Yes, MICA-IR or ASRAAM are not radar guided.
Not sure about MICA-RF if it needs help of Main radar for active radar homing (or not)
Sukhoi Su-30MKI
- Thread starter Ashwin
- Start date
Not sure about MICA-RF if it needs help of Main radar for active radar homing (or not)
Its Mica IR i guess , we don't need russian permission to integrate an IR guided missile with mki.
There's no contest. Everything about MICA IR is better than both R-73 and Sidewinder.
Almost everything related to killing another aircraft is radar guided, even cannons. When Abhinandan killed the F-16, he used the radar to guide his missile until the missile could lock on to the target. Probably why he was still lurking inside their airspace instead of returning promptly.
And yes, at BVR ranges, MICA-RF would require the help of the main radar or it will be a very grand miss. The same with MICA-IR. All mid-course updates have to come from on-board sensors, whether it's the radar, EW suite or IRST, or even off-board sensors like another fighter jet or AWACS.
LOBL mode works only if the target is close enough for the seeker to see the target. So the RF will not need radar guidance if the target is less than 20Km away. The IIR seeker works at much longer ranges, but it cannot see as much of the sky as the radar does, so the radar is required to help point the IIR seeker towards the target, using a master-slave model.
As for integrating with the Bars radar, we use our own radar computer and mission computer on the MKI, the MC is capable of sensor-fusion, and we have all the source codes needed to integrate the missile and radar. That's how we did it with Astra, no Russians involved there. Similarly, the missile OEMs can provide all the integration source codes needed to integrate the missile with the radar. The MKI uses the same standardised hardware as NATO, it's called 'open architecture' so all Western weapons designed around the same NATO standard hardware can be integrated with it. Similarly, the EW suite is our own, so there won't be any integration problems there either, as mentioned the MC is capable of sensor fusion. Simply put, we can integrate any weapon we want on the MKI as long as the weapon's OEM cooperates.
Now, one can argue that an IR missile can function without integrating it with the radar or even the EW suite, which is true, but for an air superiority aircraft, that's not enough. Without full integration, you cannot use even 10% of the MICA-IR's full capabilities. It requires radar integration for BVR ranges, it requires IRST integration for WVR combat or in case where the radar is jammed, it requires EW suite integration for all-aspect capability and automated launch, and it requires integration with the helmet for quick and easy use of the missile when in WVR combat.
Su-30MKI with SAP-14 electronic attack pod
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IAF use SAP-518 too. But it looks thinner than SAP-14. Also, it is often equipped on wingtips, not in the centerline.
Here is a Su-34 with SAP-14 in the centerline and SAP-518 on the wingtips. This combination is perfect to handle surface to air as well as air to air threats
Here is the only clear picture of Su-30MKI with SAP-518 pods. Published by IAF official social media handle.
SAP 518 , 14 are good jammers but they have there own weaknesses.
Russian EW Weaknesses Endure While Other Nations Innovate.
Airborne electronic warfare (EW) systems are becoming an increasingly important part of the electronic systems in fighter aircraft. Moreover, the functionality of many airborne EW designs are no longer just limited to being a self-protection system. One of the secondary—but growing in importance—features of this technology is to be able to record all the signals and electronic emissions that the aircraft is either subjected to or in range of during its mission.
Russia’s designers refer to the recording function of an EW system, or what they call “REB” (a Russian acronym meaning Radio-Electronic Combat), as radarnaya razvedka, or “radar signals intelligence.” Each time an aircraft is able to intercept and record a new adversary radar emission, EW jamming signal, or other electronic transmission that data can then be downloaded and becomes part of the database or “threat library” that is constantly being updated and then uploaded into other databases across the fleet of combat aircraft operating with EW suites on board.
At present, the main Russian EW design and manufacturing enterprises fall under the Radio-Electronic Technologies Concern, or KRET, in its Russian acronym. One of the most well-known and active of the KRET companies responsible for the design of many of the current-day Russian airborne EW systems is the Kaluga Scientific-Research Institute for Radio Engineering (KNIRTI).
KNIRTI produces an entire line of EW systems that are all derived from a basic design that is produced in several variants that are adapted to specific platforms. Russian writings on the development of this current generation of EW systems discuss the process by which it was designed and the current-day capabilities of the L-175 family of EW designs, which have the nickname of Khibiny.
Russian experts describe the system as “a magical piece of kit”—the history of the developmental work on the system traces its roots to the Soviet period. “Work on the system was carried out from 1977 to 1990,” according to one of the country’s most prominent military systems databases. “In 1995 the first cycle of testing was carried out and then in 1997 a second series. Only in 2014 was the system officially accepted into service as part of the equipment set for the Sukhoi Su-34, which was the platform the system it was originally designed for.”
