Introduction
Force Modernisation aims primarily to keep pace with emerging technologies, bridge the gap and hence significantly enhance capabilities to meet contemporary and future challenges. It involves not only modernising equipment but also modernising doctrinal concepts, tactics, techniques and procedures. This span of modernisation is challenged by the evolving and dynamic nature of the security environment around us. The dynamism and ever-expanding dimension of battle space have led decision-makers, developers and practitioners to understand the uniqueness of combat, which would provide the right framework for conceptualising future force modernisation.
Uniqueness of Combat
Clausewitz in ‘On War’ has rightly said, that ‘Every age has its kind of war, its limiting conditions, and its peculiar preconceptions. Every war is unique. It is because it takes place in a unique geo-political setting. The politico-military objective of any war India faces must be unique to us. Hence, the strategy that flows from it for the attainment of politico-military objectives will be unique. The possibility of such a strategy succeeding will be higher if the tactics and technology that support the strategy are indigenous.
Developing an Indian strategy will require an in-depth analysis of the intricacies which are specific to India, based on her historical episodes, adversarial situation and geographical position. These intricacies present a unique set of combat scenarios for India and can be visualised in five ways.
The first uniqueness is the diversity of domains in which combat will be conducted both due to our geographical location as well as possible adversarial situations. Our nation with a large landmass of mainland as well as island territories, has a wide variety of terrain spreading from plains, mountains, and deserts to dense forest areas. It presents a unique set of complexity in the land domain. Similarly, our large coastline, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), wide ocean areas and central location in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) presents its own set of uniqueness in the maritime domain. The wide volumes of airspaces above our land and maritime territories which are becoming denser with manned and unmanned platforms present a unique set of complexities in the air domain as well. In addition to these conventional domains, the new domains of cyber, space and information also present a diverse set of challenges that are required to be addressed.
The second set of uniqueness is the type of players who are operating in these domains. They include not only State but Non-State actors as well. They are not only restricted to uniformed forces but also include State-sponsored terrorists and militia who not only operate around our external boundaries but also within our Nation. This internal threat dimension is further cluttered due to the presence of insurgents. The introduction of invisible players like cyber and information warriors has further complicated the situation.
The next uniqueness is the types of conflict which we as a nation face in the continuum of Peace, No War No Peace to War. It is not only classical dimensions of War but the zone of No War No Peace where we are witnessing a wide set of conflicts. In this part of the continuum, insurgency and terrorism are presenting new dimensions of conflicts through the emergence of piracy and cross-border drone strikes-based threats. As we progress ahead on this continuum, Low-Intensity Conflict in localised zones has become the norm with a realistic possibility of graduating into a classical war. Our Armed Forces need to be ready for the entire span of conflicts.
The next uniqueness is that targeting is not only restricted to physical damage but is now being equally focused towards the Cognitive dimension. Seamless and quick information flow has created a transparent environment which can be easily influenced. It has resulted in every citizen becoming a possible target creating a surge in several vulnerabilities.
The last uniqueness is a ramification of all of the above-mentioned unique factors. To address the requirements of these factors mentioned earlier, specific capabilities and capacities are required to be developed The identification of the correct balance between all these factors would require a stipulation of the level and depth of capabilities, which need to be augmented. It requires creating the ideal mix of capabilities within the domain-specific Services and various combatants and support mechanisms within every Service. The achievement of such an ideal mix requires understanding the key aspects which necessitate force modernisation.
Key Factors Behind Force Modernisation
Modernisation of the military is a necessity for every nation. The complex set of factors that influence modernisation are more or less common to all the militaries across the world.
The first is the environment in and around the country. It plays a primary role in deciding the security needs of the Nation. The second factor is the capability threshold of the military for maintaining an asymmetric advantage over the adversaries. The technological threshold within the nation, both in terms of production as well as innovation, is the next factor, which plays an important role in forcing modernisation.
Budget and policy on force modernisation in the nation is the next factor which defines the pace and extent of modernisation as well. The complexity of these factors needs to be balanced by defining a path towards modernisation, a path which is either technology-driven or tactics-driven.
