The Quad (US, Japan, India, Australia Security Dialogue) : Updates and Discussions
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India, Japan, Australia and USA’s Quad: Reinvigoration of Indo-Pacific powers?
By Ambassador Anil Wadhwa
Senior officials of the Quad security dialogue partners – India Japan, Australia and USA- met virtually on 25 September where they discussed a host of “issues on regional and global issues of concern”, underscoring the importance of enhancing the resilience of supply chains and sharing best practices on combating the pandemic. This meeting was a follow-up of the official level discussions in November 2019 and the ministerial engagement of September 2019, where ongoing and proposed cooperation on infrastructure development, cyber and maritime security and stability in the Indo Pacific were dominant themes. All eyes are now on the ministerial meeting of the Quad on 6 October in Tokyo.
These developments come against the backdrop of unprecedented Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, around the Senkaku islands, the Taiwan Straits, the Western Pacific and Australia and the Line of Actual Control on the Sino Indian border. The rules-based order, and a free and open Indo Pacific which the Quad countries aspire for has been seriously challenged. A divided ASEAN is unable to put up a united front. In the disputed waters of the South China Sea, freedom of navigation is restricted, fishing is disallowed at will, and questions are raised on legitimate territorial claims of countries under the UNCLOS. Although the Quad is not targeted at any particular country, China has opened fronts against all its members. A pushback is therefore a logical outcome.
Doubts have been raised on the efficacy of the Quad, which is just a consultative mechanism, but it has already served the limited purpose of political signalling while improving coordination among major maritime powers in the Indo Pacific. The grouping has been able to work effectively in an expanded framework of Quad plus (with the inclusion of Vietnam, South Korea and New Zealand) to coordinate policies and responses with regard to the pandemic at the foreign Secretaries level. In recent weeks there is enhanced interest from countries like France, Germany and UK who have come up with their own versions of an Indo Pacific strategy to work with likeminded countries of the Quad in maintaining a rules-based, free and open Indo Pacific. The Quad has repeatedly expressed its desire to work with the ASEAN keeping ASEAN centrality in mind.
The Quad can be expected to support a Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI) proposal for the region but this would require the participants to put aside necessary financial incentives, agree on preferential investment rules, tariffs specific to these products, quality standards, rules of origin, data flow rules, and mechanisms for settling disputes.
Efforts will continue for the creation of an alternative to the Chinese BRI by pooling resources for infrastructure projects. A few model projects as capability demonstrators will set the tone. If India joins the Blue Dot Initiative, it could promote Quality Infrastructure, provided it actually works out a concrete corpus for funding projects rather than just setting standards.
In future, the Quad can be expected to move closer on issues like maritime domain awareness, logistics and interoperability with the added dimension of space-based information pooling. The Quad countries should enhance their cooperation on submarine detection and tracking in the Indian ocean through the installation of sound surveillance sensors on their islands and territories. Quad members would also do well to strengthen their intelligence and information exchange, which remains patchy, and based largely on existing alliance systems. Strengthening cooperation in new technologies like sonars, radars and over the horizon intelligence, Artificial Intelligence in the military domain and surveillance technologies is a promising area of cooperation, and the need of the hour. Over the longer term, the Quad can be expected to continue to work with ASEAN in the areas of the blue economy, white shipping agreements, coastal surveillance, the building of offshore patrolling capabilities, maritime exercises, hydrographic services, and information sharing for increased maritime domain awareness.
www.financialexpress.com
China drives Quad
As External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar travels to Tokyo for the meeting of the so-called Quad — or the quadrilateral forum involving India, the US, Japan and Australia — Beijing and its official media are letting the political bile flow. If Chinese leaders looked in the mirror, they would see that it is Beijing’s overweening strategic ambition that is driving the consolidation of the Quad. The accidental origins of the Quad go back to the Boxing Day tsunami in the eastern Indian Ocean at the end of 2004, when the navies of the four nations came together on short notice to coordinate the regional relief efforts. Soon after, in 2007, Shinzo Abe, the then prime minister of Japan, articulated the concept of the Indo-Pacific and urged the collaboration between the US and the three Asian democracies — India, Japan and Australia — to stabilise the new strategic geography. It is only in the last couple of years that the Indo-Pacific geography has gained widespread political acceptance. This week’s meeting in Tokyo could well be the moment when the Quad begins to turn from an abstract idea into a credible political coalition.
