The Quad (US, Japan, India, Australia Security Dialogue) : Updates and Discussions
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Building a new maritime surveillance network across the Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean is an increasingly contested strategic environment. A growing Chinese naval presence raises the prospect that Beijing may seek to challenge US naval dominance, potentially sparking a competitive naval arms race in the region. This would be of huge concern to Australia, forcing us to divert limited defence resources from other priority areas in the Indo-Pacific. Australia and its partners need to consider how to best leverage their strategic advantages to deter or limit China’s naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean.
One of the biggest advantages of Australia and its Indian Ocean partners, and one of China’s biggest vulnerabilities, is in maritime domain awareness. The ability of even large vessels to effectively disappear in the vastness of the Indian Ocean puts maritime domain awareness at a premium. If you can find a naval adversary and they can’t find your ships, the odds are definitely in your favour.
The Chinese navy already has significant disadvantages in the Indian Ocean, operating with limited logistical support far from home ports that are accessible only by transiting the narrow straits through Southeast Asia, where they can be easily located and tracked. China also lacks a comprehensive maritime picture of even significant parts of the Indian Ocean (although it is working to plug that gap, including through the use of satellites and other new technologies).
Individually, Australia and partners such as the United States, India and France already have significant capabilities, including maritime patrol aircraft and uncrewed aerial vehicles, and facilities that, if combined in a collaborative network, would allow comprehensive maritime surveillance of much of the Indian Ocean. The level of maritime domain awareness that could be achieved through such a network would make any Chinese naval presence highly vulnerable in a conflict.
Such a collaborative network would require information sharing, as well as collaboration in use of facilities to support maritime air surveillance. Crucially, adequate surveillance coverage of the Indian Ocean by maritime patrol aircraft would depend on access to air staging points and facilities across the region.
The US and its allies already have arrangements to provide access and logistical support in each other’s facilities, including the US bases at Diego Garcia and in the Persian Gulf. But India, with its growing fleet of Boeing P-8I maritime patrol aircraft and staging points around the region, is an essential partner in building a comprehensive regional network.
Over the past several years, India has reached mutual logistics support agreements with the US and France. The signing of an Australia–India Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement in 2020 represented a big step in building a web of agreements, opening the possibility of mutual use of facilities throughout the region. But the Australia–India piece is yet to be put into practice.
India undertakes surveillance of much of the northern Indian Ocean with P-8Is based at INS Rajali, near Chennai, and INS Hansa in Goa, as well as airfields in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Indian P-8s are increasingly also using facilities of regional partners such as Seychelles, Mauritius and French Reunion in the western Indian Ocean. It is anticipated that Indian P-8s will soon also be able to operate from the new Indian-built airfield on Mauritius’s Agalega island near the northern end of the Mozambique Channel.
Australia has its own strengths in the eastern Indian Ocean. Since at least the 1980s, the Royal Australian Air Force has undertaken aerial surveillance of the country’s northwest approaches and the Malacca Strait/Bay of Bengal as part of Operation Gateway.
The RAAF’s use of P-8A maritime patrol aircraft now provides an opportunity for collaboration with India in sharing of facilities and logistics across the region. Both countries are becoming more confident working together following Exercise AUSINDEX 2019, which saw RAAF and Indian Navy P-8s cooperating in anti-submarine warfare exercises in the Bay of Bengal, as well as the Quad exercises off Guam earlier this year.
Australia has several facilities in the eastern Indian Ocean that could substantially extend the range of India’s operations. There is an existing offer by Australia for Indian P-8s to use Australian facilities at Darwin and potentially also the Learmonth and Curtin air bases in Western Australia. There has been discussion of potential Indian use of the airfield on Australia’s Cocos Island, and an agreement was reached in February for India to place a temporary satellite tracking station there. But until the runway on Cocos is strengthened and widened (currently scheduled for 2023), it won’t be suitable for P-8 operations.
If Indian Navy operations from Australian facilities were normalised, there might also be opportunities for the RAAF to extend the area of cooperation throughout the Bay of Bengal and further afield into the western Indian Ocean. In particular, the ability for the RAAF to stage out of Indian bases in Tamil Nadu and/or Goa would help extend Australia’s reach in the central and western Indian Ocean. US Navy P-8s have already conducted operations from these Indian bases, providing opportunities for combined cooperation among the three countries.
Port Blair in India’s Andaman Islands is another potential staging point. Foreign militaries in the past were rarely given approval to use those facilities, but in October 2020 a US Navy P-8 aircraft was permitted to refuel in Port Blair for the first time. While the facility could deliver additional operational flexibility for Australian P-8s, given Australia’s access to Butterworth in Malaysia, the use of facilities on the Indian mainland would be more advantageous.
All these facilities could be considered as part of a new network of air staging points and facilities around the Indian Ocean potentially available to Australia, India, the US and other partners. This would support a collaborative maritime surveillance system that, potentially, could help deter a damaging naval arms race in the region.
www.aspistrategist.org.au
The Indian Ocean is an increasingly contested strategic environment. A growing Chinese naval presence raises the prospect that Beijing may seek to challenge US naval dominance, potentially sparking a competitive naval arms race in the region. This would be of huge concern to Australia, forcing us to divert limited defence resources from other priority areas in the Indo-Pacific. Australia and its partners need to consider how to best leverage their strategic advantages to deter or limit China’s naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean.
One of the biggest advantages of Australia and its Indian Ocean partners, and one of China’s biggest vulnerabilities, is in maritime domain awareness. The ability of even large vessels to effectively disappear in the vastness of the Indian Ocean puts maritime domain awareness at a premium. If you can find a naval adversary and they can’t find your ships, the odds are definitely in your favour.
