Royal Australian Navy : News, Updates & Discussions.
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I haven't gone thru the article but let me guess the contents , pops . Oz buys the entire stock of sea mines from the US & then doesn't lay them at Darwin or anyplace else where Oz houses it's ships & subs but instead lays them in the SCS , ECS & Yellow Sea . That too it's the US which does that for them. I mean is the US playing you like a fiddle or is the US playing you like a fiddle ? @Optimist
(usni, jan.30)
French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu and his Australian counterpart Richard Marles met in Paris Monday just over two years after plans to replace the Royal Australian Navy’s Collins-class submarines with DCNS’ Barracuda diesel-electric attack boats were dropped in favor of a nuclear submarine agreement with the U.S. and the U.K., signed in 2021.
“It is the first time that our consultations have taken place at this level — in the so-called 2+2 format – since an incident I shall not come back to,” French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna told reporters in a press conference with the defense ministers and Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong.
The meeting series was a reset in diplomatic relations following the rift between the two countries following the May election of Australian Prime Minster Anthony Albanese and the installation of a new national security team.
Rather than talk submarines, the defense ministers agreed to produce thousands of 155mm artillery shells for use by the Ukrainian military against the Russian invasion.
“There are actually complementarities between our defense industrial bases, which allows this to happen,” Marles told following the meeting. “It’s also true that we wanted to act together as a statement about how importantly Australia and France regard the support of Ukraine in the current conflict.”
Marles also fielded questions from the French press on if Australia would consider buying diesel-electric submarines. The questions were prompted by reports the Navy had closed four of its submarine repair dry docks at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard & Intermediate Maintenance Facility in Bremerton, Wash., according to a report in Sky News.
“We’re obviously working closely with the United States and the United Kingdom to develop a nuclear-powered submarine capability and develop the optimal pathway to achieve that capability,” Richard Marles said.
“There are no plans for any interim conveniently powered submarine capability.”
The first outline for the plan to produce nuclear attack submarines for the Royal Australian Navy is due in March.
First steps under consideration for the partnership include basing a number of U.S. nuclear attack boats at the RAN’s submarine base near Perth in Western Australia. Those attack boats could be manned by a blended crew of RAN and U.S. sailors, several sources familiar with the ongoing discussions have told USNI News.
The timeline for the Australians to field their own nuclear attack boats is unclear, but U.S. officials have said those subs could be decades away.
In a joint statement, France and Australia committed to continuing to operate in the Pacific and join in international exercises in the region.
“Ministers reiterated their strong opposition to any coercion or destabilizing actions in the South China Sea, including the militarization of disputed features,” reads a joint statement from the meeting.
“They reaffirmed their intention to continue transits and deployments in the Indo-Pacific in accordance with international law.”
To that end, Paris and Canberra pledged greater military logistical support in the Pacific for each other’s forces. Additionally, Australia will take part in the Croix du Sud exercise series off of New Caledonia while France will join the Talisman Saber 2023 drills off of Australia, the Monday statement reads.
The statement also opposed “unilateral changes in the status quo” regarding Taiwanese sovereignty and the statement echoed concern with human rights abuses in Xinjiang and the “erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy, rights and freedoms.” /end
Australians, French Avoid AUKUS Talk in Paris Ministerial Meeting, Commit to More Pacific Operations
Australian and French defense ministers pledged to produce artillery shells to support Ukraine against the ongoing invasion from Russia in the first meeting between the two countries since Canberra walked away from a conventional submarine deal with French sub-builder DCNS.French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu and his Australian counterpart Richard Marles met in Paris Monday just over two years after plans to replace the Royal Australian Navy’s Collins-class submarines with DCNS’ Barracuda diesel-electric attack boats were dropped in favor of a nuclear submarine agreement with the U.S. and the U.K., signed in 2021.
“It is the first time that our consultations have taken place at this level — in the so-called 2+2 format – since an incident I shall not come back to,” French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna told reporters in a press conference with the defense ministers and Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong.