Over the years, Beijing has reacted with condescension and hostility to the Quad. It often dismissed the Quad as a pitiful effort to contain a rising China and occasionally painted it as a great threat to global peace and security. As the case for the Quad gained ground amidst China’s post-pandemic aggression on multiple fronts, Beijing is trying to demonise the forum and generate opposition across the region and within the four members. Chinese arguments obfuscate the cause and effect in the transformation of the Quad. Until recently, there was much reluctance in all the four capitals against embarking on any venture that would give political offence to China. All four had serious economic stakes in China and a strong interest in building sustainable political relations with Beijing. All four tried to downgrade the Quad at different points. Resultantly, the Quad seemed a less-organised cousin of the BRICS forum that brings together Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. What is transforming the Quad today from a talk shop into a purposeful strategic framework is China’s growing unilateralism and brazen effort to establish regional and global dominance.
China seems to believe that it can keep pushing India on a range of issues — from aggression on the Ladakh frontier to deepening military partnership with Pakistan and from blocking India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to refusing to address the mounting trade deficit — and yet claim a veto over India’s relations with other powers, including the US, Japan and Australia. Until recently, India has been the most cautious in imagining a robust future for the Quad. But Delhi’s attitudes have begun to evolve as China’s pressures on India intensified. No country, certainly not a large one like India, likes being cornered. Delhi may now be ready to contribute to the consolidation of the Quad.
indianexpress.com
By Ambassador Anil Wadhwa
Senior officials of the Quad security dialogue partners – India Japan, Australia and USA- met virtually on 25 September where they discussed a host of “issues on regional and global issues of concern”, underscoring the importance of enhancing the resilience of supply chains and sharing best practices on combating the pandemic. This meeting was a follow-up of the official level discussions in November 2019 and the ministerial engagement of September 2019, where ongoing and proposed cooperation on infrastructure development, cyber and maritime security and stability in the Indo Pacific were dominant themes. All eyes are now on the ministerial meeting of the Quad on 6 October in Tokyo.
These developments come against the backdrop of unprecedented Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, around the Senkaku islands, the Taiwan Straits, the Western Pacific and Australia and the Line of Actual Control on the Sino Indian border. The rules-based order, and a free and open Indo Pacific which the Quad countries aspire for has been seriously challenged. A divided ASEAN is unable to put up a united front. In the disputed waters of the South China Sea, freedom of navigation is restricted, fishing is disallowed at will, and questions are raised on legitimate territorial claims of countries under the UNCLOS. Although the Quad is not targeted at any particular country, China has opened fronts against all its members. A pushback is therefore a logical outcome.
Doubts have been raised on the efficacy of the Quad, which is just a consultative mechanism, but it has already served the limited purpose of political signalling while improving coordination among major maritime powers in the Indo Pacific. The grouping has been able to work effectively in an expanded framework of Quad plus (with the inclusion of Vietnam, South Korea and New Zealand) to coordinate policies and responses with regard to the pandemic at the foreign Secretaries level. In recent weeks there is enhanced interest from countries like France, Germany and UK who have come up with their own versions of an Indo Pacific strategy to work with likeminded countries of the Quad in maintaining a rules-based, free and open Indo Pacific. The Quad has repeatedly expressed its desire to work with the ASEAN keeping ASEAN centrality in mind.
The Quad can be expected to support a Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI) proposal for the region but this would require the participants to put aside necessary financial incentives, agree on preferential investment rules, tariffs specific to these products, quality standards, rules of origin, data flow rules, and mechanisms for settling disputes.
