IMO, IA does not need fixed wing aircarfts for CAS. Upcoming our Helis in numbers plus Apache should be enough where IAF will be dominating in our as well as enemy air space along with S-400 cover.
Opinion INDIAN ARMY AVIATION: A CASE FOR FIXED WING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
- Thread starter Hellfire
- Start date
Well, about 60 kms is the total area in length from the Division's front line to its main logistic supply base. Ideally 30 kms is from where it replenishes its immediate requirements, I am putting a 60 km mark to exhibit greater reserves and staging areas of troops etc. I am assuming here ... not giving exact figures as they are not for public domain. Our aim must be to target these dumps/staging areas ... now you can not have your 155 Medium Artillery at frontline to give you the range even to target the immediate replenishment areas at 30 kms mark, anyways, it is out of a 155 mm's range. And MBRLs are area denial weapons; would you be using it on enemy's front lines in an attack/combat staging areas in a defensive fire or would you be employing it to disrupt logistics in depth and praying for the enemy attack to be beaten back by your own defensive fire tasks, armour and infantry ? Remember, IBGs are offensive formations and even if we are to take the Pivot Corps, they are not defensive but are supposed to start offensive tasks immediately.
Your 155 mm will be certain kilometers behind your own frontlines, MBRLs too, in order to survive a counter battery fire from the enemy. If you take the figures for ranges of the weapon systems, you will see what I aver to. Not only should we aim to hit the 60 kms mark, but also try and disrupt all attempts by the enemy to concentrate logistics and troops there. This shall allow decimation of enemy forces at the front lines, deny timely replenishment of the enemy forces and enable exploitation of any break through by a body/bodies of troops. Our aim is to break through rapidly and make deep thrusts to hold territory in shortest time possible.
S400 are not going to be integrated with the armoured divisions. In a dynamic battlefield, will they be defending a troop of tank (a troop is 3 tanks) fighting in support of infantry? Nope
Again. I am delineating platforms. Army gets CAS platforms. Airforce gets multi-role, air superiority.... the whole plethora.
My 100-120 km range is to augment own land forces integral artillery (MBRL) and beyond that, CAS command and control is shifted to IAF for tasks allocated. I am envisaging IAF to be engaging enemy beyond the 100-120 kms range ..... and ensuring air dominance locally/across the theater.
All the Ground or Land Fighting will be in a Zone 30 KM MAXIMUM Inside Pakistan
The Idea is two Fold
1 ) Destroy Pak Army Heavy Assets such as Tanks, Arty Guns , APCs and MBRL Batteries
Other Assets such as SAM sites , Missile Silos will have to be Targetted by IAF
2 ) When CEASEFIRE IS ENFORCED by USA
after 5 Days , INDIAN Army must be on Pakistan Territory
This will Destroy the Pak Army Position in Pakistan Society and Instigate a Revolt in Non Punjabi Provinces
The Idea is two Fold
1 ) Destroy Pak Army Heavy Assets such as Tanks, Arty Guns , APCs and MBRL Batteries
Other Assets such as SAM sites , Missile Silos will have to be Targetted by IAF
2 ) When CEASEFIRE IS ENFORCED by USA
after 5 Days , INDIAN Army must be on Pakistan Territory
This will Destroy the Pak Army Position in Pakistan Society and Instigate a Revolt in Non Punjabi Provinces
I feel any platform design have to be chosen with enemy counter measures in mind.
Against weaker opponent LCH itself will do the job.( thinking of high numbers in service )
Against stronger opponent, survivable weapon is the desired.
Shoulder fired Sam like stinger, Anza..
Anti aircraft guns.. FW aircraft is more survivable than rotary?
What would be the ideal CAS platform in different theatre so of operations.
Like in valley, NE, plains..
( wanted to ask if MK1 LCA already cleared in air to ground role and slow speed will fit in? May be not rocket pods )
How many FW cas platform army may require.
Can we pull Ajt trainers into army in case of required scenario.
I think Air force can do so..
My views on this issue are different from @Falcon. I will now state my reasons and what I think we should have for CAS.
The first ever use of fixed wing aircraft in war was for CAS only when Italians used the aircraft to bomb Turks near Tripoli in 1911. The bombs were hand dropped by a person seated in the front part of the aircraft. After that they were used for Recce and for shooting down recce aircraft with handheld guns and that is how air combat came into being. During WW1 air power grew to be a dominant force. Two major weapons changed the course of warfare, one was the wide spread use of Machine guns and second was the use of Tanks. The use of tanks killed the horse mounted Cavalry.