The meeting series was a reset in diplomatic relations following the rift between the two countries following the May election of Australian Prime Minster Anthony Albanese and the installation of a new national security team.
Rather than talk submarines, the defense ministers agreed to produce thousands of 155mm artillery shells for use by the Ukrainian military against the Russian invasion.
“There are actually complementarities between our defense industrial bases, which allows this to happen,” Marles told following the meeting. “It’s also true that we wanted to act together as a statement about how importantly Australia and France regard the support of Ukraine in the current conflict.”
Marles also fielded questions from the French press on if Australia would consider buying diesel-electric submarines. The questions were prompted by reports the Navy had closed four of its submarine repair dry docks at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard & Intermediate Maintenance Facility in Bremerton, Wash., according to a report in Sky News.
“We’re obviously working closely with the United States and the United Kingdom to develop a nuclear-powered submarine capability and develop the optimal pathway to achieve that capability,” Richard Marles said.
“There are no plans for any interim conveniently powered submarine capability.”
The first outline for the plan to produce nuclear attack submarines for the Royal Australian Navy is due in March.
First steps under consideration for the partnership include basing a number of U.S. nuclear attack boats at the RAN’s submarine base near Perth in Western Australia. Those attack boats could be manned by a blended crew of RAN and U.S. sailors, several sources familiar with the ongoing discussions have told USNI News.
The timeline for the Australians to field their own nuclear attack boats is unclear, but U.S. officials have said those subs could be decades away.
In a joint statement, France and Australia committed to continuing to operate in the Pacific and join in international exercises in the region.
“Ministers reiterated their strong opposition to any coercion or destabilizing actions in the South China Sea, including the militarization of disputed features,” reads a joint statement from the meeting.
“They reaffirmed their intention to continue transits and deployments in the Indo-Pacific in accordance with international law.”
To that end, Paris and Canberra pledged greater military logistical support in the Pacific for each other’s forces. Additionally, Australia will take part in the Croix du Sud exercise series off of New Caledonia while France will join the Talisman Saber 2023 drills off of Australia, the Monday statement reads.
The statement also opposed “unilateral changes in the status quo” regarding Taiwanese sovereignty and the statement echoed concern with human rights abuses in Xinjiang and the “erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy, rights and freedoms.” /end
that reminds me:
Former U.S. Navy leaders profited from overlapping interests on sub deal
Two retired U.S. admirals and three former U.S. Navy civilian leaders are playing critical but secretive roles as paid advisers to the government of Australia during its negotiations to acquire top-secret nuclear submarine technology from the United States and Britain.
The Americans are among a group of former U.S. Navy officials whom the Australian government has hired as high-dollar consultants to help transform its fleet of ships and submarines, receiving contracts worth as much as $800,000 a person, documents show. (...)
or:
The ‘Senior Advisor and Principal Author’ of our Defence Strategic Review is a Director of the United States Studies Centre
(...) These arrangements raise serious concerns:
Was any conflict of interest identified by the Independent leads between Professor Dean acting as a director at the USSC and running two public diplomacy programs funded by the US state department designed to reinforce Australian support for the Alliance while authoring an independent review of Australian defence policy with the potential to justify large scale purchases of US weapons?
Commonwealth to establish new SSN agency and regulator
The Commonwealth has announced the establishment of the Australian Submarine Agency and the Australian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Safety Regulator to oversee the development of a nuclear-powered submar
During this time, in australaland:
Firstly, there is some real light shone on the decision making process, and it doesn’t look great. In Feb 2016 the Defence Secretary noted that the Fincantieri and Navantia options were considered ‘the two most viable designs’ 2/
The report points out that there is no indication as to why the Type 26 was included as the third option on the final list instead of the French FREMM alternative – Defence has no records of the decision 3/
(juste one parenthesis (notes): 36: Six of the seven ship designs selected by Defence were from RAND’s recommended shortlist of eight ship designs. On 3 September 2015 the Ship Building Steering Group ‘agreed the RAND analysis would be used to filter the initial 24 alternatives to 8 options’ and that ‘[p]rofessional judgement of one of the RAND 8 was used to further reduce the number to 7’. The meeting minutes did not identify the particular options. 37: The sponsor’s paper noted that:Of the remaining viable designs French FREMM (DCNS) could be selected based upon the RAND assessment of lower risk to a 2020 construction start. Alternatively, the type 26 (BAE Systems) could be selected based upon the more optimistic CASG assessment of the schedule and BAE’s greater existing industrial footprint and shipbuilding experience in Australia.An agendum paper prepared by Defence’s Contestability Division questioned the evidence available to support the CASG assessment of the schedule.)