The Primacy of Tactics or Technology
It is generally believed that Technology has had a major influence on the conduct of combat. Technology is the focal arbitrator that tilts the balance between equally motivated adversaries. On the other hand, it can be argued that necessity is the mother of invention. A felt need during combat may lead to the development of a particular weapon system.
Unlike a ‘Chicken and Egg’ story, in today’s world, most of the technologies are dual use. Military technology finds application in the civilian domain and vice versa. GPS, Internet, and SDR were primarily developed for the military and have widespread civil applications today.
LIDAR, Drones, and Satellites were for civilian use but have military applications. One has to have a keen eye for selecting and adopting technology. This guides nations to adopt either a technology-led or tactics-led approach towards modernisation when it comes to developing capacities for the warfighting.
Technology Led Modernisation
In a ‘Technology Led Force Modernisation’ approach, new technological options emerge and mature with time. These new technologies are adopted by militaries wherein new concepts are developed and existing Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TIPs) are reviewed. A training mechanism is later followed to ensure that new methods of force employment are completely adopted by the entire organisation.
In India, we have been pursuing Technology-led modernisation till now. The Services identify a key weapon system/technology that is required for induction. The GSQRs of such a platform are laid and DRDO is tasked to acquire the capability, mostly through a Mission Mode project. The system, if it meets the QRs, its prototypes are trial evaluated and on its clearance, the technology is shared with a DPSU (or now a private entity) for mass production. In a modification to this process, DRDO may choose a private entity under the DCPP model for co-development and co-production. The larger point is that our system of modernisation/acquisition of a capability is based on a weapon system/ platform/technology that already exists. It not only takes years to develop it but another few years for Services to assimilate it into existing systems or raise new ones. In this system, we will always be behind the curve concerning modern militaries.
Tactics Led Modernisation
In a ‘Tactics Led Modernisation’ approach, the combatants lead the process of modernisation. The fighting arms decide the type of combat they will be faced with or how they wish to employ force against the adversary. In this approach, a core team identifies the range of technologies that will support that concept of warfighting. Some of these technologies may exist, may need modification/adaptation or some may have to be developed anew. To execute this approach, the team is funded for the realisation of the project. It may outsource R&D or modification of technology to academicians, IlTs, tech incubators, and military or civil R&D establishments.
The model may require three to four service teams working on the realisation of a new concept. Ideally, it would demand setting up an integrated team of strategists, tacticians and developers, who can develop key concepts which are peculiar to their conditions and terrain and would assist in the achievement of an asymmetric advantage over the adversary.
The technological developments emerging from tactical (warfighting) concepts being country-specific will remain effective in terms of absorption, employment and further re-adaptation. The concept of building a Smart Battalion can be taken as an example to understand this approach. A Smart Battalion focuses on the intelligent way of warfighting. A Special Forces battalion focuses on kinetic engagements at operational level, whereas a Smart Battalion will focus on intelligent engagements with disproportionate effects at operational or strategic level. The technological threshold of our soldiers is low. It will take ages to improve their technological threshold to fight smart.
Whereas, the Smart Battalion is a set of technologically oriented men who are distributed across the large battle zone. 40 to 50 of such entities comprising of 2 to 3 smart soldiers each, could be spread in the battle space thus being undetectable and untargetable. They would control surveillance, target acquisition and targeting, like a mobile and dispersed Corps/Division Intelligence and Surveillance Centre (CISC/DISC).
To implement this concept, certain special technologies would be required to be inducted or developed. These might include technologies like secure long-range communication, plug-and-play systems, sensor fusion set-up, mobile decision support systems, and adaptable survival kits to name a few. Such an approach would have dual benefits in terms of both streamlining force modernisation efforts as well as achieving an asymmetrical edge over the adversary.
India’s Force Modernisation Approach: A Choice to Make
As a Nation, we have a choice to make. We need to choose whether we would follow a ‘Technology Led’ or ‘Tactics Led’ force modernisation.
With the technological development edge being with major powers, we as a nation are forced to adopt a follower approach wherein, we end up waiting for new technologies to crystallise and later are forced to chase the process of technological absorption, tactics development and even organisational re-orientation in an unplanned manner. It results in always being behind the curve.