WW2 saw the use of airpower in every domain of warfare from recce to bombers to anti-tank roles to fighters and escort fighters. By the end of WW2, air power had acquired the emminence which it enjoys today not only in air and land battles but also Naval engagements. During the Korean war, CAS was exclusively done by FW aircraft as the helicopters had yet to emerge in this role. It was only during Vietnam war that we saw use of Helicopters in Limited CAS role. Helicopters as offensive weapons were employed by USSR when they created MI-24 gunships. As the speed of fighter aircraft grew, the ability to distinguish targets from friendly forces and the time available to aim also reduced. While the higher speed allowed for quick reaction time, it was also a problem as nearly every aircraft was required to line up its flight path with the target and overfly it after releasing the bombs or firing guns. This gave a very predictable flight path to the aircraft and allowed easy targeting by ground troops. US forces were so badly hurt in Vietnam that they resorted to high altitude carpet bombing of Viet forces to avoid the losses. This problem was so big that use of normal fighters and Bombers for CAS was stopped. A new concept of having dedicated FW aircraft for CAS role emerged and from those QRs came A-10 warthog which had its first flight in 1972. USSR followed it with Su-25 frogfoot. These aircraft were slow compared to legacy fighters and had heavy armour plating to withstand the hits from guns used by ground troops. In every battle in which these were used, resulted in heavy damage to these aircraft.
I myself remember my days in Goa when we used to be called by MLI center in Belgaum to do dummy air attacks on trainee troops. We used to fly ultra low and the moment we pulled up in the designated area to identify targets beyond the FLOT (forward line of own Troops), we used to see troops directly in line of fire hitting the ground and every other man had his gun pointed at us. If 100s of man are going to fire at you with all they have, you will get hit come what may. It was a lesson for us also as to what to expect when we go in for CAS.
It were these things which again refined the role of FW fighters for CAS role and a need was felt to give a standoff kind of ability to aircraft to stay away from harms way and yet deliver. The result was Attack Helicopters.
contd.....................
The first ever use of fixed wing aircraft in war was for CAS only when Italians used the aircraft to bomb Turks near Tripoli in 1911. The bombs were hand dropped by a person seated in the front part of the aircraft. After that they were used for Recce and for shooting down recce aircraft with handheld guns and that is how air combat came into being. During WW1 air power grew to be a dominant force. Two major weapons changed the course of warfare, one was the wide spread use of Machine guns and second was the use of Tanks. The use of tanks killed the horse mounted Cavalry.
WW2 saw the use of airpower in every domain of warfare from recce to bombers to anti-tank roles to fighters and escort fighters. By the end of WW2, air power had acquired the emminence which it enjoys today not only in air and land battles but also Naval engagements. During the Korean war, CAS was exclusively done by FW aircraft as the helicopters had yet to emerge in this role. It was only during Vietnam war that we saw use of Helicopters in Limited CAS role. Helicopters as offensive weapons were employed by USSR when they created MI-24 gunships. As the speed of fighter aircraft grew, the ability to distinguish targets from friendly forces and the time available to aim also reduced. While the higher speed allowed for quick reaction time, it was also a problem as nearly every aircraft was required to line up its flight path with the target and overfly it after releasing the bombs or firing guns. This gave a very predictable flight path to the aircraft and allowed easy targeting by ground troops. US forces were so badly hurt in Vietnam that they resorted to high altitude carpet bombing of Viet forces to avoid the losses. This problem was so big that use of normal fighters and Bombers for CAS was stopped. A new concept of having dedicated FW aircraft for CAS role emerged and from those QRs came A-10 warthog which had its first flight in 1972. USSR followed it with Su-25 frogfoot. These aircraft were slow compared to legacy fighters and had heavy armour plating to withstand the hits from guns used by ground troops. In every battle in which these were used, resulted in heavy damage to these aircraft.
I myself remember my days in Goa when we used to be called by MLI center in Belgaum to do dummy air attacks on trainee troops. We used to fly ultra low and the moment we pulled up in the designated area to identify targets beyond the FLOT (forward line of own Troops), we used to see troops directly in line of fire hitting the ground and every other man had his gun pointed at us. If 100s of man are going to fire at you with all they have, you will get hit come what may. It was a lesson for us also as to what to expect when we go in for CAS.
It were these things which again refined the role of FW fighters for CAS role and a need was felt to give a standoff kind of ability to aircraft to stay away from harms way and yet deliver. The result was Attack Helicopters.
contd.....................
After Vietnam war, world saw two major conflicts, the 1974 Yom Kippur war and the Falklands war. Then came Iraq war. First time a new concept of CAS was tried in which the airspace was divided amongst FW and Hepters and roles clearly defined. The FW aircraft were to establish air sureriority in the battlefield and operate above the MANPADS reach which was about 15k feet while the air space below this was exclusive domain of Hepters. The FW aircraft were reduced to giving AD cover to attack hepters and also do DAS-Deep Air Strike also normally reffered to as Deep air interdiction. The methods of achieving air superiority also changed to SEAD/DEAD operations and after that non stealthy FW aircraft were used to destroy other targets. The CAS role was NEARLY exclusively given to attack hepters. The same doctrine was used later in second gulf war. Even the success of Russian forces in Syria is result of such combination of air power.