The tender compliance eval in Dec 2017 found Type 26 had “extreme risk” for core requirements of delivering 9 ships with minimum design change, and commencement of construction date. Other options had only high or medium risk. 4/
Decision to go with Type 26 was based primarily on ASW capability, however Defence was unable to locate the records of its key assessment against 23 high level capability requirements on which it based its decision 5/
Capability requirements did not include any reference to design maturity – but 2nd pass noted that ‘the design is not yet complete’. This issue was well known at the time. 6/
Surface Ships advisory Committee later stated that it was a case of the proposal with the highest risk, but also ‘highest potential for capability/performance’. i.e. this is a classic case of Defence procurement being driven solely by capability. 7/
Throughout the CEP there was a complete absence of any discussion of value for money – the ANAO savages Defence for this 8/
In terms of deadlines, a key element of the decision criteria was that building should be able to start in 2020. But Type 26 was always seen as having highest risk for this. 9/
The delay to the first of class have now pushed acceptance date from early 2031 to mid 2032. Notably the PBS stated that Hunters were to commission from 2031 – not sure if this suggests a poss capability gap even if deadlines don’t blow out further 10/
Major shift in date for change of RAN to a 9 frigate navy. Initially the 1st Anzac was supposed to retired on delivery of 2nd Hunter – meaning the RAN would be operating 9 frigates from mid 2030s – now that won’t happen till 2044 11/
In terms of cost a Defence internal estimate in Jan 2023 put the cost at ‘significantly higher than the $44.3 billion advised to govt’ 12/
https://video.twimg.com/tweet_video/Fvv7MWoaUAAmmj-.mp4
The First Assistant Sec stated that the project ‘remains unaffordable within the Integrated Investment Program’ adding that it appeared BAE had ‘underestimated the combat system design, whole ship design and construction’ 13/
Head of Navy Capability said that cost overruns were ‘so significant’ that it was a case of reducing number of vessels or cutting other projects to fund Hunter 14/
Despite these issues Defence insisted to the ANAO that it was 'inappropriate' to provide a better estimate of the project cost… 15/
In terms of wider implications from this a notable issues raised was the lack of project management skills to run the acquisition. This poses a significant risk with AUKUS and a number of other major defence and shipbuilding projects in the pipeline 16/
There are also extraordinary failings of Defence record keeping. Minutes of the key Defence Committee meetings were ‘not retained’ – this is ‘the most senior enterprise level committee within Defence’. 17/
ANAO throws some wonderful shade on Defence a***covering in this footnote on the records provided 18/
All in all this is clearly a project that remains in real trouble. The likelihood of cuts to the program in the Surface Ship Review seems even greater after this report. The real question seems to be how much. End/
-------------
Fortunately, in France there is the DGA
www.strategicfront.org
Firstly, there is some real light shone on the decision making process, and it doesn’t look great. In Feb 2016 the Defence Secretary noted that the Fincantieri and Navantia options were considered ‘the two most viable designs’ 2/
The report points out that there is no indication as to why the Type 26 was included as the third option on the final list instead of the French FREMM alternative – Defence has no records of the decision 3/
(juste one parenthesis (notes): 36: Six of the seven ship designs selected by Defence were from RAND’s recommended shortlist of eight ship designs. On 3 September 2015 the Ship Building Steering Group ‘agreed the RAND analysis would be used to filter the initial 24 alternatives to 8 options’ and that ‘[p]rofessional judgement of one of the RAND 8 was used to further reduce the number to 7’. The meeting minutes did not identify the particular options. 37: The sponsor’s paper noted that:Of the remaining viable designs French FREMM (DCNS) could be selected based upon the RAND assessment of lower risk to a 2020 construction start. Alternatively, the type 26 (BAE Systems) could be selected based upon the more optimistic CASG assessment of the schedule and BAE’s greater existing industrial footprint and shipbuilding experience in Australia.An agendum paper prepared by Defence’s Contestability Division questioned the evidence available to support the CASG assessment of the schedule.)
