First of all, we lost a lot of aircrafts in Kargil, because the enemies had sufficient supply of manpads, that caused IAF later to put a focus on improved countermeasures
Let me list out the exact reasons:
01 x Mig 27 - engine flame out.
01 x Mig 21 - shot down after IR countermeasures were overwhelmed with swarm of IR SAMs (6 to 8). That is possible with the best of counter measures.
01 x Mi 17 V1 - shot down because the aircraft was the only aircraft of the 4 aircraft flight that did not have an IR counter measure dispenser. It was taken at the last minute as the original helicopter meant to fly developed a technical snag and the flight was headed for air support for an attack being undertaken by IA troops. Flt Lt Muhilan and Sqn Ldr Pundir were the pilots, the latter, if I recall correctly, having just returned from a sortie in support of troops elsewhere, who volunteered to take this aircraft out, citing his experience and understanding the pressing need of air support by our attacking troops, understood the need for maximum platforms providing for maximum firepower. The other three Aircrafts in the flight, equipped with IR countermeasure dispensation system, were to provide a screen, and they did. Approximately 14 missiles were fired at this helicopter and the two screening it just as it was going in for the fateful pass (as narrated to me by the crew member of one of the surviving aircrafts in the original attack). The swarm was concentrated and the screening aircrafts banked to starboard and port immediately to avoid being hit (even counter measures can not protect you from a dense missile front) by passing missiles. That, unfortunately, left the aircraft behind, the one without the IR counter measure dispensation system, 'open' and the aircraft was struck by a missile.
Secondly, combat helicopters are suppose to fly low and use the terrain + countermeasures for their defence. Fighters in CAS roles fligh high with LGBs for example, which makes them more vulnerable to air defences, especially if they are slow.
Flying low is undertaken by both, please do not create a new concept here.
Also combat helicopters can be supported and operated at forward army bases and alongside armored vehicles, that's why combing MBTs with combat helicopters in supporting roles, is a common tactic today.
Incorrect. The dispersion of armour and air assets is undertaken in a conventional setting when fighting a conventional war. That is war fighting 101.
No forward army bases have MBTs when going in for an attack phase. They are in their respective staging areas.
Fixed wing aircrafts on the other side, operate on separate bases and with their own missions.
I like this one the most. Separate base is also needed for Helicopters. What makes you think otherwise? Are you aware of the Engineering effort needed to land a helicopter in a terrain like, for example, found in vicinity of Jaisalmer? Or for that matter on a snow bound peak? For the former, engineers need to clear the land and prepare a helipad, with watering of the same undertaken frequently (depending on sun and temperature) in order to prevent sand from choking the engines in increased frequency of operations. This, after the helipad is created using duckboards. Similarly, in snow bound area, the helipad is created by 'beating' the snow till it firms up.
The missions of any aircraft dedicated for CAS, will be defined by the Commander, won't it? Or are there separate orders and constraints fed into the MCC and FMS for limiting their employability?
Cold start for example would not need CAS, but interdiction strikes to clear the way ahead of the armored vehicles, to provide fast movement forward.
What is Close Air Support?
Close air support (CAS) is air action by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.
Now, to define the exact role of the Army Aviation, one needs to understand that:
1. Army Aviation is an element of the power projection by the Land Forces.
2 Army Aviation is primarily concerned with potentiating the quantum of force being applied by land forces to achieve defined objectives while adhering to the principles of maneuver, mass, surprise and economy of force to the best of factors as available under operational constraints.
3. Army Aviation permits flexibility and switching of forces for a Commander within his/her battle space.
4. Army Aviation provided both Combat Support (example fire support) and Combat Service Support (example MEDEVAC)
What is Interdiction Mission?
Air attacks on enemy logistics and reinforcements moving towards the front lines, undertaken in depth areas usually.
What is the objective of Cold Start?
Aim is to hold territory as quickly as possible in order to create a stronger negotiating position for the political leadership.
Now if the aim is to hold territory, we will be required to achieve breakthrough within a couple of hours at multiple points. This initial phase of operations will require a significant flexibility and maneuverability in the quantum of force being applied within a theater. For this phase, my dear sir, one requires CAS, as you need to overwhelm the enemy defences in a very short period of time. It is only once you have achieved a breakthrough and consolidated your position that you can afford to unleash your assets for Air interdiction missions.
This is precisely coinciding with the phase that shall see the IAF undertake the following missions (just to name a few):
1. SEAD - to be undertaken by the Ground Attack Aircrafts namely Mig 27/Mirage 2000s and Jaguars/Su-30s/Mig 29s
2. SEAD Escort - Su-30s/Mig 29s
3. DCAP - Defensive Counter Air Patrol - for defence against PAF on targets in own territory. Mig 21s/29s
4. Sweep missions - To eliminate as many enemy aircrafts as can Mig 21s/Su 30s/Mig 29s
5. BARCAP - To prevent Enemy aircraft from coming in Mig 29s/Mig 21s
6. Interception - Mig 21s/29s
I am avoiding Mirage 2000 here for obvious reasons right now.
Just as IAF would need to provide air superiority too, since without that Coldstart will be stopped very early.
This statement, read in consonance with what I posted just above, becomes rhetorical.
So armed trainers have no use in interdiction strikes, nor in high threat environments with credible air defences and enemy air force in the area. Even in Yemen, where the rebels have limited access to SAMs an manpads, we have seen plenty of losses, which shows the risk. Light attack aircrafts only makes sense in low risk environments like Afghanistan.
Incorrect. They make all the sense in provision of air support to troops in proximity of enemy troops.