Russian Navy : Discussions and Updates

05.01.25

After Loss Of Tartus, Russia Now Has No Submarines In The Mediterranean​

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/after-loss-of-tartus-russia-now-has-no-submarines-in-the-mediterranean/

The Russian Navy is significantly weakened in the Mediterranean. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has denied them their permanent base there. And with it, their ability to maintain conventional submarines there for any length of time. The only boat known to be there has just left, leaving no Russian submarines in the Mediterranean.

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria in the final weeks of 2024 continues to reverberate through the Russian political and military system. Russia has lost the use of the naval base at Tartus, which is already affecting its ability to maintain forces in the Mediterranean. The Russian Navy is at its weakest there since before the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Significantly, Russia does not have any submarine in the Mediterranean Sea. The last left on January 2. It is possible that there is a nuclear powered submarine there, but we consider this unlikely.

Under the cover of darkness January 2, the Improved Kilo Class submarine Novorossiysk (B-61) slipped quietly out through the Strait of Gibraltar. Like routine transits back to the Baltic, it was conducted on the surface. Its voyage was confirmed by the Portuguese Navy on January 4.


A sustained submarine presence is untenable

Russia has maintained an almost continuous conventional submarine deployment in the Mediterranean for around a decade. Russia’s current permanent Mediterranean Sea Task Force was established in 2013 and has consistently included one or more Kilo class submarines on overlapping deployments. Naval expert Frederik Van Lokeren keeps a log of Russian vessels in the Mediterranean. This shows that there have been brief gaps in submarine deployments, notably in late 2023, but in general there has always been a Russian Kilo class submarine deployed there.

These were based at Tartus but no submarine has called there since around December 3, 2024. The loss of the base means that any submarine deployed there has to remain at sea, with only the possibility of brief calls at friendly ports. In practice Russian conventionally powered submarines spend most of their time in port, even on deployment. This makes a sustained presence in the Mediterranean untenable.


Problems with its replacement submarine?

Novorossiysk‘s replacement, if there is to be one, is still in the North Sea awaiting transit south to the Mediterranean. This Improved-Kilo class boat, believed to be Krasnodar (B-265), but possibly Mozhaisk(B-608), was observed leaving the Baltic on December 31, 2024. The submarine would normally have progressed further by now but there appears to be some delay and it has not yet been reported in the English Channel. Possibly it is related to the situation in the Mediterranean, but a more likely explanation seems to be a serviceability issue with either the submarine or one of its escorts.


The wider implications

The Russian naval base at Tartus has been a key part of Russia’s military and political influence in the Middle East and Africa. The reduced presence of warships and submarines in the Mediterranean is likely to reduce this influence.

Russia may seek to replace Tartus with another base. There has been talk of Russia negotiating a deal with the new Syrian government to retain the base but there are no signs of this on the ground.

Possible locations have been speculated, including Benghazi, Tobruk or Al Burdi. These towns in eastern Libya are controlled by Khalifa Haftar who is supported by Russia. No such deal has been confirmed however and there are are no clear signs of new construction. And any base agreed with Haftar might run into political turmoil after the 81 year-old passes.

Russia’s struggle to maintain its submarine force in the Mediterranean is also symptomatic of wider issues. The Russian Navy is overstretched following the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and is suffering maintenance challenges. Significant resources are likely being diverted to the fighting in Ukraine. And at the same time the Russian economy is facing headwinds. It seems unlikely that Russia will be able to maintain regular submarine deployments there for the foreseeable future. /end
 
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Russia to replace all nuclear attack submarines with new Yasen and Yasen M units by 2035​


On March 19, 2026, Aleksandr Moiseyev, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, confirmed that they will replace all third-generation nuclear-powered attack submarines with Project 885 Yasen and Project 885M Yasen-M units within the next ten years. The new directive targets the full renewal of the Russian multipurpose nuclear submarine force that currently includes several dozen units derived from Soviet-era designs, many commissioned between 1985 and 1996. The transition implies a one-for-one or reduced replacement ratio, with an expected end-state fleet of about 10 to 12 Yasen-type submarines. This indicates a reduction in total hull numbers but an increase in per-unit capability.

This initiative aligns with a broader Russian naval modernization effort that prioritizes underwater strike capability over surface fleet expansion. It also reflects an intent to standardize operational, maintenance, and training frameworks across a reduced number of submarine types, as it effectively replaces a mixed fleet architecture with a single dominant class. The submarines being replaced include boats from Projects 971 Akula, Project 945/945A Sierra-class, and 949A Oscar-II, which were each optimized for a specific role, such as anti-submarine warfare and anti-carrier strike missions. These boats vary in displacement from roughly 8,000 to over 19,400 tons submerged and rely on older anti-ship missiles such as the P-700 Granit in the case of the Oscar-II.

