The Quad (US, Japan, India, Australia Security Dialogue) : Updates and Discussions

India, France Move Towards An Alliance In The Indian Ocean But Will It Work?

By Ashwin Ahmad
7th January 2020

The competition for strategic space in the Indian Ocean could see China deploying an aircraft carrier with its complement of other vessels, in the coming years. That’s the assessment of the Indian Navy based on a close study of the pattern of China’s naval profile since 2008, when it first entered the Indian Ocean in force. Naval and maritime strategists believe that with the U.S.’s perceived retreat from the international arena, India will be increasingly called upon to shoulder the responsibility of countering or balancing China.

Reports last year suggest that Beijing has six to eight naval ships in the Indian Ocean – a figure that is more than likely to go up this year – along with submarines thereby ensuring a formidable footprint. It will enable Beijing to secure its sea lines of communication through which its energy supplies pass. It will also enhance Beijing’s profile on the strategic east African coast where there are large reserves of gold, coal, natural gas and uranium.

Delhi is accordingly stepping up its game in Africa but needs partners and France is seen as a potential candidate. But Paris has its own views on the Indian Ocean. Alice Guitton, Director-General for International Relations and Strategy, says her country’s vision for the Indian Ocean is not China-centric but is driven by concern over the “hardening of the military environment” in the region.

“We are not the first country to put forward a strategy and vision for the Indian Ocean. Many other countries have done so namely Japan, the United States and India,” she says, “but with the growing number of state actors in the region, there has been a hardening of the military environment which can lead to risks of miscalculation and misunderstanding. France wants to ensure that a rules-based order prevails.”

Guitton was speaking at a recent seminar at the ORF in the Capital.

As Guitton points out, France does have a vested interest in maintaining a presence in the Indian Ocean. “Geographically speaking, France’s strategic vision is the widest and most inclusive among all nations in the world as they stretch from the east of Africa to the Pacific Islands to Chile and of course up to the north,” she says.

According to French government figures, France has 9 million square km of exclusive economic zones in the Indo-Pacific area; 1.5 million citizens in five overseas territories, 200,000 expatriates, military forces permanently on station, and other vital economic interests in the region.

The problem though as Guitton admits is that Paris has been unable to substantially ‘interest its European partners’ to devote ships to patrol the area and hence Paris has been forced to look elsewhere. In 2018, President Macron called for the “creation of a new strategic alliance between France, India and Australia” to respond to challenges in the region.

Elaborating on Macron’s remarks, Guitton says that France and India have an ideal strategic partnership that will enable it to focus on common areas of concern. “Our defence relations have grown stronger and we are engaging with each other in strategic dialogue at many levels. Prime Minister Modi has also recently appointed chief of defence staff which I believe will further boost our defence relations.”

The French outreach is welcome and both countries have agreed on joint naval patrols beginning this year, with a French commitment to also monitor China’s activities in the Mozambique Channel. But both countries have different strategic objectives: France is primarily looking to safeguard its territory and citizens in the Indian Ocean region, while New Delhi is seeking to check China’s strategic inroads into its ocean backyard.

India, France Move Towards An Alliance In The Indian Ocean But Will It Work? – Strategic News Global
 
Military Logistics Agreements: Wind in the Sails for Indian Navy

November 26, 2019
By Cmde. Roby Thomas.
1578857732481.png


India has signed four military logistics support agreements with partner countries and is in the process of finalising the fifth with Russia. The issue came up for discussion during the recent visit of Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to Russia from November 05-07, 2019. When signed, the agreement with Russia, termed the Reciprocal Logistics Support Agreement (RLSA), will be an important milestone in bilateral relations. As the name signifies, the Agreement will facilitate reciprocal usage of logistics facilities by the militaries of both nations during visits to each other’s ports, bases and military installations.

This agreement is similar to the four other logistics agreements India has signed with partner countries, viz., Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the United States in August 2016, Implementing Arrangement Concerning Mutual Coordination, Logistics and Services Support with Singapore in June 2018, Agreement for the Provision of Reciprocal Logistics Support between the Armed Forces with France in March 2018, and, most recently, Agreement to Extend Logistical Support to each other’s navies with the Republic of Korea (ROK) in September 2019. Similar agreements are in the pipeline to be signed with Japan, United Kingdom and Australia.

