I understand that the arms procurement process and bureaucracy is terrible for the IAF, but will inducting these platforms into the IA (which has never operated FW aircraft?) really be faster than enhancing IAF capabilities? It feels counter-intuitive, and would take eons for any actual induction. Additionally, weren't there efforts to form an integrated defense staff that would help coordination between the branches?
I do hope that you are aware that pilots are cross attached to sister services? IAF used to regularly attach pilots for Aviation till Indian Army Aviation took off on its own. Even now, IN Pilot was flying the Army Commander Northern Command when the ALH accident took place. The pilot from IN was flying to get greater operational experience and had a Master Green Indian Army Aviation Pilot along.
Coordination at Staff level is quite different from coordination in a battle field. Hence I had mentioned that there has to be a partnership established with integration of IAF-IA at theater level. With battle moving into multiple domains ... air, land, sea, sub-surface, information, internet, assymetric assets, space ... a new concept has come to fore - of multi domain operations, as suggested by various academia in US. While the 'multi domain' aspect of any conflict has always been a reality, the fact that the US again was the first one to concretely write something on it, must be considered while crediting them for this too.
It is this space that shall see an increased need for integration of IAF-IA at theater level, something that IBG is sorely dependent on, and IN where applicable. IAF has started moving into Space, hence, there needs to be an effort to redefine its role.
The main issue with FW versus UCAV in western doctrines is high operating costs of FW over UCAVs. This is especially relevant given that most CAS operations are against insurgencies in prolonged conflict. The A-10 is the prime target which the USAF really wanted to replace but was stopped mainly by Congress. The cost of maintaining the A-10 itself is more expensive than acquiring and operating something like the Super Tucano with all its munitions, or even just more MQ9s. While I'm sure officers in the USAF love the jet, it is just too expensive to justify keeping around.
While a pilot can't be jammed as easily, their losses are felt more acutely. It is much more difficult to replace pilots than it is to replace drones.
The main challenges India faces is not of insurgency, as we have to fight the same on our own territory and there an indiscriminate fire will result in catastrophic results for us. The main challenge is planning for and executing an action against a potential collusive threat, howsoever, remote it may be.
This is true, but even then look at the performance of CAS aircraft like the
A-10 against Iraqi forces in the Gulf War. The A-10 was the most heavily damaged aircraft of the campaign and suffered the most losses. In spite of the immense superiority of Coalition forces, they still lost over 75 aircraft (total between aircraft and coalition countries) to Saddam's forces.
You are right. India faces a much more uphill battle against much better equipped and trained foes when compared to the Coalition forces in the Gulf War. Losses of slow, low flying CAS jets will probably be monumentally higher.
Losses will be there, irrespective of what you use. The probability of your UCAVs being jammed is also there. Whereas a FW can be used to specifically target opposing enemy forces in near proximity to own forces at frontline from a greater standoff range and height, thereby severely reducing the risk of own losses. I am not talking of FW based CAS exclusively, but a mixed formation strike force.