do not post juvenile arguments like Paddy & underaged urchin. When was CAATSA ever about what's fair & not about power projection?
 
Our simple question should be if Europe buys Russian Oil , then why India cannot buy Weapons
Well there's an obvious difference since it's not with oil but with weapons that Russia is attempting to take over Ukraine.

But it doesn't change the simple fact that it's really stupid of the Americans to talk about hitting India with sanctions. Stupid, but expected. American diplomacy these last thirty years has been about shouting loudly while waving a big stick. They don't seem to understand how this can be counterproductive when attempting to recruit an ally...
 
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Ahead of Lavrov’s arrival, U.S. to send Deputy NSA to India​

The visit of U.S. Deputy NSA Daleep Singh comes just before Russian Foreign Minister travels to India​


Just ahead of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to India this week, the Biden administration is sending its chief strategist on sanctions against Russia for the war in Ukraine, Deputy National Security Adviser Daleep Singh. Mr. Singh is due to be in Delhi for meetings on Thursday, while Mr. Lavrov will hold meetings with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and other officials on Friday, after arriving from Beijing where he is attending a conference on Afghanistan.

The U.S. Deputy NSA’s visit also coincides with that of British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, who will hold meetings at South Block and address a think tank event jointly with Mr. Jaishankar on Thursday, and comes amidst a flurry of visits by a number of countries, including China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, keen to discuss India’s stand on the Ukraine crisis. In particular, Mr. Singh is visiting Delhi one week after U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland visited for meetings about the Ukraine crisis, and ahead of India-U.S. “2+2” Foreign and Defence ministerial consultations that will take place in Washington in mid-April.

Rush of visitors​

When asked whether the Deputy NSA’s visit, which has not yet been announced, had been timed so as to pre-empt discussions with Mr. Lavrov, an official said Mr. Singh’s travel plans had been “made before reports about the Russian Foreign Minister had appeared”. However, it is clear that the number of visitors to the Ministry of External Affairs and the National Security Council in the past month is unprecedented, with the U.S.’s European and Quad partners Japan and Australia making public comments about Russia, and indicating clearly that they hoped to change India’s position, where it has abstained at the United Nations on Ukraine resolutions, and is now working on payment mechanisms to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions against Russia on Indian trade and energy purchases.

As The Hindu had reported earlier this week, Mr. Lavrov’s visit to Delhi is expected to brief the government on Russia’s action in Ukraine, the peace talk, and will also focus on the Russian offer of discounted oil for India, something the government is said to be considering strongly. In addition, a team from Russia’s Central Bank is in India this week to discuss payment mechanisms using Indian and Russian banks, and Rupee-Rouble transactions to avoid the growing number of sanctions placed by the European Union, the United States, and partners, adding up to more than 40 countries in all.

On Monday, the European Union’s special envoy on Indo-Pacific, Gabriele Visentin, held talks with the Ministry of External Affairs, and apart from discussing the EU’s “strategic compass”, spoke about the European call for support for its joint stand against Russia.

EU ‘unhappy‘​

When asked about Mr. Lavrov’s impending visit, and discussions in Delhi on how to strengthen alternative payment mechanisms for trade between India and Russia, Mr. Visentin told The Hindu that the EU was “not pleased” with India’s abstention votes while the EU cannot tell New Delhi what to do, it “[would] not welcome any act, which would help Russia to circumvent the U.S., its partners and the EU’s sanctions regime.” Significantly, the EU’s Mission in South Delhi flies a banner representing the Ukrainian flag colours of blue and yellow, and Mr. Visentin wore a blue and yellow ribbon in solidarity with Ukraine during the ongoing war.

Mr. Singh, who was recently appointed U.S. President Joe Biden’s Deputy National Security Adviser for international economics, has been tasked with formulating and implementing the U.S. sanctions against Russia, and is expected to reinforce that message delivered by the EU and U.K. officials. The sanctions thus far include financial bans on banks, companies and individuals close to the Kremlin, as well as targeted sanctions against Russian President Vladimir Putin, his Cabinet and Duma (Parliament) members. The 46-year old economic analyst Mr. Singh who was previously in former President Barack Obama’s treasury team, has worked on sanctions against Russia in the past as well, in 2014 after Russia annexed Crimea.
 

India-US to hold two plus two dialogue around April 11​

In the backdrop of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, defence minister Rajnath Singh and external affairs minister S Jaishankar will meet their US counterparts around April 11 to further cement defence and political ties as well as exchange notes on Ukraine and Indo-Pacific theatres of concern. This will be the first dialogue in two plus two formats between India and US since President Joe Biden occupied the White House.

While India has noted with concern public statements from the US about New Delhi being “shaky” and “wrong side of history”, the stand of the Narendra Modi government is quite unambiguous on Ukraine as it has called for the complete cessation of violence, resolution of differences through dialogue and for the territorial integrity of nation-states. PM Modi has communicated the same stance to Russian President Putin as well as Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during telephonic conversations. New Delhi also remembers the silence from EU countries particularly Germany in criticizing China for PLA’s unilateral transgression on East Ladakh LAC in May 2020. The same EU countries are still buying oil and gas from Russia while being sanctimonious towards India over the Ukraine war.



30mar-page1_1648604874822.jpg

Cementing bilateral ties
During the two plus two dialogue, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defence Secretary Llyod Austin are expected to share the American assessment of the Ukraine war, which is now dragging along with Russian forces losing steam and Moscow redefining war objectives.

The two sides will also share assessments on the Indo-Pacific with the Chinese Navy growing by the day and PLA dragging its feet on restoring peace and tranquillity on the East Ladakh LAC. The fact is that the PLA is still fully deployed in the occupied Aksai Chin area with heavy weaponry and long-range missiles in-depth areas of Xinjiang and Tibet.

India and US will also increase defence cooperation with the American F-18 deck based fighter being considered for the soon to be commissioned aircraft carrier INS Vikrant. The twin-engine multirole combat jet is expected to undergo ski jump trials at INS Hamla in Goa in April-May with trials of Rafale-M already concluded in January this year. The Indian Navy is expected to purchase at least 36 jets for INS Vikrant as indigenous deck based fighter is years away from fruition.

While India wants to indigenously develop armed drones under PM Modi’s “Atmanirbhar Bharat” initiative, the two sides are expected to discuss how US defence majors can set up shop in India in tie-up with domestic manufacturers and manufacture major defence hardware provided Pentagon does not attack legal or operational strings to the project.

The two sides will also discuss Afghanistan with the Taliban continuing with regressive measures and hardline implementation of Islamic laws by keeping girls out of schools and women out of jobs. The political situation in Afghanistan continues to be grim with traditional Taliban leaders led by Mullah Yaqoob at loggerheads with the Pakistani ISI backed Haqqani Network led by global terrorist Sirajuddin Haqqani. The same political flux holds true for Pakistan with Prime Minister Imran Khan facing a strong challenge in a no-confidence motion moved by the Opposition. With China behind his back, Imran Khan has added the US to the list of enemies led by India while taking no action against terror groups proliferating in the Islamic Republic in the name of jihad in Kashmir and beyond.