Logistics agreements are administrative arrangements which help to facilitate the replenishment of fuel, rations, spares (where required), and berthing and maintenance for the other nations’ warships, military aircraft and troops during routine port calls, joint exercises and training carried out in each other’s countries as well as during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). These agreements simplify the book-keeping during such events and ensure that the forces of the visiting countries are benefited by using the host nation’s existing logistics network, which additionally reduces overall costs and saves on time.

These agreements feed into the Indian Navy’s requirement to maintain round-the-clock and round-the-year presence in its primary areas of interest, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and, going forward, the Indo-Pacific. The Indian Navy has been maintaining presence through its concept of mission-based deployments, wherein over a dozen major surface combatants are deployed across the length and breadth of the IOR. These deployments have contributed, among other things, to significantly enhance India’s maritime domain awareness(MDA) picture, facilitate tracking of vessels of interest and also to be the first responder in case of a developing HADR scenario.

Prior to these agreements, the mission-deployed Indian warships were constrained to periodically replenish their fuel and logistics supplies from either an Indian naval fleet tanker deployed in the area or by entering the nearest Indian or foreign port. With the signing of these agreements, Indian warships have been able to extend their ‘sea-legs’ on station by taking fuel from naval fleet tankers of partner countries deployed in the region or by entering their ports.

1578857158848.png


For instance, since the signing of LEMOA with the US in 2016, Indian warships deployed near the Gulf of Aden have been fueling from the US Navy tankers in the region and similarly have the flexibility to fuel from the US naval tankers worldwide or enter ports under their control when required. The versatility and reach of this arrangement was highlighted recently when INS Kiltan, an Indian Navy anti-submarine warfare corvette, conducted replenishment-at-sea (RAS) with US Merchant Marine vessel USNS Richard E. Byrd, a Clark-class dry cargo and ammunition ship, in the South China Sea. Also, having signed the logistics agreement with France in 2018, Indian warships and military aircraft can utilise the French base of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa or the French territory of Reunion Islands in the Indian Ocean for a quick ‘turn-around’ of its assets. A logistics agreement with Russia would give the Indian Navy access to the Arctic seaports, which are likely to be ice-free for longer periods in the future due to global warming.

In addition to extending the range of Indian warships, such agreements provide for added operational flexibility of the Indian Navy’s long-range maritime patrol(LRMP) aircraft. The Indian Navy has in its inventory the extremely potent Boeing P8I acquired in 2013. The aircraft carries a variety of state-of-the-art weapons and sensors that are capable of engaging both surface and subsurface targets. With an operational range of 1200 nm (with four hours on station) and speed of 789 kmph, the aircraft forms India’s maritime ‘first line of defence’. The logistics agreements with partner countries thus facilitate the landing and refueling of these aircraft at reciprocal bases, as agreed, thereby extending their operational envelope by a substantial degree.

The logistics agreements in certain ways also divests the need for a nation to invest in overseas bases or dual-use infrastructure. This is because the efficacy of overseas bases would have to be measured vis-à-vis installation, maintenance and manpower costs. Therefore, depending on a nation’s strategic interests in a region, the development of overseas bases has to be assessed against the relative flexibility that a logistics agreement provides for expanding a nation’s operational footprint and diversifying its international presence at the same time at a much lesser cost.

Signing of these agreements has been in consonance with India’s growing maritime engagement with navies of the Indo-Pacific. The Indian Navy presently carries out bilateral naval exercises with fourteen navies and coordinated patrols with four, most of which are in the Indo-Pacific. The recent India-Singapore-Thailand Joint Maritime Exercise, conducted at Port Blair on September 16, 2019, has further added to the Indian Navy’s repertoire of joint exercises conducted in the region. Such operational engagements, coupled with the signing of logistics agreements, indicate maturing of strategic trust between nations.