Efforts will continue for the creation of an alternative to the Chinese BRI by pooling resources for infrastructure projects. A few model projects as capability demonstrators will set the tone. If India joins the Blue Dot Initiative, it could promote Quality Infrastructure, provided it actually works out a concrete corpus for funding projects rather than just setting standards.
In future, the Quad can be expected to move closer on issues like maritime domain awareness, logistics and interoperability with the added dimension of space-based information pooling. The Quad countries should enhance their cooperation on submarine detection and tracking in the Indian ocean through the installation of sound surveillance sensors on their islands and territories. Quad members would also do well to strengthen their intelligence and information exchange, which remains patchy, and based largely on existing alliance systems. Strengthening cooperation in new technologies like sonars, radars and over the horizon intelligence, Artificial Intelligence in the military domain and surveillance technologies is a promising area of cooperation, and the need of the hour. Over the longer term, the Quad can be expected to continue to work with ASEAN in the areas of the blue economy, white shipping agreements, coastal surveillance, the building of offshore patrolling capabilities, maritime exercises, hydrographic services, and information sharing for increased maritime domain awareness.
India, Japan, Australia and USA’s Quad: Reinvigoration of Indo-Pacific powers?
Senior officials of the Quad security dialogue partners – India Japan, Australia and USA- met virtually on 25 September where they discussed a host of “issues on regional and global issues of concern”, underscoring the importance of enhancing the resilience of supply chains and sharing best...
www.financialexpress.com
As External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar travels to Tokyo for the meeting of the so-called Quad — or the quadrilateral forum involving India, the US, Japan and Australia — Beijing and its official media are letting the political bile flow. If Chinese leaders looked in the mirror, they would see that it is Beijing’s overweening strategic ambition that is driving the consolidation of the Quad. The accidental origins of the Quad go back to the Boxing Day tsunami in the eastern Indian Ocean at the end of 2004, when the navies of the four nations came together on short notice to coordinate the regional relief efforts. Soon after, in 2007, Shinzo Abe, the then prime minister of Japan, articulated the concept of the Indo-Pacific and urged the collaboration between the US and the three Asian democracies — India, Japan and Australia — to stabilise the new strategic geography. It is only in the last couple of years that the Indo-Pacific geography has gained widespread political acceptance. This week’s meeting in Tokyo could well be the moment when the Quad begins to turn from an abstract idea into a credible political coalition.
Over the years, Beijing has reacted with condescension and hostility to the Quad. It often dismissed the Quad as a pitiful effort to contain a rising China and occasionally painted it as a great threat to global peace and security. As the case for the Quad gained ground amidst China’s post-pandemic aggression on multiple fronts, Beijing is trying to demonise the forum and generate opposition across the region and within the four members. Chinese arguments obfuscate the cause and effect in the transformation of the Quad. Until recently, there was much reluctance in all the four capitals against embarking on any venture that would give political offence to China. All four had serious economic stakes in China and a strong interest in building sustainable political relations with Beijing. All four tried to downgrade the Quad at different points. Resultantly, the Quad seemed a less-organised cousin of the BRICS forum that brings together Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. What is transforming the Quad today from a talk shop into a purposeful strategic framework is China’s growing unilateralism and brazen effort to establish regional and global dominance.
China seems to believe that it can keep pushing India on a range of issues — from aggression on the Ladakh frontier to deepening military partnership with Pakistan and from blocking India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to refusing to address the mounting trade deficit — and yet claim a veto over India’s relations with other powers, including the US, Japan and Australia. Until recently, India has been the most cautious in imagining a robust future for the Quad. But Delhi’s attitudes have begun to evolve as China’s pressures on India intensified. No country, certainly not a large one like India, likes being cornered. Delhi may now be ready to contribute to the consolidation of the Quad.
China drives Quad
Meeting in Tokyo could well be the moment when Quad begins to turn from abstract idea to credible political coalition
indianexpress.com
"Multinational discussion are very crucial..like minded countries, who share values can participate in it", Japan FM on expansion of Quad
Post in thread 'Indian Missiles and Munitions Discussion' Indian Missiles and Munitions DiscussionIs India connected to the US SOSUS network in Asia?
