South China Sea Dispute : News & Updates

Des roses pour Formose​


Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

Roses for Formosa

In the 1980s, the invasion of the Federal Republic of Germany by Warsaw Pact forces was the most played theme in institutional and commercial war games, or wargames, simulating not historical but potential conflicts. Currently, the most played potential conflict is undoubtedly that between the United States and China over the defence of Taiwan. The Taiwan Strait is the new "Fulda Gap

This is supported by particularly accurate and documented commercial games such as GMT Games' Next War series, the RAND Corporation's forward-looking reports and the 24 wargames recently conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). All these products and documents are American, and therefore in a way judge and jury. We will come back to this question, but let us take their objectivity as a postulate and first look at what they establish.

Tigers and dragons

There are several possible scenarios for the People's Republic of China (PRC) to seek to conquer the island of Taiwan, ranging from rapid conquest through invasion, to gradual absorption, to a blockade with a campaign of raids and strikes. We will only discuss the first, invasion, here.

To attempt this invasion, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has three main forces:

A strike force with at least 1,200 short-range and 500 medium-range ballistic missiles as well as a thousand cruise missiles of all types, including some air-launched hypersonic CJ-100s with a range of at least 2,000 km. Combined with a dedicated satellite system, this force is capable of striking not only the island of Taiwan, but also US bases throughout the region including Guam and detected vessels.

An assault force with an air component of a corps of three airborne divisions with two airlift squadrons and several helicopter squadrons and an amphibious component of three marine brigades and two specialised light mechanised divisions. Above all, there is a specialised fleet of 89 vessels (4 amphibious groups in Next War Taiwan, NWT). Once a beachhead has been established, the amphibious fleet is capable of carrying one of the eight armoured, mechanised and motorised divisions immediately projectable from the People's Republic coast every three days. It can deploy much more and faster if civilian cargo ships can land in a conquered port in Taiwan.

A "multi-milieu" intervention force composed of about 800 combat aircraft available in the region, i.e. 32 squadrons with 24 aircraft in NWT, including three 5th generation aircraft (J-20 and J-31) and six squadrons with 12 H-6 bombers carrying cruise missiles. There is also a dense air defence network, especially in the 39 naval and air bases 800 km from Taiwan. The force at sea has two naval air groups (three from 2024) and three powerful surface combat groups (SAGs), i.e. two aircraft carriers and 75 frigates and destroyers as well as five patrols of four diesel attack submarines. To this can be added a clandestine component on the island of Taiwan to provide information and sabotage, and a cyber component to disrupt adversary C4ISR networks and locate targets. The mission of this multi-purpose force is likely to complement the missile force's strikes, but more importantly to cover and protect the assault force around the area of operation and in the Strait.

On the other hand, Taiwan has a fluid environment dispute force based on an integrated ground and air defence system with 13 squadrons (about 400 combat aircraft) and on the sea of two SAGs with about 30 ships. The land forces are organised in three army corps of 8 to 10 brigades. Five islands, including Quemoy very close to the mainland, are fortified and have a garrison of one to four brigades. The three corps can be reinforced with 24 to 26 reserve brigades. Four airborne brigades constitute the Special Force under the command of the General Staff.

The US forces in the region are obviously powerful. In NWT the US Navy's 7th Fleet can deploy four naval air groups, four amphibious groups, a powerful surface group and six nuclear attack submarine patrols. The US Air Force, US Navy and US Marines (USMC) have a total of 43 fighter squadrons, including seven 5th generation (F-22, F-35B and C), seven electronic warfare squadrons, seven ground attack squadrons. Outside the area of operation, the USAF can also call on eight squadrons of 12 bombers (B-52H, B-1B and B-2A). The Americans also have the option of deploying forces ashore in the form of a Marine Corps Littoral Regiment (MLR) and/or a US Army Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), or simply brigades armed with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles. If conditions permit, with secure access to Taiwanese ports and airports, the USMC and US Army can then deploy several divisions, first light and then armoured-mechanised.