The timing of India’s aforementioned logistics agreements with respect to the then prevalent geo-strategic calculus is also interesting. US President Barack Obama had announced his ‘Re-balance to Asia’ strategy in 2011. In September-October 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping had proposed the ambitious ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ or ‘One Belt, One Road’, later renamed Belt and Road Initiative(BRI), which was preceded by more than a decade of aggressive maritime infrastructure development by China in most of the IOR littoral countries surrounding India. This included the development of islands in the South China Sea, constant forays of Chinese warships into the Indian Ocean and acquisition of a military base at Djibouti. China’s increasing economic and military heft thus required an effective counterbalance. As can be inferred, all the four logistics agreements India signed were after 2016, the first being LEMOA with the US.

India has managed to steer a straight course through the choppy geo-strategic environment by concluding military logistics agreements with the US, France, Singapore and South Korea, and is looking forward to signing a similar agreement with Russia shortly and more to follow. The endeavour has been to increase cooperation in the field of maritime security, joint exercise, HADR and interoperability between navies. Though Indian warships can always extend their operational reach by using their fleet tankers, the availability of logistics support facilities with other countries will further enhance the ability of the Indian Navy to maintain appropriate ‘presence’ for extended periods in its areas of interest in the wider Indo-Pacific.

The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Military Logistics Agreements: Wind in the Sails for Indian Navy | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
 
Thanjavur set to host South India’s first Sukhoi Squadron

By Anantha Krishnan M; January 04, 2020; 10:46 AM IST
View attachment 12668

Bengaluru: The Indian Air Force (IAF) is likely to make Air Force Station (AFS) Thanjavur in Tamil Nadu as the base for the just-resurrected 222 Squadron with Sukhoi-30 MKIs (Su-30 MKI).

This will be the second frontline fighter squadron of IAF to be based in South India, with the most potent platform capable of long reach and multi-role capabilities.

The AFS Sulur near Combatore is home to No 45 Squadron Flying Daggers, operating the Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas.

View attachment 12671

Military sources confirmed to Onmanorama that the new Sukhoi squadron will be formally inducted into the IAF during the second week of January. The move gives a major fillip to IAF’s missions in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

The IAF had announced the resurrection of the 222 Sqn - The Tigersharks – on January 1, 2020 with the Sukhois. The squadron was originally raised on September 15, 1969 with Su-7 and later with the MiG-27 ground attack aircraft.

In 2011, The Tigersharks were number-plated. (In IAF parlance, a squadron getting number-plated means it is frozen without any assets. It could be rechristened later with a different asset.)

Rich History

AFS Thanjavur was dedicated to the nation on May 27, 2013 with the primary aim of strengthening the air defence capabilities under Southern Air Command (SAC), headquartered in Thiruvananthapuram.

The station was mandated to protect various strategic and economic assets in the southern peninsula and sea lines of communication in the IOR.

View attachment 12670

The airbase was originally built by the by the Royal Air Force in 1940 and it boasts of a history operating the Hudson, Wellington 1C, Hurricane and Thunderbolt aircraft.

IAF sources say these erstwhile platforms were active in fighter operations, anti-shipping, anti-submarine patrol and transport operations.

View attachment 12669

Post dedication of AFS Thanjavur by then defence minister A K Antony in 2013, IAF’s plans to position a full-fledged Sukhoi squadron took a beating following the non-availability of the frontline strikers in desired numbers.

Strategic Boost

IAF gradually upgraded the air base to house a fighter squadron and the SAC monitored the progress on regular basis. The base was often activated during major IAF exercises.

View attachment 12672

In the last six years, the Sukhois operated on and off from AFS Thanjavur to keep the base active and during operations in the IOR.

The base is said to have played a key role when IAF test-fired the BrahMos air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) from Su-30 MKI on May 22, 2019. It was the successful second test-firing of the BrahMos ALCM from a Sukhoi. During the trial, the BrahMos achieved a direct hit on the target, thus proving its high accuracy hit-rate.

View attachment 12673

With the Sukhois now getting positioned at AFS Thanjavur along with BrahMos ACLM, the IAF gets more air power to strike from large stand-off ranges on any target at sea or on land with pinpoint accuracy by day or night and in all weather conditions.

(The writer is an independent aerospace and defence journalist, who blogs at Tarmak007 and tweets @writetake.)

Thanjavur set to host South India’s first Sukhoi Squadron

 
India's Su-30 Jets Are Now Armed With Nuclear BrahMos Cruise Missiles

What happens when the world’s most capable fourth generation fighter is armed with a uniquely destructive cruise missile?

by Zachary Keck
January 9, 2020
View attachment 12920

Key Point: The Brahmos-armed Su-30s is only one of the ways that India is strengthening its strategic deterrent.

