Islamic Republic of Pakistan : News, Discussions & Updates
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As @vstol Jockey previously said, infighting is ongoing in full swing.
Imran Khan's relations with mentor Gen Qamar Bajwa enter trouble zone
By Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury I ET Bureau | Updated: May 19, 2019, 05.08 PM IST
Recently, Bajwa also requested Imran Khan to offer some conciliatory gestures to the political opposition.
Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan's relationship with army chief and his mentor of sorts Gen Qamar Bajwa has developed strains over issues concerning functioning of the government.
Gen Bajwa, the all-powerful army chief, has been unhappy with the overall performance of the Khan-led government, including handling of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), persons familiar with Pakistan politics and civil-military ties told ET.
The army is of the opinion that it did not face FATF sanctions when Gen (retired) Pervez Musharraf was president, though a number of terrorist groups operated openly, one of the persons cited earlier said. He added that the army also feels that earlier there was less global criticism of people’s disappearances and treatment of religious minorities.
Amid the uneasiness between the two, Bajwa is said to have put his weight behind the recent cabinet reshuffle, which is being seen as an attempt to shift power away from Khan towards nominees of the military.
The new Interior Minister, Brigadier Ijaz Shah, allegedly appointed at the behest of the army chief, was director of the Intelligence Bureau under Musharraf. Shah is alleged to have run terrorist operations in Jammu & Kashmir when he served in the Inter-Services Intelligence.
When Musharraf tried to nominate Ijaz Shah as High Commissioner to Australia, the Australian government had withheld the ambassadorial appointment. Shah was also accused of playing a key role in harbouring Osama bin Laden and was named by Benazir Bhutto as someone plotting to kill her.
Another controversial appointment is that of Nadeem Babar, who is not a member of parliament, one of 16 such persons in Khan’s 47-member cabinet.
Insiders say that Khan now wants to send a signal to the outside world that he is not the military’s puppet and should not be treated as one. ET has learnt that Khan has started snubbing Gen Bajwa in one form or the other, which is likely to worsen civilian government-military relations in the coming days.
When Khan went to inaugurate the Mohmand dam on May 2, the army chief requested him to accompany him on his military plane to Mohmand agency Imran apparently refused on the grounds that since he had multiple programmes, he would prefer to fly separately.
After the ceremony, Bajwa again requested Khan to accompany him on his plane to Peshawar to discuss important issues, but Imran again avoided it saying he had other engagements.
Recently, Bajwa also requested Imran Khan to offer some conciliatory gestures to the political opposition. However, PM Imran Khan criticized the opposition and refused to announce any conciliatory gestures to the opposition, drawing ire of Bajwa, insiders point out.
According to insiders, Bajwa, who is set to retire in November, wants an extension and he has sought the help of the US to put pressure on Khan for it. However, another rumour doing the rounds is that Bajwa is undecided about seeking an extension.
Bajwa is also thinking of going to Saudi Arabia to lead the Islamic Army command, following in the footsteps of Gen Raheel Sharif, a former Pakistan army chief, ET has learnt. The Saudi assignment is financially lucrative and might be a better way to transition out of the army’s command.
At the last Pak Army Corps Commanders meeting, the commanders asked Bajwa to make sure that the current set up (civil-military) is in working order before he retires, ET has learnt.
Imran Khan's relations with mentor Gen Qamar Bajwa enter trouble zone
Imran Khan's relations with mentor Gen Qamar Bajwa enter trouble zone
By Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury I ET Bureau | Updated: May 19, 2019, 05.08 PM IST
Recently, Bajwa also requested Imran Khan to offer some conciliatory gestures to the political opposition.
Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan's relationship with army chief and his mentor of sorts Gen Qamar Bajwa has developed strains over issues concerning functioning of the government.
Gen Bajwa, the all-powerful army chief, has been unhappy with the overall performance of the Khan-led government, including handling of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), persons familiar with Pakistan politics and civil-military ties told ET.
The army is of the opinion that it did not face FATF sanctions when Gen (retired) Pervez Musharraf was president, though a number of terrorist groups operated openly, one of the persons cited earlier said. He added that the army also feels that earlier there was less global criticism of people’s disappearances and treatment of religious minorities.
Amid the uneasiness between the two, Bajwa is said to have put his weight behind the recent cabinet reshuffle, which is being seen as an attempt to shift power away from Khan towards nominees of the military.