@BMD
India and UK in final stages of signing defence logistics pact, will extend reach
By Manu Pubby, ET Bureau
Last Updated: Oct 09, 2020, 11:00 AM IST
Synopsis
The logistics pact, which will enable reciprocal use of bases and airfields for fuel, supplies and spares, has been under discussion with the UK, besides an agreement on joint training. India already has similar pacts with six nations that have interest in the Indo-Pacific region.
The logistics pact, which will enable reciprocal use of bases and airfields for fuel, supplies and spares, has been under discussion with the UK, besides an agreement on joint training. India already has similar pacts with six nations that have interest in the Indo-Pacific region.
NEW DELHI: India and the UK are in the final stages of signing a defence logistics sharing pact, according to people aware of the development, adding to a host of similar agreements with other Indo-Pacific nations that can expand the reach of Indian warships and aircraft in the region.
The logistics pact, which will enable reciprocal use of bases and airfields for fuel, supplies and spares, has been under discussion with the UK, besides an agreement on joint training. India already has similar pacts with six nations that have interest in the Indo-Pacific region.
“India’s military logistics pacts have the potential to substantially enhance the Indian Navy’s operational reach in the Indo-Pacific region. From Reunion to Djibouti and Salalah to Guam, India now has access to the remote reaches of the Indo Pacific. A logistics agreement with the UK will, for the first time, offer India access to naval facilities in the distant Atlantic,” said Abhijit Singh, who heads the maritime policy initiative at the Observer Research Foundation.
While the practical use will be determined in the coming years, these pacts can give India access to a range of ports and military bases in the region – from major garrisons in the Gulf to the remote Keeling island in the South Indian Ocean, and strategic military locations like Okinawa and Busan. India has logistics sharing pacts with the US, France, Singapore, South Korea, Australia and Japan. Advanced discussions are also on with Russia to ink the pact soon – possibly at the next bilateral meeting scheduled for this month.
“The agreement with the UK in a way provides a foundational access map for India across the Indo-Pacific. Depending on political will, through these logistics pacts India would not only have access to the entry and exit points in the Indian Ocean, but reach and presence at strategic locations in the Indo-Pacific,” said Darshana Barua, non-resident scholar, Carnegie Endowment.
While India has been very careful in using these pacts – occasional refuelling at sea and bases has taken place with the US, Indian planes have used the Reunion islands as a turnaround base and Singapore has acted as a hub – the potential to leverage these should be visible in the coming years as the naval footprint increases in the region to counter China’s ambitions.
China has started creating military bases in the Indian Ocean Region – starting with Djibouti – while India has opted for the more benign approach of entering into logistics sharing pacts that ensure adequate reach for forces, without any underlying territorial aspirations.
Major military logistics sharing pacts signed by India give access to warships and aircraft across the Indo-Pacific region, a capability that never existed before. From multiple options in the Gulf to the deep Indian Ocean and the sensitive South China Sea, these pacts will enable easy movement of the military, whenever the need arises.
- Busan (South Korea)
- Okinawa/Iwo Jima (Japan)
- Singapore
- Cocoa Keeling (Australia)
- Andamans (India)
- La Reunion (France),
- Djibouti and Bahrain (UK)
- Guam (US)
India and UK in final stages of signing defence logistics pact, will extend reach
The logistics pact, which will enable reciprocal use of bases and airfields for fuel, supplies and spares, has been under discussion with the UK, besides an agreement on joint training. India already has similar pacts with six nations that have interest in the Indo-Pacific region.
This is one agreement we can do without. There aren't any synergies to be had with both the RN & the UK. They haven't committed to the FONOPs with great conviction. It's more of an afterthought considering the French, Germans, Australians etc along with Japan & India have jumped on to the US bandwagon. Their plans to modernize & expand the RN is in disarray. Why, even Iran defrocked the UK recently! That's the kind of awe the RN inspires out here in our part of the world.