The Chinese navy already has significant disadvantages in the Indian Ocean, operating with limited logistical support far from home ports that are accessible only by transiting the narrow straits through Southeast Asia, where they can be easily located and tracked. China also lacks a comprehensive maritime picture of even significant parts of the Indian Ocean (although it is working to plug that gap, including through the use of satellites and other new technologies).
Individually, Australia and partners such as the United States, India and France already have significant capabilities, including maritime patrol aircraft and uncrewed aerial vehicles, and facilities that, if combined in a collaborative network, would allow comprehensive maritime surveillance of much of the Indian Ocean. The level of maritime domain awareness that could be achieved through such a network would make any Chinese naval presence highly vulnerable in a conflict.
Such a collaborative network would require information sharing, as well as collaboration in use of facilities to support maritime air surveillance. Crucially, adequate surveillance coverage of the Indian Ocean by maritime patrol aircraft would depend on access to air staging points and facilities across the region.
The US and its allies already have arrangements to provide access and logistical support in each other’s facilities, including the US bases at Diego Garcia and in the Persian Gulf. But India, with its growing fleet of Boeing P-8I maritime patrol aircraft and staging points around the region, is an essential partner in building a comprehensive regional network.
Over the past several years, India has reached mutual logistics support agreements with the US and France. The signing of an Australia–India Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement in 2020 represented a big step in building a web of agreements, opening the possibility of mutual use of facilities throughout the region. But the Australia–India piece is yet to be put into practice.
India undertakes surveillance of much of the northern Indian Ocean with P-8Is based at INS Rajali, near Chennai, and INS Hansa in Goa, as well as airfields in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Indian P-8s are increasingly also using facilities of regional partners such as Seychelles, Mauritius and French Reunion in the western Indian Ocean. It is anticipated that Indian P-8s will soon also be able to operate from the new Indian-built airfield on Mauritius’s Agalega island near the northern end of the Mozambique Channel.
Australia has its own strengths in the eastern Indian Ocean. Since at least the 1980s, the Royal Australian Air Force has undertaken aerial surveillance of the country’s northwest approaches and the Malacca Strait/Bay of Bengal as part of Operation Gateway.
The RAAF’s use of P-8A maritime patrol aircraft now provides an opportunity for collaboration with India in sharing of facilities and logistics across the region. Both countries are becoming more confident working together following Exercise AUSINDEX 2019, which saw RAAF and Indian Navy P-8s cooperating in anti-submarine warfare exercises in the Bay of Bengal, as well as the Quad exercises off Guam earlier this year.
Australia has several facilities in the eastern Indian Ocean that could substantially extend the range of India’s operations. There is an existing offer by Australia for Indian P-8s to use Australian facilities at Darwin and potentially also the Learmonth and Curtin air bases in Western Australia. There has been discussion of potential Indian use of the airfield on Australia’s Cocos Island, and an agreement was reached in February for India to place a temporary satellite tracking station there. But until the runway on Cocos is strengthened and widened (currently scheduled for 2023), it won’t be suitable for P-8 operations.
If Indian Navy operations from Australian facilities were normalised, there might also be opportunities for the RAAF to extend the area of cooperation throughout the Bay of Bengal and further afield into the western Indian Ocean. In particular, the ability for the RAAF to stage out of Indian bases in Tamil Nadu and/or Goa would help extend Australia’s reach in the central and western Indian Ocean. US Navy P-8s have already conducted operations from these Indian bases, providing opportunities for combined cooperation among the three countries.
Port Blair in India’s Andaman Islands is another potential staging point. Foreign militaries in the past were rarely given approval to use those facilities, but in October 2020 a US Navy P-8 aircraft was permitted to refuel in Port Blair for the first time. While the facility could deliver additional operational flexibility for Australian P-8s, given Australia’s access to Butterworth in Malaysia, the use of facilities on the Indian mainland would be more advantageous.
All these facilities could be considered as part of a new network of air staging points and facilities around the Indian Ocean potentially available to Australia, India, the US and other partners. This would support a collaborative maritime surveillance system that, potentially, could help deter a damaging naval arms race in the region.
Building a new maritime surveillance network across the Indian Ocean | The Strategist
The Indian Ocean is an increasingly contested strategic environment. A growing Chinese naval presence raises the prospect that Beijing may seek to challenge US naval dominance, potentially sparking a competitive naval arms race in the ...
QUAD has array of resources at its disposal to promote our common interests: Dr. Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell
Dr. Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell is the Editor in Chief of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs and Director of the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers. Prior to standing up the journal, he was the acting director and managing editor of Air University Press and the acting dean of the Air Force Research Institute. Earlier, he served as a human intelligence collector and Korean linguist for the US Army. He has taught at various institutions of higher learning in the United States and was an assistant professor in the Technology Integration Division at the Defense Language Institute–Foreign Language Center.Dr. Pramod Jaiswal, Strategic Affairs Editor at Khabarhub, spoke to Dr. Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell on American Grand Strategy, QUAD, Indo-Pacific Strategy, Future of Afghanistan after the US withdrawal, the US stand on Trans-Pacific Partnership and several others. Excerpts:
There is an ongoing debate on QUAD as to whether it’s a security alliance (often termed as the Asian NATO) or a group of like-minded partners advancing a common vision with a laid-out agenda in the Indo-Pacific region? In your view, what is QUAD and is it here to stay?
Obviously, at the moment, the QUAD is much more rhetoric than anything and there is a lot of talks both in front of the cameras and behind closed doors.