The major problem with the US forces is that they are not, in the name of the "policy of ambiguity", already deployed on the island of Taiwan. Politically, this can always reinforce doubts about the American determination to fight, and if the People's Republic of China government is convinced that the Americans will not intervene, the temptation to invade will become very strong. This is akin to the invasion of North Korea by UN forces in October 1950 in the belief that China would not intervene. Militarily, the need for the Americans to intervene within days of the start of a possible invasion of Taiwan requires them to be in nearby bases, in Japan in particular and in Guam. These bases are now within range of the powerful Chinese strike force.

The People's Republic of China (PRC), for its part, is faced with the dilemma of either covering up its invasion operation with prior actions - attacking bases in Japan, occupying the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea or the Senkaku Islands in the north - that will involve third nations in the war, Japan in particular, or not doing so but allowing US forces to act all too easily.

Let's look at how this all fits together and the conclusions to be drawn.

D Day to Tainan

Let's move on quickly to the scenario of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) invading Taiwan without any outside intervention. Here things are quite simple. The missile force quickly destroys the Taiwanese navy and many of its air bases. Provided the ground-air defence itself is quickly neutralised, fighter-bomber squadrons will deliver the coup de grace. Almost simultaneously, the assault was carried out on one of the few possible landing zones, either on the southern tip with Tainan as the objective, or rather on the northern tip in the direction of Taipei, or still and less likely on the east coast of the island. Despite stiff Taiwanese resistance and difficult geography for the manoeuvre, all simulations indicate a conquest of the island in about a month. Even if we change the variables in favour of a stronger-than-expected Taiwanese army and a weaker PLA, if there is no US intervention, the island is doomed to be occupied. And there, no Ukrainian scenario with material aid from outside since Taiwan will be subjected to a blockade.

The most interesting scenario is obviously the one where the PRC government is convinced of the US intervention. In this case, the prior attack by missile force of the American bases in Japan, especially in Okinawa and on the island of Guam, seems indispensable for the success of the invasion. This "Pearl Harbor" in the Sea of Japan would be devastating to the American air force in particular - several hundred aircraft are thought to have been lost - and secondarily to the navy. It would present Japan with the dilemma of remaining neutral or engaging in its own right, with significant forces (five fighter squadrons, a powerful surface group and two submarine patrols).

This phase of strikes was carried out at the same time as strikes on Taiwan, extended as we have seen by air raids and an air-amphibious assault that nobody could prevent. The challenge for the Allies - the United States, Taiwan and undoubtedly Japan - was to hold out as long as possible on the island and destroy the PLA's amphibious fleet. Without an amphibious fleet and a contested sky, it will no longer be possible to supply the landed and contained force. The latter would therefore have to be destroyed.

The US operation would take the threefold form of an advance of the 7th Fleet groups into the Straits until they were in range of fire and raids with prior penetration of the ANS, a battle for air superiority over Taiwan and the Straits, probably without touching bases on the mainland to avoid escalation, and finally a landing by air or sea of ground forces that would help the Taiwanese forces contain the enemy.

In the vast majority of games based on this scenario, the Chinese missile force is mechanically depleted, US air forces overpower the AF-APL and naval air defence, and US naval forces enter the Strait. All of these combined efforts, along with those of the anti-ship batteries on land, eventually destroyed the enemy amphibious force. In most cases, the PLA's defeat is achieved within two weeks. In scenarios where all the variables are favourable to the PRC and unfavourable to the Allies (quality of troops, ability of the US JASSM-ER cruise missiles to fire anti-naval, underestimated number of PAL missiles, refusal of the Japanese to use the bases, etc.), the result is a stalemate in Taiwan, with a frozen front and in the medium term an American intervention on land that is better supplied than the PLA. There is no game in which the PRC has managed to fully conquer Taiwan despite US intervention.

The defeat of the People's Republic of China is therefore almost inevitable as things stand, but at a colossal price for perhaps three weeks of fighting: human losses in the tens of thousands and devastated armies. Even the Americans would pay a heavy price with 6,000 to 10,000 dead according to the CSIS 24 games and considerable material damage. This in itself is a political fact. A 2015 RAND Corporation study clearly showed that China always failed in Taiwan invasion scenarios since 1996 but that the magnitude of the failure diminished over time while the price to the US always increased, until it could one day be considered prohibitive. And even if the Americans are not deterred, the Chinese will have to be persuaded.