Now where does it Leave Indian Armed Forces especially Indian Army?
Unfortunately, IAF had always been treated as the Blue eyed Boys of Armed forces. They have been able to usurp nearly every asset which right fully belongs to some other sister service. In 1974 whether it was Superconnie recce aircraft or Sea strike squadron of Jaguars or MI-25/35 attack hepters. IAF managed to loot other two services.
As has been explained by @Falcon as to what constitutes CAS and the spread of area for CAS, The role of high speed FW aircraft is very limited in such a scenerio. FW aircraft should only be used beyond this umbrella and provide top cover to attack hepters engaged in CAS. The officers of each service are better trained to recognise their own and their enemy assets compared to a service which does not deal with such assets on daily basis. I am myself witness to a strike by Jaguars on the CBG when they claimed a hit while they had gone and targeted a big tanker moving about 70NM ahead of the CBG. For them every big ship is a carrier and every small ship a frigate or destroyer. I am sure same must be the case with Army tanks also. The IAF guys probably will not be able to make out a difference between Arjun and T-90 or for that matter Al-Khalid ot T-80. Can we trust such officers with an armamment which can kill anyone including our own? I am not doubting the abilities or qualifications but just stating the inherent problems.
My opinion is That we must hand over every attack hepter to IA and IAF should be relegated to the job of DAS and providing top cover for these attack hepters to allow them to operate unmolested in the air space over the battle field. The advantage of quick reaction time of fighters has been largely nullified by the ability of these hepters to operate from areas very close to frontlines and their time over target is not very different from the time over target of FW fighters operating from bases away from frontline. Finally,
Jiska kaam usiko saajay, dooja karay toh bander laagay.
CAS is the responsibility of IA and not IAF. The new concept adopted by IA of IBGs makes neccessary that all attack hepters and some transport hepters like MIL-17 should be given to IA to be made a part of each IBG as their integral air element as was the case of USSR OMGs.
Now where does it Leave Indian Armed Forces especially Indian Army?
Unfortunately, IAF had always been treated as the Blue eyed Boys of Armed forces. They have been able to usurp nearly every asset which right fully belongs to some other sister service. In 1974 whether it was Superconnie recce aircraft or Sea strike squadron of Jaguars or MI-25/35 attack hepters. IAF managed to loot other two services.
As has been explained by @Falcon as to what constitutes CAS and the spread of area for CAS, The role of high speed FW aircraft is very limited in such a scenerio. FW aircraft should only be used beyond this umbrella and provide top cover to attack hepters engaged in CAS. The officers of each service are better trained to recognise their own and their enemy assets compared to a service which does not deal with such assets on daily basis. I am myself witness to a strike by Jaguars on the CBG when they claimed a hit while they had gone and targeted a big tanker moving about 70NM ahead of the CBG. For them every big ship is a carrier and every small ship a frigate or destroyer. I am sure same must be the case with Army tanks also. The IAF guys probably will not be able to make out a difference between Arjun and T-90 or for that matter Al-Khalid ot T-80. Can we trust such officers with an armamment which can kill anyone including our own? I am not doubting the abilities or qualifications but just stating the inherent problems.
My opinion is That we must hand over every attack hepter to IA and IAF should be relegated to the job of DAS and providing top cover for these attack hepters to allow them to operate unmolested in the air space over the battle field. The advantage of quick reaction time of fighters has been largely nullified by the ability of these hepters to operate from areas very close to frontlines and their time over target is not very different from the time over target of FW fighters operating from bases away from frontline. Finally,
Jiska kaam usiko saajay, dooja karay toh bander laagay.
CAS is the responsibility of IA and not IAF. The new concept adopted by IA of IBGs makes neccessary that all attack hepters and some transport hepters like MIL-17 should be given to IA to be made a part of each IBG as their integral air element as was the case of USSR OMGs.
I understand that the arms procurement process and bureaucracy is terrible for the IAF, but will inducting these platforms into the IA (which has never operated FW aircraft?) really be faster than enhancing IAF capabilities? It feels counter-intuitive, and would take eons for any actual induction. Additionally, weren't there efforts to form an integrated defense staff that would help coordination between the branches?
The main issue with FW versus UCAV in western doctrines is high operating costs of FW over UCAVs. This is especially relevant given that most CAS operations are against insurgencies in prolonged conflict. The A-10 is the prime target which the USAF really wanted to replace but was stopped mainly by Congress. The cost of maintaining the A-10 itself is more expensive than acquiring and operating something like the Super Tucano with all its munitions, or even just more MQ9s. While I'm sure officers in the USAF love the jet, it is just too expensive to justify keeping around.