It’s somewhat difficult for those of us on the outside to know exactly what sorts of agreements have been made behind the scenes; however, aside from great many photo ops and enhanced joint military exercises and a little bit of diplomatic posturing, it doesn’t seem to be a whole lot of substance yet.
And little if anything has been done to institutionalize the QUAD, which if it’s ever going to grow beyond the dialogue is obviously necessary.
Without institutionalization, it may remain a little more than a dialogue, a talk without action; it serves little purpose particularly when faced with a determined and unrestrained adversary.
Rhetoric is not going to change the way China is acting in the region and that’s supposedly what QUAD is all about.
If we go back to the most recent meeting of the QUAD, where was China mentioned? Nowhere.
Obviously, it’s not a one-dimensional framework either, there are other things that need to be talked about, and some of those are trade and putting forward a unified diplomatic and perhaps military front against not just China but other adversaries and threats in the region, including international terrorism.
Unfortunately, at this point, it doesn’t seem to have grown beyond dialogue yet and obviously, there are meetings on the horizon. At the moment lots of talks, not much action.
What are the potentials and limitations of the QUAD based on the four dimensions of power — diplomacy, information, military, and economy, also known as DIME?
There are a lot of different potentials across all four dimensions of the DIME construct.
Diplomatically, the QUAD and the potential QUAD Plus that the member nations of these would-be bodies would be able to synthesize the many initiatives that are out there in the Indo-Pacific, including promoting a secure free, and unfettered Indo-Pacific.
This includes bringing together India’s ‘Act East Policy’, Australia’s ‘Pacific Step-up’, Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy.
All these initiatives are around there but we need to synthesize a little bit so that they are working in conjunction with one another instead of being at loggerheads or redundant with one another.
For the informational dimension, the QUAD has a fantastic array of resources at its disposal to promote our common interests in the region and to counter the deceitful disinformation and propaganda emanating from Beijing.
There needs to be a more concentrated effort among member states to tap into those resources to project a unified strategic messaging to counter Beijing’s efforts in this regard.
Militarily, the QUAD gets a lot of pushback from those who aren’t fans of the construct, but there is sound merit in creating a defense alliance akin to but not identical to NATO.
Obviously, they are completely different regions with quite a bit of different concerns. So, take the lessons learned from NATO and apply those to designing a new Indo-Pacific treaty organization—or whatever we end up calling it.
And as a first step, I argue we must be dust off the former Southeast Asian Treaty Organization we had back in the ‘50s through the ‘70s; it wasn’t perfect and it wasn’t aimed at what the QUAD countries are aiming at now, but some of the languages are in there.
If it had been genuine, we can reify that and repurpose it; then I think we have a workable document that is already out there which might take a little bit of tweaking to make that work.
One of the biggest challenges to the military integration of the QUAD, however, is India’s continued reliance on Soviet- and Russian-made weapon systems that lack interoperability with the Western systems we use in the other QUAD countries.
We have all these joint exercises and what not, but there is a disconnect somewhere between those Indian systems and what we are using in the West.
One of my colleagues the other day, in a presentation with one of the think tanks, pointed out that you can take an Australian officer and put them on a Japanese ship and everything will be fine. They will be able to integrate and communicate perfectly because there is an operation on similar systems.
You can’t do that by taking an Indian officer and putting them on the bridge of a Japanese or Australian or American ship.
And the same thing would happen if we were to swap pilots amongst the different aircraft. So that’s something that needs to be addressed really if we are going to fully integrate in terms of the military.
But that might be a little overblown too. We have fought world wars in the past with the allies who were operating in different systems, and we managed to pull it off. But I think in the day of high-tech everything becomes a little bit problematic.
There should be greater joint professional military education, some language training, and you know just training programs that bring together all of the members of the QUAD more profoundly. We need to incentivize programs where we can do new cross-training and cross-educating amongst the different QUAD countries.
Finally turning to the economic dimension, we find a host of different and sometimes competing economic programs by the four nations, and institutionalizing the QUAD would allow members to merge many of their programs, which would reduce redundancy, save money, and provide a better-targeted approach to regional challenges.
This would also demonstrate a resolve to offer a workable counter initiative to China’s BRI. Right now, we have got America pushing the Blue Dot Network, for example, Japan pushing their particular package, and India offering certain things to some of its neighbors, and Australia through the Pacific Step-up offering certain financial packages to some of the island nations.
If we were able to merge those into a QUAD Initiative, we can pull out our resources and probably will have a better return on investment.
And it would also provide means to move the supply chain out of China into partner countries and like-minded third-party nations and really make an economic impact that demonstrates to China if you don’t follow international norms and international law there’s going to be ramifications, and this will drive home the point because one thing that could cause regime change in China is the loss of affluence, and they are quite cognizant of that in Beijing.
If they saw the potential for the loss of affluence and possible rise of dissent within the country because of that loss that would maybe make some change in their behavior rather than you know all of the military muscle-flexing that goes on currently.
So, among the most concerning limitations to these efforts is the mercurial change in American foreign policy over the past several decades.
We jump from the Bush administration to the Obama administration to the Trump administration to the Biden administration; there is some consistency there. But there is also a lot of inconsistency there, and the QUAD is a perfect example.
We are in QUAD 2.O now for a reason. A lot of people want to point a finger at other members for why that happened, but when you get right down to it if Washington had put more effort into it and actually made that pivot to Asia that was talked about but never materialized then we wouldn’t have lost QUAD 1.O. it would have continued on through.
I’m a little bit hopeful that the one thing that hasn’t been thrown under the bus since the change in administration is that QUAD is worth pursuing.