From an operational point of view, what emerges from all these games is the extreme vulnerability of all the heavy, slow, visible weapon systems in an environment where thousands of missiles of all kinds are launched at each other, with a very variable range but which can go up to several thousand kilometres, and all of them relatively accurate. In almost all the games, the vast majority of surface buildings are destroyed by missiles. This is the case for the entire Taiwanese fleet, most of the PLA surface naval force involved, including at least 80% of the amphibious fleet, but the Japanese navy also loses between 20 and 30 ships while the 7th fleet loses between 17 and 25 important ones depending on the CSIS games. A particular point in absolutely all games is that aircraft carriers are particularly vulnerable. There is not a game where the US Navy does not lose at least one (two on average in CSIS games). The two Chinese carriers almost always suffer the same fate. The air force also suffers enormous damage. The Taiwanese air force is always completely destroyed, the PRC air force loses 60-90% of its committed aircraft, almost all of them in the air or sunk with the carriers since the bases are probably not attacked. The Americans also routinely lose several hundred aircraft, and up to 700 in some games. The difference is that the vast majority of American air losses are on the ground or on sunken carriers.

A few weapon systems fare best in all games. First are the attack submarines, especially the Los Angeles and Virginia, whose patrols sink an average of 20 enemy ships at the cost of losing one ship. Diesel submarines, such as the Chinese Kilo, are less efficient and suffer but are still more effective than surface ships. Another winning system, especially for CSIS, is long-range bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles. These bombers have low vulnerability because their bases are not accessible to enemy missiles and they can fire from a safe distance. They can also carry a lot of ammunition, 200 missiles for a squadron of 12 B-52H 'bomb trucks'. The CSIS makes much of the stealthy, powerful and long-range (1,000 km) JASSM-ER (Joint air-to-surface standoff missile-Extended range). Considering, very importantly, that these missiles, designed primarily to hit land-based targets, are also effective as anti-ship missiles and that they are produced in sufficient numbers, they may be sufficient on their own to stop the Chinese offensive. The third winning system is the anti-ship batteries based on the island of Taiwan or nearby bastion islands armed with locally designed Hsiung Feng II and III missiles or imported ones such as Harpoon. They would also be responsible for much of the damage inflicted on the amphibious invasion force and be more cost-effective than other systems.

All these simulations (and the war in Ukraine) also seem to confirm the hedgehog defence idea of Admiral Lee Hsi-min, former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of China. It is better for Taiwan to invest in a techno-guerrilla defence, as Joseph Henrotin popularised the term, based on numerous small, cheap, mobile anti-access weapons than in expensive surface ships or air forces that will be quickly destroyed by the enemy without having been used. This is less impressive than a conventional force structure, and therefore may weaken the declaratory strategy, but surely more effective operationally. This is broadly the philosophy of the USMC's MLRs or the US Army's MDTFs, which are effective according to the CSIS games, the only ones to incorporate them into the scenarios, especially if they are equipped with long-range capabilities (the CSIS advocates equipping these ground forces with long-range cruise missiles). The problem is that it seems increasingly difficult in such an 'anti-access' environment for Americans to land at a port or airport as well. Strengthening local forces 'before' the war, not during it, becomes much more important.

A word about France, which, like the United Kingdom, is never included in the games despite its proclamation of its character as an "Indo-Pacific" power. The fault undoubtedly lies, as is often the case, in the absence of resources commensurate with the proclaimed ambition, but also in the absence of a clear discourse on the attitude that France would adopt in the event of serious matters. To put it plainly, would France intervene alongside the United States and possibly Japan in the event of an attempted invasion of Taiwan, and if so, with what means, since these means, except for the SNA, are not adapted to the context. The Charles de Gaulle, the jewel in the crown of our naval diplomacy, would undoubtedly find it difficult to survive in the operational context of the Taiwan Strait. A few bombers in a New Caledonia transformed into a giant aircraft carrier would undoubtedly have more effect and permanent effect in the region, if we had bombers.