The new Interior Minister, Brigadier Ijaz Shah, allegedly appointed at the behest of the army chief, was director of the Intelligence Bureau under Musharraf. Shah is alleged to have run terrorist operations in Jammu & Kashmir when he served in the Inter-Services Intelligence.
When Musharraf tried to nominate Ijaz Shah as High Commissioner to Australia, the Australian government had withheld the ambassadorial appointment. Shah was also accused of playing a key role in harbouring Osama bin Laden and was named by Benazir Bhutto as someone plotting to kill her.
Another controversial appointment is that of Nadeem Babar, who is not a member of parliament, one of 16 such persons in Khan’s 47-member cabinet.
Insiders say that Khan now wants to send a signal to the outside world that he is not the military’s puppet and should not be treated as one. ET has learnt that Khan has started snubbing Gen Bajwa in one form or the other, which is likely to worsen civilian government-military relations in the coming days.
When Khan went to inaugurate the Mohmand dam on May 2, the army chief requested him to accompany him on his military plane to Mohmand agency Imran apparently refused on the grounds that since he had multiple programmes, he would prefer to fly separately.
After the ceremony, Bajwa again requested Khan to accompany him on his plane to Peshawar to discuss important issues, but Imran again avoided it saying he had other engagements.
Recently, Bajwa also requested Imran Khan to offer some conciliatory gestures to the political opposition. However, PM Imran Khan criticized the opposition and refused to announce any conciliatory gestures to the opposition, drawing ire of Bajwa, insiders point out.
According to insiders, Bajwa, who is set to retire in November, wants an extension and he has sought the help of the US to put pressure on Khan for it. However, another rumour doing the rounds is that Bajwa is undecided about seeking an extension.
Bajwa is also thinking of going to Saudi Arabia to lead the Islamic Army command, following in the footsteps of Gen Raheel Sharif, a former Pakistan army chief, ET has learnt. The Saudi assignment is financially lucrative and might be a better way to transition out of the army’s command.
At the last Pak Army Corps Commanders meeting, the commanders asked Bajwa to make sure that the current set up (civil-military) is in working order before he retires, ET has learnt.
Imran Khan's relations with mentor Gen Qamar Bajwa enter trouble zone
More than 400 children infected with HIV 'by rogue doctor' in Pakistan
Somehow AID / AIDS & Pakistan are intrinsically linked.
@zarvan ; @safriz
Somehow AID / AIDS & Pakistan are intrinsically linked.
@zarvan ; @safriz
How China helped Pakistan build the bomb
China helped Pakistan build a nuclear bomb. But this was not a one-way street. Pakistan, in turn, gave China access to Western technology, according to a new book by Andrew Small. An extract
By TT Bureau
In January 2004, a strange handover ceremony took place in Tripoli. In a meeting room at Libya's National Board for Scientific Research, the country's nuclear chief, Matuq Mohammed Matuq, presented two white plastic bags to Donald Mahley and David Landsman, the American and British heads of the disarmament effort in Libya. Emblazoned on the bags in red letters was the name of an Islamabad tailor, Good Looks Fabrics and Tailors. The contents were so sensitive that most of the senior members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did not even have the security clearance to look at them. The task of examining the documents was left to Jacques Baute, a French IAEA official, who confirmed their veracity and sent them on a plane straight to Washington, where they were taken from Dulles Airport by armed couriers to a high security vault at the Department of Energy. One of the bags contained drawings and blueprints. The other contained detailed technical instructions. Between them, they provided step-by-step instructions for assembling a nuclear bomb.
It was not hard to work out where they had originated. While the primary text was in English, a number of the papers were in Chinese. There was also a collection of handwritten notes based on a set of lectures given by Chinese weapons experts in the early 1980s, whose names, and the dates the seminars spanned, were included in the documents. The design in the documents was for a Chinese nuclear warhead, 453kg in mass, and less than a metre in diameter. It was notably similar to a weapon known to have been tested by China in the 1960s, the CHIC-4. While too large for Libyan Scud missiles, it could have been easily airdropped or fitted on a more sophisticated system, such as the North Korean Nodong missile or Iran's Shahab-3 missile. In principle, the simple device could also have been used by terrorist groups: one nuclear expert noted that "you could drive it away in a pickup truck". The documents were missing a few of the crucial designs required for implosion, but all in all there was about 95 per cent of the information needed to make a bomb - crude by the standards of modern weapons but smaller and more sophisticated than those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The deal that Colonel Gaddafi cut with the United States and the United Kingdom - the dismantling of Libya's Weapons of Mass Destruction programme in return for its emergence from pariah status - was the beginning of the end for the A.Q. Khan proliferation network. A.Q. Khan's nuclear black-marketeering had played a crucial role in bringing the bomb to Pakistan before those same nuclear secrets were sold to an assortment of rogue states. After years of denying US intelligence reports that had become increasingly incontrovertible, the haul of material in Libya finally forced the Pakistani government to act against the man who was then still a national hero, known as the "father" of the nuclear programme that had enabled Pakistan to go toe-to-toe with India. The haul even included centrifuge components that were still in their "Khan Research Lab" cargo boxes. Within days of the handover, Abdul Qadeer Khan was removed from his official position by Pakistan's National Command Authority, which controls the country's nuclear programme, and placed under house arrest...