But to be honest, it is difficult for our allies and partners to know where Washington will stand on important issues—such as the QUAD and all of these economic opportunities that we are presenting out there— three years down the road from any presidential elections.
As I will talk about later, with the current political polling and everything, we may be looking at another change in administration within the next three years; so, that’s got to be somewhat disconcerting for our allies and partners in the region.
When it comes to QUAD, how parallel are the US, Australia, Japan, and India’s aspirations and goals?
I would say more than the parallel, the aspirations and goals of different members are more complementary. Obviously, each of the four countries is highly introspective at times.
There are some social issues we are dealing with here, everyone is dealing with COVID-19, Japan’s got issues at home as well, India with Kashmir and Modi’s perceived handling of COVID, and in Australia similar types of things going on.
With these types of things going on, sometimes there are distractions from foreign policy. I can’t speak to this phenomenon in other Quad countries, but I can tell you in the US the bulk of our people are blissfully unaware of what foreign issues we are having, and it is certainly not a good thing.
However, if we are able to take care of the affairs in our own part of the Indo-Pacific in terms of foreign policy and military patrolling and tackling international terrorism and all of those things—either on our own or with the allies—so long as these complementary trajectories remain intact, it frees up other members to do the same in their subregion of the Indo-Pacific and assist others when needed.
For instance, India is not so interested in the South China Sea as Japan and the US are; however, New Delhi is more interested in issues related to the Indian Ocean, which remains a secondary and sometimes tertiary interest in Tokyo and Washington.
However, a strong India, able to project diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power throughout the Indian Ocean region, frees up US, Australian, and Japanese resources to focus on their sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific.
So, if we are all doing it in conjunction with another, or preferably, under some kind of institutionalization, we can do it thoughtfully instead of doing it out of habit—then it does create a situation that is favorable in promoting aspirations and goals that are common to us.
Likewise, with an economically vibrant Australia and India, we move from the threat of economic coercion by Beijing. These are important to the US and Japan as well. I think it is perfectly fine within any alliance or partnership for its members to have divergent interests and aspirations, as long as they are able to support and complement one another.
That’s essentially what a partnership is for. It’s not to make everybody a carbon copy of one another or for everybody to be playing the same role within the institution.
Rather for everybody to play the role assigned, to support one another in pursuing their common interest and goals. Hence, not necessarily parallel but certainly complementary, and something that I think we can build upon.
What hopes does the US have for the upcoming first in-person QUAD summit likely to be held this fall in Washington DC? What does it anticipate to achieve out of the meet?
To be honest, I might not be the best scholar to answer this. It’s very difficult to remain objective about this. The current administration has shown very little understanding of the region in my view.
Despite drafting a lot of its team members and veterans from the Obama administration, it’s important to remember that many of these key players on the team were the same ones who orchestrated the Obama administration’s failed pivot to Asia.
So, there is the question of whether this is the A team or naught. They talk a good game, but they fail to produce meaningful results.
The recently proposed Central Asian QUAD, for example, shows just how out of touch the Department of State seems to be in the region.
First of all, it’s supposedly based on economic grounds. These countries are so far down the list of US trade partners as to be insignificant.
There is no market for US goods, and these countries—aside from military goods and donated agricultural commodities.
Second, Afghanistan is about to become Talibanistan again—thanks to the absolute bungling of the situation thereby the current administration. Over and over again, each administration seems to feel the need to lean on Pakistan as if it’s some kind of reliable ally in the region.
Throughout the war in Afghanistan, and even before that, any information or intelligence we gave to Pakistan, the ISI turned right around and fed to the Taliban.
And it is so disconcerting to see the efforts that should be going into the building and maintaining and growing the original QUAD with India, Japan, and Australia going into some ill-conceived second QUAD with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan.
And it’s mind-boggling. It distracts from and draws resources away from the original QUAD—the members of which are tried and trusted allies and partners of the United States.
So, I really think it’s perhaps not too wise to expect a whole lot out of this QUAD summit. I think this is just going to be a lot of photo ops, handshaking, empty rhetoric at the end of the day, and it’s going to be overshadowed by the fall of the democratic regime in Afghanistan.
The fall is symbolic not just for us having poured 20-plus years into trying to make this into a vibrant democracy and increasing stability in the region but also for India, NATO countries, Australia, and Japan too, who have poured tons of resources into efforts there.
And now we are just pulling out and letting it all fall apart. What does it say about us as a guarantor of security and as a reliable ally?
I think it says horrible things, and I think those kinds of concerns would be viable topics for discussion at the QUAD summit. And if they are brought up, that would probably derail the entire summit, and it could conceivably derail the entire QUAD effort. So, I don’t have a whole lot of hope for anything productive coming out of the QUAD Summit.
What are the challenges in maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight in the region? What could be the viable options for dealing with maritime disputes in a rules-based order?
The most glaring obstacle is Chinese aircraft and naval vessels challenging the US and its allies and partners as they conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) and over-flight operations.
This dramatically raises the risk of conflict, and it’s only exacerbated by what’s going on in Taiwan as well. Second, the Quad countries are not on the same page on this subject, as witnessed by the US FONOP’s in waters India holds to be sovereign waters.
Here we are, trying to build a Quad and assure our partners that are on their side, and we insert US naval vessels into the water India holds to be theirs. It doesn’t send a very good signal to New Delhi that we are on the same page.
We can disagree about whether or not those are international waters or Indian waters, but actually taking the initiative to put our ships in there at a time we are trying to build a partnership doesn’t make a whole lot of sense.