The tender compliance eval in Dec 2017 found Type 26 had “extreme risk” for core requirements of delivering 9 ships with minimum design change, and commencement of construction date. Other options had only high or medium risk. 4/
Decision to go with Type 26 was based primarily on ASW capability, however Defence was unable to locate the records of its key assessment against 23 high level capability requirements on which it based its decision 5/
Capability requirements did not include any reference to design maturity – but 2nd pass noted that ‘the design is not yet complete’. This issue was well known at the time. 6/
Surface Ships advisory Committee later stated that it was a case of the proposal with the highest risk, but also ‘highest potential for capability/performance’. i.e. this is a classic case of Defence procurement being driven solely by capability. 7/
Throughout the CEP there was a complete absence of any discussion of value for money – the ANAO savages Defence for this 8/
In terms of deadlines, a key element of the decision criteria was that building should be able to start in 2020. But Type 26 was always seen as having highest risk for this. 9/
The delay to the first of class have now pushed acceptance date from early 2031 to mid 2032. Notably the PBS stated that Hunters were to commission from 2031 – not sure if this suggests a poss capability gap even if deadlines don’t blow out further 10/
Major shift in date for change of RAN to a 9 frigate navy. Initially the 1st Anzac was supposed to retired on delivery of 2nd Hunter – meaning the RAN would be operating 9 frigates from mid 2030s – now that won’t happen till 2044 11/
In terms of cost a Defence internal estimate in Jan 2023 put the cost at ‘significantly higher than the $44.3 billion advised to govt’ 12/
https://video.twimg.com/tweet_video/Fvv7MWoaUAAmmj-.mp4
The First Assistant Sec stated that the project ‘remains unaffordable within the Integrated Investment Program’ adding that it appeared BAE had ‘underestimated the combat system design, whole ship design and construction’ 13/
Head of Navy Capability said that cost overruns were ‘so significant’ that it was a case of reducing number of vessels or cutting other projects to fund Hunter 14/
Despite these issues Defence insisted to the ANAO that it was 'inappropriate' to provide a better estimate of the project cost… 15/
In terms of wider implications from this a notable issues raised was the lack of project management skills to run the acquisition. This poses a significant risk with AUKUS and a number of other major defence and shipbuilding projects in the pipeline 16/
There are also extraordinary failings of Defence record keeping. Minutes of the key Defence Committee meetings were ‘not retained’ – this is ‘the most senior enterprise level committee within Defence’. 17/
ANAO throws some wonderful shade on Defence a***covering in this footnote on the records provided 18/
All in all this is clearly a project that remains in real trouble. The likelihood of cuts to the program in the Surface Ship Review seems even greater after this report. The real question seems to be how much. End/
-------------
Fortunately, in France there is the DGA
French Defence Strategy & Rearmament
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Indian firm in talks with Australia Navy for $5 million drone contract
An Indian firm is negotiating a deal to supply made-in-India drones to the Australian Navy. The drone firm got help from the Indian Navy to develop its products, including the human-carrying 'Varuna' drone which was showcased to Prime Minister Narendra Modi during an event.“The firm is negotiating the project with the Royal Australian Navy through their local partner to sell them the made-in-India Varuna drones,” senior Navy officials told India Today TV. The Indian Navy has been supporting and pushing the 'Make-in-India' initiative in the defence sector in a big way and has lent support to the private sector in developing their products.
The Indian Navy also placed orders for these drones, planned to be deployed on large-size warships, including the new aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, to carry personnel and cargo.