Reinforcing Pakistan's balancing role was not the only motivation for Beijing: at least in theory, nuclear cooperation was a two-way street. Not so long before, China too had been stuck on the outside of the nuclear club. The threat of US atomic weapons being used on the Chinese mainland loomed large during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1955, prompting Beijing's decision to acquire nuclear capabilities of its own.Yet crucial Soviet assistance to China's strategic weapons programme had been abruptly curtailed as ideological tensions between Mao and Khrushchev grew. At one point, China's bomb designers made daily trips to Beijing railway station in the hope of picking up a Soviet prototype that was promised but never arrived. Moscow also reneged on its agreement to provide the uranium hexaflouride (UF6) - the gaseous uranium compound required for enrichment - that China needed for its first bomb. UF6 became the "weakest link in the chain"of China's nuclear industrial production. A few final clues for implosion were gleaned from the reassembled scraps of some shredded documents the Soviet weapons specialists left behind in China before their abrupt departure. After that the Chinese scientists were on their own.
Within a few years China would become the fifth country in the world to test a nuclear bomb, and Beijing moved quickly to acquire all the accoutrements of a strategic weapons programme.
***
In September 1976, A.Q. Khan joined the Pakistani delegation at Mao's funeral, where he and his colleagues met three leading Chinese nuclear officials, Li Jue, Liu Wei and Jiang Shengjie. Jiang Shengjie was the nuclear fuel bureau chief, and one of China's top nuclear scientists. Liu Wei managed the development of China's nuclear plants and had been in charge of the "Bureau of Architectural Technology", one of the two organs that originally launched China's nuclear weapons programme, overseeing the experimental nuclear reactor and cyclotron supplied by the Soviets. The most senior figure was Li Jue, who was in charge of research and development for China's nuclear weapons programme. He had run the Ninth Bureau - the "most secret organisation in the entire nuclear programme" - during the critical phase of its development, overseeing uranium enrichment, nuclear testing, and the weapons research facility, China's own Los Alamos. This was one of A.Q. Khan's first overseas trips as a representative of the Pakistani government. He had only made his permanent return to Pakistan at the end of the previous year, bringing with him the designs for virtually every centrifuge he could lay his hands on at URENCO's facilities in the Netherlands. By July he had established his own research laboratory reporting directly to the Pakistani Prime Minister, and by September he had settled on the Punjabi town of Kahuta, about 20 miles southeast of Islamabad, as the location for his secret plant.
While Pakistan's needs were certainly on the table in the meetings, so too were China's. He briefed them on how European-designed centrifuges could help China's enrichment programme. "Chinese experts started coming regularly to learn the whole technology" from Pakistan, A.Q. Khan states in his account. Pakistani experts were sent to Hanzhong, near the ancient Chinese capital of Xian, where they helped "put up a centrifuge plant". "We sent 135 C-130 plane loads of machines, inverters, valves, flow meters, pressure gauges," he wrote. "Our teams stayed there for weeks to help and their teams stayed here for weeks at a time." But what Pakistan got in return was far greater.
In 1982, a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft belonging to the Pakistani military left Urumqi, capital of the northwestern Chinese province of Xinjiang, headed for Islamabad carrying five lead-lined, stainless steel boxes, inside each of which were 10 single-kilogram ingots of highly enriched uranium (HEU), enough for two atomic bombs. It is likely that this was the only time a nuclear weapon state transferred HEU to a non-nuclear country for military use. China had already sent 15 tonnes of uranium hexaflouride to Pakistan - somewhat more than a bomb's worth - to ensure that the nuclear project continued on schedule: "China's gas was most likely used in Pakistan's first round of enrichment while the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was still struggling with UF6 production," according to one Pakistani nuclear expert's account. Their scientists had also been closely involved in technical cooperation, as a regular visitor to Khan Research Laboratories explains: "The Chinese were working on triggering mechanisms, the centrifuges, vacuum systems. They brought rocket propellant and super-hard metals like maraging steel... They brought in fissile material and Khan gave them the data on enrichment and metallurgy. They helped Pakistan import and experiment with high explosives and Khan gave them his work on the centrifuge rotors." Chinese officials stayed at Khan's guesthouse at Kahuta, which was done up in the style of a Chinese hall.