It could completely disrupt the progress that has been made in forging close ties through the Quad.
Bringing in QUAD member’s coast guards more fully into the equation could be a benefit. These services are typically tasked with law-and-order responsibilities rather than war-fighting missions; as such, they are better suited to engage the violators of sovereign waters; hence, it is less likely to be escalating to a shooting match.
China understands this. which is why Beijing used the China Coast Guard and passed the new law in the past couple of years to give them greater authority.
It allows them to violate other nations’ sovereign space because China believes that such craft is less likely to be fired upon.
At the same time, using this law-and-order sort of vessel creates the illusion that China has some kind of sovereignty over the waters that they really don’t have.
So, if we are to engage coast guard to coast guard instead of having our big blue-water ships go up against Chinese ships, this would be beneficial at least from optics and also from the fact that we can call their bluff to some extent without having to worry about shooting war over such kinds of engagements.
The overflight issue is a little more complicated. We have the air defense zones in the Indo-Pacific being violated by the Chinese, it’s a little bit more difficult in such settings because we don’t have the air equivalent of the coast guard that can go up there and basically tell them to back off.
Do you think the USA is likely to rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal in the near future?
That window of opportunity, I think, is quickly closing. The current administration has struggled to find any traction on foreign policy.
To be honest, it diverts most of its attention toward domestic issues here in the United States, and in doing so, it has expended much of its limited political capital in DC.
Should the current polling continue on its current trajectory, the Democrats will lose its control over the Senate and possibly the House?
At which point, President Biden becomes a lame duck in not being capable of pursuing any of his agenda, including joining any of the trade blocs in the Indo-Pacific.
So, I just don’t think the intention is there, and it definitely doesn’t seem like an emergency—even though there was a lot of talk about it during the election.
It’s kind of a blessing and a curse—not joining, we give free rein and influence over these trading blocs in a manner that doesn’t benefit the QUAD at all, particularly since India has not joined RCEP either, shows that while some in the Quad partners are in, others are not.
It looks like we continue to pursue our hub-and-spoke model of diplomacy and military cooperation in the region.
Perhaps, in the current environment, it isn’t enough when it comes to these economic endeavors. So, I don’t think it’s going to happen, but I’d be happy to be proven wrong.
You know that Biden rallied American allies at the G7 meeting of wealthy democracies and treaty partners at NATO, before his sit-down with Putin. Was this sequencing a strategy or a symbolism to create a unified-front posture in order to bolster Biden’s position regarding Russia?
I think it was mostly symbolism; part of it was just poking his predecessor in the eye in saying look what a good friend I am to the Europeans. Trump had a very stormy relationship with the Europeans and brought up some important points. Under NATO, they are supposed to meet a certain percentage of the defense spending and a certain percentage of what NATO does in terms of troops, money, and efforts.
However, those things did not resonate well with the Europeans, who did not like to be called out about it. So, I think part of it was Biden going there to assuage the feelings of the Europeans and make them feel less worried about Trump.
A lot of it was symbolism both in terms of trying to one-up Trump on the world stage and also to assure long-time friends that we are going to continue to provide the support for our joint ventures.
But coming back to whether it was strategic or symbolism, what exactly did Biden get out of this meeting with Putin? Absolutely nothing. Did it stop the Russian pipeline or convince Germany to abandon it?
No. If anything, the Biden administration is all talk and no action—in some ways, the polar opposite of Teddy Roosevelt.
The Biden administration talks with a loud voice but carries no stick. Teddy Roosevelt’s famous saying was, “Speak softly,” engage in diplomacy, “but carry a big stick,” and so if we can’t get along, there will be ramifications.
The current administration is all rhetoric and diplomacy for the sake of diplomacy, which obviously provides some wonderful photo ops, but it doesn’t really lead to any action or benefits, really. So, to get back to your question, I didn’t see any strategy in it. It was just a photo opportunity.
As troops leave Afghanistan, can we take it as the US shifting military focus from counterinsurgency and conflicts in the Middle East to competing with powerful near-peer rivals, such as China?
I don’t think that the withdrawal takes any movement towards a great-power competition. First of all, Afghanistan is part of South Asia—or Central Asia, depending on how you want to draw the map.
US withdrawal from the country hands it over to the Taliban, with the Chinese already making overtures, so if we are looking at the withdrawal meaning something in terms of competition with China, then we are strengthening the Chinese hand.
If they are able to gain influence with the Taliban and they already have Pakistan in their back pocket, it won’t take a whole lot of resources to get the Taliban to follow suit.
The Taliban was created by Pakistan and shares a lot of common goals with the intelligence services in Pakistan.
So, I don’t see that the withdrawal will do us any good. If anything, it strengthens our adversary’s hand. As I mentioned, it’s a huge loss to the other QUAD and the NATO countries that invested in building up the democracy in Afghanistan and tried to work them into some kind of regional trade as well.
All of this is causing us to question the reliability of the United States as a guarantor of security, at the very time when we are trying to maintain partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and to show that we are more reliable than China.
If I’m Xi Jinping, I’m laughing my head off right now at how foolish the US looks in withdrawing from Afghanistan, at least in the way that we are withdrawing.
I think it would connote that we are open to refocus in other places in the Indo-Pacific, but if that’s the case I haven’t seen any of that.
And having brought up the Central Asian QUAD earlier, it does not seem that we are focusing anywhere. If anything, we are doubling down, but doing it from a weaker position.
By withdrawing our troops from the region, we lose a huge leverage block that we had in terms of trying to assure that Afghanistan stays democratic and the ability to make Pakistan behave a little bit better than it would have otherwise.