@BMD
India and UK in final stages of signing defence logistics pact, will extend reach
By Manu Pubby, ET Bureau
Last Updated: Oct 09, 2020, 11:00 AM IST
View attachment 18199
Synopsis
The logistics pact, which will enable reciprocal use of bases and airfields for fuel, supplies and spares, has been under discussion with the UK, besides an agreement on joint training. India already has similar pacts with six nations that have interest in the Indo-Pacific region.
NEW DELHI: India and the UK are in the final stages of signing a defence logistics sharing pact, according to people aware of the development, adding to a host of similar agreements with other Indo-Pacific nations that can expand the reach of Indian warships and aircraft in the region.
The logistics pact, which will enable reciprocal use of bases and airfields for fuel, supplies and spares, has been under discussion with the UK, besides an agreement on joint training. India already has similar pacts with six nations that have interest in the Indo-Pacific region.
“India’s military logistics pacts have the potential to substantially enhance the Indian Navy’s operational reach in the Indo-Pacific region. From Reunion to Djibouti and Salalah to Guam, India now has access to the remote reaches of the Indo Pacific. A logistics agreement with the UK will, for the first time, offer India access to naval facilities in the distant Atlantic,” said Abhijit Singh, who heads the maritime policy initiative at the Observer Research Foundation.
While the practical use will be determined in the coming years, these pacts can give India access to a range of ports and military bases in the region – from major garrisons in the Gulf to the remote Keeling island in the South Indian Ocean, and strategic military locations like Okinawa and Busan. India has logistics sharing pacts with the US, France, Singapore, South Korea, Australia and Japan. Advanced discussions are also on with Russia to ink the pact soon – possibly at the next bilateral meeting scheduled for this month.
“The agreement with the UK in a way provides a foundational access map for India across the Indo-Pacific. Depending on political will, through these logistics pacts India would not only have access to the entry and exit points in the Indian Ocean, but reach and presence at strategic locations in the Indo-Pacific,” said Darshana Barua, non-resident scholar, Carnegie Endowment.
While India has been very careful in using these pacts – occasional refuelling at sea and bases has taken place with the US, Indian planes have used the Reunion islands as a turnaround base and Singapore has acted as a hub – the potential to leverage these should be visible in the coming years as the naval footprint increases in the region to counter China’s ambitions.
China has started creating military bases in the Indian Ocean Region – starting with Djibouti – while India has opted for the more benign approach of entering into logistics sharing pacts that ensure adequate reach for forces, without any underlying territorial aspirations.
Major military logistics sharing pacts signed by India give access to warships and aircraft across the Indo-Pacific region, a capability that never existed before. From multiple options in the Gulf to the deep Indian Ocean and the sensitive South China Sea, these pacts will enable easy movement of the military, whenever the need arises.
- Busan (South Korea)
- Okinawa/Iwo Jima (Japan)
- Singapore
- Cocoa Keeling (Australia)
- Andamans (India)
- La Reunion (France),
- Djibouti and Bahrain (UK)
- Guam (US)
India and UK in final stages of signing defence logistics pact, will extend reach
The logistics pact, which will enable reciprocal use of bases and airfields for fuel, supplies and spares, has been under discussion with the UK, besides an agreement on joint training. India already has similar pacts with six nations that have interest in the Indo-Pacific region.economictimes.indiatimes.com
Quad ministers agree to meet once a year
TOKYO -- Foreign ministers from the Quad nations -- the US, Japan, India and Australia -- gathered here Tuesday for their first in-person talks in over a year and agreed to hold regular meetings.The four countries' top diplomats, who last met in September 2019 in New York, will seek to meet once a year.
The Tokyo talks came during a shortened visit to Asia by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who told Nikkei he wants to wants to formalize and potentially broaden the quadrilateral security dialogue.