But by 1982, General Zia was nervous about the slow pace of Pakistan's progress. The Israeli strike on Osirak, destroying Iraq's latent nuclear programme, drew fears that India could do the same thing - or even the Israelis themselves. Five days before the operation, the Israeli ambassador to the UN had warned that "there is abundant evidence indicating that [Pakistan] is producing nuclear weapons". Israel had made plans for a pre-emptive attack. As had India. Even Moscow was now a potential threat - Pakistan had already embarked on its programme of support for the mujahideen's anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, with the obvious risk of retaliation. Zia sent his military aide, Lieutenant-General Syed Ali Zamin Naqvi, to request weapons grade fissile material and the bomb design from China, in an effort to speed Pakistan's efforts along. Deng Xiaoping agreed. In each area where the Soviets had pulled the plug on Beijing, the Chinese would prove to be far more obliging to the Pakistanis.
Source: How China helped Pakistan build the bomb
China helped Pakistan build a nuclear bomb. But this was not a one-way street. Pakistan, in turn, gave China access to Western technology, according to a new book by Andrew Small. An extract
By TT Bureau
In January 2004, a strange handover ceremony took place in Tripoli. In a meeting room at Libya's National Board for Scientific Research, the country's nuclear chief, Matuq Mohammed Matuq, presented two white plastic bags to Donald Mahley and David Landsman, the American and British heads of the disarmament effort in Libya. Emblazoned on the bags in red letters was the name of an Islamabad tailor, Good Looks Fabrics and Tailors. The contents were so sensitive that most of the senior members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did not even have the security clearance to look at them. The task of examining the documents was left to Jacques Baute, a French IAEA official, who confirmed their veracity and sent them on a plane straight to Washington, where they were taken from Dulles Airport by armed couriers to a high security vault at the Department of Energy. One of the bags contained drawings and blueprints. The other contained detailed technical instructions. Between them, they provided step-by-step instructions for assembling a nuclear bomb.
It was not hard to work out where they had originated. While the primary text was in English, a number of the papers were in Chinese. There was also a collection of handwritten notes based on a set of lectures given by Chinese weapons experts in the early 1980s, whose names, and the dates the seminars spanned, were included in the documents. The design in the documents was for a Chinese nuclear warhead, 453kg in mass, and less than a metre in diameter. It was notably similar to a weapon known to have been tested by China in the 1960s, the CHIC-4. While too large for Libyan Scud missiles, it could have been easily airdropped or fitted on a more sophisticated system, such as the North Korean Nodong missile or Iran's Shahab-3 missile. In principle, the simple device could also have been used by terrorist groups: one nuclear expert noted that "you could drive it away in a pickup truck". The documents were missing a few of the crucial designs required for implosion, but all in all there was about 95 per cent of the information needed to make a bomb - crude by the standards of modern weapons but smaller and more sophisticated than those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The deal that Colonel Gaddafi cut with the United States and the United Kingdom - the dismantling of Libya's Weapons of Mass Destruction programme in return for its emergence from pariah status - was the beginning of the end for the A.Q. Khan proliferation network. A.Q. Khan's nuclear black-marketeering had played a crucial role in bringing the bomb to Pakistan before those same nuclear secrets were sold to an assortment of rogue states. After years of denying US intelligence reports that had become increasingly incontrovertible, the haul of material in Libya finally forced the Pakistani government to act against the man who was then still a national hero, known as the "father" of the nuclear programme that had enabled Pakistan to go toe-to-toe with India. The haul even included centrifuge components that were still in their "Khan Research Lab" cargo boxes. Within days of the handover, Abdul Qadeer Khan was removed from his official position by Pakistan's National Command Authority, which controls the country's nuclear programme, and placed under house arrest...