One of these two scenarios is going to play out when the Taliban takes control, either they are going to try to spread into other ‘stans’ like Tajikistan or Uzbekistan and other places like that—and they are already lashing out at some of the minorities in Afghanistan and have their roots in these other countries—or China gains influence and is able to temper the Taliban to some extent so that they are placated in maintaining their own borders and not spreading, but doing so at China’s behest.
So neither one of those scenarios plays out well for us or for the other QUAD countries. Indian, Japanese and Australian investments in the region and Afghanistan are going to suffer or be wiped out completely, while China is able to roll in and take over those operations or is at least able to deny the QUAD countries the benefit of keeping those. Thus, it is not a good situation at all.
How do you view the role and significance of middle powers esp. the South and Southeast Asian countries in the region? How can these countries jointly work with the US in different avenues in the region?
I think it’s terribly important, especially if we are going to accept the idea that we are no longer a superpower and moving toward a multipolar world or bifurcated environment where we have two competing great powers but they don’t have the same kind of leverage over their individual blocs that we had during the Cold War with the Soviet Union.
In either one of those situations, middle powers are given a lot more influence, because they have the ability to, kind of, maneuver amongst the different great powers and amongst themselves to pursue their own aspirations and their own goals.
I think, if you look at the way the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategic Framework were phrased, ASEAN played a significant role in recognizing the fact that working through the organization can sometimes be more beneficial than working with the individual countries that are a part of that organization.
If we work through ASEAN, then we are able to be a friend of a friend and kind of reap the benefits therefrom. And at the same time, work with an organization that is fairly democratic and has the ability to influence other countries that may not be democratic to move toward that.
I think the Indian Ocean Rim Association is another acronym out there with countries we can work with, perhaps with the exception of Iran.
I like to talk about all of these different organizations that are out there that are like a bucket full of Lego pieces. We have the master block that we build on—that we can plug into all of these international organizations and work with some of the middle powers and put those blocks into a shape that is conducive to the QUAD and our own aspirations and yet also provides a viable alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative and Maritime Silk Route and proves to be beneficial for everyone engaged in there. Obviously, it’s not just South and Southeast Asian countries that are interested.
The British are coming back into the area, we’ve got the French, several European countries, including Germany and the Netherlands that have published their own Indo-Pacific strategies in the past couple of years.
We just published an article by Stephen Nagy talking about Canada’s need for an Indo-Pacific strategy. And these are middle powers we can bring into the equation too, and we should probably foster some folks from the Indo-Pacific countries of South America and East Africa to get involved too as this then provides a very holistic approach to working middle powers into the QUAD Plus construct would be the perfect way for doing so.
But again, if we don’t institutionalize the QUAD itself with core four countries, then QUAD Plus is never going to come into existence either.
So we are back to where we started, if we don’t institutionalize the QUAD, then talking about the role and significance of middle powers and working these international organizations into what we are hoping to accomplish in the region is going to become much more problematic.
This is because all four QUAD countries will then pursue their own courses of action, which may lose their complementary trajectory if we are not working together.
What is America’s grand strategy, and what does the history of American grand strategy tell us about its current goals?
I am not entirely convinced that we are operating under any grand strategy at the moment. It seems like we are bent on accepting the narrative that we are no longer a superpower and not just one party either.
I’ve been bashing the current administration quite a bit throughout the interview, but the previous administration too gave some indications that maybe we are not a superpower anymore, maybe we are one among a couple of great powers.
And if we accept that and sit back on our laurels and accept a new world order that is dominated by Beijing because we are not joining the organizations that are shaping the new world order, then I don’t think that is much of a strategy so much as a surrender.
It is one thing to continue thinking of ourselves as a superpower or to accept our role as one of a couple of great powers and another thing to withdraw from the world order altogether or just to sit back and let Beijing get stronger and stronger without challenging them.
Naturally, this isn’t the first time in American history that we have witnessed such a malaise, as termed back in the Carter administration.
It’s not too late for us to reverse course and to go back to the history of American grand strategy, that kind of waxes and wanes with the different personalities in the White House.
It would necessitate a tremendous change of mindset in Washington in the form of a complete transformation of the current administration’s approach or seismic shift in the voting in 2022.
We haven’t talked about the Indo-Pacific in terms of grand strategy that much until the past couple of decades and this itself is somewhat a shift in American grand strategy thinking.
But have we completed the transformation to accepting the idea of Indo-Pacific? Yes, we changed Pacific Command’s name to Indo-Pacific Command, and we talk Indo-Pacific all the time.
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This wasn’t the term that came up with the Trump administration, Hillary Clinton was using it before, and I believe others before her; and so, it transcends the political parties.
But has the idea of the Indo side of the Indo-Pacific construct really taken hold? All you have to do is look at where we are focused in terms of what strategy we have out there, South China Sea, East China Sea, and Straits of Malacca—and then where is the Indian Ocean side of that?
So, are we engaged that much with Mauritius, have we started talking with Mauritius about what happens if a Labour Party government in the UK comes to power and hands Diego Garcia back to Mauritius, with all the assets we have stationed in Diego Garcia? Do we lose that?
Well, if we haven’t fostered a decent relationship with Mauritius or come to some kind of agreement with them, then we very well may. And then what happens?
Has China convinced them that they would be a better tenant there? They come in and basically take over whatever we left behind. That would be a huge blunder.
Do we have a good relationship with Seychelles, Comoros, or Madagascar?
We’ve got some decent relationships up in the northern part of the Indo-Pacific—with Qatar and Oman etc.—but as far as the current administration on whether it’s following any grand strategy, I am not sure I see it.