The Varuna drone, which can carry a human payload, has a range of 25 km and can carry 130 kg payload. It has around 30 minutes of flight time. The drone manufacturer's chief, Nikunj Parashar, confirmed that his firm is in talks with the forces for the sale of drones but did not reveal any details.
However, he said he had received huge support from the Indian Navy in the development of his drones, which are being inducted into the Indian defence services now. The Navy provided its own platforms to help develop the products, he said, adding that his firm could develop a multi-copter named Spotter which can remain airborne for two hours for surveillance with the Navy's help.
It was during one of the industry visits by the Vice Chief of Navy Staff that the defence forces encouraged his firm to work for the military sector and develop a personnel-carrying drone for the Navy, Parashar said. The Navy has been working on the IDex programme to promote indigenous defence technologies and this has been a great success for the Navy.
"The prime minister launched 75 challenges. We have really expedited and done this job. We thought that if we have to achieve success, we have to do things differently. We have made our procedures simple so that we can take these cases ahead. We are sure that by August 15, we will achieve our target as promised to PM Modi," Navy Vice Chief Vice Admiral SN Ghormade said recently.
The PM has set a target of $5 billion in exports for Indian firms by 2025, which has led to both public and private sector firms making extra efforts to achieve the objective.
Indian firm in talks with Australia Navy for $5 million drone contract
The Indian Navy also placed orders for these drones, planned to be deployed on large-size warships, including the new aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, to carry personnel and cargo.
Hunter class
Australian navy overhaul to double surface fleet and add ‘optionally crewed’ warships
The Albanese government has announced a major overhaul of the navy’s surface combatant fleet, saying it would more than double the number of warships, including the intention to acquire six new large optionally crewed surface vessels (LOSVs) that can be operated remotely by a support vessel during wartime.
The plan will mean Australia reduces its order of Hunter-class frigates from nine to six. The new surface combatant fleet will also consist of three upgraded Hobart-class destroyers, 11 new general-purpose frigates to progressively replace the six remaining Anzac-class frigates, the six new LOSVs and 25 minor war vessels.
The announcement came after the government received independent analysis, led by the retired US navy Vice-Admiral William Hilarides, on changes needed to the navy fleet in parallel with the Aukus nuclear-powered submarine plan. The independent review of the “size, structure and composition of Navy’s surface combatant fleet” was handed to the government last year.
The analysis found that the current and planned surface combatant fleet was “not appropriate for the strategic environment we face, noting it is the oldest fleet Navy has operated in its history”.
It argued that Australia needed a surface fleet with “greater capability in integrated air and missile defence, multi-domain strike and undersea warfare”, echoing calls from the defence strategic review last year which found that the “plan for the surface combatant fleet is not fit for purpose”.
The independent analysis urged “immediate implementation” of the shake-up to the fleet, arguing that “any delay will exacerbate the risk” to Australia’s security.
$54bn total bill
The government announced an additional $1.7bn over forward estimates and $11.1bn over the next decade for accelerated delivery of the surface combatant fleet and to expand Australia’s shipbuilding industry, bringing the total cost of the plan over the next 10 years to $54bn.The government says this investment will mean the defence spend in the early 2030s will reach 2.4% of GDP, compared with the 2.1% it was planned to be when the government came to office.
“This decision we are making right now sees a significant increase in defence spending in this country and it is needed given the complexity of the strategic circumstances that our country faces,” said Richard Marles, the defence minister and deputy prime minister.
The independent review also supports the defence strategic review and the government’s commitment to continuous naval shipbuilding in Australia, calling it “an essential foundation for sovereign capability and independence”.
The chief of navy, Admiral Mark Hammond, called the announcement a “welcome intervention” and a “shot in the arm”, saying it was the “most significant investment in the surface combatant fleet” in the navy’s history.
The LOSVs are now being developed by the US, with the Australian government in talks with Washington and planning to be a “fast follower” once the ships were operational. Australia intends to build the six LOSVs in Western Australia.
A model for the general-purpose frigates to be acquired has not been settled on, with models from the US, South Korea, Germany and Spain under consideration.