India’s nuclear command has begun receiving fighter jets armed with the country’s most advanced, supersonic cruise missile.

According to media reports, India’s Strategic Forces Command (SFC) has begun receiving 42 Su-30MKI air dominance fighters modified to carry air-launched BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. This will significantly enhance the striking power of the air leg of India’s nuclear triad.

“Individually, the Su-30 and BrahMos are powerful weapons,” Russia and India Report noted. “But when the world’s most capable fourth generation fighter is armed with a uniquely destructive cruise missile, together they are a dramatic force multiplier.”

The Sukhoi Su-30 MKI is a twin-seater, highly maneuverable, fourth-generation multirole combat fighter aircraft built by Russia’s Sukhoi Design Bureau and licensed to India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. The plane will serve as the backbone of India’s Air Force through 2020 and beyond. Delhi has already acquired around 200 jets, and eventually plans to acquire 282 of them.

The Brahmos is jointly developed by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroeyenia. Capable of traveling at speeds of Mach 3.0, the Brahmos is the fastest cruise missile in the world. As Russia and India Report explained, “The BrahMos’ 3000 km per hour speed – literally faster than a bullet – means it hits the target with a huge amount of kinetic energy. In tests, the BrahMos has often cut warships in half and reduced ground targets to smithereens.”

The same report notes that the Su-30 will add to the Brahmos’ already deadly effect. “The Sukhoi’s blistering speed will add extra launch momentum to the missile, plus the aircraft’s ability to penetrate hardened air defences means there is a greater chance for the pilot to deliver the missile on to its designated targets.”

Pairing the Su-30 with the Brahmos missile will also drastically expand the striking power of the air leg of India’s nuclear triad. The Su-30 itself has a range of up to 1,800 kilometers while the Brahmos missile can strike targets nearly 300 kilometers away. Thus, the newly modified Su-30s will allow India’s nuclear aircraft to strike deep in the heart of China or Pakistan, Delhi’s two main adversaries.

The plan to modify the Su-30 to carry the Brahmos missiles was first hatched back in 2010 when the SFC submitted a proposal for two squadrons of Su-30s to be put under its command. Later, in 2012, India’s cabinet approved the project to modify 42 Su-30s to carry 216 Brahmos missiles. According to the Times of India, the integration project was mostly carried out by BrahMos Aerospace, with HAL also contributing crucial modifications.

The first of the new planes was handed over to the SFC in February and is believed to have undergone tests last month. Production on the second of the modified Su-30s has already begun. It is unclear when the SFC expects to receive the rest of the planes.

The Brahmos-armed Su-30s is only one of the ways that India is strengthening its strategic deterrent. It has also been busy testing the Agni-V, which is three-stage solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a range of about 5,000 km. When the Agni-V is inducted into service, India will have the ability to strike any part of China with nuclear weapons for the first time. Furthermore, India is currently testing ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), which will complete the nuclear triad.

India's Su-30 Jets Are Now Armed With Nuclear BrahMos Cruise Missiles
Republished 2015 article... That's a big problem with national interest... they keep republishing old articles... have to drag down to check...
 
  • Agree
Reactions: sid4587 and Gautam
So, these brahmos equipped 222 squadron sukhois are separate from the 42 su -30 mki for the SFC. it looks like ? How is it going with the SFC su-30 mki.. Any idea how many were delivered..?
Last update I got said the air frames are being strengthened. That was a long time back. The 42 for the SFC has probably been received already.
 
So, these brahmos equipped 222 squadron sukhois are separate from the 42 su -30 mki for the SFC. it looks like ? How is it going with the SFC su-30 mki.. Any idea how many were delivered..?

Last update I got said the air frames are being strengthened. That was a long time back. The 42 for the SFC has probably been received already.

There's nothing for the SFC. All MKIs, without a single exception, are for the IAF. They have earmarked some MKIs to DRDO for tech development, that's about it.

None of the MKIs will be used for nuke delivery, all are for conventional role only. The Brahmos itself is for conventional role only. The MKI in its current configuration is not suitable for nuke delivery anyway.