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Their maintenance burden has increased due to aging reactors, outdated electronics, parallel logistics chains, and distinct maintenance requirements tied to multiple design bureaus. The transition plan removes these distinctions and replaces them with a unified structure centered on Yasen-class submarines. This reduces the number of hull types, certainly, but also the number of reactor types, combat systems, and spare part inventories. The removal of Oscar-II units in particular reduces reliance on large, single-mission cruise missile carriers. The Yasen and Yasen-M submarines are fourth-generation nuclear-powered attack submarines with a submerged displacement of about 13,800 tons and a beam of 13 meters, with the improved Yasen-M variant shortened by about 9 meters compared to the length of the Yasen-class (139 meters).

They are designed as multipurpose submarines combining the roles of attack submarines and cruise missile carriers to execute anti-ship, anti-submarine, and land-attack missions. The internal layout reflects this, with a large spherical sonar array in the bow and torpedo tubes relocated aft at an angle. The crew size is reduced to about 64 personnel in Yasen-M compared to about 85 in the original Yasen, indicating a higher level of onboard automation. The nuclear reactor, estimated at about 200 MW thermal output, is designed for a core life of up to 25 to 30 years without refueling. Submerged speeds are reported at up to 28 knots in quiet mode and higher at full power. Endurance is effectively unlimited except for food and maintenance constraints.

The strike capability of the Yasen-class is based on a vertical launch system with eight modules, each capable of carrying multiple cruise missiles, for a total payload of up to 32 cruise missiles in standard configuration. The submarines can deploy Kalibr missiles for land attack strikes exceeding 1,500 kilometers, Oniks missiles for anti-ship missions, and Zircon hypersonic missiles, which have been progressively integrated into the class since 2024-2025. The presence of hypersonic missiles also introduces reduced reaction times for defensive systems. In addition to vertical launch systems, the Yasen/Yasen-M submarines carry ten 533 mm torpedo tubes capable of deploying up to 30 torpedoes, mines, and anti-submarine missiles.

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This dual capability allows them to simultaneously conduct strategic strikes and tactical engagements, replacing the fixed anti-ship loadouts of earlier classes such as Oscar-II. Stealth performance is a central design feature of the Yasen-class, with measures including a low-magnetic steel hull with reduced acoustic signature, anechoic coatings, and a reactor cooling system that relies on natural circulation in certain operating modes to minimize pump noise. The sonar suite includes a large bow array, flank arrays along the hull, and a towed array for wide-area and long-range detection coverage. This configuration improves detection capability across different frequency ranges. Compared to third-generation submarines, which relied on smaller sonar arrays and noisier propulsion systems, the Yasen class is designed to operate with reduced detectability.

Reported submerged speeds reach up to 28 knots in quiet mode and higher at maximum output, allowing both stealthy patrol and rapid maneuver. This reduced noise profile supports covert patrols in contested maritime areas and increases survivability against anti-submarine warfare forces. Production of Yasen and Yasen-M submarines is concentrated at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk, which remains the primary facility for nuclear submarine construction in Russia. As of 2026, one Yasen submarine and five Yasen-M units are in service, with additional submarines such as Perm and Ulyanovsk under construction and planned, bringing the projected total to about 10 to 12 units. Unit cost estimates have ranged from about $700 million to over $1.5 billion, depending on the build period and exchange rates.

Construction timelines have ranged from 8 years for later units to over 15 years for the lead boat, reflecting both funding cycles and technical challenges. Industrial constraints include delays in turbine supply, workforce limitations, and dependency on foreign production chains. These factors limit the annual output rate to roughly one submarine per year or less. Operational deployment of Yasen-class submarines is divided between the Northern Fleet, which operates in the Arctic and North Atlantic, and the Pacific Fleet, covering the Asia-Pacific region. Units such as Kazan operate in the Northern Fleet, while Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk are assigned to the Pacific Fleet, and have already conducted routine patrols and exercises.

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Their missions include tracking naval groups, conducting patrols, and maintaining readiness for strike operations against land and maritime targets. The transition to a single multipurpose class will change the Russian fleet structure by concentrating capabilities in fewer hulls. This reduces redundancy, crew training, and maintenance cycles, but increases reliance on each submarine. The integration of these submarines occurs alongside the deployment of Borei-class ballistic missile submarines, forming a combined strategic and conventional deterrent posture. From a strategic standpoint, the transition to a Yasen-centered submarine fleet expands the range of targets that can be engaged without forward basing of surface ships, including through the use of cruise and hypersonic missiles.

This enhances Russia's ability to target naval formations, coastal infrastructure, and inland objectives without requiring forward deployment of surface forces. The shift has implications for maritime balances in the North Atlantic and Arctic, where submarine operations play a central role. However, the scale of transformation is constrained by Russia's production capacity, financial resources, and the availability of supporting systems such as surveillance and targeting networks. There are also indications that future submarine development will focus on smaller and less costly fifth-generation designs expected in the 2030s. This suggests that the Yasen-class may represent a peak in capability but also a transitional step toward longer-term restructuring.

Written by Jérôme Brahy