India's measly $10-$20 billion looks like rounding error in the fight for chips. No point in going to a nuclear war with a pocket knife.
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Biden Sparks a $2 Trillion Arms Race Over Chips, Green Subsidies
Story by Alan Crawford •
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U.S. President Biden© Getty Images
(Bloomberg Businessweek) -- When French President Emmanuel Macron arrived in Washington for a state visit in
December, he groused that it’s
not in America’s interest if much of Europe’s industry is “just killed.” South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, who visited the White House on April 26, has warned of a widening “economic war” of government subsidies and tax perks that could leave all nations worse off.
Both were expressing alarm at the international fallout of the US-China rivalry and President Joe Biden’s Made in America policies. Europe and South Korea—important trade and security partners for the US—are among the most exposed to the Biden administration’s two-pronged agenda of supporting strategic industries such as electric vehicles, semiconductors and artificial intelligence while working to hobble China’s efforts to make advances in those same fields for military purposes.
America’s newly muscular industrial policy is already warping global supply chains. Laws Congress approved last year together offer about $420 billion in funding to incentivize the domestic production of chips and clean-energy technologies. Add the infrastructure bill Biden signed in 2021, which requires that all iron, steel and other construction materials used in public-works projects be made in the US, and you’ve got about $2 trillion in federal spending over 10 years.
One effect of all this cash sloshing around—intended or not—is that overseas businesses feel a gravitational pull toward the US to tap the funds available under the
Chips and Science Act and the
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). For instance, Swedish battery maker Northvolt AB has said it is
prioritizing expansion in the US over Europe. German carmaker Volkswagen AG already opted in March to build a
$2 billion factory for its new electric Scout brand in South Carolina, describing the incentives on offer as akin to “a gold rush.”
The diversion of corporate investment is one consequence of the Biden administration’s efforts to integrate domestic and foreign policy in what National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has
called “a modern industrial and innovation strategy” that creates jobs at home while projecting American strength abroad. To advance those goals, Washington is prepared to wield sticks as well as carrots. Sullivan has described export controls as “a new strategic asset” to impose costs on adversaries in the name of national security.
The upshot is that South Korea—whose largest trading partner is China—risks getting whacked on at least two fronts. Companies including Samsung Electronics Co. and SK Hynix Inc., the world’s two largest memory chipmakers, were granted a one-year reprieve from US
export controls on supplying advanced semiconductor technology to China. It remains unclear what happens when that runs out this October.
Seoul has also expressed concern that Hyundai and other South Korean car marques will be penalized by the IRA because they don’t manufacture EVs in the US, meaning their models don’t qualify for federal tax credits on EV purchases. The chief executives of Samsung and Hyundai Motor Co. were part of
a large delegation of business leaders that accompanied Yoon on his trip to Washington.
Even as he warned that supply chains were being upended by a global race to build out cutting-edge manufacturing facilities, with each country “sparing nothing” to bring industry home, Yoon in March announced South Korea’s intention to jump into the fray with a 550 trillion won ($413 billion) investment plan focused on public-private partnerships in chips, batteries, robots, EVs, displays, biotechnology and other areas.
Cow Eats Corn Straight From Feeder
Seoul is not alone: From The Hague to Tokyo, governments are compelled to bend to Washington’s will or respond in kind. On April 18, the European Union approved a €43 billion ($47.2 billion)
Chips Act that opens the door to state funding for the likes of ASML Holding NV, a Dutch manufacturer of chipmaking equipment whose exports to China have been curtailed at America’s behest. The EU is also lining up massive subsidies to counter the impact of the IRA, which carries close to $370 billion in funding to help the Biden administration meet climate goals. In Canada, Justin Trudeau’s government dangled incentives worth as much as C$13 billion ($9.5 billion) over a decade to land a Volkswagen
battery plant that might have been destined for the US.
In Japan, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., the world’s go-to maker of advanced chips, has made it known it’s looking for the government to pick up about
half the $8 billion cost of a new fabrication plant under construction in Kumamoto Prefecture.
While Seoul is willing to go along with the US on matters of national security, there is still “deep concern” among Korean private companies over what’s seen as “discriminatory” elements in Biden’s policies, said Wonho Yeon of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, speaking at
an April 18 forum organized by the Wilson Center to mark Yoon’s visit.
China is redoubling efforts to advance its semiconductor industry in the face of what President Xi Jinping calls US attempts at “containment.” Xi recently urged on Chinese tech companies, saying innovation is key to achieving “high-level technological self-reliance.”
With both China and the US engaging in “this new economic statecraft,” third countries “are facing a dilemma in keeping the balance between domestic politics and foreign policy,” said Miyeon Oh, director of Korea Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies at the April 18 event. “Frictions” between allies, including over the IRA, should be seen as part of a “learning process,” she said.
With their deep pockets, the EU, Japan and Korea can at least afford to go some way to matching the US. Others cannot. The UK, with its economy sputtering, has little new funding in its response to the IRA.
In a
lengthy critique of Biden’s industrial policy published in
Foreign Policy, Adam Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, called the approach ultimately “self-defeating” because it’s based on “four profound analytic fallacies: that self-dealing is smart; that self-sufficiency is attainable; that more subsidies are better; and that local production is what matters.”
There are signs the administration is tweaking its policy to address some of the concerns raised by allies. Washington and Tokyo struck a deal in March to
allow critical minerals sourced in Japan to qualify for IRA subsidies, despite the countries not having a free-trade agreement (FTA). The EU, which has tempered its initial criticism of the US measures, is in talks for a similar arrangement. (To qualify for incentives offered in the IRA, automakers must not only build their EVs in the US but will also need to certify that components come from the US or FTA partners.)
In another sign that the Biden administration is trying to be accommodative, a loophole has been carved into the IRA that allows Hyundai to access full US subsidies for rental and leased EVs, a market that makes up more than 25% of its US sales. Samsung has submitted a statement of intent to tap chip subsidies for an advanced plant it’s building in Texas that’s due to start production in 2024,
Dong-A Ilbo newspaper reported April 19.
It’s surely an irony not lost on Yoon that South Korea was seen as the country most at risk from Xi’s industrial master plan for China when it was unveiled in 2015. The blueprint, called “Made in China 2025,” trumpeted Beijing’s ambitions to lead the world in 10 future-oriented industries, including robotics, pharmaceuticals and aerospace. Its focus on “self-sufficiency” contributed to the souring of relations with the US, Europe and Asia.
The US strategy laid out by Sullivan has echoes of that plan, with goals to maintain and defend America’s lead in three “force multiplier” areas: computing, including chips and AI; clean tech; and—the administration’s likely next focus—biotech and biomanufacturing. The risk is that it has a similarly alienating effect.
Biden is already touting the creation of new US jobs as a result of these policies as his campaign for reelection next year gears up. Call it “Made in America 2024.”
—With Sam Kim
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