At present there are several variants of the system designed for specific platform applications:
• KC418E—Sukhoi Su-24MK/MK2 export variant
• L-175М10-35—Sukhoi Su-35
• L-175V Khibiny-10V—Sukhoi Su-34
•L-265 Khibiny-10M/L-26510M—Sukhoi Su-35S (installed in wingtip pods rather than underwing containers)
• Khibiny-U—Sukhoi Su-30SM
The L175 series of designs is described in one of the Russian documents outlining its specifications as “being capable of acting as an individual or group of aircraft against detected threat signals by emitting active radar jamming pulses across a wide range of frequency bands and against up to four separate targets simultaneously, launching anti-radiation missiles against emitting targets, and also transmitting passive jamming by creating false thermal images and dipole reflectors.”
Observers in Ukraine and Belarus say these while Russian systems are powerful jammers and can create enough interference to adequately blind adversary radars and other sensors, “the overall objective that the Russian systems are designed to achieve is for their adversaries to lose situational awareness—at least long enough for the Russian aircraft to be able to carry out its mission,” according to one Ukrainian EW design engineer.
The Russian methodology for EW has shortcomings, however, say both Belarus and Ukraine EW designers—all of which will only become more pronounced over time.
One is the continued Russian reliance on Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) as the basis for the signals generated by these jamming pods. This is a system by which the threat library of an EW system recognizes the radar signal that it is receiving and parrots back the signal so that the radar system appears to have contacted nothing. This method depends on the pulses from adversaries to be on a constant frequency and at a standard, regular interval.
“This is no longer the case with more modern radar systems,” said the same Ukrainian designer. “Today’s radars are often ‘frequency-hopping’ and also the pulse width varies and with no repetitive pattern—therefore making it impossible for many jammers to mimic the incoming signal in such a way as to adequately conceal the aircraft.”
A second issue is the power levels of Russian jamming systems. The strength of Russian EW signals is at times overpowering, Ukrainian EW specialists tell AIN, but that signal is also so strong that it is also like a beacon. For any enemy’s anti-radiation weapon that has a “home on jam” mode, it literally makes the Russian aircraft a target.
Thirdly, both Ukraine and Belarus engineers state that smaller, lower power, and quieter EW systems can be built that use commercially available components—reducing costs—which are not based on DRFM technology and require none of the many hours of collecting and analyzing signals needed to build threat libraries. They instead create false targets that shift position regularly. This causes a missile or other weapon’s homing system to be diverted away from the real target, but without generating a powerful signal that also gives away an aircraft’s position.
Designs of this type are included in a series of developments in off-the-shelf technology that makes it possible for a much larger number of nations to build effective EW systems. The analogy that some of the Ukrainian and other non-Russian designers use is that this change is not unlike the availability today of commercial satellite imagery.
EW, they observe, is like some other categories of modern weaponry. Once the monopoly of only a handful of nations with large budgets and technologically sophisticated defense industrial bases, the ability to create jammers and other EW systems is now present in nations where it could not have been thought of as possible a decade ago.
Russian EW Weaknesses Endure While Other Nations Innovate.
Airborne electronic warfare (EW) systems are becoming an increasingly important part of the electronic systems in fighter aircraft. Moreover, the functionality of many airborne EW designs are no longer just limited to being a self-protection system. One of the secondary—but growing in importance—features of this technology is to be able to record all the signals and electronic emissions that the aircraft is either subjected to or in range of during its mission.
Russia’s designers refer to the recording function of an EW system, or what they call “REB” (a Russian acronym meaning Radio-Electronic Combat), as radarnaya razvedka, or “radar signals intelligence.” Each time an aircraft is able to intercept and record a new adversary radar emission, EW jamming signal, or other electronic transmission that data can then be downloaded and becomes part of the database or “threat library” that is constantly being updated and then uploaded into other databases across the fleet of combat aircraft operating with EW suites on board.
At present, the main Russian EW design and manufacturing enterprises fall under the Radio-Electronic Technologies Concern, or KRET, in its Russian acronym. One of the most well-known and active of the KRET companies responsible for the design of many of the current-day Russian airborne EW systems is the Kaluga Scientific-Research Institute for Radio Engineering (KNIRTI).
KNIRTI produces an entire line of EW systems that are all derived from a basic design that is produced in several variants that are adapted to specific platforms. Russian writings on the development of this current generation of EW systems discuss the process by which it was designed and the current-day capabilities of the L-175 family of EW designs, which have the nickname of Khibiny.