Reinforcing Pakistan's balancing role was not the only motivation for Beijing: at least in theory, nuclear cooperation was a two-way street. Not so long before, China too had been stuck on the outside of the nuclear club. The threat of US atomic weapons being used on the Chinese mainland loomed large during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1955, prompting Beijing's decision to acquire nuclear capabilities of its own.Yet crucial Soviet assistance to China's strategic weapons programme had been abruptly curtailed as ideological tensions between Mao and Khrushchev grew. At one point, China's bomb designers made daily trips to Beijing railway station in the hope of picking up a Soviet prototype that was promised but never arrived. Moscow also reneged on its agreement to provide the uranium hexaflouride (UF6) - the gaseous uranium compound required for enrichment - that China needed for its first bomb. UF6 became the "weakest link in the chain"of China's nuclear industrial production. A few final clues for implosion were gleaned from the reassembled scraps of some shredded documents the Soviet weapons specialists left behind in China before their abrupt departure. After that the Chinese scientists were on their own.
Within a few years China would become the fifth country in the world to test a nuclear bomb, and Beijing moved quickly to acquire all the accoutrements of a strategic weapons programme.
***
In September 1976, A.Q. Khan joined the Pakistani delegation at Mao's funeral, where he and his colleagues met three leading Chinese nuclear officials, Li Jue, Liu Wei and Jiang Shengjie. Jiang Shengjie was the nuclear fuel bureau chief, and one of China's top nuclear scientists. Liu Wei managed the development of China's nuclear plants and had been in charge of the "Bureau of Architectural Technology", one of the two organs that originally launched China's nuclear weapons programme, overseeing the experimental nuclear reactor and cyclotron supplied by the Soviets. The most senior figure was Li Jue, who was in charge of research and development for China's nuclear weapons programme. He had run the Ninth Bureau - the "most secret organisation in the entire nuclear programme" - during the critical phase of its development, overseeing uranium enrichment, nuclear testing, and the weapons research facility, China's own Los Alamos. This was one of A.Q. Khan's first overseas trips as a representative of the Pakistani government. He had only made his permanent return to Pakistan at the end of the previous year, bringing with him the designs for virtually every centrifuge he could lay his hands on at URENCO's facilities in the Netherlands. By July he had established his own research laboratory reporting directly to the Pakistani Prime Minister, and by September he had settled on the Punjabi town of Kahuta, about 20 miles southeast of Islamabad, as the location for his secret plant.
While Pakistan's needs were certainly on the table in the meetings, so too were China's. He briefed them on how European-designed centrifuges could help China's enrichment programme. "Chinese experts started coming regularly to learn the whole technology" from Pakistan, A.Q. Khan states in his account. Pakistani experts were sent to Hanzhong, near the ancient Chinese capital of Xian, where they helped "put up a centrifuge plant". "We sent 135 C-130 plane loads of machines, inverters, valves, flow meters, pressure gauges," he wrote. "Our teams stayed there for weeks to help and their teams stayed here for weeks at a time." But what Pakistan got in return was far greater.
In 1982, a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft belonging to the Pakistani military left Urumqi, capital of the northwestern Chinese province of Xinjiang, headed for Islamabad carrying five lead-lined, stainless steel boxes, inside each of which were 10 single-kilogram ingots of highly enriched uranium (HEU), enough for two atomic bombs. It is likely that this was the only time a nuclear weapon state transferred HEU to a non-nuclear country for military use. China had already sent 15 tonnes of uranium hexaflouride to Pakistan - somewhat more than a bomb's worth - to ensure that the nuclear project continued on schedule: "China's gas was most likely used in Pakistan's first round of enrichment while the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was still struggling with UF6 production," according to one Pakistani nuclear expert's account. Their scientists had also been closely involved in technical cooperation, as a regular visitor to Khan Research Laboratories explains: "The Chinese were working on triggering mechanisms, the centrifuges, vacuum systems. They brought rocket propellant and super-hard metals like maraging steel... They brought in fissile material and Khan gave them the data on enrichment and metallurgy. They helped Pakistan import and experiment with high explosives and Khan gave them his work on the centrifuge rotors." Chinese officials stayed at Khan's guesthouse at Kahuta, which was done up in the style of a Chinese hall.
But by 1982, General Zia was nervous about the slow pace of Pakistan's progress. The Israeli strike on Osirak, destroying Iraq's latent nuclear programme, drew fears that India could do the same thing - or even the Israelis themselves. Five days before the operation, the Israeli ambassador to the UN had warned that "there is abundant evidence indicating that [Pakistan] is producing nuclear weapons". Israel had made plans for a pre-emptive attack. As had India. Even Moscow was now a potential threat - Pakistan had already embarked on its programme of support for the mujahideen's anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, with the obvious risk of retaliation. Zia sent his military aide, Lieutenant-General Syed Ali Zamin Naqvi, to request weapons grade fissile material and the bomb design from China, in an effort to speed Pakistan's efforts along. Deng Xiaoping agreed. In each area where the Soviets had pulled the plug on Beijing, the Chinese would prove to be far more obliging to the Pakistanis.