After MKI was turned down, the SFC asked for a squadron of Rafale, which also did not work out. So any nuke delivery will be done by the IAF-operated Rafales.

As for the MKIs modified to carry Brahmos, there will be 40 in all, and these 40 will be divided up into smaller numbers and sent to all MKI squadrons.
 
After MKI was turned down, the SFC asked for a squadron of Rafale, which also did not work out. So any nuke delivery will be done by the IAF-operated Rafales.
With the operational deterreance patrol of INS Arihant it was said that the nuclear triad was complete. Rafales are yet to come, so what do we use now of nuke delivery ? Mirage ? Jaguar ?
As for the MKIs modified to carry Brahmos, there will be 40 in all, and these 40 will be divided up into smaller numbers and sent to all MKI squadrons.
42 you mean ?

On a similar note, do we have any MKI squadrons stationed in A&N islands ?
 
There's nothing for the SFC. All MKIs, without a single exception, are for the IAF. They have earmarked some MKIs to DRDO for tech development, that's about it.

None of the MKIs will be used for nuke delivery, all are for conventional role only. The Brahmos itself is for conventional role only. The MKI in its current configuration is not suitable for nuke delivery anyway.

After MKI was turned down, the SFC asked for a squadron of Rafale, which also did not work out. So any nuke delivery will be done by the IAF-operated Rafales.

As for the MKIs modified to carry Brahmos, there will be 40 in all, and these 40 will be divided up into smaller numbers and sent to all MKI squadrons.
as far as i think brahmos on sukhoi should always be for warships, never ever for anything else.
 
as far as i think brahmos on sukhoi should always be for warships, never ever for anything else.

It's meant for land attack.
With the operational deterreance patrol of INS Arihant it was said that the nuclear triad was complete. Rafales are yet to come, so what do we use now of nuke delivery ? Mirage ? Jaguar ?

Mirage and Jaguar for now. Rafale much later.

42 you mean ?

All 42 are meant for the IAF.

On a similar note, do we have any MKI squadrons stationed in A&N islands ?

Only detachments. Dunno if IAF plans to permanently station an MKI squadron there, but there was talk of it. If that's going to happen, they will actually need to order a new squadron.
 
  • Like
Reactions: Gautam
Well what's this ?

Tatamdaw hopes China will not support armed groups that oppose the government

Friday, January 17, 2020

The Tatmadaw hopes Beijing will not support armed groups that oppose the government, said Tatmadaw spokesperson Brigadier-General Zaw Min Tun.

He was responding to questions about a meeting between China’s special envoy for Asian affairs and the statements issued by some ethnic armed groups ahead of the visit by President Xi Jinping.

“We will not accept on our land those who are against the government of our neighbouring country and we hope our neighbours have the same ideology,” said Zaw Min Tun.

The special envoy, Mr Sun Guoxiang, met the United Wa State Army, National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla), Kachin Independence Army and Arakan Army, ahead of Xi’s visit.

The government has been trying to persuade eight ethnic armed groups to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, and seven of them are based in areas on the border with China. They include the UWSA, NDAA and KIA, all of which issued separate statements welcoming Xi’s visit.

Frontier Myanmar Media Monitor
 
It's meant for land attack.

.
why do we need to go so deep with sukhoi and attack on land if it is non-nuclear, 2.5 ton weapon ? a scenario based example would shut me up.......i am considering we are not attacking anyone in asia apart from china and pakistan..
 
India-Australia ties have evolved. Build on them now

Jan 14 2020
By Dhruva Jaishankar

Deeper people-to-people and economic ties and shared strategic concerns are driving the cooperation
1579328028525.png


The scheduled visit to India by Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison was understandably postponed amid the catastrophic wildfires in his home country. But when it does take place, the next India-Australia summit will be an important occasion to consolidate relations between the two countries. It is fashionable to characterise the India-Australia relationship as one of perpetually unfulfilled promises. But, for perhaps the first time since 1947, India and Australia have an opportunity to develop a bilateral relationship free from major irritants.