Russian experts describe the system as “a magical piece of kit”—the history of the developmental work on the system traces its roots to the Soviet period. “Work on the system was carried out from 1977 to 1990,” according to one of the country’s most prominent military systems databases. “In 1995 the first cycle of testing was carried out and then in 1997 a second series. Only in 2014 was the system officially accepted into service as part of the equipment set for the Sukhoi Su-34, which was the platform the system it was originally designed for.”
At present there are several variants of the system designed for specific platform applications:
• KC418E—Sukhoi Su-24MK/MK2 export variant
• L-175М10-35—Sukhoi Su-35
• L-175V Khibiny-10V—Sukhoi Su-34
•L-265 Khibiny-10M/L-26510M—Sukhoi Su-35S (installed in wingtip pods rather than underwing containers)
• Khibiny-U—Sukhoi Su-30SM
The L175 series of designs is described in one of the Russian documents outlining its specifications as “being capable of acting as an individual or group of aircraft against detected threat signals by emitting active radar jamming pulses across a wide range of frequency bands and against up to four separate targets simultaneously, launching anti-radiation missiles against emitting targets, and also transmitting passive jamming by creating false thermal images and dipole reflectors.”
Observers in Ukraine and Belarus say these while Russian systems are powerful jammers and can create enough interference to adequately blind adversary radars and other sensors, “the overall objective that the Russian systems are designed to achieve is for their adversaries to lose situational awareness—at least long enough for the Russian aircraft to be able to carry out its mission,” according to one Ukrainian EW design engineer.
The Russian methodology for EW has shortcomings, however, say both Belarus and Ukraine EW designers—all of which will only become more pronounced over time.
One is the continued Russian reliance on Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) as the basis for the signals generated by these jamming pods. This is a system by which the threat library of an EW system recognizes the radar signal that it is receiving and parrots back the signal so that the radar system appears to have contacted nothing. This method depends on the pulses from adversaries to be on a constant frequency and at a standard, regular interval.
“This is no longer the case with more modern radar systems,” said the same Ukrainian designer. “Today’s radars are often ‘frequency-hopping’ and also the pulse width varies and with no repetitive pattern—therefore making it impossible for many jammers to mimic the incoming signal in such a way as to adequately conceal the aircraft.”
A second issue is the power levels of Russian jamming systems. The strength of Russian EW signals is at times overpowering, Ukrainian EW specialists tell AIN, but that signal is also so strong that it is also like a beacon. For any enemy’s anti-radiation weapon that has a “home on jam” mode, it literally makes the Russian aircraft a target.
Thirdly, both Ukraine and Belarus engineers state that smaller, lower power, and quieter EW systems can be built that use commercially available components—reducing costs—which are not based on DRFM technology and require none of the many hours of collecting and analyzing signals needed to build threat libraries. They instead create false targets that shift position regularly. This causes a missile or other weapon’s homing system to be diverted away from the real target, but without generating a powerful signal that also gives away an aircraft’s position.
Designs of this type are included in a series of developments in off-the-shelf technology that makes it possible for a much larger number of nations to build effective EW systems. The analogy that some of the Ukrainian and other non-Russian designers use is that this change is not unlike the availability today of commercial satellite imagery.
EW, they observe, is like some other categories of modern weaponry. Once the monopoly of only a handful of nations with large budgets and technologically sophisticated defense industrial bases, the ability to create jammers and other EW systems is now present in nations where it could not have been thought of as possible a decade ago.
I have a question for experts
Can we reduce some weight of Su30 mki using composites and restructuring of wires?
If yes then we can increase TWR without changing it's engine and only AESA radar will be major upgrade required. It is a very complicated task though.
@randomradio
@vstol Jockey
Can we reduce some weight of Su30 mki using composites and restructuring of wires?
If yes then we can increase TWR without changing it's engine and only AESA radar will be major upgrade required. It is a very complicated task though.
@randomradio
@vstol Jockey
Reduction in weight might be compensated by extra power needed for advance avionics and radar.
The MKI will be getting some airframe upgrades and changes in the internal estate. Whether we are uprating the AL-31FP or getting a new engine, that's something time will tell. It could go either way.
The Russians are pushing the IAF to accept the Su-30SM2 for the upgrade program. So that's with the Irbis-E and 117S.
Su-30 MKI Overhaul time is now less than 15 months. (Under HAL)
What do they do in an overhaul ?
Change all the expendables and parts that have nearly ended service life ? Except the airframe I imagine.