The strategic importance of playing

Last but not least, the strategic importance of wargames. "War is an experiment whose experience cannot be made" said Henri Poincaré, in fact he was talking about combat whose experience in contact with death received or given cannot be perfectly simulated. But a few decades earlier, the Prussian General Staff had shown that, on the contrary, it was possible to create a coherent image of future military operations by merging a set of data from history, from the analysis of the conflict of the moment, from simulations in the field (large manoeuvres) and, once these data had been transformed into game elements, from simulations on maps. This is how the Prussian army, which only had this virtual experience until 1864, was able to win over the French army, which was the most experienced in the real world at that time. Of course, for this to be useful it must be done with the scientific rigour of the experimental sciences, like the medicine described by Claude Bernard at the same time. Of course, these simulation experiments must also serve to forge solid opinions and not to provide confirmation for opinions already formed. And if by some extraordinary chance the result of the simulations contradicts an opinion, it is the opinion that must change and not the result. All this requires, it is true, a rigour uncommon with many strategic decisions, but the game is the only serious method to dissipate uncertainty.

The special thing about the "Taiwan simulation", like the Fulda Gap, or a few others, is that these elements normally reserved for a small circle are made available to the general public through open publications and very sophisticated commercial games. With the same data giving the same results through the same equation, rigorous simulations should normally give similar results and so a common opinion is formed about what might happen...and thus influence it. Hopefully the Chinese high command will also simulate the invasion of Taiwan and if they do so rigorously, not like the Japanese suppressing the simulation group that predicted defeat in the middle of the war, they will not attack until they, as a good follower of Sun Tzu, have a much better chance of success. Let us hope so.

Similarly, if we had focused on the joint simulation of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, perhaps we would have had a better idea of what would happen, provided of course that we had done it rigorously by introducing "more and less than expected" variables. But this was obviously not done, and especially not in Moscow. We can see the result.

We can now hope that somewhere in Paris there is a large map of Ukraine and its surroundings with hundreds of counters and that scenarios are played on demand. One can even imagine a map of Europe or the world. At least, that's what would happen if we were serious.
 
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Charting submarine routes in Southeast Asia​

François-Xavier Bonnet
In Hérodote Volume 176, Issue 1, January 2020, pages 25 to 41

abstract: Military oceanographic research, in particular bathymetry, is becoming an issue of considerable geopolitical importance in Southeast Asia. In a context of power rivalries between China and the United States and territorial disputes between four ASEAN states and China in the South China Sea, some Southeast Asian countries are building their submarine fleets and acquiring materiel for anti-submarine warfare. The example of the Spratly Islands shows just how sensitive the issue of bathymetry is. In the past, the Spratly Islands—also referred to as “Dangerous Ground”—were an area to avoid, but over the last fifty years have become a strategic territory: a nuclear submarine equipped with ballistic missiles situated in the area could well threaten a large percentage of the world’s population.

intro:
With tensions in the South China Sea and power rivalries between the United States (US) and China, several Southeast Asian countries are modernizing their navies and investing in submarines. Oceanographic research, whether civil or military, has become an issue of considerable geopolitical importance, not only for asserting sovereignty over maritime territories, but also for supporting anti-submarine warfare and enabling surveillance of coasts and straits. Asian countries, such as the Philippines, that have hitherto remained on the sidelines in this respect are now endeavoring to build their own military oceanographic research facilities.​
Focusing specifically on the Spratly Islands, I will demonstrate the importance of one of the branches of oceanography: bathymetry. Economic arguments (fishing and the extraction of hydrocarbons) are generally advanced to explain the rivalries over the Spratlys between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. However, secret hydrographic research since the 1920s has shown that, contrary to popular belief, the Spratly Islands are crossed by deep canyons that act as “highways” for both conventional and nuclear submarines. A nuclear-powered submarine equipped with ballistic missiles in the Spratlys could well threaten a large part of the world.​
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summary:
The Southeast Asian seas: A challenging geographical setting for submarines
  • The proliferation of submarines in Southeast Asia
  • Submarine routes in Southeast Asia
  • Embryonic military oceanography in the Philippines archipelago
Bathymetry, a major geopolitical issue: The case of the Spratlys
  • Secret hydrographic research
  • The shadow war during the Second World War
  • A nuclear submarine in Dangerous Ground
  • Controlling the routes through Dangerous Ground
  • The South China Sea: A sanctuary for Chinese nuclear submarines
Conclusion
 
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