"As partners in this Quad, it is more critical now than ever that we collaborate to protect our people and partners from the CCP's exploitation, corruption and coercion," Pompeo said in remarks before the meeting, accusing China's Communist Party of a cover-up that worsened the coronavirus pandemic.
Pompeo called the Indo-Pacific vision a shared goal. He touched on the issues surrounding the South China Sea, the East China Sea and cross-strait relations between Taiwan and mainland China.
The Quad was formed as the core of an envisioned network of economic and security cooperation in the region, with an eye toward a rising China.
"The four countries share the goal of strengthening the free and open international order" grounded on basic values and rules such as democracy and the rule of law, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi said.
Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne called the meeting an "important step in the continuing evolution of the Quad," adding that Canberra has no partners more important than Tokyo, Washington and New Delhi in its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.
Indian counterpart Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said the world "is significantly different today than what it was when we met last year in New York in September."
"Now, the events of this year have clearly demonstrated how imperative it is for like-minded countries to coordinate responses to various challenges that the pandemic has brought to the fore," Jaishankar added.
Distrust of China has been growing in all four countries due to Beijing's initial response to the coronavirus pandemic and its crackdown on Hong Kong.
The quartet has been cooperating more closely on security matters. Japan and India signed an agreement last month allowing them to share military supplies and logistical support, and India and Australia inked a similar deal in June. Australia has expressed interest in joining this year's Malabar joint naval exercise, an annual event held by the U.S., India and Japan.
Washington continues to clash with Beijing over trade and security. While Canberra has taken pains to maintain balanced trade and security relationships, the coronavirus pandemic has stoked anti-China sentiment there. New Delhi's relations with Beijing have deteriorated amid the reigniting of a border conflict in the Himalayas.
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga affirmed his intention to carry on Japan's push for a "free and open Indo-Pacific" at a meeting here Tuesday with the top diplomats of the U.S., India and Australia.
The Indo-Pacific concept "is a vision of regional peace and prosperity that has become widely recognized throughout the international community," said Suga. "My government's basic policy is to make sure we move forward with it."
The gathering of Quad ministers marked Suga's first face-to-face meeting with cabinet-level foreign officials since taking office. The new prime minister will visit Vietnam and Indonesia this month in his first official trip abroad.
Quad ministers agree to meet once a year
US, Japan, India and Australia reaffirm 'shared goal' of open Indo-Pacific
asia.nikkei.com
We have committed to FONOPs in SCS ?! When did that happen ?
We aren't doing that great either. At least they have a new carrier. Our Vikrant is still being put together. Then there is the question of fighters from that carrier.
Isn't the IN sailing with or without the USN in the SCS albeit irregularly? What exactly would you call that even if the IN & the MEA don't explicitly call it FONOPs?
The MiG-29k we've procured are for both the AC. We have 2 AC. So do they. Our only dilemma is when do we go on for a 3rd not if or whether we need a 3rd.Theirs is if they actually need & can afford to operate the 2nd one.
Joint sailing ops & familiarisation drills. I would consider it FONOPs if we sailed through the Taiwan strait.
We have 2 ACs right now ? All we have is Vikky. The Migs are problematic. The way Navy's budget keeps getting lowered I wouldn't be surprised if in a few years their dilemma turns our dilemma.
Which is something the RN has yet to do.
I don't get why do you have to read things literally. Are you testing my knowledge or patience? Aren't we commissioning the INS Vikrant the next year or the year after next? Or do you see it meeting the same fate as the Titanic during the commissioning process?
As to whether the MiGs are problematic or not, the decision to base them on both carriers has already been taken with the TEDBF to replace them in a decade or more.
2 carriers are in operation. The budget to operate them would also have been factored in much before the manufacturing started. The precise reason why we're not going in for another AC . For the time being.
The name should change if the group actually becomes formal. India wants to bring Russia into the group.
I don't think Russia wants to join an anti-China club. And I don't think the USA want to let Russia join a strategic club.
France, UK, New Zealand, South Korea, Canada, maybe.
France, UK, New Zealand, South Korea, Canada, maybe.