Source: How China helped Pakistan build the bomb
Urdu speeking soldiers of Pakistan army (probably Punjabi) shooting on unarmed Pashtun civilians over an argument about mistreatment. You can see Pakistan flag patch on their shoulders.
These idiots talk about IA's actions in Kashmir which btw are only going after terrorists, but these PA idiots are simply killing their own people
Pakistan needs diplomatic push to exit FATF grey list - Pakistan - DAWN.COM
Well what better gift to new government in India than to take Pakistan out of grey list and blacklist. Come on FATF
Well what better gift to new government in India than to take Pakistan out of grey list and blacklist. Come on FATF
Two girls say Chinese husbands running brothel
THE NEWSPAPER'S CORRESPONDENT
SARGODHA: Two girls belonging to Kot Momin have alleged that two Chinese men married them and attempted to smuggle them to China, but they managed to escape after realising that their ‘husbands’, who claimed to be Muslims, were running a brothel in Lahore on the pretext of a marriage bureau.
Samina and Tasawur Bibi of Kot Momin tehsil, some 50 kilometres from here, told the media that they belonged to poor families and their parents married them off to Chinese men, who assured their parents they will keep the girls in Lahore and arrange business for the families. But, the girls said, they realised that the men were neither Muslim nor honest. They also alleged that the Chinese were running a brothel and using the cover of a marriage bureau in Lahore’s DHA Phase I. They said that as soon as they found out the reality, they escaped.
Samina and Tasawur also approached a lawyer for dissolution of marriage and appealed to the Punjab inspector general of police to take action against the culprits.
Some Christian families are also eagerly waiting for any information on their daughters, who were married to Chinese men and later taken to China.
Published in Dawn, May 20th, 2019
THE NEWSPAPER'S CORRESPONDENT
SARGODHA: Two girls belonging to Kot Momin have alleged that two Chinese men married them and attempted to smuggle them to China, but they managed to escape after realising that their ‘husbands’, who claimed to be Muslims, were running a brothel in Lahore on the pretext of a marriage bureau.
Samina and Tasawur Bibi of Kot Momin tehsil, some 50 kilometres from here, told the media that they belonged to poor families and their parents married them off to Chinese men, who assured their parents they will keep the girls in Lahore and arrange business for the families. But, the girls said, they realised that the men were neither Muslim nor honest. They also alleged that the Chinese were running a brothel and using the cover of a marriage bureau in Lahore’s DHA Phase I. They said that as soon as they found out the reality, they escaped.
Samina and Tasawur also approached a lawyer for dissolution of marriage and appealed to the Punjab inspector general of police to take action against the culprits.
Some Christian families are also eagerly waiting for any information on their daughters, who were married to Chinese men and later taken to China.
Published in Dawn, May 20th, 2019
I think this account will remain as an anonymous one and will get killed in a while....
Its no better in the UAE. I have seen first hand how the Biradar Mulq treats its Pakistani cousins.
Newly formed Islamic State-Pakistan (walayah e pak) has claimed to have assassinated a member of Pak intelligence in Balochistan.
Chinese man arrested for pushing worker into furnace
FAISALABAD: A Chinese national was arrested on Wednesday after he reportedly pushed a worker into a burning furnace in Faisalabad, Express News reported.
The incident occurred at a factory in Faisalabad’s Sahianwala Industrial Estate. According to Express News, the labourer was pushed into the furnace by the Chinese supervisor of the labour force. The foreigner reportedly lost his cool after the worker failed to comprehend his instructions.
FAISALABAD: A Chinese national was arrested on Wednesday after he reportedly pushed a worker into a burning furnace in Faisalabad, Express News reported.
The incident occurred at a factory in Faisalabad’s Sahianwala Industrial Estate. According to Express News, the labourer was pushed into the furnace by the Chinese supervisor of the labour force. The foreigner reportedly lost his cool after the worker failed to comprehend his instructions.
Maybe he took the Iron part seriously and tried to forge the man into something else, Pakistani influence and Chinese ethnicity is a potent mixture, can behave strangely at times.