Historically, India-Australia relations suffered from at least four deep structural impediments. The first was the logic of the Cold War, during which Australia decided to be among Britain and the United States’ closest allies, while India initially opted for non-alignment. This led to a number of disagreements and misunderstandings. As India achieved Independence, for example, Australian leaders advocated to their British counterparts that the strategically important Andaman and Nicobar Islands be retained by the empire.

More challenging was the Pakistan factor. Australian attempts at mediation between India and Pakistan in the 1940s and 1950s were rebuffed by New Delhi. Over time, Cold War imperatives meant that Canberra opted for closer relations with Pakistan — a member of the early Anglo-American alliances — rather than India. Repeated efforts by successive Australian high commissioners to India to alter the balance in New Delhi’s favour fell upon deaf ears in headquarters. Nevertheless, the two countries did work in these early years to establish diplomatic relations, cooperate in the Commonwealth, and engage in military officer exchanges.

The second complicating factor was India’s nuclear status outside the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This resulted in Australia taking a particularly strong stance against India’s 1998 nuclear tests, which came soon after French nuclear tests in the South Pacific. However, the 2008 waiver granted to India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the subsequent lifting by Australia of its uranium ban against NPT non-signatories, and a bilateral civil nuclear agreement in 2014-2015 largely addressed the matter.

Third, the relationship historically suffered from a lack of economic content. This has changed. India is today the fifth-largest export destination for Australia, and Australia is a top 20 trade partner for India. Yet, even as merchandise trade remains below potential, trade in services has grown significantly, whether in education, information and communication technologies, or tourism. A recent Australian government-commissioned India Economic Strategy identified several sectors as worthy of priority in pushing forward the bilateral economic relationship.

Fourth, the relationship was previously held back by an absence of people-to-people content. Although the backdrop to this was the “White Australia” policy, which discouraged immigration from Asia, differences played out in policy matters such as the contrasting approaches of the two countries to apartheid-era South Africa. In recent years, however, Indian immigrants have been among the largest contributors to Australia’s population growth. In addition to the massive influx of Indian students, Indian tourists are also visiting Australia in larger numbers.

The end of the Cold War, India’s nuclear mainstreaming, Australia’s demographic diversification, and a growth in economic ties have today altered the reality of the India-Australia relationship. These factors certainly still cast a shadow, but they have been sidelined by new drivers of cooperation. These include China’s assertiveness and economic profile, shared concerns about Southeast Asian cohesion, and anxieties about the United States’ strategic commitment to the Indo-Pacific.

On the strategic side, India-Australia relations have experienced a major upswing. This is evident in a growing number of military exercises involving all three services, as well as staff talks and military training initiatives. In 2019, the countries took part in large-scale anti-submarine warfare exercises in the Bay of Bengal.

The establishment of a bilateral 2+2 dialogue (involving senior foreign and defence ministry officials) and trilateral dialogues with Japan and Indonesia represent more heft and purpose in strategic coordination. The resuscitation in 2017 and elevation this year of the quadrilateral security dialogue (also involving the United States and Japan) has obviously captured the most attention. Although the two countries will continue to have different capabilities, priorities, and strategic circumstances — which are natural — attempts at improving maritime domain awareness, enhancing interoperability (such as through a mutual logistics support agreement), and identifying areas of defence technological cooperation represent probable next steps.

On the economic side, expectations must be kept modest even if the trajectory remains mostly positive. For Australia, a resource-rich and highly-developed economy, foreign affairs has often been equated with trade. Efforts at casting India as the “next China” are bound to disappoint, if for no other reason than the very different natures of the Chinese and Indian economies. Instead, areas of obvious convergence — as on energy and services — still have room for further growth.

It is important to recognise the considerable distance that India-Australia relations have had to come, and the efforts made by successive governments in both countries since 2000 to redress past difficulties. In this light, the next India-Australia summit promises to be an important milestone.

India-Australia ties have evolved. Build on them now | ORF
 
why do we need to go so deep with sukhoi and attack on land if it is non-nuclear, 2.5 ton weapon ? a scenario based example would shut me up.......i am considering we are not attacking anyone in asia apart from china and pakistan..

Basing Brahmos on aircraft is simply another means of attacking the targets that land based Brahmos do. Except that IAF can decide the targets they want to hit, so this is about equipping the IAF to perform their tasks more effectively.