To remain ahead of the curve Atmanirbharta initiative has provided our nation with a possible solution. A ‘Tactics Led’ approach would not only assure that we develop an asymmetric edge over our adversaries through indigenous solutions but also achieve the aim of setting up a self-reliant world-class defence ecosystem in our nation. It would ensure that we can enter the era of modern war along with the West, breaking the shackles of being a follower.
It is indeed tragic that India, which was a pioneer in ancient times, introducing the world to pivotal concepts like zero, medical breakthroughs and astrology, has been forced to follow advanced nations in technological breakthroughs. In the military and national security domain, there is a need for an intellectual transformation alongside technological absorption.
It has to be followed by changes in organisation, culture, mindset and behaviour. It would require a holistic and realistic visualisation of future warfighting wherein an optimum balance between the old and new options is conceived.
Modalities to be Adopted: ‘Tactics Led’ Force Modernisation
The key to success in the ‘Tactics Led’ force modernisation would depend on the effective adoption of an integrated approach – both between the Services as well as between the Civil and Military agencies. These integrated teams would have to plan for various modalities while adopting this approach. The first step would be an integrated threat assessment with the intent to identify the key tactics which can be developed to achieve asymmetry against the adversaries. It would require utilising a re-modelled set up of tacticians, op planners, strategists, testers and developers. These novel tactics would provide the base for the next step of developing futuristic concepts and identifying specific technological requirements that will be required to prosecute developed concepts.
An imaginative fighting methodology would require the support of an analytical framework for finding realistic solutions and shortening the path from ideation to implementation. It will involve identifying whether the technological requirements can be met within the nation or would require international collaboration – based on Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL). This would provide the framework of rank ordering technological gestation period vis-à-vis prioritisation of tactical gaps.
The complexity at this stage would demand the utilisation of simulation-based war game mechanisms to identify the impact of identified capabilities in various scenarios. The employment of each technological capability in a stimulatory mechanism will provide the initial guidelines for the development of a prototype.
The prototype would then be fielded in specific exercises and war games involving both Red and Blue forces to test its efficacy in actual conditions. The feedback received through this action would be utilised for undertaking further enhancements/modifications in the prototype.
It would also provide clarity in the development of doctrinal concepts.
The base concept and efficacy of the prototype in operations would be shared with the Services for induction-related deliberations and planning.
Conclusion
‘Multi-domain operations (MDO)’ have become inevitable, flexible and sophisticated wherein response options have to be optimum for the entire conflict continuum. These response options if based on non-indigenous concepts would always carry the danger of being non-effective in our battle zones. In addition to indigenous concepts, there would also be a requirement to adopt not only indigenous equipment but an indigenous network architecture as well.
The necessity of such an architecture in present times can be seen when Network Centric Warfare (NCW) or Data Centric Warfare (DCW) have become the backbone for the conduct of operations. Such an NCW or DCW set-up is based on platforms and sensors supported by a complex network of computers, sensors, and terrestrial and satellite links. The combat management system architecture for such a set-up would have to be indigenous. In addition, this architecture should also have the ability to integrate non-indigenous platforms based on OP necessity. Setting up such an architecture would ensure that the capabilities of our future battle systems evolve and expand in sync with operational necessities.
To develop such a robust mechanism, we as a nation and military will have to embrace a far-sighted approach towards force modernisation following the path of imagination and innovative thinking. Our ancient wisdom will have to be used as a source of inspiration. It will inspire all of us, that we were leaders once and can become once again. This intent would require belief in our capabilities and strength. As mentioned in Rig Veda, ‘Aano Bhadra Kartvo Yantu Vishwatah’, we would also have to welcome good ideas and develop them with full support and zeal.
India is at the cusp of great change and correct actions at this stage are necessary to build the core of technological strength within the nation.We have laid down our path to become a ‘Viksit and Sashakt Bharat. It is, therefore of prime importance that the intellectual control and direction of what technologies are required needs to be firmly entrenched within the Armed Forces, with assistance from academia, DPSUs, DRDO and technocrats. A correct approach by the defence ecosystem during these times will ensure that we can transform our thoughts, skills and capabilities that are essential for building a ‘Future Ready Armed Force.
By Gen Anil Chauhan (The author is India’s second and current Chief of Defence Staff)
(Excerpted from Ready, Relevant and Resurgent: A Blueprint for the Transformation of India’s Military)
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