We do have some legacy pieces of diplomacy and military relationships that are still there, one we talked about earlier, with Pakistan for example, which I find to be ill-conceived.
Last week, Defense Secretary Austin was there, reassuring Pakistanis of the commitment to hosting a wonderful relationship with Pakistan, which again as I pointed out earlier is nothing but a lopsided relationship, with us relying on them and them taking advantage of us.
I think the concern is we don’t want to completely lose Pakistan to China, but I argue that it is pretty much a done deal already.
So, I do think we were influenced by the history of American grand strategy, but I am not sure they are following any strand of it in the current administration—and even if we are, then it’s pretty much behind the scenes, not out there for general consumption.
QUAD has array of resources at its disposal to promote our common interests: Dr. Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell
Dr. Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell is the Editor in Chief of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs and Director of the Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers. Prior to standing up the journal, he was the acting director and managing editor of Air University Press and the acting dean of the Air Force...
english.khabarhub.com
U.S. draft bill seeks possible inclusion of S. Korea in 'Five Eyes' intelligence sharing program
WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (Yonhap) -- A draft bill from the U.S. House of Representatives would require the U.S. administration to consider expanding its intelligence sharing program to include South Korea and three others if enacted, the bill showed Wednesday.The National Defense Authorization bill for fiscal year 2022, submitted by the subcommittee on intelligence and special operations, seeks to expand the so-called Five Eyes, the U.S.' intelligence sharing program that currently involves Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand.
"The committee directs the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services, the Senate Committee on Armed Services, and the congressional intelligence committees, not later than May 20, 2022, on current intelligence and resource sharing agreements between the United States and the countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom; as well as opportunities to expand intelligence sharing with South Korea, Japan, India, and Germany," it says.
The House Committee on Armed Services began reviewing the bill on the day, along with those submitted by other subcommittees, to create its final draft for FY22 National Defense Authorization Act.
The intelligence subcommittee bill, if included in the final draft and enacted, would require the U.S. government to study the benefits of expanding the Five Eyes arrangement, "including the nature of insights that each of these countries may be in a position to contribute."
In a related move, the bill also seeks to require the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, in consultation with the commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), to submit a report on the U.S.' intelligence collection capabilities and activities in the area of USFK operation.
South Korea and the U.S. are said to be closely cooperating on military intelligence under their more than seven-decades old alliance.
U.S. draft bill seeks possible inclusion of S. Korea in 'Five Eyes' intelligence sharing program | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (Yonhap) -- A draft bill from the U.S. House of Repr...
Japan's Suga to visit US for Quad summit with Australia, India: Media
TOKYO (REUTERS) - Japan's Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga will visit Washington later this month for a four-way meeting of leaders from the United States, Japan, Australia and India, Kyodo News reported on Wednesday (Sept 8).On the sidelines of the proposed meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, Mr Suga will also likely meet bilaterally with President Joe Biden, Kyodo said, citing "several" unnamed Japanese government sources.
Mr Suga became the first leader to hold a face-to-face White House summit with Mr Biden in April, underscoring Japan's central role in US efforts to face down an increasingly assertive China.
Mr Suga's term as leader of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) - and by default Japan's prime minister - ends on Sept 30. He has said he would not run in the next election for party leader on Sept 29.
Japan's Suga to visit US for Quad summit with Australia, India: Media
He will also likely meet bilaterally with US President Joe Biden on the sidelines. Read more at straitstimes.com.
Japan, Vietnam sign defense transfer deal amid China worries
Japan can now give defense equipment and technology to Vietnam under an agreement signed Saturday, as the two countries step up their military cooperation amid worries about China's growing military influence. Japan's Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi said the deal elevates their defense partnership...
Britain joins defence pact with Australia and US to curb China
‘We may be separated geographically but our interests and values are shared’ says Johnson
www.independent.co.uk
In related but more humorous news:
So... A Chinese Think Tank Has Beef With the U.S. Air Force
The organization, which has close ties with the People's Republic of China, accused the service of insulting their military through a call sign.
'Stab in the back': France blasts new US-UK-Australia security pact
The 'AUKUS' pact aimed at countering China's influence in the region will see Australia scrap its Attack Class Submarine Programme with France in favour of a deal with the UK.
www.euronews.com
'Quad' countries to agree on secure microchip supply chains
TOKYO, Sept 18 (Reuters) - Leaders of the United States, Japan, India and Australia will agree to take steps to build secure semiconductor supply chains when they meet in Washington next week, the Nikkei business daily said on Saturday, citing a draft of the joint statement.U.S. President Joe Biden will host a first in-person summit of leaders of the "Quad" countries, which have sought to boost co-operation to push back against China's growing assertiveness. read more
The draft says that in order to create robust supply chains, the four countries will ascertain their semiconductor supply capacities and identify vulnerability, the Nikkei said, without unveiling how it had obtained the document.
The statement also says the use of advanced technologies should be based on the rule of respecting human rights, the newspaper said on its web site.
The draft does not name China, but the move is aimed at preventing China's way of utilising technologies for maintaining an authoritarian regime from spreading to the rest of the world, the Nikkei said.
The United States and China are at odds over issues across the board, including trade and technology, while Biden said in April his country and Japan, a U.S. ally, will invest together in areas such as 5G and semiconductor supply chains. read more
No officials were immediately available for comment at the Japanese foreign ministry.
'Quad' countries to agree on secure microchip supply chains-media
Leaders of the United States, Japan, India and Australia will agree to take steps to build secure semiconductor supply chains when they meet in Washington next week, the Nikkei business daily said on Saturday, citing a draft of the joint statement.