While a pilot can't be jammed as easily, their losses are felt more acutely. It is much more difficult to replace pilots than it is to replace drones.
This is true, but even then look at the performance of CAS aircraft like the A-10 against Iraqi forces in the Gulf War. The A-10 was the most heavily damaged aircraft of the campaign and suffered the most losses. In spite of the immense superiority of Coalition forces, they still lost over 75 aircraft (total between aircraft and coalition countries) to Saddam's forces.
You are right. India faces a much more uphill battle against much better equipped and trained foes when compared to the Coalition forces in the Gulf War. Losses of slow, low flying CAS jets will probably be monumentally higher.
These points are reflective of the desires of Congress (namely McCain), not the will of the USAF. The USAF wants to prepare itself for near-peer adversaries and conflicts in contested environments. The fact of the matter is the A-10 is not survivable in a modern air threat environment. Modern SAMs do not care about a titanium bathtub. The best defense is not being hit in the first place, which is why stealth is a key design feature in 5th-gen aircraft and hypersonics is the next big thing in military aviation.
UAVs and UCAVs are an asset only in uncontested air space. In any contested air space they will meet the same fate which PA drons had post Balakot. They are useless in a full blown conflict. Even Houthis have shot them dowm on many occassions and who can forget the CAPTURE of the most sophisticated UCAV of USAF by Iranians.
I am still failing to understand why pinaka cant be used in these scenarios and have backup from NAMICA ? it is cheaper approach and recent pinaka trials proved it to be more accurate like 50 CEP.
What about moving targets or targets which are beyond the reach of Pinaka? How about hunter and search capability? A battlefield is a highly dynamic field with things moving very rapidly and surprises are not surprises but norms.
@vstol Jockey
How Much Time will Army Require to Become Fully Operational on New FW assets
Who will train them , Who will maintain the planes , What about Armaments , Airbases
Will we make New Airbases for Army FW planes
Who will be the Ground Controller
There are so many practical issues to be sorted
There is NO virtue in RE INVENTING the Wheel
How Much Time will Army Require to Become Fully Operational on New FW assets
Who will train them , Who will maintain the planes , What about Armaments , Airbases
Will we make New Airbases for Army FW planes
Who will be the Ground Controller
There are so many practical issues to be sorted
There is NO virtue in RE INVENTING the Wheel
We need Full Integration of IAF and Army in
Operational Areas and During Conflicts
We can Issue Written Orders that IAF Squadrons will be Commanded by The Corps Commanders
Operational Areas and During Conflicts
We can Issue Written Orders that IAF Squadrons will be Commanded by The Corps Commanders
I' am of an opinion that IA should invest in drones so that they could be deployed for scanning the ground and searching the locations of their SAM batteries through EW and other sort of measures and relaying live imagery to the airborne fighters so that without wasting a single minute they can release their payload from standoff range.
It will Not just be a Waste of Human resources , But also involve Huge sums of Money
As Far as I have Read ,ALL Exercises after 2004 , ie when Cold Start was first unveiled
Have been JOINT exercises
Are we saying that even 15 years later
We have NOT been able to achieve JOINTNESS
Now that technology has improved a lot in target acquisition, classification and networking, can't the FW aircraft above the manpad range do CAS role?
Swarm drones for suicide mission or small missiles/bombs that can track and destroy..
They do CAS but not in the umbrella as mentioned by @Falcon. That area remains exclusive domain of Hepters. Infact very recently US used hepters for SEAD/DEAD also. Hepters being slow can do nap of the earth flying and very difficult to pick up and target. Infact during day time in deserts, the range of MANPAD seekers also reduces. Giving that much more advantage to Hepters. The use of DIRCM is another thing which has made hepters better suited for this role. In second Gulf war, no Hepter was lost to enemy fire even in contact zone.
use of air power in Kargil war was a case of CAS by FW aircraft. The attack on Munthadhalo being one such example.
Correct and in correct.
The modern battlefield has evolved tremendously with emphasis primarily in denial of capabilities (of fielding and concentrating platforms/forces) with their destruction being a secondary objective.
You achieve the former by two measures:
1. Destruction of support infrastructure (bridges etc), denial of concentration of forces by enemy in depth (of their own territory) to reinforce defensive positions/forces.
2. Destruction of the major storage sites of ammunition, spares etc. which are within easy reach (in terms of hours and not days) in terms of ability to provide logistical support in a very short time to defensive forces.
For Point #1, that is why the call for dedicated FW CAS for IA in Army Aviation - enables an 'on demand' platform. This will circumvent the time consuming process of communicating and then allocating a suitable a platform from IAF, a process that may see a complete change of the position of these highly mobile platforms.
For the other point, yes and no. SEAD missions will be carried out against long range SAMs by platforms meant for same, already ear marked and allotted tasks of IAF as also for the latter, IAF has been tasked.