Prime Minister’s Visit to USA for Quad Leaders’ Summit and UNGA High-level Segment
Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi would be participating, along with Prime Minister Scott Morrison of Australia, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga of Japan and President Joseph R. Biden of USA, in the Leaders’ Summit of the Quadrilateral Framework in Washington D.C, USA, on 24 September 2021. The Leaders will review progress made since their first virtual Summit on 12 March 2021 and discuss regional issues of shared interest.As part of their ongoing efforts to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, they will review the Quad Vaccine initiative which was announced in March this year. They will also exchange views on contemporary global issues such as critical and emerging technologies, connectivity and infrastructure, cyber security, maritime security, humanitarian assistance / disaster relief, climate change and education. The Summit would provide a valuable opportunity for dialogue and interactions among the Leaders, anchored in their shared vision of ensuring a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.
Prime Minister is scheduled to address the General Debate of the High-Level Segment of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 25 September 2021 in New York. The theme for this year’s General Debate is ‘Building Resilience through hope to recover from COVID-19, rebuild sustainably, respond to the needs of the planet, respect the rights of people, and revitalise the United Nations’.
New Delhi
September 14, 2021
Prime Minister’s Visit to USA for Quad Leaders’ Summit and UNGA High-level Segment
Prime Minister’s Visit to USA for Quad Leaders’ Summit and UNGA High-level Segment
Chilling sign in China-Japan clash
Tensions are rising between Japan and China, and a surprising move by Tokyo surrounding a disputed territory shows an alarming showdown could be looming.
www.news.com.au
China says Japan ‘preparing for war’ after first major military exercises in 30 years
A historic dispute between China and Japan has reignited, threatening the stability of the region amid fears of a showdown between the heavyweights.Tensions are rising between Japan and China, and a surprising move by Tokyo surrounding a disputed territory shows an alarming showdown could be looming.
At the centre of the bitter clash are a chain of uninhabited islets in the East China Sea, known as Senkaku Islands in Japan and Diaoyu Islands in China.
The dispute is a historic one, with China claiming the discovery of the region from the 14th century, while Japan was in control of it from 1895 until its surrender after World War II.
The islands have been contested for centuries. Picture: STR/AFP
The islands were administered by the US until 1972, when they were handed back to Japan, and the 1968 discovery of possible undersea oil reserves in the area sparked renewed interest at the time.
Tensions over the islands then boiled over yet again in 2012, leading to mass protests in China.
Japan’s shock move
But in a surprising new move, Japan is pushing back against increasingly aggressive moves by China, with the Japan Ground Self-Defence Force (JGSDF) kicking off nationwide exercises involving all units for the first time in almost three decades.
According to local Japanese media, it was in direct response to “China’s ramped-up regional assertiveness”, with Tokyo claiming Chinese Coast Guard vessels had entered Japanese territorial waters a staggering 88 times between January 1 and the end of August.
In response, Japan has been beefing up its Self-Defence Forces, with the addition of F-35 fighter jets, converting warships to aircraft carriers and building new destroyers, submarines and missiles.
It’s the first time Japan has conducted such exercises in almost 30 years, with the last occurring in 1993 after the Cold War ended.
A Chinese vessel sails near the disputed islands in August 2016. Picture: 11th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters via AP
‘Defending our territory’
Speaking to CNN this week, Japan’s Defence Minister Nobuo Kishi insisted his country was willing to defend its territory and draw a red line around the islands.
“Against Chinese action to Senkaku Islands and other parts of the East China Sea … we have to demonstrate that the government of Japan is resolutely defending our territory with the greater number of Japanese coast guard vessels than that of China,” he said.
“There is no territorial dispute relating to the Senkaku Islands between Japan and other countries.”
China hits back
But according to Beijing, the ownership of the islands is not in dispute.
“The Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands are an inherent part of China’s territory, and it is our inherent right to carry out patrols and law enforcement activities in these waters,” China’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement in 2020.
And in a report by Communist Party mouthpiece the Global Times this week, an anonymous Chinese military expert claimed that if Japan were to repeat the exercises again, “this could be a sign that Japan is preparing for war and the PLA should stay vigilant”.
Tensions between Beijing and Tokyo are rising. Picture: Reuters
The Global Times also claimed that Japan was “trying to display its hard power to serve the US Indo-Pacific strategy to contain China militarily”, but argued that “a military conflict with China will bring destructive consequences to the country”.
It added that “China is prepared for the worst-case scenario” in which “the US and its allies, including Japan, launch an all-out military intervention to interrupt China’s national reunification”.
Experts’ warning
Experts have long sounded warning bells over China’s actions in the East China Sea, with a leading expert raising the alarm over the islands in February.
Dr Toshi Yoshihara, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments think tank in Washington, said at the time that intervention in the region was necessary.
“Unless Japan promptly takes substantive countermeasures to push back, China will without question continue to pursue a strategy aimed at taking away sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture, “ he said, according to Japan Forward.
More Coverage
‘Immature and embarrassing’: China lashed‘Vulnerable’: Australia’s grim China warning“If Japan only wrings its hands, limiting its response to expressions of regret and concern, and does not take any substantive action to push back, then there is no doubt that China will move on to the next stage of its ‘salami-slicing’ game plan for seizing sovereignty.”
And in a grim sign of how dire the situation was becoming, US President Joe Biden vowed to stick to America’s security pact to defend Japan if the Senkaku Islands were attacked almost immediately after being sworn in at the start of the year.